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Sylvia Plath and “the bigger things” explores the ways in which Plath’s 
“confessionalism”—so often read as antithetical to T. S. Eliot’s notion of “impersonality”—
constituted not a break from modernism but rather a negotiation of its transatlantic legacy. In 
doing so, it works against a long-standing critical tradition that has defined Plath, who was living 
in England as she composed her Ariel poems, as nonetheless a distinctly American poet and one 
focused uniquely—and, as some have claimed, even pathologically—on the self. An examination 
of Plath’s published work, including interviews, statements of poetics, journal entries, and 
letters, in the context of a range of archival materials, such as college essays, teaching notes, and 
annotations she made to texts now housed in her personal library, reveals the extent to which 
engaging modernism—and, in particular, the tradition of the modernist epic—enabled her to 
position her explorations of “the personal” in relation to what she called “the bigger things.” As I 
argue, Plath’s engagements with modernism and the atrocities of World War II, which she 
indeed defined as “the bigger things,” prove not an escape to a literary “golden age,” to a New 
Critical conception of modernism institutionalized at midcentury, nor a regression to a childhood 
framed by the war. Instead, they constitute a direct engagement not only with the literary scene 
of early 1960s London—in which the critic Al Alvarez had issued a call for poets to address the 
“forces of disintegration” at work in both the horrors of the twentieth century and in the 






writing the majority of the poems that she would include in her Ariel manuscript, such atrocities 
of the past as the Holocaust (in the wake of the capture, trial, and execution of Adolf Eichmann) 
and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (with Cold War tensions at fever pitch on the brink 
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 Lothes 1 
 
Chapter 1 
“[A]n old-fashioned American”: Sylvia Plath, Modernism, and “The New Seriousness” 
In Edith Sitwell’s poem, “Green Song,” composed in response to World War II and 
collected for the first time in A Poet’s Notebook (1943), such a light returns to the world “[a]fter 
the long and portentous eclipse of the patient sun” (194)—during which humanity had “lost” 
“[a]ll names, sounds, faiths, delights, and duties” (196)—that “Time seemed but the beat of heart 
to heart, / And Death, the pain of earth turning to spring again” (The Canticle of the Rose 196). 
The underlining here is Plath’s. And next to this line in her copy of Sitwell’s The Canticle of the 
Rose: Poems 1917-1949 (1949), she has written the word “resurrection.” Indeed, Plath’s “Lady 
Lazarus,” that paean to resurrection, can be read as itself a resurrection, its much-cited ending, I 
would argue, reprising a moment toward the middle of Sitwell’s “Green Song”: 
 The naked Knight in the coat of mail 
 Shrieked like a bird that flies through the leaves— 
 The dark bird proud as the Prince of the Air— 
 “I am the world’s last love. . . . Beware—”  (194-5) 
In “Lady Lazarus,” this moment reemerges, pared down and strikingly stark but retaining the 
hallmarks of the original—the ominous flight and prophetic warning: 
Herr God, Herr Lucifer 
  Beware 
  Beware. 
 
  Out of the ash 







  And I eat men like air.  (Ariel 17) 
That Plath wrote “resurrection” rather than “rebirth” (her more characteristic way of 
describing modernist representations of renewal)1 in the margins of “Green Song,” and that the 
poem contains the seeds of “Lady Lazarus”—for example, Sitwell’s “dark bird proud as the 
Prince of the Air” modulating, in Plath’s rather more direct nomenclature, into “Herr Lucifer,” 
and the flight Plath repurposes for her own speaker rendered so faithfully as to preserve Sitwell’s 
original “air” / “beware” end rhyme—suggests that Plath had turned to the elder poet in that 
famously prolific fall of 1962. And with a look in the archives and in Plath’s journals, that Plath 
would turn to Edith Sitwell proves not as surprising as we might think. An admirer of Sitwell 
since her undergraduate days at Smith, Plath wrote two essays on the modernist, despite her 
absence from the curriculum. In one of these essays, a nearly thirty-page study of Sitwell’s full 
body of work, Plath describes herself, despite having studied that semester such canonical staples 
as Eliot, Yeats, and Auden, as particularly taken with Sitwell: “I do not know when I have been 
so struck and entranced by any poet” (“Edith Sitwell”). And on closer inspection we find 
evidence of this entrancement—echoes of The Canticle of the Rose, one of the collections Plath 
                                               
1 Sitwell’s envisioning of death as “the pain of earth turning to spring again” of course positions death within a cycle 
of rebirth, the emphasis placed on the cyclical nature of this process redoubled with the addition here of “again.” 
“Rebirth” would seem the more ready term to characterize this process, as the term was also the characteristic way 
of referring to modernist depictions of renewal within the academy, as Plath’s notes on and in modernist texts 
written while at Smith College, notes that are peppered with the term, demonstrate. For example, Plath’s copy of 
The Waste Land is literally framed by the interpretation of her mentor at Smith, Elizabeth Drew, its margins 
containing quotations from Drew’s book on Eliot, T. S. Eliot: The Design of His Poetry (1949). Part of this framing 
includes the phrase, “the possibility of rebirth” (Eliot, The Complete Poems). And in Plath’s teaching notes on 
Lawrence’s short story, “The Woman Who Rode Away,” she has written, “Sacrifice necessary for Rebirth” 
(“Teaching at Smith College”). Since “resurrection,” on the other hand, doesn’t carry with it a cyclical framework—
being, as it generally is, a one-time deal—its somewhat incongruous appearance in the margins here, especially 
considering the lack of any specific biblical references in “Green Song” to Jesus or Lazarus, suggests the possibility 
of Plath’s reading of the poem while she was in the process herself of exploring the theme of resurrection, as she 







had used to compose her essays3 —not only in “Lady Lazarus,” but throughout what are 
arguably Plath’s most important poems, the so-called “transcendence” poems. While we hear 
echoes of Sitwell in earlier Ariel poems,4 such as “Elm,” composed in April of 1962, as we will 
see, Sitwell’s full impact doesn’t begin to emerge until we reach “A Birthday Present,” the first 
“transcendence” poem, composed at the end of September, and a poem which, I would argue, 
kicks off (and not coincidentally) the remarkably prolific six-week period during which the 
majority of the Ariel poems were composed.5 This period is indeed punctuated by Sitwell-
inflected poems: beginning with “A Birthday Present,” the period peaks in terms of productivity 
with “Lady Lazarus,” after which her rate of composition drops off markedly, with the exception 
of a surge of activity on November 6th, when we get the last “transcendence” poem, “Getting 
There.” And at various points throughout this peaking and waning, we find other Sitwell-




                                               
3 I will be referring to the underlining and marginalia in Plath’s copy of The Canticle of the Rose throughout this 
dissertation. This copy is housed in the Plath archives in the Mortimer Rare Book Room at Smith College. For more 
information, see the listing for this volume in the Works Cited.  
4 What I will be referring to as the Ariel poems are those Plath included and arranged in her typescript for the 
volume, rather than the collection published in 1965 by Ted Hughes, which, as we will see, is a decidedly different 
collection. As Hughes writes in his introduction to The Collected Poems, “The Ariel eventually published in 1965 
was a somewhat different volume from the one she had planned. It incorporated most of the dozen or so poems she 
had gone on to write in 1963, though she herself, recognizing the different inspiration of these new pieces, regarded 
them as the beginnings of a third book” (15). Plath’s Ariel was later published as Ariel: The Restored Edition (2004), 
and it to this volume I’ll be referring throughout this dissertation.  
5 While Plath’s Ariel manuscript is comprised of forty poems composed over an almost three-year period (the 
earliest written poem she collected for the volume, “You’re,” written in January of 1960, and “Death & Co.,” the 
latest, composed November 14, 1962), the majority of them (about three-fourths: twenty-nine poems) were written 
within about six weeks (from the end of September of 1962, starting with “A Birthday Present,” to mid-November, 
ending with “Death & Co.”). As I will argue in Chapter 3, “A Birthday Present” “kicks off” this six-week burst 







The narrative that has generally surrounded the creation of the Ariel poems, particularly 
those composed during this famously prolific six-week period from the end of September 
through the beginning of November, has accounted for the seemingly sudden appearance of the 
distinctive Ariel voice or Ariel poetics in terms of the breakdown of Plath’s marriage to Ted 
Hughes. While this experience certainly played a critical role in the shift to the Ariel poems, it is 
not, I would argue, in and of itself sufficient to account for it. It is not, in other words, the full 
story. But since the journals Plath kept during this time were, according to Hughes, either lost or 
destroyed,6 it is a story that has remained persistently and—given the circumstances, and 
acknowledging the necessary partiality of “the story” of the genesis of any work of art, the 
degree to which any work of art can ever be fully “accounted for”—inescapably incomplete. A 
steady line of criticism has sought to recuperate for Ariel a fuller register and a broader range of 
contexts, including critics who have taken important strides in placing Plath back into her 
political and historical contexts, in particular.7 And yet, even with the considerably fuller story 
these critics have helped to generate, what I would argue are some of the key distinguishing 
                                               
6 Plath had been an avid journal writer since she was young. Hughes indicates in his foreword to the abridged edition 
of Plath’s Journals that there were originally two journals that spanned the period “from late ’59 to within three days 
of her death”; he “destroyed” the later journal to protect his children and “[t]he other disappeared” (xiii).  
7 Building upon the foundational work begun in the ‘80s to place Plath in historical and political contexts—work 
such as Stan Smith’s chapter on Plath, “‘Waist-Deep in History,’” in Inviolable Voice: History and Twentieth-
Century Poetry (1982) and Paul Breslin’s The Psycho-Political Muse: American Poetry Since the Fifties (1987)—
more recent scholars, such as Robin Peel and Deborah Nelson, have placed Plath within a specifically Cold War 
context. Throughout this dissertation, I will be drawing from Peel’s groundbreaking Writing Back: Sylvia Plath and 
Cold War Politics (2002), which examines, for instance, the role Cold War news reporting played in Plath’s writing. 
Nelson’s Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America (2002) explores the ways in which the “private” was becoming 
increasingly the subject of public debate in the postwar period. My project, in its emphasis, as we will see, on 
Plath’s placement of personal experience into relation with “the bigger things,” departs from Nelson, who, for her 
purposes, focuses on the “private”—and the ways in which the private had become public—in Plath’s work.  
 For recent studies placing Plath into new (and especially illuminating) wider contexts, see Tracy Brain’s 
chapter on “Plath’s Environmentalism” in The Other Sylvia Plath (2001); Laura Frost’s chapter on Plath and the 
psychodynamics of fascism in Sex Drives: Fantasies of Fascism in Literary Modernism (2002); the collection of 
essays edited by Anita Helle representing new directions in Plath scholarship coming out of the archives, The 
Unraveling Archive: Essays on Sylvia Plath (2007); the essays on Plath’s engagements with the visual arts in Eye 
Rhymes: Sylvia Plath’s Art of the Visual (2007); and Janet Badia’s examination of the pathologizing of Plath’s 







features of Plath’s Ariel poetics—her placement of “personal” experience, for example, into 
conversation with what she calls “the bigger things,” and her framing of this conversation within 
a cycle of death and rebirth, rebirth and renewal becoming, in Ariel, both subject matter and 
structural principle—still remain largely unaccounted for, largely, that is, un-contextualized. 
However, if we trace Plath’s “resurrection” from the margins of Sitwell’s “Green Song” to 
Ariel’s “Lady Lazarus,” drawing from still largely untapped archival materials such as Plath’s 
annotations of texts in her personal library, her college essays, and her notes from her year of 
teaching at Smith, we discover a Plath who not only engages Edith Sitwell—whose presence in 
Ariel, as I will argue, played a critical role in helping to shape some of its most distinctive 
qualities—but a Plath who, indeed by way of her intertextual engagements with Sitwell, in turn 
successfully negotiates the canonical modernist tradition of the 1950s, centered as it was upon T. 
S. Eliot. Indeed, what Plath’s engagements with Sitwell allow us to uncover are the ways in 
which she configured her “confessionalism” as a negotiation of—rather than a break from (as it 
has often been perceived)—Eliot’s line of modernism, one that proves no throwback, no 
nostalgic escape to the past, but instead a direct engagement with her contemporary literary 
scene, the literary scene, that is, of early 1960s London. Situated within the particular context in 
which she composed her Ariel poems, we find Plath, often considered a distinctly American 
poet, engaging in a transatlantic conversation that, in turning back to modernism, sought a means 
of addressing the psychological and political realities of a Cold War moment in which the 
atrocities of World War II—those Plath addresses in a good number of her Ariel poems—were 










Plath began composing “Lady Lazarus” on October 23rd and completed it on the 29th, the 
day before (or perhaps even the same day)8 she recorded an interview with Peter Orr for the 
BBC, which aired on the 30th. This interview, I will argue, serves as a statement of Ariel poetics 
and, as such—and given its close proximity to the composition of “Lady Lazarus” and the 
transcendence poems more generally—it can help us begin to unpack the nature and significance 
of Sitwell’s rather surprising presence in Ariel.9 Very soon into the interview, Orr asks Plath 
what subject matter and themes she finds herself most drawn to, and her answer, as we might 
expect, is a “confessional” one:  
Perhaps this is an American thing: I’ve been very excited by what I feel is the new 
breakthrough that came with, say, Robert Lowell’s Life Studies, this intense 
breakthrough into very serious, very personal, emotional experience which I feel 
has been partly taboo. Robert Lowell’s poems about his experience in a mental 
hospital, for example, interested me very much. These peculiar, private and taboo 
subjects, I feel, have been explored in recent American poetry. (Orr 167-8)  
                                               
8 In Writing Back: Sylvia Plath and Cold War Politics (2002), Robin Peel notes, “According to her diary [Plath] 
travelled up to London on Monday 29 October” and had a meeting with the BBC producer; “The recording may 
have been made then, or the following day when the broadcast took place. Astonishingly, Plath read poems that she 
had only just finished” (197). 
9 Sitwell is certainly not an influence regularly associated with Plath. To my knowledge, only Sandra Gilbert, in her 
chapter on Plath in No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth-Century (1996), and Deryn 
Rees-Jones, in Consorting with Angels: Essays on Modern Women Poets (2006), have addressed the Sitwell-Plath 
connection in any depth. While I will draw from their groundbreaking work on this connection—both Gilbert and 
Rees-Jones, for example, detect and explore the presence of Sitwell’s World War II poem, “Lullaby,” in Plath’s 
“Daddy,” a presence I will take up in Chapter 3—my project departs from theirs with its emphasis on Plath’s 
engagements with “the bigger things,” an engagement for which, I argue, Sitwell serves as a model, helping Plath to 
formulate a poetics that not only engages “the bigger things,” but frames them within a cycle of death and rebirth, 
and in doing so, allows her to negotiate an Eliot-focused line of modernism. While Gilbert, for example, focuses on 
the Sitwell-Plath connection, for her purposes, this connection is not placed within the wider (but specific) context 
of modernism at midcentury. And while Rees-Jones invaluably places Plath within the context of British 
modernism, her study focuses on the performative nature of modern women poets’ self-fashioning. And certainly, to 







The double emphasis Plath places here on the “Americanness” of the “new breakthrough” into 
“partly taboo” experience—Lowell’s version of which would increasingly be classified as 
“confessional” as M. L. Rosenthal’s coining of the term in his 1959 review of Life Studies began 
to gain traction—prompts Orr to ask Plath, as an American living in England, to situate herself in 
terms of the transatlantic divide: “as a poet, and as a person who straddles the Atlantic . . .  on 
which side does your weight fall?” (168). To this question, then, of whether she considers 
herself, essentially, more American or more British, this request to declare her loyalties, so to 
speak, Plath begins to point us toward Sitwell’s role in her Ariel poetics. Her response, at first, 
would seem a resounding “American.” After a quick interjection (“That’s a rather awkward 
position, but I’ll accept it!”), she tells Orr, “I think that as far as language goes I’m an American, 
I’m afraid, my accent is American, my way of talk is an American way of talk, I’m an old-
fashioned American” (168). However, as she continues, she shifts her footing, her Americanness 
(a particular “old-fashioned” kind of Americanness) serving as the very reason she in fact no 
longer lives in America: “That’s probably one of the reasons why I’m in England now and why 
I’ll always stay in England. I’m about fifty years behind as far as my preferences go and I must 
say that the poets who excite me most are the Americans. There are very few contemporary 
English poets that I admire” (168). While Orr follows up with the question of whether “this 
mean[s] [she] think[s] contemporary English poetry is behind the times compared with 
American,” it is Plath’s own “preferences” here—for living as an American in England, for 
American poets who “excite” her over “contemporary English” ones who don’t—that she 
positions as “about fifty years behind.” And if we follow Plath’s temporal logic, “fifty years 








And in her response to this question of whether she considers English poets to be “behind  
the times,” Plath refers us to the contemporary context as well as the critical framework that can 
help us gain a fuller understanding of the ways in which she configures her “confessionalism”—
its “breakthrough” so often conceived as a break from Eliot’s line of modernism, as we will 
see—indeed in relation to modernism, and what the implications might be for doing so:  
No, I think it is in a bit of a strait-jacket, if I may say so. There was an essay by 
Alvarez, the British critic: his arguments about the dangers of gentility in England 
are very pertinent, very true. I must say that I am not very genteel and I feel that 
gentility has a stranglehold: the neatness, the wonderful tidiness, which is so 
evident everywhere in England is perhaps more dangerous than it would appear 
on the surface. (168) 
The essay Plath refers to here is A. Alvarez’s introduction to his anthology The New Poetry 
(1962), published in April about six months before she gave her interview.10 In the essay, 
Alvarez traces what he perceives to be the malaise of the contemporary London literary scene 
back to English poetry’s reactionary response to American modernism, specifically the 
modernism of Eliot and Pound.11 By the start of the thirties, it had seemed (in particular to F. R. 
Leavis) that the two Americans had “brought about a significant reorientation of literature” in 
England (17). However, once “Eliot removed himself into another, remote sphere of influence by 
proclaiming himself ‘Anglo-Catholic in religion, royalist in politics, and classicist in literature,’” 
Alvarez contends, “the whole movement of English verse has been to correct the balance 
                                               
10 Alvarez published two earlier versions of this introductory essay, a very brief version, under the title “Beyond the 
Gentility Principle” (the title he would retain for his introduction to The New Poetry) in the Observer on February 
19, 1961 and a fuller version, entitled “English Poetry Today,” in Commentary in September of 1961. I’ll be 
referring to (and distinguishing between) all three versions in my discussions. (The Commentary version is virtually 
identical to the anthology introduction, Alvarez having performed, as he puts it, only “slight alterations”) (The New 
Poetry 16).  







experimentation had so unpredictably disturbed” (17). These “corrections” took the form of what 
Alvarez calls “three negative feed-backs,” one of which punctuated each decade from the thirties 
onward, all three driven by what Alvarez calls in the title of his essay, “the gentility principle”: 
All three negative feed-backs work, in their different ways, to preserve the idea 
that life in England goes on much as it always has, give or take a few minor 
changes in the class system. The upper-middle class, or Tory, ideal . . . may have 
given way to the predominantly lower-middle class, or Labour, ideal of the 
Movement . . . but the concept of gentility still reigns supreme. And gentility is a 
belief that life is always more or less orderly, people always more or less polite, 
their emotions and habits more or less decent and more or less controllable; that 
God, in short, is more or less good. (21) 
Such a mindset, for Alvarez, was proving more and more untenable in the face of the twentieth 
century’s steady accumulation of “modern horrors” (23). “That the English have succeeded so 
long” in preserving this sense of gentility—and that they had, by and large, managed to ward off 
Eliot’s and Pound’s experiments—“owes a good deal to the fact that England is an island; it is, 
literally, insulated from the rest of the world” (21). What Alvarez was calling for in The New 
Poetry, then, was a poetry capable of registering “that all our lives, even those of the most 
genteel and enislanded, are influenced profoundly by forces which have nothing to do with 
gentility, decency, or politeness” (22). These forces are the specifically modern “forces of 
disintegration which destroy the old standards of civilization,” forces whose “public faces are 








  So by identifying herself as “not very genteel” and, later in her interview with Orr, 
insisting that “personal experience [ . . . ] should be relevant, and relevant to the larger things, 
the bigger things such as Hiroshima and Dachau and so on,” Plath positions her poetry in direct 
response to Alvarez’s call, her linking of the personal and the “bigger things,” as I will argue, a 
reconfiguration of Alvarez’s, his insistence on the “[profound]” “[influence]” on “all our lives” 
of the “forces of disintegration” (Orr 170). Plath had long demonstrated an interest in the 
connections between personal experience and the political and historical, an interest that 
certainly long preceded her encounter with Alvarez’s essay; however, what the essay offered her, 
during that fall of 1962, was a critical framework to help “legitimize” the new poetry she was 
writing, to help shore her up in the face of a steady stream of rejection letters and a crumbling 
marriage.12 Indeed, it was the failure of her marriage, according to Robin Peel in Writing Back: 
Sylvia Plath and Cold War Politics (2002), that enabled the “reexpress[ion]” of a “dialogue”—
one that had been apparent in her writing “[t]hroughout her life”—between her “artistic 
ambitions” and “her desire to engage with the wider world” (41).  
Prior to meeting Hughes, as Peel demonstrates both in Writing Back and in his later 
essay, “The Political Education of Sylvia Plath” (2007), Plath had [long] shown a pointed 
interest in politics and global affairs. In 1950, for example, while still in high school, she co-
wrote an article published in the Christian Science Monitor entitled “Youth’s Plea for World 
Peace,” in which, as Peel describes it, she “quietly questions the logic of the president’s direction 
to the Atomic Energy Commission that it continue its work on the hydrogen bomb,” the article 
concluding that “[f]or those of us who deplore the systematic slaughter legalized by war, the 
                                               
12 Alvarez describes Plath during this period as “busy with her children and her bee-keeping in Devon, busy flat-
hunting in London, busy seeing The Bell Jar through the press, busy typing and sending off her poems to largely 
unreceptive editors (just before she died she sent a sheaf of her best poems, most them now classics, to one of the 







hydrogen bomb alone is not the answer” (“The Political Education” 45-6). And such political 
awareness and concern was in turn broadened and deepened by her studies at Smith and her two 
Fulbright years at Newnham College, Cambridge. It was at Smith where Plath came into “contact 
with a range of political ideas, all meticulously recorded and articulated,” reading, for example, 
Jose Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses (1929) and Erich Fromm’s Escape from 
Freedom (1941)—which examines the rise of fascism as a “specific problem of freedom and [a] 
general problem of the interaction of economic, psychological, and ideological factors in the 
social process” (Fromm 98)—both of which she retained in her personal library, now housed in 
the archives at Smith (“The Political Education” 55). And it was at Smith, too, where Plath 
began exploring the possibilities of bringing the world of these political ideas into her poetry. 
“By 1955,” the year she would graduate, Peel writes, “Sylvia Plath was consciously seeking to 
enlarge her range of poetry by experimenting with verse that addressed wider political issues,” 
verse such as “Temper of Time,” which features Kilroy of World War II graffiti fame, and which 
she would publish in The Nation (55).  
And by the time she was well-settled into her studies at Cambridge and on the verge of 
meeting Hughes at a party there, Plath had progressed from an experimentation with wider 
political issues to a determination to make such a wider world part of her poetic practice. In a 
March 1956 letter to her mother, written just a few months before meeting Hughes, Plath 
describes poems she had been working on that she felt demonstrated “encouraging growth”: 
“‘Channel Crossing’ is one of the first I’ve written in a ‘new line’; turning away from the small, 
coy love lyric (I am most scornful of the small preciousness of much of my past work) and 
bringing the larger, social world of other people into my poems” (Letters Home 222). Up to this 







explore in poetry what she had already begun to explore in prose, in earlier “stories [she had 
written] about social problems,” problems that included, as she notes, [the] “Jewish question,” 
and that were therefore not only socially but politically and historically inflected (222).13 “Now,” 
she determined, “I am making a shift,” and this shift entailed an embedding of personal 
experience within the larger world: “The world and the problems of an individual in this 
particular civilization are going to be forged into my discipline” (222). And by the time Plath 
indeed meets and marries Hughes, as Peel sums up, an “[e]xamination [of] world and ‘self’ at the 
intersection of global issues, would enrich her understanding, and was not to be at the expense of 
her belief in the value, for her development as a writer, of scrupulously examining her own 
subjectivity” (“The Political Education” 57).  
However, it is Plath’s marriage to Hughes, Peel argues, that effectively puts this 
development, “this progress toward political and artistic convergence,” on hold (57). While 
Plath’s interest in politics and history continued relatively unabated after she married Hughes, 
her explorations of these interests in her poetry stalled as Hughes’s own poetic process began to 
solidify and garner praise,14 his first book, The Hawk in the Rain (1957), winning the Harper’s 
first publication prize judged by Auden, Stephen Spender, and Marianne Moore. A good part of 
what this process entailed for Hughes was not, as it was for Plath, an exploration of “social 
                                               
13 I am indebted to Peel here for drawing this letter to my attention (“The Political Education” 57).  
14 While Peel argues that “the meeting with Ted Hughes in 1956 arrested [Plath’s] progress toward political and 
artistic convergence” (“The Political Education” 57), he is careful to point out that to suggest part of Hughes’s 
influence on Plath’s poetry included a shifting away from the political is not to strip Plath of artistic agency: “It 
would be wrong to conclude that the reappearance of this convergence in the autumn of 1962 poems indicates that 
everything Plath wrote in between is constrained by Hughes. Her work benefits from his advice, encouragement, and 
commitment in ways that are obvious, his long written list of suggested subjects being one of the most striking, but 
her treatment of these subjects is her own. The reporting of Cold War events foregrounded the politics that Hughes’ 
view of art may have caused Plath to otherwise suppress” (64). And while having met Hughes may have “applied a 
break to any further move Plath may have been inclined to make toward activism and overt political involvement,” 
“[t]his is not to say that Plath meekly allowed herself to be dominated by Hughes, but rather that she was readily 
persuaded by the strength and certainty of his conviction. Hughes, with his interest in magic, astrology, and 







problems,” but rather more a shutting out of such problems; as Hughes describes it (and Peel 
paraphrases it) in a letter to Lucas Myers,15 with whom he worked on Saint Botolph’s Review at 
Cambridge,16 “the only way to progress as a writer is to become a political outsider, live 
anonymously, and become introspective” (57-8).17 Plath’s and Hughes’s move, then, from 
London to Devon in August of 1961 served within this context, Peel argues, as a move “away 
from people actively engaged in politics, away from people actively engaged in the arts, away 
from people engaged in academic life” to a space in the countryside populated with the aging 
relics of imperialism: “the neighbors in Devon with whom [Plath] came into contract were often 
people who had retired from colonial service in India, Nigeria, or some other part of the former 
British Empire” (59). With their move to Devon, in other words, “the retreat from the world was 
completed” (58).18  
After some traveling in the States and a teaching stint at Smith, Plath’s permanent return 
to England at the end of 1959 had helped provide the conditions that Peel argues were crucial for 
the next phase of her political education. Enabling both the critical and geographical distance 
from the U.S. necessary for “a reassessment, revival, and restoration of a dormant political 
engagement,” the move had prompted her to “[become] more gripped by the reporting of Cold 
War events” as she moved “closer geographically to the political fault lines along which the two 
ideologies were grinding like tectonic plates” (55). However, it is not until Plath and Hughes 
                                               
15 Peel was not given permission to quote from this letter. 
16 It was at the launch party for Saint Botolph’s Review that Sylvia Plath so famously met Ted Hughes.  
17 This view seems to have been, at least in part, inspired by Robert Graves, a great favorite of Plath’s and Hughes’s. 
As Peel writes, “poets, such as Robert Graves, believed that the Machiavellian and internecine world of the daily 
exercise of power is a distraction to the making of poems. Those national agencies of power and enemies of 
creativity, the organizations, institutions, and bureaucracies of public life, are avoided by an poets wishing to 
preserve their artistic integrity” (Writing Back 15-6). 
18 While the move to Devon amounted to a retreat from “active[e] engage[ment]” in “politics,” “the arts,” and 
“academic life,” we might point out, however, that it did not entail a retreat—given their neighbors’ backgrounds—







separate, according to Peel, that Plath’s poetry would benefit from this revived and reassessed 
political engagement, her interest in the relation between personal experience and what she calls 
in her interview with Orr “the bigger things” reigniting, I would emphasize, with an intensity that 
speaks to the pressure not only of her personal crisis but of mounting Cold War fears that would 
peak with the Cuban Missile Crisis in mid-to-late October, as Plath was in the full swing of her 
six-week burst of Ariel-writing.  
What Peel offers us, then, is indeed a fuller version of the “story” of the Ariel poems, one 
in which the usual story—the breakdown of Plath’s and Hughes’s marriage—is fruitfully situated 
within the wider contexts of her political and historical moment, this moment experienced, in 
particular, from the vantage point of an England at the end of empire and steeped within 
escalating Cold War tensions. However, to more fully attend to the particular ways in which 
Plath responded to these contexts in her poetry, to arrive, in other words, at an even fuller version 
of the story of the Ariel poems, we must also attend to Plath’s literary context, to the ways in 
which she fashions her response to her political and historical contexts as indeed an engagement 
with her contemporary literary scene.  
Discussions of Plath that place her within her contemporary literary context have 
generally focused on her American context, placing her in relation to those other 
“confessionals,” particularly Robert Lowell, whose class she audited (along with Anne Sexton) 
at Boston College in the spring of 1959, before she and Hughes moved to London. While Plath’s 
(American) “confessional” context is certainly central to any story concerning the development 
of the Ariel poems, a story that doesn’t attend to the immediate literary context in which these 
poems were indeed composed—a London literary scene that had, for those who had already 







recalibrating its transatlantic connections—is a story that necessarily misses the ways in which 
Plath in fact strategically deployed her American “confessionalism” to inscribe herself both 
within this scene and within this scene’s reclaiming of a modernist legacy and “the bigger 
things.” With the exception of the crucial work that has been done to situate Plath more generally 
within a tradition of women writers (building from the seminal work of Gilbert and Gubar) and 
more specifically within “confessionalism,” studies have tended to focus on Plath in relation to 
individual writers rather than literary traditions or movements.19 Indeed, while attention has been 
paid to Plath’s engagement of individual modernist writers (especially Virginia Woolf and, 
increasingly, D. H. Lawrence),20 no studies to my knowledge have devoted extensive attention to 
Plath’s engagement with the “modernist tradition” more broadly. And with the sole and very 
notable exception of William Wootten’s The Alvarez Generation: Thom Gunn, Geoffrey Hill, 
Ted Hughes, Sylvia Plath, and Peter Porter (2015), from which I will be drawing, none has 
performed any in-depth examinations of Plath’s engagement with the particular contemporary 
literary context of 1960s London.21 And none to my knowledge has examined the ways in which, 
in engaging her immediate literary context, Plath was indeed both engaging and reconfiguring a 
modernist tradition and, by way of this reconfigured tradition, the “bigger things.”   
                                               
19 A notable exception is Al Strangeways’s Sylvia Plath: The Shaping of Shadows (1998), which devotes a chapter 
to Plath’s engagements of Romanticism, focusing principally on William Blake, Thomas De Quincey, Emily Brontë, 
and D. H. Lawrence.  
20 Since Sandra Gilbert’s work on Plath’s engagements with Woolf in her chapter “In Yeats’ House: The Death and 
Resurrection of Sylvia Plath” from No Man’s Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the Twentieth Century 
(1994), reading Plath’s work in connection with Woolf has become standard. For more on the Lawrence-Plath 
connection see Al Strangeways’s Romanticism chapter in Sylvia Plath: The Shaping of Shadows (1998) and Sally 
Bayley’s “‘I Need a Master’: Sylvia Plath Reads D. H. Lawrence” (2008).  
 In Sylvia Plath: The Wound and the Cure of Words (1992), Steven Gould Axelrod offers an extended 
reading of Plath’s engagements of T. S. Eliot; however, Axelrod’s focus is on the ways in which Plath’s relationship 
with, and loss of, her father play out in the psychodynamics of her relationship with Eliot as a literary precursor, 
rather than on Plath’s engagements with a particular line of modernism stemming from Eliot.   
21 Besides being mentioned in passing, or addressed in terms of his biographical role in Plath’s life from 1962-3, as 
someone to whom she read her poems and from whom she garnered support, Alvarez is surprisingly missing as a 
critical factor in the shaping of her Ariel poetics. To my knowledge, Wootten’s study is to date the only study that 










 During that fall of 1962, as her marriage deteriorated and she renewed her explorations 
of the “bigger things” within her poetry, Plath was not only citing Alvarez, she was reading her 
new poems to him. Though in his later reflections on Plath, Alvarez notes that when she came to 
him, “she knew [him] only glancingly,” the two had in fact known each other, albeit glancingly, 
for a couple of years (The Savage God 40). They had met in the spring of 1960. That February, 
Plath had at last found a publisher for The Colossus, and in March, Hughes’s second collection, 
Lupercal, was released. Alvarez had reviewed Hughes’s first collection favorably, though with 
certain reservations, but when Lupercal appeared, he hailed it as a genuine literary event. In his 
initial review of the collection, he notes that “Hughes’s first volume of poems was good, but in 
some ways predictable. He was a Cambridge man and showed all the Cambridge influences” 
(“An Outstanding Young Poet” 22). However, with Lupercal, Hughes had “take[n] a limited, 
personal theme and, by an act of immensely assured poetic skill, broadened it until it seems to 
touch upon nearly everything that concerns us” (22). “This is not easy poetry to read,” Alvarez 
concludes, “but it is new, profound and important” (22).  
Spurred by Alvarez’s enthusiasm for the volume, the Observer requested a brief write-up 
on Hughes to complement the review, and the two “arranged to take [their] kids for a walk on 
Primrose Hill” (The Savage God 20). At the time of this first meeting, when Alvarez stopped by 
the house, Plath was, for him, eclipsed by Hughes, whom he considered “on the edge of a 
considerable reputation” (21). For Alvarez, “This was Ted’s time” (21). Meanwhile, not having 
put together that Sylvia was Sylvia Plath, whose poem “Night Shift” he had admired (“it was 







the Observer, he had read Plath that day starkly in terms of 1950s conceptions (and 
consumptions) of American housewifery; Plath appeared, to Alvarez, “briskly American: bright, 
clean, competent, like a young woman in a cookery advertisement, friendly and yet rather 
distant” (22). Even when Plath reminded him of the poem, Alvarez continued to engage her in 
these terms, calling the poem “lovely”; as he later reflected, “[l]ovely wasn’t the right word, but 
what else do you say to a bright young housewife?” (23).  
Interestingly, Plath makes a notable appearance in the brief write-up of Hughes, the 
contrast established there between the two seeming to attest to Peel’s depiction of Hughes as 
longing for a retreat into the countryside, attesting, too, perhaps to the degree to which Hughes’s 
explorations of the violence in nature had already begun to fashion a poetic role for him. The 
contrast suggests that Plath, on the other hand, was as at home in New York as she was in the 
New Yorker: “In London, where he lives in Chalcot Square, near Camden Town, he has the look 
of a countryman—in gangling contrast to his tall, trim American wife, Sylvia Plath, who is a 
New Yorker poet in her own right” (“Frogs and Springboks” 9). Plath’s appearance here is 
notable, too, in the sense that, as a “poet in her own right,” she is described as “tall” and “trim,” 
though at the time she would have been nine-months pregnant, an omission she relayed to her 
mother with amusement. Whether the omission of her pregnancy speaks more to early 1960s 
niceties or the degree to which motherhood at the time was seen as antithetical to a career 
beyond the home remains an open question,22 though Alvarez’s apparent misremembering of 
some of the details of that first meeting seems to point toward the latter. While his review of 
Lupercal and the more personal Hughes piece were published on March 27th, Plath didn’t give 
birth to Frieda until the first of April. His later walks with Hughes and their children perhaps 
                                               
22 Plath registers the pressures placed on women to choose from various roles, all supposedly mutually exclusive, 







coloring his memory of that first visit, prompting him to credit Hughes that day with a child that 
hadn’t yet been born, he establishes a contrast between the mention in the Hughes piece of Plath 
as poet (and not-mother by omission) and his first impressions of Plath as young housewife and 
mother (who, as such, “seemed effaced, the poet taking a back seat to the young mother and 
housewife”), a contrast which underscores the degree to which Plath was at this time, for 
Alvarez, a poet on paper, in effect, but in person, a young mother and housewife first and 
foremost (22).  
Indeed, in the beginning, Alvarez was largely Hughes’s friend, and Plath was, for 
Alvarez, Hughes’s wife, who also happened to be a poet. After their initial meeting, Alvarez 
“saw Ted occasionally, Sylvia more rarely,” the two men occasionally meeting at a local pub or 
taking their children on walks (25). Perhaps things first began to shift for Alvarez, however, 
when he was sent a copy of The Colossus and Other Poems, published at the end of October. At 
least on paper, Alvarez (steeped within the discourses circumscribing 1950s gender identities) 
was beginning to take Plath seriously, reading her as an “exception” to the general rule of female 
“poetesses”: “Sylvia Plath’s The Colossus needs none of the usual throat-clearing qualifications, 
to wit: ‘impressive, considering, of course, it is a first volume by a young (excuse me), American 
poetess.’” While admitting, as he had with Hughes’s The Hawk in the Rain, certain reservations, 
(“At times her feeling weakens, the language goes off on its own and she lands in blaring 
rhetoric,” for example), as he indeed admits of all first books (“it would be a strange first book 
that had no faults”), Alvarez not only reviews the volume favorably, but reviews it in terms of 
the poetics that was beginning to take shape for him in answer to the doldrums and evasions of 
the contemporary scene as he perceived it. His review of The Colossus appearing in mid-







later serve as the introduction to The New Poetry (“Beyond the Gentility Principle” 28). In the 
essay, he formulates the new poetry he calls for—a poetry capable of moving beyond 
“gentility”—in terms of “seriousness”: “What poetry needs, in short, is a new seriousness, which 
is a question of depth rather than subject matter. It depends on the poet’s ability to go deep, to 
face the full range of his experience with his full intelligence” (28). For Alvarez, then, Plath’s 
poetry was beginning to display characteristics that would align it with the poetry he was looking 
for. Her book succeeds, in his estimation at the time, largely because it is not genteel, gentility 
for Plath, as Alvarez applies it in her case, carrying with it all the strictures of “femininity”: “She 
steers clear of feminine charm, deliciousness, gentility, supersensitivity and the act of being a 
poetess. She simply writes good poetry” (“The Poet and the Poetess” 21). And her poetry is 
good, according to Alvarez, because it is not only not-genteel, but it is marked “with a 
seriousness that demands only that she be judged equally seriously” (21).   
While Alvarez embeds his key words—“gentility” and “seriousness”—in his review of 
The Colossus, and therefore the volume can be read, in retrospect, as indeed in keeping with the 
“new poetry” he was calling for, Plath’s collection is read, in the review itself—perhaps in part 
because it was a first volume, perhaps in part because Plath had yet to come into her own more 
fully “new” poems—in isolation. It is Hughes’s Lupercal, on the other hand, that Alvarez reads 
not only in and of itself, but as situated within the larger contemporary context, its “seriousness” 
and non-gentility contributing not only to the success and “newness” of the individual volume 
but to the establishment, more generally, of a new poetry.23 While in his review of Lupercal, 
                                               
23 While for Alvarez, Plath at the time was “serious,” her seriousness was marked by a certain indirection in contrast 
to the full-facing directness his “new seriousness” required, insisting, as it did, that poets “face the full range of 
[their] experience with [their] full intelligence.” In The Colossus, Plath’s “mass of experience,” according to 
Alvarez, “is never quite brought directly into daylight,” but is rather experienced askance as a “sense of threat, as 







Alvarez concludes that the collection is “new, profound and important,” it is in his 
accompanying write-up of Hughes that he situates this “newness” and “importance” within the 
context of the contemporary literary moment as well as, more broadly, within his feedback 
model of twentieth-century literary history. This more personal piece on Hughes, in which Plath 
makes her brief appearance, is entitled “Ted ‘n’ Thom,” and it is indeed with Thom Gunn that 
Alvarez pairs Hughes from the start. In his review of The Hawk in the Rain, Alvarez had noted 
that Faber and Faber had two months earlier “published a very good volume of poems by Thom 
Gunn,” which “[t]hey have followed . . . up with a book by another young poet, Ted Hughes, 
who seems, in his way, to have learned from Mr. Gunn,” both “mak[ing] use . . . of  the same 
occasionally belligerent ugliness” as “part of a deliberate, anti-poetical toughness and a desire to 
talk straight” (“Tough Young Poet” 12). A few years later, by the time Lupercal appears, 
Alvarez has arrived at a fuller articulation of Gunn’s and Hughes’s role: “They both represent a 
more romantic revolt against the dry, cerebral verse of the ‘Movement’ of the fifties” (“Frogs 
and Springboks” 9).  
Gunn’s and Hughes’s “revolt” here stands in contradistinction to the “negative feed-
backs” that mark, for Alvarez, “the whole movement of English verse . . . to correct the balance 
[American modernist] experimentation had . . . disturbed,” a movement he would expound in 
brief in the Observer a year later and in full a year after that in The New Poetry (17). “Since 
about 1930,” Alvarez writes, “the machinery of modern English poetry seems to have been 
controlled by a series of negative feed-backs,” the first of which he identifies as the reaction of 
the poets of the thirties to the experiments of the twenties: “[t]he thirties poets . . .  asserted that 
they had no time to be difficult or inward or experimental; the political situation was too urgent” 







skill with references, with slang, with the time’s immediate worries,” all of which “went into the 
production of a kind of social, occasional verse, mostly traditional in form, but highly up-to-date 
in idiom”—the poets of the thirties (with the notable exception of MacNeice) saw to it that “[b]y 
the end of the thirties experimental verse was out and traditional forms, in a chic contemporary 
guise, were back in” (18). For the poets of the forties, however, “[Auden] was thought to be too 
clever and not sufficiently emotional for the extreme circumstances of the . . . war,” which 
“brought with it a taste for high, if obscure, rhetoric” (19). Dylan Thomas, with “his act as the 
blindly inspired poet,” served as the catalyst for what Alvarez identifies as “the second negative 
feed-back”: “a blockage against intelligence,” an emphasis, in other words, on emotion at the 
expense of reason or logic, “[Thomas’s] followers . . . us[ing] his work as an excuse to kiss all 
meaning good-bye” (19).  
As we move into the fifties, toward the contemporary literary moment in which Alvarez 
is writing, it is the Movement that launches the third negative feedback, a reaction “against wild, 
loose emotion” (19). Largely given its sense of cohesion by Robert Conquest’s anthology New 
Lines (1956), the Movement, in Alvarez’s estimation, “was, in short, academic-administrative 
verse, polite, knowledgeable, efficient, polished, and, in its quiet way, even intelligent,” Alvarez 
pointing out that “[o]f the nine poets to appear in the anthology, six, at the time, were university 
teachers, two librarians, and one a Civil Servant” (19). In all, what Larkin and the others 
“attempt[ed] to show [was] that the poet is not a strange creature inspired,” as in the case of the 
Dylan Thomas persona; rather than fashioning the poet as an exception to the common man, as 
that rare man singled out with the gift of “vision,” the Movement poets sought instead to 
demonstrate that the poet was “just like the man next store—in fact, he probably is the man next 







 For Alvarez, then, Gunn’s and Hughes’s “revolt against the dry, cerebral verse of the 
‘Movement’” serves much more as a response to the Movement than a reaction against it, rather 
than, in other words, a pendulum swing back to the romanticism of Thomas and the forties or a 
continuation of the series of “negative feed-backs” that helped to produce both Thomas and the 
Movement in the first place. Gunn’s and Hughes’s “romanticism,” Alvarez stipulates, differs 
from that of “Thomas and the forties people”——it “is tougher and stronger” (“Frogs and 
Springboks” 9).24 Rather than serving as a reactionary response to the Movement, and therefore 
as part of the larger series of reactionary responses to American modernism, Gunn’s and 
Hughes’s “revolt,” then, figures instead as a sort of anecdote to the Movement precisely because 
it seems to offer a way of returning to the moment in which the “whole movement of English 
poetry” went awry for Alvarez, a way of returning to—and indeed negotiating—a modernism 
cleaved along transatlantic lines and in terms that would in turn structure the negative feedbacks 
it inspired.25  
In defining the “new seriousness,” insisting that poets “go deep [ . . . ] to face the full 
range of [their] experience with [their] full intelligence,” Alvarez calls for a redressing of “the 
                                               
24 Alvarez’s branding of Gunn’s and Hughes’s romanticism as “stronger and tougher” itself seems to point toward 
this return to (and repurposing of) modernism, to a fusion of American and British modernisms that we see, for 
example, in Vorticism, that British avant-garde movement which offered a place in its short-lived magazine BLAST 
to the Americans Pound and Eliot. Alvarez’s “stronger and tougher,” then, seems to align Gunn and Hughes—within 
the context of Alvarez’s modernist-centric literary history—with the focus Vorticism, for example, placed on 
“masculine” movement, virility, and concision. 
25 In his essay, Alvarez refers to his earlier work, The Shaping Spirit (1958), in which, as he summarizes it here, he 
“suggested [ . . . ] that “the experimental techniques of Eliot and the rest never really took on in England because 
they were an essentially American concern: attempts to forge a distinctively American language for poetry” (17). In 
The New Poetry, then, he furthers this line of thinking by shifting his focus from the “distinctively American” 
quality of Eliot’s experiments, to the distinctively British reaction against them, a reaction he attributes to the 
prevalence of English “gentility” (17). In Thomas Hardy, positioned at the point of transition between the Victorian 
and the modernist, Alvarez offers us an example of this principle at work: “Sometime in the twenties Thomas Hardy 
remarked to Robert Graves that ‘vers libre could come to nothing in England’” (17). “All we can do,” Hardy is to 
have said, “is to write on the old themes in the old styles, but try to do a little better than those who went before us” 
(17). It is “the series of negative feedbacks” that Alvarez identifies, then, that conspire “to produce precisely the 







late Romantic separation of emotion and intelligence,” this separation, he implies, having 
structured the presumed incompatibility between British modernism’s Lawrencian romanticism 
and the avowed classicism of Eliot. Such an incompatibility, as Wootten points out, was a central 
tenant of the criticism of F. R. Leavis, whose presence at Cambridge and lectures at Oxford did 
much to shape the critical minds of Alvarez, Gunn, and Hughes, all of whom were studying at 
the time at Cambridge and Oxford. “From the Leavises [both F. R. and his wife Q. D.],” Wootten 
writes, “would come many of the terms and criteria that would be used to reject the Movement in 
general and Larkin in particular” (10). In this sense, Alvarez was indeed a Leavisite (a critical 
inflection that would play out as well, as we will see, in his assessments of Edith Sitwell), his 
essay beginning with a citation of Leavis’s view in 1932 of the role Eliot and Pound played in 
“reorienting modern poetry,” a view, as Alvarez notes in the next paragraph, that the critic later 
rescinded: “Twenty years later he took it all back again. And he was right” (“Beyond the 
Gentility Principle” 28).  
But, as Wootten points out, while Alvarez begins with Leavis, by the end of the essay he 
has formulated his “new poetry” as a way of moving beyond a particular Leavisite stalemate 
(68). While in the first version of his essay, Alvarez renders the Leavisite nature of this stalemate 
implicitly, in his final version, he writes that “Dr. Leavis has come, apparently, to believe that D. 
H. Lawrence and T. S. Eliot represent the two warring and irreconcilable poles of modern 
literature” (The New Poetry 28). Such polarity, Alvarez contends, could no longer hold in a post-
Freudian world in which “the forced recognition of mass evil outside us”—those “forces of 
disintegration” whose “public faces are those of two world wars, the concentration camps, 
genocide and the threat of nuclear war”—“has developed parallel with the scientific analysis of 







“separation of emotion and intelligence has become totally meaningless,” the poet “can no longer 
deny, with any assurance, the impulses he does not wish to face,” “[j]ust as he . . . is no longer 
absolved from using all his intelligence and skill to make poetic sense of them” (28). Alvarez 
concludes the first version of his call for a new poetry by insisting that “[t]his new seriousness in 
not an impossible ideal” (28). Indeed, Alvarez writes, “It is present,” and present on both sides of 
the Atlantic, “in different ways and degrees, in the work of Americans like Robert Lowell and 
John Berryman and Englishmen like Ted Hughes and Thom Gunn” (28). In practicing a non-
genteel poetry in response to their contemporary moment, what Gunn and Hughes (as well as 
Lowell and Berryman) had achieved, then, was indeed a return to—and reconciliation of—
modernism, a “combination,” as Alvarez puts it, “of D. H. Lawrence’s concern with the inner 
life, however violent and painful, and T. S. Eliot’s concentration, formal intelligence and skill” 
(28).  
Lowell’s inclusion in this achievement surely could not have escaped Plath’s attention, 
especially considering—despite the fact that Alvarez had identified her work in The Colossus, 
just two months before the first version of his essay appeared in the Observer, as “serious” and 
not-genteel—her own absence from the list. At this point, while Hughes’s Hawk in the Rain and 
Lupercal had both won prizes—Lupercal winning the Somerset Maugham award in 1960, the 
year after Gunn had won it—Plath had found herself relieved simply to find a publisher for her 
first collection. As she had written to fellow American Fulbright scholar Lynne Lawner in 
February 1960—noting that “of the 50 poems in it one-third were written this fall” with 
“[n]othing pre-Cambridge & over 50 . . . weeded & let fall despite their claim of publication”—
The Colossus had been “a long hard book in coming” (“Nine Letters” 49).26 But her move to 
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England that December had, in effect, moved her into a literary market more receptive to her 
collected work: “The British Publishers Heinemann have just accepted my first book of poems 
with what can only be called enthusiasm” (49). In America, in contrast, where her book had 
already made the rounds to publishers, as she tells Lawner, “I’ve had nothing but cold shoulders” 
(49). That year Plath had come close to a major award of her own, missing out—“by a whisper” 
(Unabridged Journals 492)—to George Starbuck for the Yale Series of Younger Poets prize, 
Starbuck having, along with Plath and Sexton, audited Lowell’s course at Boston University the 
previous spring. Given Plath’s proximity to Starbuck, as well as their mutual proximity to 
Lowell, the loss must have indeed seemed discomfitingly close. 
In the face of these rejections of her collected work in the U.S., despite the success she 
had had in placing individual poems in Poetry and The New Yorker, for example—The New 
Yorker having offered Plath in March a contract for first-reading rights (Letters Home 411)—
Plath described herself, by the time of Heinemann’s enthusiastic acceptance, as having become 
“thoroughly grim and bloody-minded about it all,” so much so that she envisioned her move to 
England as permanent: “I think I shall be a very happy exile & have absolutely no desire to 
return to the land of milk & honey & spindryers” (“Nine Letters” 49). Once she had signed a 
contract for The Colossus and thereby had cleared some space for herself to begin thinking of her 
next collection, Plath, happy exile indeed, had begun to find London certainly receptive to her 
officially post-Colossus work. London Magazine, for example, had become a ready home for her 
new poems, as had, she discovered, the Observer. While Plath had published only one Colossus 
poem in the Observer, she would publish—in just the eight months between May of 1961 (a few 
months after Alvarez first publishes his call for a “new seriousness”) and January of 1962 (a few 







three post-Colossus poems, two of which she would include in her Ariel manuscript, “The Rival” 
and “Morning Song.”27 As Alvarez would later recall, and do so in terms of his “new 
seriousness”—expressed in that first version of his essay as “a question of depth more than of 
subject matter” (“Beyond the Gentility Principle” 28) and in the longer introduction as apparent 
in what he refers to as “the new depth poetry” (The New Poetry 28)—these three poems 
suggested to him that Plath was indeed becoming more “serious”: “The current was deepening, 
its flow becoming easier” (The Savage God 27). 
Given Alvarez’s endorsement of The Colossus as “serious” and not-genteel and his 
support for her new, even more “serious” work, as well as what might be described as the 
increasing proximity of this work to the more personal and recent work of her one-time mentor 
Lowell (the Lowell of Life Studies, whom Alvarez had so championed in his first version of 
“Beyond the Gentility Principle”),28 when Alvarez releases The New Poetry, Plath, as Alvarez 
remembers it, “was disappointed not to have been included” (40). Though with the anthology 
Alvarez was expressly “trying to represent what [he] [thought] was the most significant work of 
the British poets who began to come into their own in the fifties,” the volume had indeed 
“included the work of two American writers who, although established before then, seem[ed] . . . 
to be concerned with problems that some of the new generation [were] beginning to face”—
Lowell and Berryman (The New Poetry 15). In the first version of the essay, the two Americans 
had stood on rather equal footing with Gunn and Hughes, the “new seriousness . . . present, in 
different ways and degrees” in all four poets’ work, Alvarez allowing for, but not delineating, 
                                               
27 During this period, Plath published in the Observer “Morning Song” (May 21, 1961), “[Sleep in the] Mojave 
Desert” (November 19), and “The Rival,” (January 21, 1962) (Steinberger, “A celebration this is”).  
28 In The Savage God, Alvarez writes that a “crucial element in [Plath’s] poetic maturity was the example of 
Lowell’s Life Studies,” though he emphasizes, and I would agree, that Lowell served as an “example” rather than an 
“influence” in the sense that “she never picked up his peculiarly contagious style. Instead of a style, she took from 







these differences. However, in the introduction to the anthology, Alvarez indeed differentiates 
the two sets of poets chronologically, if not by degree, the Americans achieving a sort of top 
billing as he presents them as having gone first and perhaps farthest in achieving the 
reconciliation of the classicist and romantic strands of modernism that he was looking for, a 
reconciliation that could then serve as a model for those British poets—most notably, in this 
version, Hughes (Gunn, though present in the anthology, absent from its introduction)—now 
“coming into their own.”29   
So while Plath had been disappointed not to have been included, Lowell’s prominence 
both in Alvarez’s argument and in the anthology itself must have been at least heartening, must 
have given her, at least, a sense of proximity to the volume. Having audited his poetry course at 
Boston College a few years earlier, in the spring of 1959, the same year Lowell would publish 
Life Studies, Plath knew firsthand of Lowell’s developments, his attempts, as Alvarez might put 
it, “to face the full range of his experience with his full intelligence.” And what’s more, Plath had 
already begun to align herself with what she would later call, in her interview with Orr (speaking 
in terms of Alvarez’s “new seriousness”), Lowell’s “new breakthrough . . . into very serious, 
very personal, emotional experience” (Orr 167-8). For example, in a journal entry from the end 
of February of 1959, in which Plath recorded a run-down of Lowell’s class the day before, she 
had charted for her poetry a Lowell-inflected drive toward the personal:  
My main thing now is to start with real things: real emotions, and leave out the 
baby gods, the old men of the sea, the thin people, the knights, the moon-gods, the 
mad-maudlins, the lorelei, the hermits, and get into me, Ted, friends, mother and 
                                               
29 While Lowell’s and Berryman’s poetry achieves “top billing” in terms of Alvarez’s argument in the introduction, 
this billing plays out structurally in the anthology itself, their poetry appearing first under the rubric “The 







brother and father and family. The real world. Real situations, behind which the 
great gods play the drama of blood, lust and death. (Unabridged Journals 471)  
Although Alvarez had included Lowell and Berryman, he wrote in his preface that he had 
“[o]therwise . . . often regretfully, not included new work by poets whose reputations were made 
before 1950 . . . nor that of young writers, like Peter Porter and Sylvia Plath, who, although 
living in this country, are not British” (15). Unfortunately for Plath, as Wootten points out, 
“though [she] was, it seemed, too American to qualify for The New Poetry, her residency in 
England may well have been a factor in her surprising exclusion by Donald Hall from the 
forthcoming Contemporary American Poetry” (101). In Alvarez’s anthology, then, she had at 
least scored a mention.  
When Alvarez next sees Plath, he is indeed struck by what appeared to him to be a sea-
change in confidence. By the time The New Poetry was published in April of 1962, Alvarez had 
lived briefly in America and then gone through a divorce and a move, and with Plath’s and 
Hughes’s own move to Devon, the men’s occasional pub ventures and walks with their children 
had become a thing of the past. Still centered in London, Alvarez stopped by Court Green on his 
way to vacation in Cornwall that June, and, as he notes, it wasn’t Hughes but Plath who showed 
him around. Court Green “had once been the local manor” and “was set slightly above the rest of 
the village, up a steep lane next to a twelfth century church,” and as Plath gave Alvarez the tour, 
“the electric gadgets, the freshly painted rooms, the orchard and the burial mound” (which Plath 
described as “prehistoric”), seemed to Alvarez to be “her property,” whereas “Ted, meanwhile, 
seemed content to sit back and play with little Frieda” (The Savage God 28). Alvarez reads this 
apparent sea change in Plath in terms of marital power dynamics, concluding “that the balance of 







More importantly for our purposes, Alvarez attributes Plath’s more direct engagement of 
him to a resurgence of, and perhaps a distinct change in, her writing. No doubt encouraged by the 
Observer’s publication of “Morning Song,” “[Sleep in the] Mojave Desert,” and “The Rival,” 
Plath also had, by this time, The Bell Jar under her belt, having completed it by May of 1961, the 
same month she composed “Morning Song,” with which she would begin her Ariel collection. 
And that January, Plath had given birth to her son, Nicholas, and after a few months had returned 
to her writing, composing the poem for three voices, “Three Women” in March—it would be 
accepted by the BBC in June, around the time of Alvarez’s visit—and the future Ariel poem, 
“Elm,” in April. That May, David and Assia Wevill, the young couple to whom Plath and 
Hughes had leased their London flat when they moved to Devon, visited and set into motion that 
prominent narrative thread of Ariel, the failed marriage. By the time Alvarez arrived for his visit 
in June, Plath had already begun threading this narrative through her poems, having composed 
“The Rabbit Catcher” (“We, too, had a relationship”), and “Event” (“Love cannot come here”) 
(Ariel 7, Collected Poems 195). “I’m writing again,” she told Alvarez, as he prepared to leave 
that day; “Really writing” (The Savage God 28). And she wanted him to see her poems. A month 
later, toward the end of July, she would send him three, including “Elm,” along with a letter 
asking for his feedback.30 
Plath, it seems, was now determined to establish a literary connection with Alvarez on 
her own terms. While Alvarez and Hughes’s friendship had been based in an avoidance of any 
discussion of poetry, Alvarez having been told that “‘[Hughes] never talk[ed] shop’” (20), the 
next time Alvarez sees Plath, she had dropped by with “a sheaf of typescripts” (30). In the time 
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since they had last met, the Observer had published “Finisterre” and, in late September, shortly 
before Plath pays her visit to Alvarez, “Crossing the Water,” which Alvarez describes as “a 
beautiful short poem . . . which was not in Ariel, although it was as good as many that are” (29). 
The two, then, spoke of “Crossing the Water” and when Alvarez asked what had brought Plath to 
London, she replied that “she was flat-hunting, and then added casually that she and the children 
were living on their own for the time being” (30). Plath had begun mentioning obtaining a legal 
separation from Hughes in her letters to her mother in August and September (Letters Home 460, 
463), and by October 9th, around the time of her visit to Alvarez, she wrote, “I am getting a 
divorce. It is the only thing” (465). Her mother had likely hoped she would return to the States, 
but Plath put that option firmly out of mind: “I should say right away America is out for me. I 
want to make my life in England. If I start running now, I will never stop. I shall hear of Ted all 
my life, of his success, his genius . . . I must make a life all my own as fast as I can” (465). 
Though she briefly entertained the idea of finding a place off the coast of Ireland, hoping to 
avoid all the buzz as news of Hughes’s affair spread through the literary circuit, she had now 
resolved to work herself and her children back to London,31 to place herself, in other words, right 
in the very center of that circuit—and there she was, in the flat of A. Alvarez, (“the opinion-
maker in poetry over here,” as she would soon refer to him (476), “settled in front of the coal 
stove on one of the rugs . . . very much at her ease” (The Savage God 30). When Alvarez reached 
for her poems, “[s]he shook her head”; these were poems meant to be read aloud, she told him, 
and so that afternoon she read for him a series of Ariel poems, “six or eight” of them, including 
“Berck-Plage,” “The Moon and the Yew Tree,” and “Elm” (30-1).  
                                               
31 In the same letter in which Plath tells her mother she won’t be returning to the U.S., she writes, “I want to have a 
flat in London, where the cultural life is what I am starved for” (465). And soon afterward, in a letter to her brother 
and sister-in-law, she writes of her life in Devon, “this year of country life has been, for me, a cultural death. No 







“After that,” Alvarez writes, “Sylvia dropped in fairly often on her visits to London, 
always with a batch of new poems to read” and this was how “[he] first heard, among others, the 
‘Bee’ poems, ‘A Birthday Present,’ ‘The Applicant,’ ‘Getting There,’ ‘Fever 103°,’ ‘Letter in 
November,’ and ‘Ariel’” (31-2). “Ariel,” thought Alvarez, was “extraordinary”: “I told her it was 
the best thing she had done” (32). And one of the ways in which the poem is extraordinary, for 
our purposes, is the way in which, by way of it, Plath effectively inscribes herself into Alvarez’s 
introduction. In the first version of his essay, while Alvarez had located the new poetry he was 
calling for in the work, for example, of Lowell and Hughes, the question remained of “whether 
or not we will get any more of it” (28). Similarly, by the end of the introduction to his anthology, 
Alvarez states that “a good deal of poetic talent exists in England at the moment,” but the 
question was “whether it will come to anything,” a question that “largely depends . . . on the 
degree to which the poets can remain immune to the disease so often found in English culture: 
gentility” (28). In other words, by the end of both of these versions of his essay, the 
establishment of a “tradition” of this new poetry was by no means certain. And while in the first 
version, “[the] new seriousness is not an impossible ideal” but “is present,” [i]t is present, in 
different ways and degrees” (28); likewise, while in the introduction, Lowell’s Life Studies, for 
example, “is a large step forward in this new direction,” the destination toward which this new 
direction was pointing had yet, in other words, to be fully arrived at. Therefore, as Plath begins 
“Ariel,” not only is the foothold of this new poetry on the contemporary scene by no means 
secure, its full potential had yet to be tapped.   
In the extended space of the introduction, Alvarez indeed has room to expand upon the 
differing ways and degrees to which the “new seriousness” was both present and not yet so. In 







Catholicism and rhetorically in certain mannerisms of language and rhythm,” as he had in his 
New Critical triumph, Lord Weary’s Castle (1946), “he is now [in Life Studies]. . . trying to cope 
with them nakedly, and without invasion” (25). While “the total impact of [Life Studies] as a 
whole is together more powerful” than that of Lord Weary’s Castle, individual poems in the 
volume “fail for appearing more compulsively concerned with the processes of psychoanalysis 
than with those of poetry” (25). “Conversely,” Alvarez writes, “with their deliberate common 
sense and understatement, some of the Movement poets command, at their best, a self-contained 
strength and a concern for the discipline of verse which is vital if the art is to remain public” 
(25). In other words, while Life Studies in general succeeds, especially in terms of “the new 
seriousness” of its subject matter, in terms of what Alvarez might call the Lawrencian quality of 
its explorations of a fuller range of experience, individual poems sometimes fail in their apparent 
lack of Eliotic “control,” the “craft” necessary to transform the “raw” psychoanalytic materials 
into poetry, control which, while lacking the “depth” and “seriousness” of Lowell in terms of 
their subject matter, the Movement poets demonstrate with their technical skill. Ultimately, 
acknowledging the relative “failures” of Lowell and successes of the Movement, “the question” 
becomes for Alvarez, then, “the kind of success a style allows” (25). 
And it is here that he turns to a comparison of Larkin and Hughes. And it is here, as we 
will see, that Plath enters herself into the discussion. Alvarez offers the reader the full text of 
Larkin’s “At Grass,” describing the poem as “elegant and unpretentious and rather beautiful in 
its gentle way” (26). However, as we would anticipate, the problem with the poem, for Alvarez, 
is its “gentility”; as Alvarez puts it, the poem “is a nostalgic re-creation of the Platonic (or New 
Yorker) idea of the English scene, part pastoral, part sporting,” the horses at pasture having once 







race meetings and high style” (26). Wondering whether “memories [of their racing days] plague 
their ears like flies,” as we can see, Larkin’s speaker indeed perceives the horses mainly in 
human, “civilized” terms, the horses’ un-genteel potential remaining latent throughout most of 
the poem: “one crops grass, and moves about / —The other seeming to look on— / And stands 
anonymous again” (25). There is a moment in the poem, however, that marks the potential for 
the horses to move beyond their domestication, a moment in which “they / Have slipped their 
names,” become unbridled. And yet this potential is effectively contained as they “stand at ease, / 
Or gallop for what must be joy,” the speaker translating their movement in terms of rather “safe,” 
genteel emotion. Though centered on horses, the overall effect of the poem, in which the horses 
“gallop” in just a single line, is one of stillness and reflection. 
“[The poem],” Alvarez concludes, “is more skillful but less urgent than [Hughes’s] ‘A 
Dream of Horses’” (26). In Hughes’s poem, the horses are decidedly not still. They are both an 
expression of animality, of violence, and of the violence and animality of the human psyche: 
“Out of the night that gulfed beyond the palace-gate / There shook hooves and hooves and 
hooves of horses: / Our horses battered their stalls; their eyes jerked white” (26). The sheer force 
of the horses becomes so powerful that “every grain of the earth had hooves and mane,” and as 
the speakers (the “born grooms” of the poem) “crouch at [their] lantern, [their] bodies drank the 
din, / [a]nd [they] longed for a death trampled by such horses” (27). Unlike Larkin’s, Hughes’s 
poem, for Alvarez, is both un-genteel and serious: “It is unquestionably about something: it is a 
serious attempt to re-create and so clarify, a powerful complex of emotions and sensations” (27). 
However, “the poem, by the standard of Hughes’s best writing,” Alvarez admits, “is not all that 
good; it is less controlled than Larkin’s and has a number of romantic, quasi-medieval trappings 







“Ariel,” then, as the title poem, is not simply one of the most accomplished poems in the 
volume, not simply a poem that, as Wootten observes, “appears to have mixed Plath’s sedate 
regular horse riding with an incident involving a runaway horse while she was at Cambridge” 
(120). It is also a poem very much in conversation with Hughes’s “A Dream of Horses” and 
Alvarez’s introduction to The New Poetry. In other words, by composing her own non-genteel 
horse poem—which, for a time, as we will see, keeps pace with Hughes’s—Plath effectively 
enters “Ariel” into Alvarez’s horse-poem comparison. And if Hughes’s poem, for Alvarez, 
embodies the present state of “the new poetry,” its “newness” having relegated Larkin’s “At 
Grass” to the past, “Ariel” charges forward into its future.   
 In his later reflections, Alvarez attributes Plath’s visits with her new poems, including 
“Ariel,” to his introduction, to the fact that it “apparently . . . said something she wanted to hear; 
she spoke of it often and with approval, and,” as we have seen, “she was disappointed not to 
have been included” (The Savage God 40). Indeed, as Wootten puts it, “at the right moment in 
Plath’s personal and poetic development, The New Poetry presented a challenge” (118). “It had 
an introduction in tune with her sensibility,” he writes, “while at the same time excluding her and 
championing her estranged husband” (118). And at this moment, as Wootten demonstrates, 
Alvarez’s ideas—or more precisely, perhaps, the ways in which his ideas dovetailed with, and to 
a certain degree, as we will see in Chapter 3, helped to clarify her own—were very much on her 
mind: “[‘Ariel’] was written two days after the letter to her mother that enthused over meeting 
Alvarez again, a letter full of the message of ‘Beyond the Gentility Principle,’ and indeed on the 
verge of spending the afternoon with Alvarez to read him new poems” (120-1). On October 25th, 
as Robin Peel points out, Plath had written to her mother, “accus[ing] her of shying away from 







Back 253). This is the day she also wrote the letter to her brother and sister-in-law in which she 
identifies Alvarez as “the opinion-maker in poetry over here,” noting that he “is giving me an 
afternoon at his home to hear me read all my poems” (Letters Home 476). What’s more, Plath 
divulges, “I’m the first woman poet he’s taken seriously since Emily Dickinson!” (476). 
Although Plath reports being “delighted” by this assessment, the way in which Alvarez frames 
her, as he had in his review of The Colossus, as an “exception” to the rule of the “poetess,” the 
way in which he, by doing so, cordons off her work as “women’s writing” in separation from, 
rather than in relation to, the work of men, could hardly have escaped her attention.   
 Two days later, then, on October 27th, just a few days before meeting Alvarez again to 
read him her most recent work, during the same visit to London in which she would record her 
interview with Orr for the BBC, in which she directly cites Alvarez, Plath writes “Ariel,” and in 
doing so, accepts, we might say, Alvarez’s “challenge.” In comparing “Ariel” with Hughes’s “A 
Dream of Horses,” Wootten notes,  
Both poems are about horses and the riding of them, capturing the dawn hour and 
the speed of the horses; they share details: the repeated emphasis upon the horses’ 
eyes, the suicidal way “we” “longed for a death trampled by such horses.” Both 
poems too have an apocalyptic ending. (119) 
While Wooten focuses his comparison, for his purposes, on the interplay between Plath and 
Hughes’s horse poems, “Ariel,” I would argue, isn’t solely in conversation with Hughes’s poem, 
but, as she writes herself into Alvarez’s comparison by way of it, with Larkin’s as well. In being 
“about” “the riding of [horses],” “Ariel,” in a sense, more directly invokes Larkin’s poem than 
Hughes’s. Hughes’s poem generates its tension by contrasting the enclosure of the grooms’ 







thundering in the darkness spur the “stable-horses” (27) to “[batter] their stalls” (26). The “riding 
of [horses]” in Hughes’s poem, in other words, remains latent in the status of the grooms’ horses 
as “stable-horses.” And Hughes’s grooms don’t long to ride the horses thundering beyond the 
stalls or even their own “stable-horses”; they long to “be quartered by them” (27). Larkin’s 
poem, on the other hand, quite directly focuses on the (albeit former) riding of horses, generating 
as it does its tension by contrasting the unobserved and stripped-down leisure of retired 
racehorses with the much-attended finery of their former racing days, with the “Cups and Stakes 
and Handicaps, / [w]hereby their names were artificed / [t]o inlay faded” while “against the sky / 
[there were] [n]umbers and parasols” and “silks at the start” (25).  
In a way, Hughes’s “A Dream of Horses” picks up from where Larkin’s “At Grass” 
leaves off, with “the groom, and the groom’s boy, / [who] [w]ith bridles in the evening come” in 
the poem’s last lines (qtd. in The New Poetry 26). Hughes’s poem, then, could be said to begin 
with these grooms, who introduce themselves in the first line as the poem’s speakers: “We were 
born grooms, in stable-straw we sleep still” (26). And whereas Larkin’s poem ends with a hint of 
approaching darkness, of “evening,” Hughes’s begins in “sleep,” with hooves pounding “[o]ut of 
the night” (26). However, while “Ariel,” like Hughes’s “A Dream of Horses,” begins in the 
darkness toward which the end of Larkin’s poem gestures, it begins not with grooms who “in 
stable-straw . . . sleep still,” with those attenders to horses in their stalls (26), but with 
  Stasis in darkness. 
Then the substanceless blue  
Pour of tor and distances. (Ariel 33) 
“Ariel” begins, then, with a stillness shot through with an anticipation of motion, with a stillness 







of tor and distances.” In other words, “Ariel” begins, we might say, with the stillness of the 
starting gate. And in the next gates over, stand Larkin’s horses, arrayed in their former glory, in 
their “silks at the start.”  
 However, in this race, Larkin’s horses don’t make it out of the gates. Of Alvarez’s 
comparison of Larkin’s “At Grass” and Hughes’s “A Dream of Horses,” Wootten concludes, “if 
the race between the two poems has a winner, that winner is by no means clear,” noting 
Alvarez’s admission of the faults in Hughes’s poem (120). However, given Alvarez’s emphasis 
on the “kind of success a style allows,” despite his admission of Hughes’s lack of control in 
comparison with Larkin’s, Hughes’s success, for Alvarez, outpaces Larkin’s in terms of its depth 
and “seriousness,” both of which Alvarez prizes far more highly than the “elegan[ce]” and 
“[control]” with which he credits Larkin (my emphasis). Although to enter herself in this “race,” 
(this comparison of the Movement with the potential of the “new poetry”), Plath needed to begin 
“Ariel,” so to speak, with Larkin, once out of the gates, it is Hughes’s poem that “Ariel” must 
keep pace with. For Alvarez, Hughes’s poem wins out over Larkin’s because of its “serious,” 
and, we could add, un-genteel “attempt to re-create and so clarify . . . a powerful complex of 
emotion and sensations” (27). And for Alvarez, it is by way of its horses that Hughes’s poem 
attempts such re-creation and clarification:  
Unlike Larkin’s, Hughes’s horses have a violent, impending presence. But 
through the sharp details which bring them so threateningly to life, they reach 
back, as in a dream, into a nexus of fear and sensation. Their brute world is part 
physical, part state of mind. (27) 
With “Ariel,” then, one of the ways in which Plath both invokes and keeps pace with—







speed, power, and threat of Hughes’s horses. In Hughes’s poem, the horses thundering in the 
distance are so powerful, leave such an impression upon the grooms, that the darkness in which 
they run itself becomes motion, becomes “darkness that was avalanching to horses / [a]nd a 
quake of hooves” (26). Likewise, the “darkness” with which “Ariel” begins, too, becomes 
motion, a downward rush, a darkness that shifts to a “substanceless blue / [p]our of tor and 
distances.” Suggesting the approaching dawn with which the poem ends, the “blue” here 
“pour[s]” and then shifts, in its turn, to the speaker’s horse, “God’s lioness,” whose speed and 
power it is that can, for the speaker, “pour . . . tor[s],” that can, in effect, transform high, rocky 
hills into liquid motion. And while “Ariel” begins with a starting-gate eruption of speed, Plath’s 
horse, rather than being adorned with the former “silks” of Larkin’s retired racehorses, appears 
wild and bare; while the speaker indeed rides the horse, the horse takes shape—gains 
“[substance]” in the poem—in the form of “[t]he brown arc / [o]f the neck [the speaker] cannot 
catch” (33). Though ridden, this horse is, at least in effect, unbridled. 
 And such speed and energy is underscored, even enacted, by the poem’s form. If 
Hughes’s poem can be said to be, as Alvarez implies, rather overblown, Plath’s, on the other 
hand—very much in keeping with her speaker’s Lady “Godiva[-like]” “unpeel[ing],” her 
stripping away, we could say, of gentility—is stripped bare (Ariel 33). Whereas “Ariel,” like “A 
Dream of Horses,” is composed of tercets, Hughes’s lines, for example, stretch nearly the full-
width of the page while Plath’s are strikingly short, over half of the lines of the poem consisting 
of no more than three words, three lines consisting of just one. As a result, moving across the 
page, these short lines at times keep the poem’s momentum in check, each word (since there are 
few words) acquiring added emphasis, but the overall movement down the page, unlike that of 







Indeed, in assessing the “faults” of Hughes’s poem, as we have seen, Alvarez points out 
that it “has a number of romantic, quasi-medieval trappings” and while he doesn’t enumerate 
them, it would seem that the poem’s ending might well be one (27). As the grooms awaken in 
“broad day,” “[their] stable-horses / [lying] in their straw, in a hag-sweat, listless and wretched,” 
they awaken to a desire to be “tied, be quartered by these poor horses, / If but doomsday’s flames 
be great horses, / The forever itself a circling of the hooves of horses” (27). This desire to be 
“quartered,”32 especially when read in light of the poem’s second stanza, which situates the 
grooms and their horses within a “palace-gate” (26), indeed generates for the poem a “quasi-
medieval” setting. The structuring of power in the poem, too, we might say, is medieval, the 
relation of the (implied) king or queen to the grooms echoed in the relation of the grooms to their 
horses. Part of what the grooms appear to long for, then, in longing to be quartered, is an 
upending of this hierarchy, a treasonous desire that could merit such punishment. In desiring to 
“be quartered by these poor horses”—the horses, rather than a monarch, in effect, imbued with 
the agency to carry out the sentence—the grooms suggest a giving over of themselves to the 
power of the horses (that power, up to this point, having been contained by their stalls), a giving 
over, Alvarez might say, in other words, to the inner violence and animality of the self, a 
recognition of and delving into the “forces of destruction” he argues are at work “inside of us.” 
And in these final lines, this (decidedly un-genteel) longing to be quartered—and the upturning 
of the structuring of power implicit in such a longing—amplifies further still to a longing for 
apocalypse (for “doomsday’s flames”), the horses, one for each quarter, coming to signify, in 
effect, the four (in this case riderless) horses of the apocalypse. An ushering in of war, death, 
famine, and conquest, a bringing on of a final judgment in which the “good” would be 
                                               
32 Quartering was established in the thirteenth century as part of the punishment for the high crime of treason, along 







distinguished from the “evil” and the “evil” punished, the desire of the grooms to be quartered 
and for “doomsday’s flames [to] be horses” suggests a desire concentrated far more on 
punishment and destruction, on a conscription to the flames, than it does (if it does at all) on 
revelation and renewal.  
Wootten succinctly describes the pared-down quality of Plath’s poem in terms of the 
faults Alvarez locates in Hughes’s: “[Plath] has taken the very poem Alvarez used to show the 
direction in which he would like poetry to go, divested it of quasi-medieval trappings and 
pretentiousness and made it more controlled” (120). Although Plath has certainly stripped any 
“trappings” and “pretentiousness” found in Hughes’s poem, that is not to say, I would argue, that 
“Ariel” contains no medieval references. In fact, a key way in which Plath’s poem invites a 
comparison with Hughes’s is that it is indeed, as Wootten puts it, a poem “about horses,” but 
more specifically, I would argue, a poem about horses situated within a medieval register. 
Whereas the medieval references in “A Dream of Horses” read as “trappings” for Alvarez, those 
in “Ariel” indeed play an integral role.  
 As Judith Kroll writes in her classic study, Chapters in a Mythology: The Poetry of 
Sylvia Plath (1976), while “Ariel” was in fact the name of the horse Plath was learning to ride in 
Devon, and while critics have read the name, as well as the title of the collection, as a reference 
to Shakespeare’s Tempest, the poem’s “primary reference” is biblical: “the derivation of the 
name may be either ‘lion (lioness) of God’ or ‘altar [hearth] of God’” (189). More specifically, 
we might say, the primary reference is medieval-biblical, “[the] word [‘ariel’],” as the Oxford 
English Dictionary reveals, “transferred by Wyclif from the Vulgate” in 1382. Plath invokes this 
meaning (and thereby Hughes’s medieval and biblical register) directly as the speaker first 







And in invoking Hughes’s register, Plath simultaneously divests it of its original power 
dynamics. While the ending of “A Dream of Horses” overturns the dynamic of the groom’s 
relation to the horses (a reiteration of the relation between the implied monarch and the 
grooms)—the grooms longing for the horses to tear them to pieces—the dynamic is inverted 
rather than subverted. In contrast, the dynamic of “Ariel” is one of, as Kroll puts it, “ecstatic 
unity” (188). The poem tracks, in other words, the “grow[ing]” “one[ness]” of the speaker and 
her horse as they gather speed, as together they become motion, a “[p]ivot of heel and knees,” 
the possessor of any given heel or knee indistinguishable, or, at the very least, beside the point.  
And at its center (it’s exact middle, in fact), the poem itself pivots: 
Something else  
 
Hauls me through air— 
Thighs, hair; 
Flakes from my heels. 
 
White  
Godiva, I unpeel— (33) 
Becoming “White / Godiva,” all “[t]highs” and “hair,” the speaker situates her ride within a 
medieval, but also, I would argue, political context:  
The earliest extant source for the story [of Lady Godiva] is the Chronica (under 
the year 1057) of Roger of Wendover (d. 1236). He recounts that her husband, in 







declared he would do so if she rode naked through the crowded marketplace. She 
did so, her hair covering all of her body except her legs. (“Lady Godiva”)  
Readings of “Ariel” have tended to constrict the figurative potential of the speaker’s ride to the 
biographical fact of Plath’s death or else to interpret the ride exclusively as a longing for 
individual transcendence, for a shedding of the world and the individual self (Ariel 33, 34). What 
both readings have in common, therefore, is their framing of the ride as a self-focused, self-
directed act—as an act performed by the self on behalf of the self—with the goal of freeing this 
self from, or moving it beyond, the world. Such readings tend to focus especially on the second 
half of the poem, as the speaker becomes Godiva. From here—from “White / Godiva” 
“unpeel[ing]”—the speaker “[f]oam[s] to wheat, a glitter of seas” until, by the end of the poem, 
she becomes  
  [. . .] the arrow,   
 
  The dew that flies  
Suicidal, at one with the drive 
Into the red 
 
Eye, the cauldron of morning. (34) 
Kroll, for example, works against literal readings of the poem (especially those which have 
focused on its use of “[s]uicidal”) in terms of Plath’s death, arguing that “[a]lthough the personal 
‘I’ [of the speaker] merges with the eye of the rising sun, this is not a suicidal death-wish” (192). 







represents the death of the (personal) self—the little ‘I’; or the (conventional) longing of the soul 
for union with God” (192). 
 While Kroll’s movement beyond literal readings of “[s]uicidal” productively opens up 
the poem’s figurative register, its focus indeed remains on the self. Even if the poem expresses a 
longing for a union with God, with something greater than the self—as the speaker’s reference to 
her horse as “God’s lioness” seems to suggest—this longing is for an individual union with God. 
Certainly this individual “drive” for “mystical union or transcendence” is a critical component of 
the speaker’s ride; however, such readings, I would argue, overlook the political valence with 
which Plath ascribes this ride and, in doing so, fundamentally misread the poem’s ending. By 
identifying herself as Godiva, the speaker indeed encodes her ride as a political act, as an act 
performed not only with her self in mind, but others. As the speaker becomes “White / Godiva” 
in the middle of the poem, the poem shifts from an evocation of the physical experience of the 
ride—the speed and power of, and growing union with, her horse—to its figurative potentialities. 
Once the horse has achieved “substance” in the third stanza as “[t]he brown arc / [o]f the neck I 
cannot catch,” as the poem progresses no other physical details are evoked and, as a result, the 
horse recedes from a particular physical presence to the speed and drive which propel the poem 
toward its final image. The speaker’s longing for oneness, then, shifts from a union with her 
horse, with physical power and speed—“God’s lioness, / [h]ow one we grow”—to a union with 
the non-physical drive itself that propels both speaker and horse—the horse, as Alvarez says of 
Hughes’s horses, becoming “part physical, part state of mind,” or, perhaps more specifically, 
shifting from “physical” to “state of mind”—until, by the poem’s end, the speaker has become 
“at one with the drive.” And it is this drive that the speaker identifies (differentiating it from the 







besides her horse] [h]auls me through air”—[t]highs, hair.” The speaker defines the drive, in 
other words, as the drive of “White / Godiva,” the dash here, in effect, presenting those 
metonymic details of thighs and hair as this “[s]omething else,” recalling as they do that Godiva, 
in her naked ride, as the legend goes, covered all of her body with her hair except for her legs. 
Part of this Godiva-drive is, of course, an “unpeel[ing],” and for the speaker this 
unpeeling, this “stripping away” of an “outer layer,”33 is not simply the stripping away of the 
individual self, as it has generally been read, but the stripping away of the individual self—as it 
is for the Godiva of legend—in sacrifice for the collective. As the legend goes, in riding naked 
through the town, Godiva sacrifices her modesty (as well as, we might add, her “gentility”) in 
exchange for an easing of the townspeople’s suffering: “it is said that so great was her 
compassion for the people of Coventry that Godiva overcame her horror of doing this” (“An 
Anglo-Saxon Tale”). By identifying the “something else” that “hauls [her] through air” as the 
drive of Godiva (“thighs, hair”), Plath’s speaker indeed defines—indeed enacts—this drive as a 
drive for sacrifice, an offering up of the individual self on behalf, at least in part, of the 
community; the drive of Godiva, in other words, becomes in “Ariel” “the drive / [i]nto the red / 
[e]ye, the cauldron of morning” (Ariel 34). As Kroll points out, the word “Ariel” derives its 
biblical meanings—including “God’s lioness”—from the Old Testament. The Book of Leviticus, 
for example, gives us “Ariel” as “altar (hearth) of God”: “The altar of holocausts is called the 
‘ariel of God’ . . . on this altar burned the perpetual fire that was used to consume the sacrificial 
victims” (qtd. in Kroll 189). In “Ariel,” then, Plath figures this “altar” on which sacrifices 
                                               
33 The Oxford English Dictionary defines “unpeel” as “to peel (in various senses); esp. to strip away (an outer 







“burned” in “perpetual fire” as the sun, as the “cauldron of morning” toward which the speaker, 
at one with her horse and the drive of Godiva,34 rides in the final lines of the poem.  
It is in this single and final image of the cauldron that Plath effectively boils down 
Hughes’s “quasi-medieval trappings,” reorienting his medieval-biblical register toward the 
generative and female-centered potentialities of the future. Indeed, it is within this image that 
Plath melds the medieval legend of Godiva—and, as we will see, the ancient mythical structures 
underlying it—with the biblical resonances of “Ariel.” The cauldron is at once God’s fiery 
“altar” of sacrifices into which the speaker, as Godiva, offers herself, and an ancient symbol 
evoking witchcraft and the White Goddess. As Barbara Walker writes in The Woman’s 
Dictionary of Symbols and Sacred Objects (1988), “The cauldron was the prime female symbol 
of the pre-Christian world, which is why Christians universally associated it with witchcraft” 
(124). And as Kroll notes, for Robert Graves, whose The White Goddess: A Historical Grammar 
of Poetic Myth (1948) both Hughes and Plath knew well,35 “the Godiva legend derives from a 
disguised form of a White Goddess procession” (191). Indeed, Plath suggests as much as her 
speaker identifies herself not as Lady Godiva, but as “White / Godiva.” And for Graves, the 
cauldron was closely associated with the White Goddess: “a common emblem of the White 
Goddess as Muse is her cauldron of poetic inspiration, mentioned many times by Graves” (Kroll 
274, footnote 17). More specifically, as Laura Annawyn Shamas points out in “We Three”: The 
Mythology of Shakespeare's Weird Sisters (2007), “In The White Goddess, Graves profiles the 
cauldron of the Celtic Triple Goddess Cerridwin; in her myth when three burning drops from her 
                                               
34 Becoming one with her horse and her Godiva-drive, the speaker and her horse fuse as an offering. As Kroll points 
out, “Godiva’s name—‘Godgifu,’ ‘God’s gift’ is parallel to the epithet ‘God’s lioness’” (274, footnote 15).  
35 As Kroll writes, “Hughes . . . confirmed Plath’s familiarity with the book,” noting that “[h]e and a friend had a 
‘cult’ of the White Goddess, which Sylvia Plath ‘immediately took up’” (42). In a journal from May of 1958, for 
example, Plath records searching The White Goddess with Hughes for baby names, “unearth[ing] a whole series of 
subtle symbolic names for children whose souls haunt me,” coming up with a list of names, “all white goddesses and 







brew fall on little Gwion’s finger, who stirs her cauldron, ultimate knowledge is given to the 
child” (58). “Graves,” Shamas writes, “connects Cerridwin’s cauldron with rebirth and 
illumination” (58).36  
For Wootten, one of the “details” that “Ariel” “shares” with “A Dream of Horses” is “the 
suicidal way ‘we’ ‘longed for a death trampled by such horses’” (119). While the two poems 
unquestionably evoke a “suicidal” drive, and do so by way of horses, Wootten here translates 
“Ariel” in terms of—indeed by way of quoting—“A Dream of Horses.” However, the two 
evocations of a suicidal drive, I would argue, are markedly distinct. Plath’s use of “suicidal” 
indeed invokes, but by way of invoking, transfigures the suicidal drive that brings “A Dream of 
Horses” to its fiery conclusion. The “suicidal” drive of Plath’s speaker, in other words, is not 
simply a drive for death and destruction, both of which Hughes’s speakers long for as they long 
to be trampled and quartered, but rather a drive for the “unpeel[ing]” of Godiva, for “suicide” as 
sacrifice, and more specifically, as a sacrifice ushering in collective redemption, illumination, 
and rebirth.  
The “suicidal” drive of both poems indeed culminates with a longing for apocalypse, and 
while, as Wootten puts it, “[b]oth poems have an apocalyptic ending,” their endings, in keeping 
with their drives, I would argue, differ strikingly. As in Leviticus, “Ariel” in the Book of Isaiah 
also means a fiery altar of sacrifice, but in Isaiah this altar is placed within an apocalyptic 
narrative of the “judgment and deliverance of Jerusalem”:37 “Jerusalem is called Ariel by Isaia[h] 
in the prophecy in which he describes the capture, the destruction, and the divine preservation of 
                                               
36 In “A Dream of Horses,” the grooms awaken to find their “stable-horses . . . in a hag-sweat, listless and 
wretched,” as if they had been tormented by an evil female demon or witch (qtd. in The New Poetry 27). In “Ariel,” 
Plath takes this off-hand witch-inflected description and makes of it the central symbol of the cauldron. And for 
Graves, Cerridwin herself becomes, “by the end of her story . . . ‘a screaming black hag,’ both creator and 
destroyer” (Shamas 58). 








the Holy City . . . the prophet sees [Z]ion awaiting the impending invasion of Sennacherib like an 
altar on which the immolated victims will be consumed” (qtd. in Kroll 189). Isaiah envisions in 
his prophecy a Lord who declares to the people of Jerusalem, “I will bring distress upon Ariel”; 
“I will encamp like David against you” (“Isaiah, Chapter 29”: 2, 3). Brought low (“You shall 
speak from beneath the earth, / and from the dust below, your words shall come”), the people are 
judged (“The horde of your arrogant shall be like fine dust, / a horde of tyrants like flying chaff”) 
and the fire is unloosed (4, 5):  
Then suddenly, in an instant, 
 
you shall be visited by the LORD of hosts, 
With thunder, earthquake, and great noise, 
whirlwind, storm, and the flame of consuming fire. (5-6) 
The prophesy, however, does not end here with destruction and fire, as the longing of 
Hughes’s grooms for “doomsday’s flames” does, but rather with the redemption and rebirth 
of the city:  
On that day the deaf shall hear 
the words of a scroll; 
And out of gloom and darkness, 
the eyes of the blind shall see. (18) 
And the city soon will be renewed, as 
Surely, in a very little while, 
Lebanon shall be changed into an orchard, 







 In the speaker’s ride into the cauldron, then, Plath in effect harnesses the speed, 
power, and destruction of Hughes’s horses, but does so in the service not only of punishment, 
destruction, and a conscription to the flames (upon which “A Dream of Horses” largely 
focuses), but of the redemption and rebirth that such destruction—set as it is within the 
medieval and biblical narratives of Godiva, the White Goddess, and the Old Testament 
“Ariel”—enables. In the image of the cauldron, in other words, the speaker’s Godiva-ride as 
sacrifice to ease the townspeople’s burdens melds with the ride of her horse—having become 
one with her horse, with “Ariel”—as the altar upon which Jerusalem, as sacrifice, must burn 
before being redeemed. 
Plath indeed redoubles her emphasis on rebirth, distancing “Ariel”—which she 
composed, I think not coincidentally, on her birthday—still further from “A Dream of 
Horses,” as her speaker rides not only toward a cauldron—which, as we have seen, Graves 
“connects . . . with rebirth and illumination”—but toward, more specifically, a “cauldron of 
morning.” Wootten notes that “A Dream of Horses” and “Ariel” both “[capture] the dawn 
hour” (119). However, after “hav[ing] fallen like drunkards into a dream / [o]f listening, 
lulled by the thunder of the horses” in the darkness, when Hughes’s grooms “aw[aken],” it is 
“broad day”; it is precisely, in other words, the dawn hour that they have missed (qtd. in 
Alvarez, The New Poetry 27). In “Ariel,” on the other hand, it is the approach of dawn, we 
could say, that sets the poem in motion; there is “stasis in darkness” until the darkness begins 
to lighten, to turn blue and the blue itself turns to motion—“the substanceless blue / [p]our of 
tor and distances.” The poem, then, which begins with approaching dawn, ends with dawn 
itself, with a shift from “blue” “into the red / [e]ye, the cauldron of morning.” In harnessing 







Horses,” leaving it behind with the longed-for death and destruction with which it ends. 
While Hughes’s poem ends with the grooms longing for a “doomsday” of fire and destruction 
(a longing situated, by way of its “quasi-medieval trappings,” in the past), “Ariel” ends—by 
way of its own medieval-biblical references, by way, in other words, of its final image of the 
cauldron—with a riding forward into a future rich with transformative potential.  
If “A Dream of Horses” was, for Alvarez, the present state of “the new poetry” he was 
calling for, then, “Ariel” indeed charged forward into its future. In his preface for the revised 
edition of The New Poetry, published four years later in 1966, Alvarez reflected back on his 
introduction, assessing the degree to which it had succeeded as “an attempt,” as he had 
intended it, “to read the entrails and prophesy the direction poetry might soon take” (17). “To 
some extent,” he concludes, “I seem to have been proved right” (17): “the essay seemed to 
correspond to some genuine poetic reality” (18). Noting that he had eased “some of the self-
imposed restrictions of the first edition,” which “no longer seem[ed] necessary or justified,” 
Alvarez announces that he has now included two more poets in the “American” section, Anne 
Sexton and Sylvia Plath, whose “work, more than anyone else’s, makes sense of my 
introduction” (18). While Alvarez mentions the introduction as having “even hit a response 
nerve in one or two serious writers,” given that he bemoans not having been able “to include 
far more of Sylvia Plath’s poems,” since “her literary executors felt, reasonably enough, that 
this might interfere with the sale of her first posthumous collection,” it would seem that it was 
Plath he had mainly in mind. As it stood, although Sexton and Plath appear about equally 
represented in the table of contents (the anthology including six of Sexton’s poems and seven 
of Plath’s), the anthology itself tells a different story. While Alvarez affords Sexton six pages 







The discrepancy in page distribution here may well have been the result of an issue of 
permissions, of an upcoming volume (Sexton published Live or Die in 1967, within about a 
year of the anthology’s revised edition); however, Alvarez’s later reflections suggest 
otherwise. In The Savage God, published five years after his revised edition of The New 
Poetry, he reproduces nearly verbatim the sentence (including its structure) that he had 
originally used to situate Sexton and Plath in relation to his introduction, but this time Sexton 
is missing. This time, Alvarez writes, it is “[Plath’s] work, more than anyone else’s, [that] 
vindicates my argument” (40). It is Plath’s work, in other words, rather than Sexton’s or 
Lowell’s (her “confessional” counterparts in the anthology’s “American” section), rather than 
Hughes’s (or the work of any other British poet on the scene), that Alvarez felt most fully 
realized “the new seriousness” of “the new poetry.” (“I believe,” Alvarez writes, drawing to a 




The Plath-Alvarez interchange indeed brings us considerably closer to a fuller version 
of the “story” of the Ariel poems, revealing the degree to which Plath conceived “Ariel,” and, 
as we will see, the collection of poems that bears its title, as an intervention into the 
contemporary British literary scene. Strangely, Alvarez is largely absent from readings of 
Ariel; while mentioned often (usually in terms of the biographical role he played in 
supporting Plath’s poetry), he is mentioned mostly in passing. Wootten’s study of the 
interplay between Alvarez’s ideas and Plath’s poetry, therefore, is an invaluable addition to 
Plath studies. However, once we’ve added the layer of the story that both Wootten as well as 







biographical, and political and historical components of the story in terms of Plath’s 
engagement with her immediate literary scene—key elements remain missing.  
While Alvarez certainly plays a fundamental role, his ideas of “the new seriousness” 
of “the new poetry” are largely absent from studies of Plath’s poetry perhaps for the very 
reason I argue that we can’t stop here with him in The Savage God. Although he concludes 
his reflections on Plath by emphasizing, in effect, the ways in which Plath remains alive in 
her poetry, observing that “her poems still speak so distinctly in her accents: quick, sardonic, 
unpredictable, effortlessly inventive, a bit angry, and always utterly her own,” Alvarez, for his 
purposes (the book’s subtitle is A Study of Suicide), ends his reflections on Plath with Plath’s 
death (56). And later in the volume, what was once “the new seriousness” of “the new 
poetry,” becomes, for Alvarez, “Extremist art,” an art in which “the destruction [of the age] is 
all turned inwards and the artist deliberately explores in himself that narrow, violent area 
between the possible and the impossible, the tolerable and the intolerable” (267). When Plath 
is categorized as such, this emphasis on extremity and inwardness, then, prompts us to read 
Ariel backward through the lens of her death, to read the volume, in other words, as 
inexorably death-bent.  
Such fatalism hardly does justice to the full creative range of Plath’s achievement, to 
the ways in which, for example, she situates death within a cycle of rebirth, renewal, and 
transformation, as we will see. While Alvarez insists on a distinction between Plath’s life and 
art—“her actual suicide, like Berryman’s or like Lowell’s breakdowns or the private horrors 
of Hughes, is by the way; it adds nothing to her work and proves nothing about it”—this 
distinction effectively collapses indeed into fatalism, into the literal: “it is with Sylvia Plath 







collection of essays, Beyond all This Fiddle (1968), “The achievement of [Plath’s] final style 
is to make poetry and death inseparable” (57). “In a curious way,” he writes, “the poems read 
as though they were written posthumously” (57). And as Alvarez was the first critical 
champion of Plath’s work, his ideas would shape discussion of Plath for some time.  
Wootten, too, for his purposes, tracing as he does Plath’s interactions with Alvarez and 
his support for her work, effectively ends his chapter on Plath with her death, with, in particular, 
Alvarez’s “A Poet’s Epitaph” published in the Observer six days after her suicide, written, as 
Wootten puts it, “at once [as] an obituary, a first attempt to bestow upon a poet high critical 
standing and a first showing of examples of the work that would justify esteem” (128). While 
Wootten’s study contributes much to a fuller understanding of the Ariel poems, what’s missing, I 
would argue, is modernism. What’s missing, more specifically, is an examination of the ways in 
which, in aligning herself with Alvarez’s “new seriousness,” Plath repurposes his reclaimed 
modernism—his efforts, in other words, to legitimize this “new poetry” by securing for it a 
modernist pedigree—for a project toward which she had long been aiming. As Plath positions 
her engagements of her political and historical moment—her engagements of what she calls in 
her Orr interview, “the bigger things”—as an engagement with her contemporary literary 
moment, aligning herself, as we have seen in her discussion with Orr, with Alvarez’s ideas, she 
simultaneously engages the (past) literary moment of modernism. In other words, to engage her 
contemporary literary moment and “the bigger things” was, for Plath, in no small part, to engage 
modernism. And, conversely, to engage modernism was no nostalgic escape from her 
contemporary literary moment, but rather a direct engagement of it. And Wootten himself 
gestures toward the narrative threads of Ariel’s development still left to be explored: “For all 







Plath was producing in autumn 1962” (118). To examine more fully both the ways in which 
Plath explored the relation between “personal experience” and “the bigger things” and the ways 
in which she configured this exploration as answering Alvarez’s call for a “new poetry”—to 
begin to draw us, in other words, still closer to the particular Ariel quality of the Ariel poems—
we must return to Plath’s interview with Orr, to “Lady Lazarus,” and, through “Lady Lazarus,” 




While with “Ariel,” Plath had inscribed herself into Alvarez’s introduction to The New 
Poetry, when she gives her interview with Orr for the BBC about two weeks later, she in turn 
inscribes Alvarez into her own statement of Ariel poetics. Whereas leading up to the interview, 
Plath had likely found some consolation in her proximity to Lowell for having been excluded 
from the anthology, in the interview itself she explicitly aligns herself with Lowell, or rather 
more specifically, with a Lowell read through the lens of Alvarez’s “new seriousness.” Plath, in 
other words, aligns herself with the “intense breakthrough into very serious, very personal, 
emotional experience” of Life Studies. And in aligning herself, too, with Anne Sexton,38 Plath 
affiliates herself not simply with these two poets but with the new current in American poetry—
the wider “American thing,” as she refers to it—that these two poets were beginning to represent. 
And it is her alignment with Sexton that seems particularly close; her description of Sexton’s 
work, it would seem, could just as readily apply to her own: “I think particularly the poetess 
Anne Sexton, who writes about her experience as a mother, as a mother who has had a nervous 
                                               
38 When Orr asks Plath toward the beginning of the interview, what themes and subject matter she finds herself 







breakdown, is an extremely emotional and feeling young woman” (168). Although Plath and 
Sexton share with Lowell the experience of breakdown, then, it is with Sexton alone that Plath 
shares the experience of motherhood, an experience, as we will see in Chapter 3, that plays a 
fundamental role not only in Ariel itself, but in Plath’s transition to the Ariel poems. However, 
while Plath gestures toward affinities with Sexton that exceed Alvarez’s critical framework, she 
reads Sexton here primarily through Alvarez’s lens, in terms of a Lawrencian attention to inner 
life “controlled” by Eliotic “craft”: “her poems are wonderfully craftsman-like poems and yet 
they have a kind of emotional and psychological depth which I think is something perhaps quite 
new, quite exciting” (168). And just how new Anne Sexton’s work was to the British poetry 
scene, Orr underscores in his transcription of the interview in which he renders the poet “Ann 
Saxton” (168). 
In aligning herself with “confessionalism,” then, Plath was indeed aligning herself with 
Alvarez’s reconfiguration of modernism. As Alvarez concludes in his introduction, “the best 
contemporary English verse” was able to bring together what Leavis depicted as “the two 
warring and unreconcilable poles of modern literature”—Lawrence and Eliot (28). In such 
verse—as it follows the lead, as Alvarez points out, of Lowell—“the psychological insight and 
integrity of D. H. Lawrence [ . . . ] combine[s] with the technical skill and formal intelligence of 
T. S. Eliot” (28). Such is the case, then, it would seem, with Sexton in Plath’s estimation, and 
with Plath herself, given the experience and “craft” that could just as easily characterize her own 
work. However, as we will see, Plath charts for her “confessionalism” a somewhat different 
route through modernism. For Plath, Lowell and Sexton indeed “combine” the “psychological 
insight” of Lawrence and the “formal intelligence” of Eliot, but this combination, or rather this 







presents it in her interview with Orr. 
While Plath identifies the “peculiar, private and taboo subjects” that Lowell addresses in 
Life Studies, such as “his experience in a mental hospital,” as subjects that “have been explored 
in recent American poetry” more generally, she, like Alvarez, is careful to distinguish her own 
use of the personal, as well as Lowell’s and Sexton’s (whose use she describes in similar terms), 
from those other American experiments with the personal, those of the Beats. “I think my poems 
immediately come out of the sensuous and emotional experiences I have,” Plath tells Orr,  
but I must say I cannot sympathize with these cries from the heart that are 
informed by nothing except a needle or a knife, or whatever it is. I believe that 
one should be able to control and manipulate experiences, even the most 
terrifying, like madness, being tortured [ . . . ], and one should be able to 
manipulate these experiences with an informed and an intelligent mind. (169) 
In characterizing Plath’s poetry, Alvarez never once uses the term “confessional.” For Alvarez, 
as he would claim in his essay, “Poetry in Extremis,” published in 1965, Plath’s poetry “is too 
concentrated and detached and ironic for ‘confessional’ verse, with all that implies about self-
indulgent cashing-in on misfortunes” (26). In other words, for Alvarez, true “confessional” 
poetry became “indulgent” at least in part as a result, as we see in Plath’s implicit reference to 
the Beats, of its apparent lack of Eliotic “control.” As Alvarez put it, on the heels of The New 
Poetry’s publication, the challenge of “the new seriousness,” of “try[ing] to cope with [the] 
forces [of disintegration] and create real poetry out of them,” was to “[n]ot just express them as, 
say, Ginsberg did in that poem ‘Kaddish,’ which seems to me a rather heavily edited transcript of 
what happened between Ginsberg and his psychiatrist” (“A. Alvarez and Donald Davie” 19, my 







in Life Studies, those that, as we have seen, “fail for appearing more compulsively concerned 
with the processes of psychoanalysis than with those of poetry” (The New Poetry 25).  
 In taking a shot at the Beats, Alvarez was in good company. In her essay published in The 
Cambridge Companion to the Beats (2017), “The Beats and Literary History,” Nancy M. Grace 
writes that “[i]n the 1950s and 1960s, critical consensus remained steadfast in its condemnation 
of Beat literature and Beat culture”: “For [ . . . ] [its] detractors, Beat writing was unrehearsed, 
willfully anti-intellectual (i.e. opposed to intellect and reason in favor of action and emotion) and 
anti-academic (i.e. opposed to scholarly activities associated with colleges and universities), as 
well as being shocking for the sake of shocking, a situation proving that the Beats wallowed in 
ignorance of preceding literary movements, lineages, and ancestors” (62). And for Alvarez, this 
perceived “wallowing in ignorance” was specifically a “wallowing in ignorance” of Eliot’s line 
of modernism, without which, the “confessionalism” of the Beats devolved into romantic excess, 
suffering from “that split between feeling and intelligence which has bedeviled decadent 
Romanticism from Shelley to Ginsberg” (The Savage God 275). Whereas for Alvarez, then, what 
saved “serious” explorations of the personal and psychological from the charges of “self-
indulgen[ce]” and “wallowing” was Eliot’s “formal intelligence,” for Plath there remained one 
final requirement, and it is with this requirement that she effectively parts ways not only with the 
Beats, but with Lowell and Sexton.  
 It is here, wielding Eliot’s own key terms from his essay “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” 
(1923), as we will see, that Plath tells Orr that “very serious, very personal, emotional 
experience” should not only be “controlled” and “manipulate[d]”—as Lowell and Sexton, in 
particular, in Plath’s estimation, controlled theirs—but, what’s more, to avoid the charge of 







but certainly it shouldn’t be a kind of shut-box and mirror-looking, narcissistic experience. I 
believe it should be relevant, and relevant to the larger things, the bigger things, such as 
Hiroshima and Dachau and so on” (170). In other words, for Plath, avoiding the charge of “self-
indulgen[ce]” took not only Eliotic “control,” but also a placing of personal experience into 
relation to “the bigger things,” something Alvarez would certainly (as he did in Plath’s case) 
endorse, but did not require. As he clarifies in The New Poetry,  
I am not suggesting that modern English poetry, to be really modern, must be 
concerned with psychoanalysis or with the concentration camps or with the 
hydrogen bomb or with any other of the modern horrors. For poetry that feels it 
has to cope with pre-determined subjects ceases to be poetry and becomes 
propaganda. I am, however, suggesting that it drop the pretense that life, give or 
take a few social distinctions, is the same as ever, that gentility, decency, and all 
the other social totems will eventually muddle through. (23) 
So while Alvarez doesn’t require the situating of personal experience in relation to “the bigger 
things,” nor does he provide, as Wootten puts it, a “blueprint” for doing so, his essay indeed 
establishes a critical framework to both support and help to interpret such a project.  
For Alvarez, the “horrors” of the twentieth century were a distinctly modern 
phenomenon. “War and cruelty have always existed,” he writes, “but those of the twentieth 
century are different in two ways”:  
First, mass evil (for lack of a better term) has been magnified to match the scale 
of mass society. We no longer have local wars, we have world wars, which 
involve the civilians quite as deeply as the military. Where once, at worst, 







the death of individuals, we have mass extermination. Instead of individual torture 
and sadism, we have concentration camps run scientifically as death factories. 
(22) 
“War and cruelty” wrought on such a mass scale, Alvarez observes, “make it increasingly 
difficult to ignore,” so much so that a failure to register “the forces of disintegration” at work 
within these “modern horrors,” a failure to acknowledge “that life [ . . . ] is [indeed not] the same 
as ever,” as Alvarez claimed the Movement poets failed to do, was to engage in a nostalgic 
fantasy that was, at this point in history, tantamount to willed ignorance. And such willed 
ignorance, given the context, carried not only physical (in the sense of allowing an uninterrupted 
continuation of the conditions of war), but also psychological and ethical freight: “Once upon a 
time, the English could safely believe that Evil was something that happened on the Continent, 
or farther off, in the Empire where soldiers were paid to take care of it. To believe this now 
requires at best an extraordinary single-mindedness, at worst stupidity” (23).  
 The second way in which “the forces of disintegration” prove specifically modern for 
Alvarez has to do with the lens through which, at midcentury (in the wake of Freud), they are 
necessarily viewed: “the forceable recognition of a mass evil outside us has developed precisely 
parallel with psychoanalysis; that is, with our recognition of the ways in which the same forces 
are at work within us” (23). In other words, Alvarez argues not only that “all our lives [ . . . ] are 
profoundly influenced by [these] forces,” but that “the [very] same forces [that] are at work” in 
the “modern horrors” of the wider world are also at work “within us” (my emphasis). Therefore, 
the critical framework that Alvarez offers is a construction of a parallel between the public and 
what we might call the private “faces” of these “forces of disintegration,” a parallel, as Plath puts 







seriousness,” Alvarez does not insist upon an explicit exploration of this parallel—merely a 
dropping of the “pretense” of “gentility”—Plath makes such an exploration indeed central not 
only to her Ariel poetics as she defines it in her interview with Orr, but to the Ariel poems in 
which this poetics becomes fully materialized.  
No Ariel poem more than “Lady Lazarus,” for example, explores such a parallel, explores 
the degree to which “the forces of disintegration which destroy the old standards of 
civilization”—forces that manifest themselves both publicly and privately—prove all too close to 
home; indeed they are home. “It is hard to live in an age of psychoanalysis and feel oneself 
wholly detached from the dominant public savagery,” Alvarez writes in The New Poetry (23). In 
“Lady Lazarus,” death functions as the medium for this sense of “attachment,” as a figure, that 
is, for the “disintegration” that aligns its private and public manifestations (its “faces”) in 
parallel. As a suicide who “rise[s]” phoenix-like from “the ash,” Plath’s speaker is indeed not 
only “not detached” from these public faces, she emerges from death inscribed by them: “my 
skin /[b]right as a Nazi lampshade,” “my face a featureless, fine / Jew linen” (Ariel 14). And this 
“public” face of atrocity, which would “terrify,” is at the same time, Lady Lazarus tells us, “[a]t 
home on me / [a]nd I a smiling woman” (14).  
Although Alvarez didn’t insist upon (nor provide a blueprint for) situating “serious” 
personal experience in relation to “the bigger things,”39 the framework he provides for such a 
practice proves all the more important considering the long line of criticism that has read Plath’s 
work as insistently, even pathologically, focused on the self, that has read her references to the 
historical and political (if these references are indeed read) as constituting a movement inward 
                                               
39 In fact, Plath’s response to Alvarez’s call proved so much her own that Alvarez himself could not have anticipated 
it; indeed upon hearing some of the Ariel poems for the first time, he described himself as “appalled” and likened the 







into the self so forceful and unremitting as to collapse the very historical—particularly her 
references to the Holocaust—into that self.40 However, for Plath, as we will see, to structure a 
parallel between the public and private “faces” of “the forces of disintegration” was not to 
collapse the two; through what I will call (borrowing from Walter Benjamin’s reading of 
Brecht’s epic theater) the “epic acting” of many of her speakers, Plath maintains a critical 
distance both between speaker and audience and between these public and private faces, this 
distance serving as a space—and indeed calling attention to this space—that, to borrow from 
Arendt, both “relates” and “separates” (The Human Condition 52). And yet, Plath’s references to 
“the bigger things” have often been read as idiosyncratic and markedly out of place, at best, and 
symptomatic of individual ego and neuroses, at worst. The framework Alvarez provides, then, 
underscores the degree to which such a parallel, such a relation (and separation) between 
personal experience and “the bigger things”—as Plath explored it within the particular literary, 
political, and historical moment of early 1960s England—proved not simply an individual (or 
idiosyncratic) concern on Plath’s part, but a more general concern that not only manifests in 
Alvarez’s call for a “new poetry,” a “new seriousness,” but in a wider intellectual current that 
traces, in part, from the Frankfort school, a current in which Alvarez’s own call could be said to 
be rooted.41 
                                               
40 Such is, for example, Seamus Heaney’s condemnation, characteristic in the tenor and terms of its critique, 
claiming as it does that in poems such as “Lady Lazarus,” “the cultural resonance of the original story harnesses to a 
vehemently self-justifying purpose” (168). Strikingly, critics have claimed that her work fails in precisely the terms 
with which she defined it. Careful, in her interview with Orr, to qualify her use of personal experience, placing it 
into conversation with the historical so that it doesn’t become “mirror-looking, narcissistic experience,” in Calvin 
Bedient’s assessment, it is history itself, in Plath’s hands, that becomes a mirror: “Plath uses the historical and the 
mythic as a vanity mirror. When she writes as if she were abused as a Nazi victim, she climbs to self-importance 
over the bodies of the dead” (qtd. in Brennan 45). Self-justifying, self-aggrandizing, according to this line of 
criticism, Plath’s reach toward “the bigger things” always folds back onto the self.  
41 Erich Fromm’s Escape from Freedom (1941), for example, in effect lays the groundwork—with its charting of a 
shift in modern psychology, a shift, that is, in individual psychology that plays out on the collective level, helping to 
account for the ease with which fascism took root—for the parallel Alvarez draws between the “forces of 
disintegration” at work on both the private and “public” level, a parallel that the development of psychoanalysis, he 







Gilbert and Gubar, for example, whose reading of Plath’s WWII references is certainly 
more nuanced than that of these earlier “self”-focused critics, conclude, as Peel paraphrases it, 
that “[i]n writing about her present world, Plath is drawing on the iconography, imagery, and 
discourses of her childhood and writing back to her past” (30). Such a narrative—even given its 
nuance and the fact that there is certainly truth to it—falls far too easily in line with the narrative 
of these earlier critics, one that charts Plath’s engagement with the larger, historical world in 
terms of an inward, self-bound arc. Stating that “[i]n writing about her present world, Plath is . . . 
writing back to her past,” Gilbert and Gubar, too, chart Plath’s engagement with the larger world 
as not only a movement inward, but also as a movement backward, as what could be 
characterized as a rather regressive retreat from present realities into the past naiveties of 
“childhood.”42  
However, what Alvarez’s framework—to which Plath herself, in her interview with Orr, 
directs us—allows us to see more clearly is that Gilbert and Gubar’s argument proves at least 
equally true in reverse: in writing about WWII, about the past, Plath is writing about her present. 
And her present here is not only the present as she experienced it individually but the present as 
                                               
Hannah Arendt as part of the intellectual current from which Alvarez was drawing. Arendt—who had befriended 
Benjamin in Paris before Hitler’s invasion (Benjamin, who had himself identified loosely with the Frankfurt 
school)—served, as Wootten puts it, pointing particularly to On the Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), as one of 
Alvarez’s “great sources” (49). 
“Whether Plath herself read [ . . . ] Arendt with great attention, or even at all, does not greatly matter,” 
Wootten writes; “She was getting enough of [her] in concentrated form from talking to Alvarez, from reading 
‘Beyond the Gentility Principle’ and from the many pieces of popular and specialized neo-Sartrean analysis of the 
time” (116). We will be exploring Plath’s work in relation to both Arendt and Fromm in Chapter 3. As for Fromm, 
as we have seen, Plath’s connection to his work was direct: she owned a copy of Escape from Freedom, having 
written an essay on it while a student at Smith, and she kept this copy with her when she moved to London in 
December of 1962. As I will argue, Fromm indeed became a key presence for Plath during her prolific six weeks 
during the fall of 1962. 
42 As Peel puts it, “[Gilbert and Gubar] assert that the Ariel poems show that throughout her entire life, the ‘real’ 
world for Plath remained the marked world of her childhood, the world of the second world war” (28). While noting 
the “subtle[ty]” of their reading and acknowledging that Gilbert and Gubar “avoid the trap of viewing poetry as 
sociology” and that “there is much in Plath’s writing to encourage readings which emphasize the way that the 1940s 
and the war cast a long shadow which influenced her writing in complex ways,” Peel argues that “[Plath] was also 







it was registered collectively within the broader literary, political, and historical moment of early 
1960s England. In fact, a key distinguishing feature of Plath’s own (collective) moment was 
indeed the very presentness of the past. In his volume of The Oxford English Literary History, 
The Last of England? (2004), R. W. Stevenson notes that “the literary history of the period 1960-
2000 might well be judged to have started with events in 1945, or at any rate with belated 
reactions to them” (56). Stevenson traces for us the belatedness of the two “bigger things” Plath 
herself invokes with her references to Hiroshima and Dachau:  
Present since 1945, the atomic threat had been quickly heightened by the Cold 
War which soon followed, and the development of a Soviet nuclear bomb by 
1949. But the real hazards of atomic warfare seemed to become widely apparent 
only in the later 1950s,43 reflected in the rise of the CND [the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament] at the time,44 and summed up in W. H. Auden’s 
conclusion, in Encounter in June 1959, that “there has seldom been a time . . . 
when the present and future of the whole human endeavour on this earth have 
seemed questionable to so many people” (p. 72). Regular weapons tests and 
confrontations between the superpowers made human life seem even more 
questionable in the early 1960s. Forty years later, Martin Amis recalled the Cuban 
Missile Crisis as “the most severe in human history”: a “long dankly gleaming 
                                               
43 Sitwell, as we will see in Chapter 3, proves rather prescient in this regard, having registered Hiroshima within her 
mythopoesis of “the Cold” and what she calls the “Second Fall of Man” (The Canticle of the Rose xxxiv). Sitwell, 
“The Shadow of Cain,” the first of her “Three Poems of the Atomic Age,” published in 1947. 
44 As Stevenson writes, “Government adherence to Cold War politics . . . frustrated the most broadly popular 
movement to emerge from the late 1950s, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), founded in 1958. 
Drawing on disgust at Britain's late imperial ambitions at Suez, as well as anxiety at the proliferation and testing of 
atomic weapons, CND gathered support independently of conventional party allegiances. [ . . . ] By 1961, annual 
CND marches to the atomic weapons laboratory at Aldermaston. . . seemed to Raymond Williams to represent a 







twilight” which left “the children of the nuclear age . . . weakened in their 
capacity to love.” (54) 
“Uncertainties of ‘the whole human endeavor,’ its present and its future,” Stevenson concludes, 
“shadowed life and imagination throughout the rest of the century, shaping an era radically 
lacking confidence in the powers and endurance of its culture and civilization,” as Alvarez 
himself registers in his “forces of disintegration which destroy the old standards of civilization” 
(54). Indeed, across Plath’s letters, journals, and poetry, we can trace this shadow—the shadow, 
for example, of what Stevenson calls “Britain's late imperial ambitions at Suez,”45 which would 
later, along with the “anxiety [produced by] the proliferation and testing of atomic weapons,” 
help galvanize popular CND support, the rise of the CND itself,46 and the Cuban Missile Crisis,47 
whose threat of total nuclear war from October 16-28, 1962, as we will see, helped shape some 
of the most important Ariel poems Plath produced during her prolific six-weeks that fall, 
                                               
45 In a letter to her mother dated November 1, 1956, Plath, who was studying at Cambridge at the time, described the 
fallout from “the huge crisis aroused by Britain’s incredible and insane bombing of Egypt”: 
You have no idea what a shock this bombing caused us here. The Manchester Guardian, my favorite British 
paper, called this armed aggression by Britain “a disaster” and I cannot understand what Eden hopes to gain 
by it other than such a loss of face, aid and support among Britain’s colonies, allies, and, of course, 
growing enemies as can never be remedied. The crass materialistic motives of this attack on the Suez are so 
apparent as to give Russia food for propaganda for years to come. I shall be eager to hear Cambridge 
student opinion about this. Letters of horror have deluged 10 Downing Street from all over Britain. The 
eloquence of Gaitskill in the Opposition is heartening. [. . . ] The British arrogance—that old, smug, 
commercial colonialism—alive still among the Tories, seems inexcusable to me. I think the British policy 
in Cyprus has been questionable enough. This is the last.  
 All the newspapers look to American foreign policy in a way which makes me hope that 
Washington lives up to the U.N. and not its old loyalty to Britain. What joy there must be in Moscow at this 
flagrant nationalism and capitalism; this aggression by force, which has always been the cry of the Western 
Allies. (Letters Home 282)   
46 Not long after the birth of her first child, Plath wrote a letter to her mother describing her experience at one of the 
CND marches that Stevenson mentions. In the letter, Plath wrote, “Last Sunday had an immensely moving 
experience and attended the arrival of the Easter weekend marchers form the atomic bomb plant at Aldermaston to 
Trafalgar Square in London”; “I felt proud that the baby’s first real adventure should be as a protest against the 
insanity of world-annihilation” (Letters Home 378). I will discuss this letter more fully in Chapter 3. 
47 As we will see in Chapter 3, Robin Peel argues that the Cuban Missile Crisis intensified the pressures that helped 







including “Lady Lazarus,” begun on October 23trd and completed the day after the Crisis 
resolved, on the 29th.  
 Similarly belated, Stevenson observes, was the Holocaust’s full impact on the public 
mind:  
The Nuremberg Nazi trials at the end of the war had not made the concentration 
camps a centre of public attention, and it was only in the early 1960s, with the 
capture, trial, and execution of Adolf Eichmann in 1960-2, that the Holocaust 
much entered general discussion and awareness. As Elaine Feinstein recorded in 
her novel The Survivors (1982), people “had read the newspapers after the war . . . 
knew the facts . . . had seen the photographs,” but the Eichmann trial “brought the 
truth into . . . consciousness in a new way” (55).48 
And the early sixties, specifically 1960-1962, was indeed a formative period for Plath, as we 
have seen. Her return to England with Hughes in December of 1959, after her short teaching stint 
at Smith, placed her in England at precisely the time when the threat of nuclear war and the 
atrocity of the Holocaust entered public “consciousness in a new way.”49  
                                               
48 As Stevenson writes, “Even the term ‘Holocaust’ had scarcely been employed before 1960, but its influence 
expanded steadily thereafter” (55). 
49 As Peel writes, “A reappraisal of Plath’s ‘ephemeral’ reading of news permits a term such as ‘Hiroshima’ to be 
read as a signifier of Plath’s 1960s present no less than her 1940s past” (Peel 39); “[r]eferences to Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki were frequently employed to illustrate events in the present, not the past” (Peel 39). Peel, as we have seen, 
marks 1960 as a pivotal moment not only in what he calls Plath’s “political education” (Plath having demonstrated 
strong political awareness throughout her life), but also in her ongoing struggle to reconcile her “artistic ambitions” 
with “her desire to engage with the wider world” (“Political Education” 41). Plath’s experiences living in England 
(first as a Fulbright scholar at Cambridge and later, in 1960, when she relocated with Hughes after a couple of years 
living in the U.S.), provided her with the critical distance from the U.S. and its part in the increasing tensions of the 
Cold War that would play a key role in helping Plath to achieve, in what Peel demarcates as her post-1960 period, 
what he calls “the effective fusion of politics and art in, for example, such imaginative writing as The Bell Jar and 
the poems of 1962 and 1963” (41). And Plath was afforded such critical distance from the vantage point of an 
England rather newly sidelined from world events—the Suez Crisis of 1956, for example, “showing,” as Stevenson 
puts it, “that Britain no longer had the authority, or the resources, to impose its will on a wider world, and that its 
actions abroad were largely subject to the approval of the United States,” and the later Cuban Missile Crisis that 
“suggested that Britain, neither directly involved nor much consulted, now figured only as a minor chess piece in 







So when Plath insists, then, that personal experience should be “relevant” to “the bigger 
things,” she not only situates herself within the “present” of her historical moment but, in terms 
of her literary moment, both in relation to and in distinction from Lowell and Sexton, neither of 
whom she, nor Alvarez in The New Poetry, associates with a direct engagement of “the bigger 
things.” And in insisting on an exploration of the parallel between personal experience and “the 
bigger things,” between the private and public faces of the “forces of disintegration,” Plath 
indeed parts ways with Lowell and Sexton, charting for herself a path through modernism that 
moves beyond the reconciliation of modernism with which Alvarez defines “the new 
seriousness”; while Alvarez doesn’t require “that modern English poetry [ . . . ] be concerned 
with psychoanalysis or [ . . . ] any [ . . . ] of the modern horrors,” in “drop[ping] the pretense that 
life [ . . . ] is the same as ever,” the English poet must “face the full range of his experience with 
his full intelligence” (The New Poetry 24). The path through modernism that Alvarez explicitly 
charts for “the new seriousness,” then, entails turning to Lawrence as a model for exploring 
personal experience, as a model, in effect, for subject matter, while turning to Eliot for the 
“formal intelligence” with which to transform this subject matter into poetry.  
However, there is another path through modernism toward which Alvarez gestures in his 
essay, and it is upon this path that Plath sets herself as she shifts from Lowell and Sexton toward 
“the bigger things.” In his definition of “the new seriousness” with which he begins to draw his 
                                               
What’s more, the Holocaust’s entry into “‘collective memory’ in Britain,” Stevenson writes, “exactly 
demarcates the period from 1960-2000”; poets in the “early years [of this period] especially” thus “could generally 
be distinguished in terms of quite opposite reactions to recent history,” a distinction Alvarez, writing at the time, 
both identified and, as we will see, did much to foster:  
The work of “the Movement” and its successors continued to illustrate the post-war recoil [Ted] 
Hughes [would later] identif[y], turning away from “dark gods” in favor of a milder climate of 
“English strengths” and a return to the example of Thomas Hardy. Also writing in the early 1960s, 
A. L. Alvarez demanded of poets a contrary disposition—one Ted Hughes’ own work came to 








essay to a close, Alvarez argues that “the two warring and unreconcilable poles of modern 
literature” embodied by Lawrence and Eliot, as Leavis perceived them, have, in “[t]he best 
contemporary English verse,” in fact begun to be “creatively reconciled” (28). However, earlier 
in the essay, in his discussion of Lowell and Berryman’s emergence in the U.S., Alvarez locates 
the beginnings of such a reconciliation—this deconstruction, in effect—within Eliot himself. 
“Since Freud,” Alvarez writes, “the late Romantic dichotomy between emotion and intelligence 
has become totally meaningless” (24). “This position had, I think,” Alvarez continues, “already 
been partially assumed by T. S. Eliot when he wrote The Waste Land” (24). Indeed, when Eliot 
wrote The Waste Land (1922), he had already laid out his “theory” of the “dissociation of 
sensibility” in “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), toward which Alvarez here points us (64). In 
his reclaiming of the metaphysicals, Eliot argues that “something [ . . . ] happened to the mind of 
England” during the seventeenth century, something “from which we have never recovered” 
(64). Whereas the metaphysical poets had “possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could 
devour any kind of experience,” a mechanism that enabled them to “feel their thought as 
immediately as the odour of a rose”—“A thought to Donne,” Eliot writes, “was an experience; it 
modified his sensibility” (64)—the poets from the point of the English Civil War onward 
dissociated “thought” from “feeling” (63). They no longer “fe[lt] their thought”; they 
“reflect[ed]” on it (64, my emphasis). “[T]his dissociation,” Eliot argues, “was aggravated by the 
influence of the two most powerful poets of the century, Milton and Dryden,” who “performed 
certain poetic functions so magnificently well that the magnitude of the effect concealed the 
absence of others” (64). As a result, under “the influence of Milton and Dryden” (65), “the 







It is with what Eliot describes as “[t]he second effect of [this] influence” that Alvarez’s 
conception of “the late Romantic dichotomy between emotion and intelligence” comes into play 
(65). For Eliot, as “[t]he sentimental age began early in the eighteenth century, and continued,” 
“poets revolted against the ratiocinative, the descriptive; they thought and felt by fits, 
unbalanced; they reflected” (65). For Alvarez, then, Eliot’s “dissociation” of feeling and thought 
becomes a “dichotomy between emotion and intelligence” rooted specifically in the late 
Romantics. And for Alvarez, it was in The Waste Land in particular that Eliot had worked toward 
the “unification of sensibility” for which he had advocated in “The Metaphysical Poets” (65). 
For Eliot, one had to look outside of English poetry to the French Symbolists to find a 
contemporary model for such a unification, and in the French Symbolists, such a unification 
amounted, in effect, to a reconciliation not unlike that which Alvarez envisioned between 
Lawrence and Eliot, as they had come to represent—symptomatic of the “dissociation of 
sensibility” that Eliot had diagnosed—“psychological insight and integrity” on the one hand, and 
“technical skill and formal intelligence” on the other (The New Poetry 28). Parallel to the link he 
forges between the metaphysical poets and modernist experimenters in his justification of 
modernist “difficult[y],” Eliot points in his essay to a connection between Racine, “the great 
master of the seventeenth century,” and Baudelaire, “the great master of the nineteenth” (66). 
Unlike in English literature, where “the greatest masters of diction [ . . . ], Milton and Dryden, 
triumph with a dazzling disregard of the soul,” “[i]n French literature,” Eliot writes, “[t]he 
greatest two masters of diction are also the greatest two psychologists, the most curious explorers 
of the soul” (66).  
And it is in his function as a “psychologist,” an “explore[r] of the soul,” that the Eliot of 







poet who had “partially assumed” his own “position” that “the dichotomy between emotion and 
intelligence ha[d] become meaningless” in a post-Freud world. For Alvarez, The Waste Land is 
“a poem [that] follows, with great precision and delicacy, the movement of a psyche not just of a 
society, in the process of disintegration” (24). The Eliot of The Waste Land, then, was for 
Alvarez a poet who had faced “the forces of disintegration” at work in modern society on both 
the individual and collective level, forces which gentility had done its best, over the past thirty 
years, to gloss over. Like Alvarez in his call for “a new seriousness,” for poets “to face the full 
range of [their] experience with [their] full intelligence,” the Eliot of The Waste Land had 
himself, in “The Metaphysical Poets,” called for poets to incorporate psychological insight into 
their poetics, to embrace their “full intelligence” as they looked,50 as the French Symbolists were 
looking, into facets of experience that had been shied away from in English poetry since the time 
of Donne: “Those who object to the ‘artificiality’ of Milton or Dryden sometimes tell us to ‘look 
into our hearts and write.’51 But that is not looking deep enough; Racine or Donne looked into a 
good deal more than the heart. One must look into the cerebral cortex, the nervous system, and 
the digestive tracts” (66). 
However, while Eliot had faced what gentility in English poetry refused to as he traced 
“the movement of a psyche [ . . . ] in the process of disintegration,” he had not, in Alvarez’s 
                                               
50 In reclaiming the metaphysical poets, Eliot offers a justification of their “metaphysics” and, in doing so, a 
justification for the “erudition” he had called for in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” published three years 
earlier (40). Anticipating “the mythical method” he would define in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” two years later, 
Eliot argued that modern civilization demanded of poets the full application of what Alvarez would call their “full 
intelligence”:  
It is not a permanent necessity that poets should be interested in philosophy, or in any other 
subject. We can only say that it appears likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at present, 
must be difficult. Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and 
complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The 
poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, 
to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning. (65, Eliot’s emphasis) 
51 In his reference here to Sir Philip Sidney, Eliot suggests that the metaphysical poets had indeed gone further than 







estimation, done so “openly” (The New Poetry 24). It would take Lowell and Berryman back in 
the States nearly forty years later “to write poetry of immense skill and intelligence which coped 
openly with the quick of their experience, experience sometimes on the edge of disintegration 
and breakdown” (24-5). And according to Alvarez, Lowell and Berryman were able to do so, 
while Eliot could not, because “they were no longer concerned with Eliot’s rearguard action 
against the late Romantics”;52 “they were,” Alvarez writes, “no longer adherents of the cult of 
rigid impersonality” (24). And it is in terms of Eliot’s conception of “impersonality” that 
“confessional” poetry has so often been read, in effect, as irreconcilable with Eliot’s line of 
modernism. While the general critical consensus on “confessionalism” appears to be the 
problematic nature of the label, a common thread of contention has been, as Christopher Beach 
sums up in The Cambridge Companion to Twentieth-Century American Poetry (2003), the status 
of “confessionalism” as “a significant break from New Critical and modernist models” (154). 
And indeed, it is in relation to Eliotic impersonality, in particular, that “confessionalism” has 
been conceived as such a break. As David Yezzi puts it in “Confessional Poetry and the Artifice 
of Honesty,” “More than any other school, confessional poetry directly and vociferously opposed 
the ‘impersonality’ argued for by T. S. Eliot in his essay ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’” 
(14).  
Nearly a decade after The New Poetry, writing in The Savage God (1971), Alvarez 
himself would describe the Lowell of Life Studies as “violat[ing] all the principles of New 
Criticism: there was immediacy instead of impersonality, vulnerability in place of exquisitely 
dandified irony” (39). However, as he does here—where he identifies the “principles” that 
                                               
52 As we have seen, the Romantics, in Eliot’s view, lacking as they did a “unified sensibility,” “thought and felt it 
fits, unbalanced” toward the pole of “feeling” as they “revolted against the ratiocinative, the descriptive” that 







Lowell “violates” as those of New Criticism rather than attributing them directly to Eliot—in The 
New Poetry, Alvarez is careful to distinguish Eliot’s “impersonality” from the New Critical 
promulgation of it. Rather than setting up Lowell, in other words, in direct opposition to Eliot’s 
“impersonality,” as Yezzi does in his representative take, Alvarez situates Lowell instead in 
direct opposition to New Criticism. And it is this distinction that in large part enables him to 
conceive of Lowell and Berryman as proceeding from Eliot’s line of modernism rather than 
breaking from it. For Alvarez, what Lowell and Berryman were “no longer adherents” of was not 
impersonality per se, but rather “the cult of rigid impersonality” (my emphasis). And this “cult,” 
for Alvarez indeed had its leader in the New Criticism. “[D]uring the later twenties and thirties in 
America,” Alvarez writes, “Eliot’s technical achievements and the radical revaluation of 
literature that went with them seemed so bewilderingly impressive that the urgently personal 
uses this technique was put to were overlooked” (24). Indeed, in the U.S., “a whole school of 
criticism was developed to prove technically that there was no necessary or even significant 
connexion between art and its roots in an artist’s life” (24). “Eliot’s talk of classicism, like his 
use in [The Waste Land] of literature and theology,” Alvarez concludes, “was an elaborate and 
successful defense which forced impersonality on a deeply personal and painful subject” (24). 
While The Waste Land had been heralded as conveying the “disillusionment of a generation” 
(qtd. in McAloon), Alvarez here is alluding to the poem’s “roots” in the deterioration of Eliot’s 
first marriage and his nervous breakdown, “personal and painful subject [matter]” well in line 
with what Lowell had explored in Life Studies, and what Anne Sexton and Plath were themselves 
in the process of addressing. For his part, as he put it in “Thoughts after Lambeth” (1931), Eliot 
had considered the idea that The Waste Land had spoken for a generation “ridiculous,” perhaps, 







reflecting on his failed marriage to Vivienne Haigh-Wood (who would eventually be committed 
to a mental institution), the poem—however “impersonal” its final effects may have been—had 
its roots deep-set in the “personal”:  
I came to persuade myself that I was in love with Vivienne simply because I 
wanted to burn my boats and commit myself to staying in England. And she 
persuaded herself (also under the influence of [Ezra] Pound) that she would save 
the poet by keeping him in England. To her, the marriage brought no happiness. 
To me, it brought the state of mind out of which came The Waste Land. (qtd. in 
McAloon) 
Indeed, snapshots of the marriage make it in to the final version of the poem, in fragments of 
dialogue such as, “My nerves are bad tonight. Yes, bad. / Stay with me. Speak to me. / Why do 
you never speak. Speak” (qtd. in McAloon). And Haigh-Wood herself considered some of the 
lines Eliot had originally included in the manuscript (before Pound performed his extensive edits, 
which would garner him the title, in Eliot’s dedication of the poem, of “the better craftsman”) too 
revealing, and asked that they be cut (McAloon).  
This, then, is Alvarez’s Eliot and Alvarez’s Waste Land, a poem that functions every bit 
as much on the level of the individual psyche as it does on the level of the larger “society,” a 
poem that contains the seeds, then (as it traces both a “psyche” and a “society [ . . . ] in the 
process of disintegration”), of “the forces of disintegration” he identifies at work on the public as 
well as the private level. And however much the New Critics, in Alvarez’s view at least, had 
fought to “prove technically that there was no necessary or even significant connexion between 
art and its roots in an artist’s life,” there is certainly support for the necessity of this connection 







which came The Waste Land,” but in Eliot’s own “theory” of “impersonality.” In “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent,” Eliot lays out this “relation,” as he phrases it, “of the poem to its author” 
by way of “a suggestive analogy” (40): “When the two gases [oxygen and sulfur dioxide] are 
mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum, they form sulphurous acid. This combination 
takes place only if the platinum is present; nevertheless the newly formed acid contains no trace 
of platinum, and the platinum itself is apparently unaffected: has remained inert, neutral, and 
unchanged” (41). In this analogy, Eliot explains, “[t]he mind of the poet is the shred of 
platinum,” the “catalyst”: “It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man 
himself; but, the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man 
who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute 
the passions which are its material” (41). In establishing “the relation of the poem to its author,” 
then, Eliot breaks the poet, in effect, into two categories, “the man who suffers” and “the mind 
which creates,” categories roughly analogous to Alvarez’s “emotion” (embodied in Lawrence) 
and “intelligence” (embodied in Eliot himself, in his “technical achievements”). However, here 
the “separation” Eliot envisions between the “man” (emotion) and the “mind” (intelligence) is a 
matter of degree rather than absolutes. Eliot does not, in other words, reify the very 
“dissociation” of “feeling” and “thought” that he himself had diagnosed and according to which 
the New Critics, to Alvarez’s mind, had ironically reduced him to the “intelligence” pole of the 
“late Romantic dichotomy.” Instead, rather than functioning as the two poles of a dichotomy, 
Eliot’s two categories, we might say, constitute something closer to the two ends of a spectrum, 
by way of which “the man” and “the mind” are not only separated, but also linked. Whereas for 
Alvarez, as he would put it later in The Savage God, impersonality in the hands of the New 







was separated utterly from the man who made it” (38, my emphasis), for Eliot in “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent,” utter separation serves, perhaps, as the ideal, but it is an ideal—as he 
implies with “more perfect” and “more completely separate”—that is not, in actuality, attainable. 
“More completely separate” is not to say “completely separate”; Eliot’s addition of “more” here, 
in other words, renders the separation indeed not entirely complete, if, after all, it could be 
rendered more so, just as an artist who could be rendered “more perfect” by way of this (not fully 
complete) separation is not perfect in any absolute sense (my emphases).   
 And indeed we see Eliot maintaining this connection between “the man who suffers” and 
“the mind which creates” more substantively as he begins to elaborate the “experience of the 
man himself” which serves as the “material” that the “mind digest[s] and transmute[s]” in the 
process of producing a work of art. “[E]xperience,” for Eliot, is “of two kinds: emotions and 
feelings” and these emotions and feelings function, then, as “the elements which enter the 
presence of the transforming catalyst”; indeed, “the poet’s mind,” Eliot writes, “is in fact a 
receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there 
until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together” (41). In this 
image, then, there is certainly separation between the mind, figured here as “a receptacle,” and 
the “emotions and feelings” derived from experience, figured as “the elements” to be combined 
into “a new compound”; and yet, in this process of poem-making, the mind is indeed dependent 
upon this experience, without which there could of course be no poem. Whereas in “Tradition 
and the Individual Talent,” the mind “may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of 
the man himself” (my emphasis)—experience that Plath, in her interview with Orr, will call 
“personal”—in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” published after Eliot writes The Waste Land, this 







“Eliot’s talk of classicism,” Eliot states that “[o]ne can be classical, in a sense, by turning away 
from nine-tenths of the material which lies at hand,” not unlike what Alvarez accuses the 
Movement of doing in what he reads as its avowal of gentility (176). However, rather than 
“selecting only mummified stuff from a museum”—like Alvarez’s Hardy, who tells Graves that 
“[a]ll we can do is to write on the old themes in the old styles, but try to do so a little better than 
those who went before us”—Eliot advises “doing the best one can with the material at hand,” 
“material which you must simply accept” (177, my emphasis). “[I]n this material I include the 
emotions and feelings of the writer himself, which, for that writer,” Eliot reiterates, “are simply 
material which he must accept” (177, my emphasis).  
Rather than the “rigid,” “iron dogma” of New Criticism’s “impersonality” as Alvarez 
presents it, then, Eliot’s “impersonality” proves, indeed, malleable. In effect, this connection (as 
well as separation) between “the man who suffers” and “the mind which creates” in turn helps to 
structure a spectrum between what Eliot classifies as the “personal” and “impersonal” poet. For 
Eliot, making “impersonal” poetry requires “a concentration, and a new thing resulting from the 
concentration, of a very great number of experiences which to the practical and active person 
would not seem to be experiences at all” (43). And this “concentration” is not something that 
“happen[s] consciously or of deliberation” (43). Indeed, for Eliot, “the bad poet is usually 
unconscious where he ought to be conscious, and conscious where he ought to be unconscious,” 
“errors” that “tend to make him ‘personal’” (43). And it is here that we arrive at some of the 
most oft-cited lines from the essay: “Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from 
emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, 
only those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these 







“impersonal” poet, but something more akin to a spectrum along which a poet can attain 
“matur[ity] [ . . . ] not [by] being necessarily more interesting, or having ‘more to say,’ but rather 
by being a more finely perfected medium in which special, or very varied, feelings are at liberty 
to enter into new combinations” (40). In other words, a poet can achieve “matur[ity]” by “more 
completely separat[ing]” the “man who suffers” (the man, this is, with his experiences from 
which particular emotions and feelings derive) from the “mind which creates” (the mind that 
enables, that is, the “unconscious” recombination of such emotions and feelings). And, as we 
have seen, the “more completely separate” the “mind” becomes from the “man,” “the more 
perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material.” The more a 
poet “digest[s] and transmute[s]” what we could call “personal” experience, then, the further he 
moves toward the “impersonal” side of the spectrum (toward, but never fully achieving, 
“perfection”), and, conversely, the less a poet “digest[s] and transmute[s]” his experience, the 
more “personal” he will become so that he does not “escape” “personality” and “emotion” but 
instead “express[es]” them.53  
And it is just such “express[ion],” we could say, that Alvarez believes Ginsberg to be 
guilty of in “Kaddish.” While Alvarez, as we have seen, credits Ginsberg for addressing the 
“forces of disintegration,” he claims that, rather than “creat[ing] real poetry out of them,” 
Ginsberg “just express[es] them.” In effect, then, Alvarez locates Ginsberg too far toward the 
“personal” side of Eliot’s spectrum, Ginsberg having failed, in effect, to sufficiently “diges[t] 
and transmut[e]” his personal experience so that the text reads, for Alvarez, not as a “poem,” but 
                                               
53 For Eliot, to “escape” “personality” and “emotion” in poetry is not to sever oneself from them, but is instead, as 
we have seen, to sufficiently “digest and transmute” (rather than “express”) them. According to Jewel Spears 
Brooker, in Mastery and Escape: T. S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism, Eliot’s notion of escape is “not escape 
from one’s current position, but escape to a broader perspective; it is a transcendence (via a return) in which [ . . . ] 








as “a rather heavily edited transcript of what happened between Ginsberg and his psychiatrist.” 
And it is too far toward the personal, too, that he locates Lowell himself at times “for appearing 
[in what he considered the least successful Life Studies poems] more compulsively concerned 
with the processes of psychoanalysis than with those of poetry.”   
However, overall, the Lowell of Life Studies, in Alvarez’s estimation, indeed sufficiently 
“digests and transmutes” his subject matter, and in doing so, avoids veering too far to the side of 
the “personal.” And as opposed to the earlier (Allen-Tate-inflected) Lowell of Lord Weary’s 
Castle (1946), a volume that had won him, with its craft and “difficulty,” the Pulitzer Prize and 
made him a New Critical darling, this Lowell of Life Studies, then, was no longer an “adheren[t] 
of the [New Critical] cult of rigid impersonality,” but was instead an “adheren[t],” we might say, 
of Eliot’s considerably more malleable impersonality, or rather, of the spectrum along which he 
located the “personal” and “impersonal” poet (Eliot 40). And for Alvarez, it is this Lowell who 
“had assimilated the lesson of Eliot and the critical thirties” by “assum[ing] that a poet, to earn 
his title, had to be very skillful, very original, and very intelligent.” And it is in “Tradition and 
the Individual Talent” that Eliot largely imparts this lesson. For Eliot, the title of poet is indeed 
something that must be “earned,” Eliot “alive,” as we have seen, “to a usual objection” that his 
“métier for poetry [ . . . ] requires a ridiculous amount of erudition (pedantry), a claim which,” he 
argues, “can be rejected by appeal to the lives of poets in any pantheon” (40). And it is such 
pantheons that poets must “learn,” in effect, if they are to achieve Eliot’s conception of 
impersonality. Whereas in discussions that have tended to position “confessionalism” as 
antithetical to impersonality, Eliot’s relation of the poem to the artist is generally taken to 
constitute the whole of his “Impersonal theory of poetry,” Eliot himself delineates two “aspects” 







author, but “to other poems by other authors,” a relation that “suggest[s] the conception of poetry 
as a living whole of all the poetry that has ever been written” (40)—is what lends the essay its 
title. For Eliot, to become “impersonal,” a poet must place himself in dialectical relation to 
“tradition.” And for Eliot, establishing oneself in relation to “tradition” does not mean 
“following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid adherence to its 
successes”; instead, it requires the supposedly “ridiculous amount of erudition” that he defends. 
Tradition, for Eliot, is something “that cannot be inherited,” something that “must [be] obtain[ed] 
[ . . . ] by great labour,” and as such, it is something that indeed, in Alvarez’s words, must be 
“earned.”  
And it is through this “aspect” of impersonality, in particular, that Alvarez is able to 
conceive of Lowell and Berryman as proceeding—without contradiction, without “negative 
feedback”—from Eliot’s line of modernism. And it is this “aspect” that allows Alvarez, more 
specifically, to conceive of the “personal” nature of Lowell’s poems as implicit within Eliot’s 
very notion of impersonality.54 For Eliot, a poet in effect gains what Alvarez calls “originality” 
not necessarily by way of “those aspects of his work in which he least resembles anyone else”; 
instead, “often [ . . . ] the most individual parts of his work may be those in which the dead poets, 
his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously” (38). It is within the framework of Eliot’s 
dialectical relation of the poet to “all other poets” (to, in other words, “tradition”) that we can 
make sense of such a seeming contradiction. Tradition, for Eliot, “involves the historical sense,” 
which he determines is “nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond 
his twenty-fifth year” (38). Becoming an “impersonal” poet and, therefore, a “mature” one, 
                                               
54 While Alvarez credits both Lowell and Berryman as having “assimilated the lesson of Eliot and the critical 
thirties,” it is Lowell’s Life Studies that he credits as “a large step forward in [the] new direction” he was charting 







entails for Eliot cultivating “a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its 
presence”: “the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his 
bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it the 
whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a 
simultaneous order” (38). And it is here, in terms of this “simultaneous order,” that Eliot lays out 
the dialectical mechanisms of “tradition” as he conceives it: 
 The necessity that [a poet] shall conform [to tradition], that he shall cohere, is not  
onesided; what happens when a new work of art is created is something that 
happens simultaneously to all the works of art which preceded it. The existing 
monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the 
introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing 
order is complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the 
supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, 
altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the 
whole are readjusted, and this is conformity between the old and the new. (38-9) 
Considering that Eliot studied philosophy at Harvard and wrote his dissertation on F. H. 
Bradley, it comes not altogether as a surprise to detect in the movement with which he defines 
“tradition”—the relation between “the old” and “the new”—the structure of the Hegelian 
dialectic. In “Also F. H. Bradley: A Hegelian Reading of T.S. Eliot’s Negativity” (2005), for 
example, Brian Glaser argues “that Eliot’s early poetics of impersonality,” in particular, “are 
more Hegelian than he—and the majority of subsequent critics—have come to recognize” (27). 
Indeed, although Anne Paolucci, in “T. S. Eliot’s Dissertation: Knowledge and Experience (An 







does not insist “that Eliot borrowed directly from Hegel,” she at the same time does not discount 
“the possibility”; intentional or not, Paolucci writes, “a good measure of Hegelian influence 
filtered down [to Eliot] automatically through Bradley” (114).55 Such “filter[ing] down” includes 
the “assum[ption] that Eliot shared”—despite his specific critiques of Bradley—“the large[r] 
Bradleyan argument in which an experiential dialectic replaces the Hegelian conceptual dialectic 
and that he adopts with Bradley the notion of Immediate Experience (the starting-point of the 
phenomenological dialectic) as the only possible source of reality, and Absolute Experience as 
the only legitimate objective whole or reality” (115). While Eliot, via Bradley, may have 
replaced Hegel’s “conceptual dialectic” with an “experiential” one, this dialectic retains, as we 
can see in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” a distinctively Hegelian movement.56 For 
Hegel, charting “the growth from particulars to universals, so that universals ultimately include 
all concrete particulars within them” (Rivkin and Ryan 647) was to chart what he called “the 
inner self-movement of the content of logic,” to chart, in other words, the movement of his 
“conceptual dialectic”: “Here we are dealing with forms of consciousness each of which in 
realizing itself at the same time abolishes and transcends itself, has for its result its own 
negation—and so passes into higher form” (Hegel 647). As a result of this movement, each 
“form of consciousness” becomes “a fresh concept but higher and richer than its predecessor; for 
it is richer by the negation or opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, but also something 
more, and is the unity of itself and its opposite” (647).  
                                               
55 For more on Eliot and Hegel, see Mastery and Escape: T.S. Eliot and the Dialectic of Modernism by Jewel Spears 
Brooker.  
56 That Bradley’s experiential dialectic retains the role of an “Immediate” (regardless of whether this immediate is 
conceptual or experiential in nature) in the position of the “first term” of the dialectic (as, in other words, “the 
starting-point of the phenomenological dialectic”), underscores that Bradley had indeed retained the core structure 
and movement of the Hegelian dialectic. I will address the role of the “immediate” in Hegel’s dialectic a little later 







For Eliot, the movement of tradition proceeds in just this fashion: “the whole of the 
literature of Europe [ . . . ] and within it the whole of the literature of [the poet’s] own country,” 
as we have seen, “composes a simultaneous order,” “an ideal order” complete in itself that serves 
as the original universal, whose “oldness” is then negated by the addition of the new particular—
“the new (the really new) work of art.” As a result, we arrive at a new order in which the old is 
simultaneously, in Hegelian terms, both “abolished” and “preserved” (648), this new order 
amounting to “something more” (as transcendence) in the sense that it is comprised of “the unity 
of [the old order] and its opposite,” the “new work of art.” In Eliot’s terms, then, “this is 
conformity between the old and the new” (Selected Prose 39): “for order to persist after the 
supervention of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the 
relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted” (38).  
And it is through this dialectical relation between the old and new, which marks the 
movement of “tradition” for Eliot, that “the most individual parts” of Lowell’s poetry, those, in 
other words, that are “new”—those that involve his use of the “personal,” his ability to “cop[e] 
openly,” as Alvarez puts it, “with the quick of his experience”—become the very qualities 
through which Eliot, as his “ancestor,” “assert[s] [his] immortality,” including, we might add, his 
impersonality, “most vigorously.” For Alvarez, in effect, the “old” order of “all the works of art 
which preceded” The Waste Land—the last “new (the really new) work of art,” everything after 
it in English literature constituting, to his mind, simply a reactionary “feedback,” an avoidance—
had been, in Eliot’s words, “altered” by its addition so that “the relations, proportions, values of 
each work of art toward the whole,” which now included The Waste Land, had been 
“readjusted,” thereby establishing “conformity between the old and new.” The “newness” of The 







Eliot’s impersonality, and so the other works of art, according to this schema, would necessarily 
be readjusted in relation to it, would be read, to a certain degree, through its lens, as the New 
Critics, in their avowal of Eliot’s critical principles, had come to read literature through what 
Alvarez called, as we have seen, the “elaborate, iron dogma by which poetry was separated 
utterly from the man who made it.”  
And to this “whole”—readjusted, in part, in relation to impersonality—Lowell adds Life 
Studies, a work Alvarez indeed considered “new” in Eliot’s sense of the word, a work that, as he 
put it in The Savage God, was “[i]n its way [ . . .] as brave and revolutionary as The Waste Land” 
since “it appeared [ . . . ] [during] the era of doctrinaire New Criticism” (38). It is in its relation, 
then, to a “whole” reoriented toward impersonality that Life Studies, in effect, reads as “new.” 
And it is in this sense that Eliot’s impersonality “asserts [its] immortality most vigorously” in 
“the most individual parts” of Lowell’s work, in his use, that is, of the “personal.” In effect, 
Alvarez situates Lowell’s use of the “personal” as the negation of this reoriented “whole,” which, 
before the “supervention” of Life Studies, had constituted what Eliot refers to as “an ideal order” 
(Selected Prose 38). This “ideal order” functions, in Hegelian terms, as the “universal,” that is, 
the “immediate” which, translated into Eliot’s terms, comprises a “complete” order in and of 
itself. With the “supervention,” then, of Life Studies (the “new” particular), “what is at first 
immediate,” as Hegel puts it, “now appears as mediated, related to another” (648). “Hence,” 
within this Hegelian dialectic, “the second term that has thereby come into being”—which, for 
our purposes, would be Lowell’s use of the “personal”—“is the negative of the first,” of the 
“ideal order” inflected by impersonality (648).  
But as “the negative” of this “ideal order,” Lowell’s use of the “personal,” which is to say 







Hegel, “[t]he immediate [ . . . ] [is] extinguished in the other” (that is, in the “new” particular), 
“but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual 
result of dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is therefore 
determined as the mediated—contains in general the determination of the first within itself” 
(648). “Consequently,” “the first” (the “ideal order” adjusted to The Waste Land) “is essentially 
preserved and retained even in the other,” in Lowell’s Life Studies (648). In other words, within 
this dialectic, Lowell’s “negation” of Eliot’s impersonality (according to which, in part, the 
“ideal order” had been reoriented) doesn’t simply establish an opposition or contradiction. 
Instead, in the sense that it marks what Hegel calls a “relationship” between the two terms, 
between The Waste Land-oriented “ideal order” and Lowell’s “new” particular,57 Lowell’s 
“negation” contains the seeds of “the third term,” serves, in other words, as “the turning point of 
the movement of the concept” (649). In other words, by “includ[ing] its own other within it,” 
Lowell’s “negation” “is consequently as contradiction, the posited dialectic of itself” and 
“therefore with it the dialectical moment consists in positing the unity that is contained in it” 
(648). By way of this “reciprocal contact” between Eliot’s impersonality and Lowell’s use of the 
personal, then, by way of the “negative relation to self,” in other words, that is Lowell’s use of 
the personal (“it is the other in its own self”)—this “negative relation to self,” which is, for 
Hegel, “the innermost source of all activity”—we arrive at “the third term,” “the negative of the 
negative”: “[a]s self-transcending and self-preserving contradiction, this negativity is the 
restoration of the first immediacy, of simple universality,” of, in other words, a new “ideal order” 
                                               
57 As Hegel elaborates, “The second determination, the negative or mediated” (for our purposes, Lowell’s “new” 
particular), “is at the same time also the mediating determination. It may be taken in the first instance as a simple 
determination, but in its truth it is a relation or a relationship; for it is the negative, but the negative of a positive, and 
includes the positive within itself. It is therefore the other, but not the other of something to which it is indifferent—
in that case it would not be an other, nor a relationship—rather it is the other in its own self, the other of an other; 







resulting from the addition of, and subsequent reorientation toward, Life Studies. It is in this 
sense, then, that Lowell’s use of the personal, serving as it does, in effect, as the “negation” of 
Eliot’s impersonality, “abolishes” but also “preserves” it en route to a newly reoriented “order.” 
It is in this sense, then, that Eliot’s impersonality “asserts [its] immortality most vigorously” in 
that with which it would appear irreconcilable. 
And it is through the lens of this “ideal order,” newly reoriented in relation to Life 
Studies, that Alvarez can read Eliot’s impersonality as indeed “urgently personal” (The New 
Poetry 24). Through this lens of the “personal”—which, for Alvarez, necessarily functions, in a 
post-Freud world, in keeping with psychoanalysis—Alvarez arrives, then, not only at an Eliot 
whose Waste Land traces “the movement of a psyche not just of a society,” but at one whose 
poetics, in part, amounts to a defense mechanism. For Alvarez, “Eliot’s talk of classicism, like 
his use in [The Waste Land] of literature and theology, was an elaborate and successful defense 
which forced impersonality on a deeply personal and painful subject” (24). It is from this Eliot, 
then, whom we might call a pre-New Critical Eliot, one who had yet to be codified and thereby 
reduced to one pole in “the late Romantic dichotomy between emotion and intelligence,” that 
Lowell, in Alvarez’s formulation, proceeds. Indeed, it is this recuperated Eliot who had “partially 
assumed” Alvarez’s “position” that this “late Romantic dichotomy [ . . . ] was meaningless,” an 
Eliot who had begun a project that Lowell would then, in Life Studies, take “forward in [a] new 
direction,” the direction, that is, of “the new seriousness.” Whereas Eliot had addressed “the 
forces of disintegration” at work on the level of the psyche, but had not been able to “cop[e] 
openly” with them, Lowell had indeed been “trying” to do just that, “to cope with them nakedly, 







And Lowell was able to do so, according to Alvarez, as we have seen, because he had 
“assimilated the lesson of Eliot and the critical thirties” that a poet “had to be very skillful, very 
original, and very intelligent.” While the “lesson” that Lowell, as well as Berryman, had 
“assimilated” is largely imparted in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” here Alvarez’s 
“assimilated” and “very intelligent” take us back (or rather forward) to Eliot’s post-Waste Land 
essay, “The Metaphysical Poets,” in which, as we have seen, Eliot defines the “dissociation of 
sensibility” that serves, it would seem, as the foundation for Alvarez’s own “late Romantic 
dichotomy.” With “assimilated” and “very intelligent,” though, Alvarez gestures not only toward 
the “dissociation” that Eliot diagnoses, but toward the larger ways in which Eliot’s overall 
project in the essay—a project which includes but also exceeds this “dissociation”—helps 
structure his own. As Eliot closes the essay, he makes his final plea that the metaphysicals be 
included “in the direct current of English poetry, and that their faults [ . . . ] be reprimanded by 
this standard rather than coddled by antiquarian affection,” suggesting that “[t]hey have been 
enough praised in terms which are implicit limitations because they are ‘metaphysical’ or ‘witty,’ 
‘quaint’ or ‘obscure’” (66-7). However, at the same time, Eliot argues, “we must not reject the 
criticism of Johnson (a dangerous person to disagree with) without having mastered it, without 
having assimilated the Johnsonian canons of taste” (67).58 Indeed, by the end of the essay, Eliot 
has modeled for us just such an assimilation: “It would be a fruitful work, and one requiring a 
substantial book, to break up the classification of Johnson (for there has been none since) and 
exhibit these poets in all their difference of kind and of degree, from the massive music of Donne 
to the faint, pleasing tinkle of Aurelian Townshend” (67). And in a way, Alvarez himself 
performs a similar assimilation as he patterns his own project—a call, in part, for a more open 
                                               
58 It was Samuel Johnson who had coined the label “metaphysical poets” in his chapter on Abraham Cowley in his 







and direct exploration of the forces of disintegration at work in the individual psyche—on a poet 
and critic whose work had been interpreted as insisting that “poetry,” in Alvarez’s words, be 
“separated utterly from the man who made it.” In working to establish a modernist lineage for 
“the new seriousness,” then, Alvarez in effect establishes a fittingly modernist lineage for his 
own critical writing, for the critical framework with which he defines and justifies the need for a 
“new poetry,” a new poetry he positions, as we have seen, in dialectical relation to the “old,” to 
an “ideal order” inflected by the impersonality of The Waste Land.  
 In his call for the metaphysicals to be incorporated within “the direct current of English 
poetry,” Eliot refers us back in his essay to where he had identified the English Civil War as the 
moment in which this “current” had been disrupted, as the moment in which the “dissociation of 
sensibility set in.” Prior to this point, English poetry had flowed directly to the metaphysicals, 
who were, for Eliot, “the successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth [century]” (64). “[W]hat 
would have been the fate of the ‘metaphysical,’” he wonders, “had the current of poetry 
descended in a direct line from them, as it descended in a direct line to them?” (65). For one, 
Eliot writes, “They would not, certainly, be classified as metaphysical. The possible interests of a 
poet are unlimited; the more intelligent he is the better; the more intelligent he is the more likely 
that he will have interests: our only condition is that he turn them into poetry, and not merely 
meditate on them poetically” (65).  
It is to this passage that Alvarez takes us, in effect, when he lists the “assum[ption] that a 
poet [ . . . ] had to be very intelligent” as part of the “lesson” Lowell and Berryman had 
“assimilated.” And it is Eliot’s overall project of reclaiming the metaphysical poets and, in doing 
so, threading a direct line through the sixteenth-century “dramatists” (whom critical consensus 







critical consensus certainly positioned as something of a minor tributary)59 and onward, 
uninterrupted, to the modernist experiments and “difficult[y]” he sought to legitimize. This, we 
might say, is the “lesson” that Alvarez himself assimilates as he seeks to legitimize “the new 
seriousness.” For Alvarez’s purposes, the disruption of “the current of English poetry” takes 
place with “American” modernism, or rather with the series of “negative feed-backs” with which 
English poetry responded to the modernism of Eliot and Pound. And whereas Eliot had 
diagnosed the “dissociation of sensibility” as a symptom of the disruption he had identified, 
Alvarez, as we have seen, attributes this series of “feed-backs” to “gentility,” to that “disease so 
often found in English culture” (The New Poetry 28). It is a result of these “feed-backs,” these 
“genteel” avoidances which had culminated at midcentury in what he felt were the backward-
looking inadequacies of the Movement, that what should have been a direct line stemming from 
Eliot, in particular, had been diverted. And so, like Eliot, Alvarez anchors his “new poetry” in a 
poetry already firmly positioned within the main “current”—the main critical current, that is, 
Eliot’s modernism (while not detectable, except by way of reactionary “feed-backs,” in the main 
current of contemporary English poetry) having become by the fifties fully institutionalized 
within the academy. Like Eliot, then, Alvarez imagines what English poetry would look like had 
the current not been disrupted, had the current, which had “descended in a direct line” to Eliotic 
modernism, “descended in a direct line”—without “negative feed-back”—“from [it],” 
descended, that is, in a direct line to the “new seriousness.” And Alvarez envisioned this direct 
line, then, through the figure of Lowell, who with Life Studies had side-stepped the “feed-backs” 
and gone straight to the source, to an Eliot who, in The Waste Land, had partially assumed 
Alvarez’s own “position,” who had begun to “cope” with the “private” faces of “the forces of 
                                               
59 As Eliot notes, “the phrase [metaphysical poetry] has long done duty as a term of abuse, or as the label of a quaint 







disintegration.” And so it is Lowell, then, who—far from breaking with modernism—takes this 
project, this exploration of “personal” disintegration begun with Eliot, a step forward. And it is 
Plath, then, who, in her interview with Orr, takes it a step further still, and does so, as we will 
see, by going straight to the source herself.  
A couple of years before Alvarez first published the full-length version of his essay in 
Commentary, M. L. Rosenthal, back in the States, had taken a similar approach, establishing a 
“current” that leads both directly to and from Eliot and Pound’s modernism. For Rosenthal, who, 
as we have seen, first coined the label “confessional” in his 1959 review of Life Studies, 
“confessionalism,” as Lowell represents it, begins with “the great Romantics,” “who [ . . . ] 
spoke directly of their emotions but did not give the game away even to themselves” (“Poetry as 
Confession” 154). The development of the mode then shifts to American soil with Whitman, 
who “took American poetry to the very edge of the confessional in his Calamus poems,” and, 
“[m]ore recently, under the influence of the Symbolists, [with] Eliot and Pound [who] brought us 
into the forbidden realm itself, yet even in their work a certain indirection masks the poet’s 
actual face and psyche from greedy eyes” (154). For Rosenthal, then, like Alvarez, it is Eliot (as 
well as Pound), who, for all his “mask[ing],” for all his impersonality, brings us into “the 
forbidden realm” of “confession” itself. And it is Lowell, then, who “removes the mask” (154). 
Like Rosenthal, Alvarez’s “direct current” implicitly begins with the Romantics, with “Eliot’s 
“rearguard action against” them (The New Poetry 24). While the term’s valences are certainly 
combative, such action suggests Eliot openly and directly engaged the late Romantics, an 
engagement which distinguishes it from the “negative feed-backs” to modernism that Alvarez 
characterizes in terms of the avoidances of “gentility.” For Alvarez, then, the main current of 







disrupted by—Eliot. But whereas Rosenthal’s lineage reads “confessionalism” as a 
predominantly American phenomenon—with the emotional directness of British Romanticism 
transplanted onto American soil, where it took root with Whitman and developed more directly 
with the expatriate, though American, Eliot and Pound until it came full-flower with Lowell—
Alvarez’s lineage (without Whitman) reads more along the lines of transatlantic exchange, an 
exchange initiated, for his purposes, by Eliot and Pound, indeed in their guise as expatriates, an 
exchange then reseeded by Lowell as his influence began to make its way onto British soil.   
And so when Plath, as she responds directly to Alvarez’s call for a “new poetry,” 
establishes her own direct line to Eliot, she immerses herself—a poet so often considered a 
particularly American phenomenon herself—in a distinctly transatlantic current.60 Indeed, not 
only does Plath engage Eliot directly, reconfiguring his “theory of Impersonal poetry,” as we will 
see, she appropriates Eliot himself —his personal experience, his literary career—as a model for 
her own self-fashioning, for her own negotiation of both her contemporary literary moment as 
well as the modernist lineage Alvarez was working to secure for it. Describing herself in her 
interview with Orr as “an old-fashioned American,” whose “preferences” are “about fifty years 
behind,” Plath casts herself not only in the role of the first wave of modernist expatriates, those 
committed, as Pound put it, to “[m]ak[ing] it new” and who began doing so indeed about fifty 
years before she gives her interview;61 by crediting her Americanness for her permanent 
residence in England, for the fact that “[she’ll] always stay in England,”62 she casts herself in the 
                                               
60 For more on Plath and the role her nationality has played in the criticism, see Tracy Brain’s chapter, “Straddling 
the Atlantic,” in The Other Sylvia Plath (2001); here Brain argues that “Plath’s writing plays out a perpetual 
displacement, a midatlanticism that is neither American nor English” (46). Brain’s work here is important and 
illuminating, but for my purposes, I intentionally embed Plath, as an American, within the specific literary scene of 
early 1960s London to examine the ways in which her later poetry engaged her immediate literary and political 
contexts.  
61 This injunction comes from Pound’s Cantos (“Canto LIII”).  
62 As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, in response to Orr’s question of “which side” her “weight fall[s]” in 







role, specifically, of Eliot, that permanent, London-based expatriate, as she herself brings the 
“new” (the “new breakthrough” into “private and taboo subjects”)—a breakthrough she indeed 
identifies, as Alvarez identifies the modernism of Eliot and Pound, as “an American thing”—
onto a stagnant London scene, a scene in which she declares, “[t[here are very few contemporary 
English poets that I admire,” an opinion with which Alvarez would agree whole-heartedly (Orr 
168).  
When Plath aligns herself with the “new” “American thing” she sees happening, in 
particular, with Lowell and Sexton, she does so using the language of Lowell’s own 
interpretation of his project as well as the language with which Alvarez interprets it. In an 
interview with The Paris Review in 1961, the year before Plath gives her interview with Orr, 
Lowell described the contemporary (American) poetry scene as constituting, and indeed stuck in, 
an “Alexandrian age”:  
Poets of my generation and particularly younger ones have gotten terribly 
proficient at forms. They write a very musical, difficult poem with tremendous 
skill, perhaps there’s never been such skill. Yet the writing seems divorced from 
culture somehow. It’s become too much something specialized that can’t handle 
much experience. It’s become a craft, purely a craft, and there must be some 
breakthrough back into life. (“The Art of Poetry”) 
In Alvarez’s terms, then, poetry, for Lowell, had shifted too far toward the Eliotic pole of 
modernism—toward “technical skill” and “formal intelligence”—at the expense of a Lawrencian 
                                               
fashioned American[ness]” as “one of the reasons” she has become an expatriate (168). Plath’s full response reads 
as follows: 
Well, I think that as far as language goes I’m an American, I’m afraid, my accent is American, my way of 
talk is an American way of talk, I’m an old-fashioned American. That’s probably one of the reasons I’m in 
England now and why I’ll always stay in England. I’m about fifty years behind as far as my preferences go 
and I must say that the poets who excite me most are the Americans. There are very few contemporary 







exploration of experience. When Plath, then, describes for Orr the poetry she is drawn to, she 
does so in terms of this breakthrough while at the same time describing this breakthrough in 
terms of Alvarez’s “new seriousness.” “I’ve been very excited by what I feel is the new 
breakthrough that came with, say, Robert Lowell’s Life Studies, this intense breakthrough,” she 
tells Orr, shifting from Lowell’s language to that of Alvarez, “into very serious, very personal, 
emotional experience which I feel has been partly taboo” (Orr 167-8, my emphasis).  
 And yet, later in the interview, as she discusses the process through which one might 
accomplish this “breakthrough,” Plath shifts from engaging Lowell’s language and Lowell’s 
echoing of Eliot’s language—all through the lens of “the new seriousness”—to engaging Eliot’s 
in his own terms. In The Paris Review interview, as he praises the poetry of Elizabeth Bishop, 
Lowell expresses a view of the Beats quite in keeping with that of Alvarez. “[Bishop] seldom 
writes a poem that doesn’t have [an] exploratory quality,” Lowell states, “yet it’s very firm, it’s 
not like [B]eat poetry, it’s all controlled” (“The Art of Poetry”). With “controlled” here, Lowell 
gestures toward Eliot, a gesturing that becomes significantly more pointed as Plath differentiates 
her own use of the personal from that of the Beats. As we have seen, Plath tells Orr, invoking the 
drugs and violence with which the Beats were often associated, “I cannot sympathize with these 
cries from the heart that are informed by nothing except a needle or knife, or whatever it is” (Orr 
169). Unlike the Beats’ use of personal experience (as Lowell, Alvarez, and Plath herself read it), 
“one should be able to control and manipulate experiences,” she argues, “even the most 
terrifying, like madness, being tortured, this sort of experience, and one should be able to 
manipulate these experiences with an informed and an intelligent mind” (169, my emphasis). 
With her emphasis on skill (the ability to “control and manipulate experiences”) and intelligence 







justification of modernist “difficult[y]”), Plath demonstrates here that she, too, “had assimilated 
the lesson of Eliot and the critical thirties.” And having aligned herself with Lowell’s (American) 
“breakthrough,” she, too, was taking the project begun with Eliot—the specific project of 
“cop[ing]” with psychological disintegration that Lowell, as Alvarez conceived him, had 
returned to and engaged—“forward in [a] new direction.” However, while Plath, like Lowell, we 
might say, had begun “cop[ing] openly” with psychological disintegration by the time she gives 
her interview with Orr, she stages her own return to Eliot to pick up a thread of the project that 
had essentially been dropped as Alvarez charted his direct line between Eliot and Lowell. 
Before beginning his discussion of The Waste Land, Alvarez had laid out his parallel of 
the private and public “faces” of “the forces of disintegration,” defining these public “faces,” as 
we have seen, as “those of two world wars, of the concentration camps, of genocide, and the 
threat of nuclear war.” When he then describes The Waste Land as “a poem [that] follows [ . . . ] 
the movement of a psyche not just of a society, in the process of disintegration,” he effectively 
establishes the poem as a model for exploring this parallel. However, not long before arriving at 
The Waste Land, Alvarez had also laid out his clarification that “modern English poetry” need 
not “be concerned with psychoanalysis or with the concentration camps or with the hydrogen 
bomb or with any other of the modern horrors,” Alvarez clarifying, in other words, that he 
wasn’t demanding that “the new poetry” address any particular subject matter; it is here that he 
establishes what he does call for, the “drop[ping] [of] the pretence that life, give or take a few 
social distinctions, is the same as ever, that gentility, decency, and all the other social totems will 
eventually muddle through.” And so when he shifts from The Waste Land to Life Studies, the 
role that disintegration on the level of “society” plays in the modernist urtext effectively lies 







a “cop[ing] openly” with personal disintegration in ways that Eliot himself had been unable to 
do—through Lowell. And it is this thread that Plath picks up as she returns to engage Eliot in his 
own terms, shifting, as she does so, “the historical sense” from its meaning in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” to Eliot’s rearticulation of it in the later “Ulysses, Order, and Myth.”  
The distance Plath establishes between herself and the Beats as she insists that personal 
experience be “control[led] and manipulate[d]” with “an informed and an intelligent mind” arises 
in the interview from a discussion of her references to the Holocaust, a discussion which Orr 
frames as a query into Plath’s professed “Americanness”: “You say, Sylvia, that you consider 
yourself an American, but when we listen to a poem like ‘Daddy,’ which talks about Dachau and 
Auschwitz and Mein Kampf, I have the impression that this is the sort of poem that a real 
American could not have written, because it doesn’t mean so much, these names do not mean so 
much, on the other side of the Atlantic, do they?” (169). In response, Plath points to her German 
and Austrian lineage—“[o]n one side I am a first generation American, on one side I’m second 
generation American”—adding, too, that she is “rather a political person as well,” which in turn 
prompts Orr to ask whether “as a poet,” she has “a great and keen sense of the historic” (169). 
Plath responds decidedly in the affirmative:  
I am not a historian, but I find myself being more and more fascinated by history 
and now I find myself reading more and more about history. I am very interested 
in Napoleon, at the present: I’m very interested in battles, in wars, in Gallipoli, the 
First World War and so on, and I think that as I age I am becoming more and 
more historical. (169) 
 It is within this context of her political and historical engagements, then, that Plath 







tend now to come out of books rather than out of [her] own life,” she responds with what would 
seem a characteristically “confessional” response, but with one that Eliot himself, in his 
“impersonality,” would agree with, given his discussion of the “experience” that serves as the 
“material” for the mind to “digest and transmute,” experience that “include[s],” as we have seen, 
“the emotions and feelings of the writer himself.” “No, no,” Plath tells Orr, “I would not say that 
at all. I think my poems immediately come out of the sensuous and emotional experiences I 
have” (169). It is here that Plath distances her use of the personal from that of the Beats and here 
that she points toward where the historical does in fact enter into her poetics. While her poems 
arise from personal experience, in other words, to avoid the charge of self-indulgence leveled at 
the Beats (as well as at the “confessionals,” as their, as well as their supporters’, defensive 
distancing from the Beats seems to attest),63 this personal experience must not only be 
“control[led]”—as Lowell argues that Bishop “control[s]” hers, a control which indeed saves her 
poetry, for Lowell, from an association with the Beats—it must also prove “relevant” to “the 
bigger things.” Arising as it does from her characterization of herself as “becoming more and 
more historical,” Plath’s rehearsal of the relation between personal experience and formal 
intelligence points not only toward Alvarez’s two poles of modernism (structured according to 
his “late Romantic dichotomy”) but toward the less-discussed “aspect” of Eliot’s “Impersonal 
theory of poetry,” less-discussed, that is, in relation to the “confessionals” (Selected Prose 40). 
While the “control[ling]” of personal experience with Eliotic craft engages the “aspect” of 
Eliot’s impersonality that involves “the relation of the poem to its author,” when Plath provides 
her additional requirement for ensuring that personal experience in poetry doesn’t become a 
                                               
63 For example, in Predicting the Past: The Paradoxes of American Literary History (2009), Michael Boyden 
describes M. L. Rosenthal’s support of Life Studies as, at least in part, a defensive posture: “[his] conception of an 
unconfessional confessionalism was a response to the recurrent charge of critics trained in Eliotic impersonality that 







“shut-box and mirror-looking, narcissistic experience,” she shifts to an engagement of the 
“aspect” that involves the relation of the author to all other authors within the (Western) literary 
“tradition,” the relation of the “new work of art” to “all the works of art which proceeded it” 
(40).  
Here, the poet becomes “impersonal” by acquiring what Eliot calls “the historical sense,” 
which, as we have seen, he defines as “involv[ing] [ . . . ] a perception, not only of the pastness 
of the past, but of its presence; the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his 
own generation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of literature from Homer and 
within it the whole of the literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and 
composes a simultaneous order” (38). It is this sense that “makes a writer traditional” and “at the 
same time [ . . . ] most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity” (38). 
The historical sense, then, helps to enable a poet to (not “utterly”) separate “mind” from “man,” 
to conceive of himself and his work not simply as a particular but as a particular dialectically 
synthesized into the “universal,” into the “ideal order” of “all the works of art which preceded 
[his].” In other words, the historical sense enables the poet to “continual[ly] surrender himself as 
he is at the moment,” (as a particular, we might say), “to something that is more valuable,” (the 
“universal,” the “ideal order”) (40). It is here that Eliot concludes that “[t]he progress of an artist 
is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality,” a progress that indeed proves, 
in Hegelian terms, both “self-transcending and self-preserving.” 
 While Eliot’s discussion of how to acquire “the historical sense” largely reads as an 
acquiring of extensive literary history (as an acquiring of “a ridiculous amount of erudition” by 
studying the “pantheons” of Western literature), this sense of literary history broadens, as the 







possible to achieve such extensive erudition, “Shakespeare,” Eliot notes, “acquired more 
essential history from Plutarch than most men could from the whole British Museum” (40). 
“What is to be insisted upon,” Eliot concludes, “is that the poet must develop or procure” not 
only literary history but a more general “consciousness of the past and that he should continue to 
develop this consciousness throughout his career” (40). It is in terms of the “historical sense” as 
a “consciousness of the past” that extends beyond simply the literary—a “consciousness” that 
involves “a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence”—that the essay 
reads as a precursor for Eliot’s later conception of the “mythical method” (178). While Eliot 
never uses the term “impersonal” in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth” (1923), published four years 
after “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” he reformulates the “aspect of [the] Impersonal 
theory of poetry” that involves “the relation of the poem to its author”—the relation (and 
separation) of “the man who suffers” to (and from) “the mind which creates”—as the relation 
between, as we have seen, personal or “living material” (“the emotions and feelings of the writer 
himself”) and “how [ . . . ] [the writer] deal[s] with [this material] [ . . . ] as an artist” (177). “It is 
here,” Eliot writes, “that Mr. Joyce’s parallel use of the Odyssey has a great importance” (177). It 
is here, in other words, that the “mythical method” becomes a method by which an artist might 
achieve impersonality, by which an artist, in other words, might “deal with”—both transform and 
establish a form for—“living material.” “In using the myth,” Joyce, as Eliot describes him, 
“manipulat[es] a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity” (177). With his 
“mythical method” (by deploying “the historical sense” as formal technique, in other words), 
Joyce fulfills both “aspects” of Eliot’s “theory of impersonal[ity],” impersonality, we might say, 
on the level of the individual (“the relation of the poem to its author”) as well as on the level of 







historical sense” in the literary sense of the dialectical relation of “the new (the really new) work 
of art” to “all the works of art which preceded it,”64 but also in the broader (Shakespeare-
reading-Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans) sense of a “consciousness of the 
past,” “a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence,” a relation Joyce 
formalizes in his “continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity.”  
When Plath describes her own process of acquiring, in effect, the broader “historical 
sense,” of “reading more and more about history” and thereby “becoming more and more 
historical,” she frames this process, as Eliot does, as one of maturation. As we have seen, when 
Eliot first introduces “the historical sense” in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” he identifies 
it as “nearly indispensable to anyone who would continue to be a poet beyond his twenty-fifth 
year” and, later in the essay, as something a poet “should continue to develop [ . . . ] throughout 
his career.” And for Plath, “becoming more and more historical” is indeed something that has 
happened, as she tells Orr, “as I age,” and something that “certainly wasn’t [the case] at all in my 
early twenties” (169). Here Plath situates her lack of “the historical sense” precisely within the 
grace period Eliot offers before this sense becomes “nearly indispensible” for a poet’s “maturity” 
(38). Offering her statement of poetics on the heels of this description of her own process of 
acquiring what we might call the broader “historical sense,” then, Plath indeed engages Eliot’s 
impersonality on both the individual and collective level, but what’s more, she reconfigures its 
later permutation, “the mythical method.”  
When Plath tells Orr that while “[her] poems immediately come out of [her] sensuous and 
emotional experiences”—rather than immediately coming out of the books by which she was 
                                               
64 The method by which Ulysses was created—and thereby Ulysses itself—indeed proves, we could say, “really 
new” for Eliot, which he underscores by likening it to “a scientific discovery,” because “[n]o one else has built a 







gaining a fuller knowledge of “Napoleon,” “Gallipoli, the First World War and so on”—that 
“one should be able to control and manipulate [such] experience[s],” she begins to shift 
Alvarez’s “ideal combination” of Lawrencian subject matter and Eliotic “formal intelligence” (a 
combination that amounts, in effect, to Eliot’s impersonality on the level of the individual) over 
into impersonality on the level of the collective. And her choice of verbs here—“control and 
manipulate,” the very terms with which Eliot defines “the mythical method”—indeed marks the 
shift, in effect serving as her pivot to the collective. “[I]n manipulating a continuous parallel 
between contemporaneity and antiquity,” Joyce, for Eliot, discovers a means “of controlling, of 
ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy 
which is contemporary history” (177, my emphasis). “Control” and “manipulate” do not in fact 
appear in the earlier “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and seem specific to “Ulysses, Order, 
and Myth,” specific, that is, to setting up “the mythical method.” And it is with these terms that 
Plath lays out her own “manipulat[ion] [of] a continuous parallel.” Immediately after she tells 
Orr that “one should be able to manipulate [personal] experiences with an informed and 
intelligent mind,” she offers, in effect, her method for doing so: “I think [personal experience] 
should be relevant, and relevant to the larger things, the bigger things such as Hiroshima and 
Dachau” (169-70, Plath’s emphasis).  
As “the historical sense” enters into her poetics, the “continuous parallel” that Plath 
“manipulates,” then, is not only the parallel between, as we have seen, the private and public 
“faces” of “the forces of disintegration,” but one that reconfigures the “parallel between 
contemporaneity and antiquity” in the service of “the mythical method’s” broader goal, as Eliot 
puts it, of “controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense 







historical moment—a moment in which the Holocaust and the threat of nuclear war were 
entering into “public consciousness in a new way”—to explore and “shape” “contemporary 
history” was to explore the ways in which her contemporary moment was itself shaped by the 
recent past of World War II, by, as she states in her interview with Orr, Hiroshima and Dachau. 
And with her “perception,” to borrow from Eliot, “not only of the pastness of the past, but of its 
presence,” her “manipulation” of a “continuous parallel” between the atrocities of World War II 
and her current Cold War moment—a moment in which the world appeared, as she writes “Lady 
Lazarus” and by the time of her interview with Orr, on the brink of nuclear annihilation with the 
Cuban Missile Crisis—Plath indeed engages The Waste Land as a “poem [that] follows,” in 
Alvarez’s words, “the movement of a psyche not just of a society,” as a poem that expands its 
scope toward “the bigger things,” a poem, in other words, that engages with the tradition, we 
might say, of the modernist epic. One of the ways in which The Waste Land proves 
“characteristic of modernist poetry,” writes Pericles Lewis, whose genre section on poetry in The 
Cambridge Introduction to Modernism (2007) centers on the poem, is the fact “that it contains 
both lyric and epic elements,” and these epic elements, according to Lewis, are put into the 
service, in modernist poems such as The Waste Land and The Cantos, of “address[ing] broad, 
historical questions, the sorts of questions normally addressed by epic” (“The Waste Land”). And 
this epic mode of inquiry—inherent to “the mythical method” as well as, I will argue, Plath’s 
appropriation of it—indeed marks Plath’s departure from Lowell’s engagement of Eliot, as 
Alvarez presents it in The New Poetry.  
In adapting the mythical method to structure an exploration of the relation between 
personal experience and “the bigger things,” as well as the relation between the atrocities of 







through modernism and threads this component of Eliot’s project, the project of The Waste Land, 
forward through “the new seriousness.” As we will explore more fully in the next chapter, 
however, such a course offered Plath no sure footing, Eliot proving, at least in the earlier stages 
of the development of the Ariel poetics, a rather disabling presence in her writing. And indeed 
Eliot exerted both personal (as an advocate of Hughes and, therefore, as a presence in her daily 
life) as well as more collective pressures on Plath’s work. As Michael Boyden puts it in 
Predicting the Past: The Paradoxes of American Literary History (2009), “During the early 
sixties, T. S. Eliot was such a dominant presence that few were inclined to confront his work 
head on” (145). And yet, Plath does just this. And it was Sitwell, I will argue, who played a large 
role in helping her do so. Helping enable Plath to negotiate Eliot’s line of modernism as well as 
the tradition of the modernist epic, more generally, Sitwell offered Plath a model—more direct 
even than that of The Waste Land—for an engagement of “the bigger things.” Such a model—
presented in the form of Sitwell’s Gold Coast Customs (1929) (itself composed in part as a 
response to The Waste Land and belonging, I would argue, to the tradition of the modernist epic) 
as well as her World War II poetry and her “Three Poems for the Atomic Age”—helped Plath, as 
we will see in Chapter 3, address not only The Waste Land but Eliot’s oeuvre more broadly. As a 
result, the culmination of her series of “transcendence” poems, “Getting There,” which will be 
the focus of the Conclusion, amounts not only to a head-on engagement of Eliot, but to a 
reconfiguration of his historical vision.  
In effect, then, by tracing Plath’s “resurrection” from the margins of Sitwell’s “Green 
Song” to the center of her poetics as she presents it in her interview with Orr, given just after 
completing “Lady Lazarus,” we discover Plath—at key moments in the development of the Ariel 







Sitwell’s The Canticle of the Rose, more broadly. Such a conversation, as we will see in the 
following chapters, plays a critical role in helping Plath to frame her poetics—her exploration of 
both the parallel between the private and public “faces” of the “forces of disintegration” as well 
as the parallel between her contemporary historical moment and the recent past of World War 
II—within a Sitwellian cycle of death and rebirth, something that becomes in Ariel, as it had in 
The Canticle of the Rose, both subject matter and structural principle. Sitwell, in other words, 










“[E]ccentric grotesqueries”: Edith Sitwell, Marianne Moore, and “The Tour” 
While Sitwell is indeed an essential part of the “story” of the Ariel poems—as we will 
see in the conversation that takes place between “Lady Lazarus” and “Green Song” and, more 
broadly, between Ariel and The Canticle of the Rose—she is strikingly absent from the statement 
of poetics Plath offers in her interview with Orr, given almost simultaneously with the 
completion of “Lady Lazarus.” While Plath makes explicit reference, in other words, to Alvarez 
as well as to Lowell and Sexton, and she directly echoes Eliot’s language from “Ulysses, Order, 
and Myth,” Sitwell, while present in Plath’s poetry, is missing from her explicit statement of 
poetics. This absence, I would argue, speaks much to Sitwell’s position in relation to the 
modernist canon of the fifties, in which The Waste Land, as well as Eliot himself, had to a 
considerable extent become modernism itself. Sitwell, for example, doesn’t seem to have 
appeared on any of the syllabi for Plath’s classes, either in high school, at Smith, or, later, at 
Cambridge. However, despite this, Plath manages to write not one but two academic essays on 
the poet, one a nearly thirty-page examination of Sitwell’s oeuvre. And while Plath’s mentor at 
Smith, Elizabeth Drew, made her disapproval of Sitwell known in her comments on Plath’s 
extended study of Sitwell, Plath’s interest in Sitwell persisted, and continued to persist through 
that incredibly prolific fall of 1962.  
And this despite not only Drew’s disapproval, but also Alvarez’s.65 For Alvarez, the 
Sitwell of The Canticle of the Rose, the Sitwell, in other words, of the forties (when the 
collection was published), would have been associated with what he perceived to be the romantic 
                                               
65 There is no record of any discussion of Sitwell between Plath and Alvarez, but given the intensity of Alvarez’s 
disapproval of Sitwell and the fact that this disapproval bore the seeds of his later conception of “the new 
seriousness,” it seems fairly certain that his opinion would not have changed by the time Plath met him, three years 







and visionary excesses of Dylan Thomas and his followers. And when, in July of 1957—a month 
before Ted Hughes’ The Hawk in the Rain was released—Sitwell’s Collected Poems appeared, 
Alvarez attested both to her continuing popularity with the general public, which had peaked in 
the forties with her war poetry, and the extent to which this popularity appeared unfounded to 
critics versed in Eliotic modernism as well to those seeking the direction in which contemporary 
poetry was now headed. Alvarez’s review of Sitwell in The Observer—which Sitwell biographer 
Richard Greene identifies as “the most influential” of the “good many negative reviews” that 
Sitwell received for the collection (409)—appeared just a few months, then, before his review of 
Hughes’s Hawk, entitled “Tough Young Poet,” in which he lauds the volume’s “mainspring” of 
“a sense of dramatic violence” (12), a violence he would envelop a few years later, when 
Hughes’s second volume, Lupercal, appeared, in a “romanticism [ . . . ] tougher and stronger 
than the stuff of Dylan Thomas and the forties people” (“Frogs and Springboks” 9), and a few 
years after that, in “the new seriousness.” And it is indeed in terms of his burgeoning sense of 
“the new seriousness” that Alvarez dismisses Sitwell.  
Beginning his review by attesting to what he calls, in the title, “Sitwellism,” Alvarez 
attests, too, to this phenomenon’s apparent lack of a critical basis: “Whenever a critic hesitates to 
sing Dame Edith Sitwell’s hosannas there is sure to be trouble: the correspondence columns are 
full for weeks. Why, I wonder?” (11). With his answer to this question, Alvarez situates Sitwell 
in the remote past, outside of contemporary poetic concerns, and far, as we will see, from what 
would soon become “the new seriousness” as well as the modernist lineage he was fashioning for 
it. Public support of Sitwell’s work didn’t derive from a “belie[f] in the inviolability of poetry” 
or a “[concern] with the sanctity of the poet as a cultural symbol,” according to Alvarez; instead 







rather special”—something, in other words, too particular to belong to the wider “whole” of 
“literature”—“like a taste for the baroque” (11, my emphasis). Seeming to miss (or perhaps 
willfully missing) the extent to which Façade explores the very falseness of exteriors, of what 
we could call “the baroque”—something to which Plath, in her long essay on Sitwell, proved far 
more receptive, describing Façade, for example, in terms of “the raucous, empty gaiety of the 
world” (“Edith Sitwell”)—Alvarez concludes that Sitwell’s series of poems “seems no more 
‘abstract’ ([Sitwell’s] word for it) than any other rather literary nursery rhyme” (11). “Yet though 
the poetry may often have that charming, sophisticated, dream-like air of a Christmas panto for 
adults,” ultimately Alvarez wonders, “does it really matter?” (11, Alvarez’s emphasis).  
What Sitwell’s poetry lacks for Alvarez, then, is “seriousness.” Sitwell, he quips, 
referring to her introduction to the collection, “seems unwilling to admit that any of her verse is, 
despite appearances, less serious than ‘Paradise Lost’” (11). Prefiguring his definition of “the 
new seriousness” as “a poet’s willingness to face the full range of his experience with his full 
intelligence” (The New Poetry 24), Alvarez writes that “[i]nstead of using poetry to express 
precisely the fullness of experience, [Sitwell] has contrived with great care and invention a series 
of moulds into which the reader can pour just as much feeling as he wants” (“Sitwellism” 11). 
Therefore, rather than reading Façade, which he positions as representative of Sitwell’s early 
works, as a significant work of modernist experiment, Alvarez ultimately reads it, in effect, as 
failing in New Critical terms; rather than comprising an autonomous art object, in other words, 







they are so and not otherwise,’”66 as they are “challenges to [the reader’s] powers of free-
association—a kind of ‘do-it-yourself’ verse” (11).   
Lest we think it was just Sitwell’s early work that affronted Alvarez—work which he 
describes as “exuberant froth,” “a matter of the sophisticated ornament” “ha[ving] nothing to do 
with the feel of the thing”—Sitwell’s later poetry, for Alvarez, not only fails to redeem her but 
fails even to live up to the earlier poems he so summarily dismisses (11). “[C]ompared with 
‘Façade’ or ‘Bucolic Comedies’ or ‘The Sleeping Princess,’”67 this later work proves merely 
“noisy and uncertain” (11). Citing a couple of lines from “The Shadow of Cain,” one of Sitwell’s 
“Three Poems of the Atomic Age” which address the bombing of Hiroshima, Alvarez contends 
that “[f]or all the apocalyptic rumbling” of her later poetry, “[Sitwell’s] anguish, however sincere 
it in fact may be, sounds more rhetorical than personal” (11).  
Plath, however, in her assessment of Sitwell’s full body of work, reads Sitwell as indeed 
not only a “personal poet,” but a “serious” one. Interpreting the uses to which Sitwell puts the 
rhythms and images of nursery rhyme far differently from Alvarez, who reads such qualities as, 
in effect, rendering Façade unfit for “serious” adult reading, Plath compares what she calls 
“[Sitwell’s] acute and vivid observations” to “those of a child (a terribly clever and technically 
adroit child, to be sure!) coming awake in a very personal and intimate wonderland” (“Edith 
Sitwell”). And for Plath, this sense of a “personal [ . . . ] wonderland” in Sitwell’s early work, 
this “childishness,” we might say, is both precisely the point and something certainly more than 
“froth” or “ornament,” tempered and complicated as it is, as though viewed through the lens of 
adulthood or through, perhaps, the lens of a childhood not reduced to any one-dimensional sense 
                                               
66 Here Alvarez is quoting from Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria; for Eliot, “Coleridge was perhaps the greatest of 
English critics, and in a sense the last,” as he states at the beginning of his essay, “The Perfect Critic” (Selected 
Prose 50).  







of innocence: “There is another side to this bucolic world [of Sitwell’s early poems] [ . . . ] where 
the story book animals turn harsh and grunting and all is mired in ‘heavy brutish greedy 
darkness’” (“Edith Sitwell”). This “personal [ . . . ] wonderland,” in other words, is tempered by 
a sense of threat lurking beneath the “façade,” a sense of threat not altogether unlike that which 
Alvarez praises in his review of The Colossus as giving Plath’s work “its distinction” (“The Poet 
and the Poetess” 21). And as she traces Sitwell’s shift “from the early bucolic world to the 
contemporary world of the atomic bomb,” this threat takes a far more public and, we could say, 
“serious” form: “It is in Gold Coast Customs,” Sitwell’s long poem published in 1929 as a 
response, in part, to Eliot’s Waste Land, “that the grotesque whimsicalities of her previous 
nursery rhyme poems and the giddily rocking rhythms in Façade combine in a terrifying 
nightmare holocaust which approaches ‘an appalling spiritual shock’” (“Edith Sitwell”). And it is 
in her later poems, such as “Street Song” and “Green Song,” with which Plath later places “Lady 
Lazarus” into conversation, that Sitwell, for Plath, “achieves her mastery of subtle, disciplined 
tone and texture in perfect union with a profound and creative criticism of life” (“Edith Sitwell”).  
While in the spring of 1953, during which she writes her long paper, Plath detects the 
seeds of the “personal” and the “serious” in Sitwell’s work, then, Alvarez, four years later in his 
review, wonders indeed “what the fuss was about” (11). Questioning whether Sitwell’s poetry 
“really matter[s],” he suggests that it lacks the “depth” with which he would soon define “the 
new seriousness,” a depth without which Sitwell, in his view, forfeits her modernist status: “Do 
the tricks of rhythm and rhyme, the exotic, improbable, nursery-tale objects make the early 
poems into anything more than delicious games? Was, in fact, Dame Edith, for all her 
inventions, ever ‘modern’ in any significant sense?” (11). In Alvarez’s estimation, then, Sitwell 







poet of “the new seriousness” could hardly proceed, as Lowell, in Alvarez’s feedback model of 
literary history, in his dialectical positioning of “confessionalism” in relation to modernism, had 
proceeded from Eliot. Early in her long essay, Plath indeed registers the degree to which Sitwell 
didn’t fit easily within the New Critical models to which she had been “conditioned”: “Coming 
as I do from a generation conditioned and educated to comprehend the broken images of Eliot’s 
Waste Land, the tragic gaiety of Yeats’s gyring universe, and the lyric paradoxes of Auden’s Age 
of Anxiety, it was nevertheless with a shock that I catapulted into Edith Sitwell’s ‘first world,’ a 
bucolic landscape ranging from incarnate animalistic scenery to rococo fairytale gardens” 
(“Edith Sitwell”).  
And it is precisely the ways in which Sitwell didn’t quite fit, the ways in which she stood 
as “something apart,” in terms of both the New Critical canon of modernism and Alvarez’s own, 
the ways in which she stood, too, then, on the outskirts of contemporary literary tastes, I will 
argue, that helped Plath to negotiate her pursuit of a modernist endorsement as well as a 
modernist lineage from which her own poetics, with its engagement of “the bigger things,” could 
proceed. While in her interview with Orr, Plath situates her poetics in dialectical relation to 
Eliot’s line of modernism, it is Sitwell who helps Plath to navigate this line from which she had 
experienced herself as indeed “something apart.” For Plath, Sitwell serves not only as a model 
for situating her explorations of the parallel between “the personal” and “the bigger things” 
within a cycle of death and rebirth, but as a model, more generally, for flouting what she would 
later call in her interview with Orr, citing Alvarez, “gentility.” And it is what Plath calls the 
“eccentric grotesqueries” of Sitwell’s work, I will argue, that she appropriates not only for the 
development of her own poetics, but also for her search for a modernist mentor, and, later, in 










When Plath first encounters Sitwell’s poetry, in any in-depth sense at least, she does so, 
tellingly, not in a classroom but in a bookstore:  
According to habit, I was browsing through the shelves of our local bookstore 
when I chanced upon an enticing pink-and-black jacketed volume entitled The 
Canticle of the Rose. Sitting down casually on a wicker chair, I began to leaf 
through the pages. The next thing I heard was a child’s voice coming faintly from 
somewhere far off, “Look, mummy, that girl’s still sitting there.” Galvanized into 
action, I hastily gathered myself together, put the book back on the shelf, and left. 
(Later I returned in a more solvent state and bought it.) (“A New Idiom”) 
This account appears in the first of Plath’s essays on Sitwell, a nine-page paper written in May of 
1951 that serves, in effect, as Plath’s apprenticeship to the elder poet’s “technical experiments,” 
including her “striking union of sight-sound-touch-taste stimuli” (“A New Idiom”). “[T]hese 
images,” Plath writes, “awaken a new awareness in the reader, who must allow himself to be 
conditioned to this new mode of expression” in order more fully to “comprehend its multitude of 
delicate variations and intricacies” (“A New Idiom”). Three years later, Plath shifted from an 
examination of the “technical experiments” in Sitwell’s early poetry to a twenty-nine-page 
exploration of her wider oeuvre. Despite having studied, as she indicates at the beginning of this 
longer essay, Eliot, Yeats, and Auden, Plath describes herself as especially enamored with the 
elder poet: “I do not know when I have been so struck and entranced by any poet” (“Edith 
Sitwell”). However, while Plath received an “A” for the assignment, (as she had for her first 







from heavily while preparing to teach his work to her freshman English class, made her distaste 
for Sitwell clear. In her comments on the paper, Drew indicated that although she thought Plath’s 
work “excellent,” she did not share what she referred to as Plath’s “spontaneous enthusiasm” for 
Sitwell’s poetry, her choice of words suggestive of Sitwell’s peripheral status, positioning Plath’s 
affinity for the elder poet’s work as impulsive and idiosyncratic, arising as it did from outside of 
the academy (“Edith Sitwell”). In a single sentence, Drew summarily dismissed Sitwell’s work: 
“I don’t like all the capitalization in the poems [and] I feel the symbolism is imposed from 
without rather than coming from within” (“Edith Sitwell”). Though Drew added an ameliorative 
“But I may easily be wrong!” Plath could not have failed to notice, at least in her own academic 
circle, that Sitwell was not considered a particularly reputable poetic model (“Edith Sitwell”). 
 Indeed, by the time Plath encounters Canticle, Sitwell’s reputation—beginning with the 
1911 serial publication of her anthology Wheels, bolstered by her experimental Façade, and 
cresting in the mid-forties with her war poetry—had already begun its swift deterioration. 
Thanks to her two successful and press-filled tours in America in the 40s, audiences and some 
critics there continued to embrace Sitwell as a literary star, though as one, perhaps, of 
diminishing luster. However, in Britain, by 1949, with the release of Canticle, “the tide, which 
had flown her way since 1942,” as Sitwell biographer Victoria Glendinning puts it, “was just on 
the turn” (285).   
In the early forties, Sitwell had begun writing again for the first time since she had 
published Gold Coast Customs in 1929. Throughout the thirties, she had focused her attention on 
prose, falling out of favor as the “Auden generation” came to the fore with its “documentary 
techniques” and images of “engines, carbines, insulators, and turbines” (Glendinning 191), a 







poetry’s reactionary responses to the American modernist experiments of the twenties. However, 
with the war came what Frederick Prokosch refers to in his essay for the 1948 volume, A 
Celebration for Edith Sitwell, as “a powerful reaction against Auden, and a resurgence of 
traditional influences, of traditional imagery and metrics,” all of which came to be associated by 
the end of the forties and early fifties, as we have seen in the case of Alvarez’s literary history, 
with Dylan Thomas (whose reputation Sitwell did much to foster and who was a great favorite, 
too, of Plath’s) and with Sitwell herself, in her post-Façade phase (qtd. in Glendinning 249). 
Sitwell produced during the war some of her most critically praised work, indeed some of the 
most important work written during and about the war, such as “Still Falls the Rain.”  
 But as we have seen, by the end of the forties, poetic tastes had again begun to shift in 
reaction to the perceived excesses of the romanticism of Thomas and his followers and as a 
“negative feedback”—in the form of an avowed understatement and a specific “Englishness”—
to modernism. For this new crop of poets, those of the Movement, such as Larkin, as we saw in 
the last chapter, as well as D. J. Enright, Elizabeth Jennings, and Kingsley Amis, against whom 
Alvarez would position the poetry of “the new seriousness,” “the apocalyptic poetry of the war 
years seemed remote and overdone” (Greene 384). In response, their focus on “common sense, 
clarity, modesty of intention, and plain language” in effect reclaimed “some of the neglected 
qualities of the best Georgian verse,” against which Sitwell had long since aligned herself in her 
anti-Georgian anthology, Wheels (384). As Glendinning sums it up, “The Movement was in 
general anti-Eliot, anti-modernist, anti-symbolist, pro-Leavis” (308).   
 Certainly, when Plath first encounters Sitwell, F. R. Leavis was approaching the peak of 
his influence. Since the early thirties, as director of studies in English at Cambridge and senior 







educational theories of literature,” which by the time Plath had enrolled at Smith, had helped to 
shape “a whole generation of readers, teachers, and critics, worldwide” (Glendinning 171). And, 
unfortunately for Sitwell, Leavis was no fan. In his widely circulated New Bearings in English 
Poetry (1932)—with which Alvarez begins his introduction to The New Poetry, summing it up as 
a “procla[mation] that Eliot and Pound had between them brought about a significant 
reorientation of literature”—Leavis famously quipped that Sitwell (as well as her two brothers, 
Osbert and Sachavarell) “belong[s] to the history of publicity rather than of poetry,” a view that 
by the time of the book’s release had become, according to Glendinning, “evidently part of the 
conventional wisdom,” a view that carries over, it would seem, into Alvarez’s estimation of 
Sitwell as “something apart” from modernism (117).68 Leavis indeed held fast and long to this 
opinion, so much so that when Ted Hughes was asked in 1995 by Richard Greene, whether 
Sitwell, an admirer of his work when it began appearing in the fifties, had contacted him, 
Hughes, responding in the negative, attributed the lack of contact to Leavis’s anti-Sitwell 
reputation: “Perhaps because I came through Cambridge, she felt wary of me—though I was as 
skeptical of Leavis and his destructive temperament as she was” (qtd. in Greene 385). 
While Plath first came upon Sitwell in the U.S., where her reputation had better 
weathered the shift in aesthetics and Leavis’s disdain, her mentor at Smith, Elizabeth Drew, 
before settling in the States, had attended Oxford and then taught at Cambridge from 1934-7, 
during Leavis’s ascendency there. And during this time, logical positivism was taking root at 
Oxford, “encouraging a distrust of things beyond the empirical” and helping to foster “a literary 
mood that preferred observation to vision,” Sitwell’s predominant post-Facade mode (Greene 
384). Drew’s comments on Plath’s paper, then, prove rather representative of the prevailing 
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critical opinion in England; her distaste for Sitwell’s use of capitalization and symbolism, which 
she felt was “imposed from without rather than coming from within,” echoed, for example, the 
logical-positivist bent of L. F. Duchene’s assessment in the March 2, 1945, edition of the 
Manchester Guardian: “In short passages one becomes aware of Dr. Sitwell’s power. But in 
large doses, her continuous over-emphasis, her ‘superbe,’ her symbolism in capital letters—
derived from literature rather than life—her clotted rhythms, all conspire to an over-dressed 
monotony and a certain hollowness” (qtd. in Greene 385).   
And yet despite her mentor’s disapproval of Sitwell, Plath’s interest indeed persisted. 
“April Aubade,” for example, written while at Smith, suggests that Plath’s conversation with 
Sitwell’s “Green Song” started long before she began composing “Lady Lazarus.”69 In the poem, 
Plath experiments with Sitwell’s poetic world view, in which, as she describes it in her extended 
essay, “[t]he repetitive and intricate patterns of the universe [ . . . ] are seen as the united 
blueprint of God’s plan under the superstructure of things” (“Edith Sitwell”). She offers “Green 
Song” as emblematic of this view, noting that in the poem, “jewels run in the blood of birds and 
humans and in the sap of plants alike” (“Edith Sitwell”). In “April Aubade,” Plath rehearses this 
jewel-blood-sap image cluster embedded in religion, describing “diamonds jangl[ing] hymns 
within the blood / and sap ascend[ing] the steeple of the vein” (Collected Poems 312). And about 
a year after receiving Drew’s feedback on her essay, in a letter to Gordon Lameyer dated 
February 6, 1954, Plath describes having “bought two magnificent records,” one of which was 
                                               
69  Though Plath wrote the poem before she began to date her typescripts consistently, and it is filed, in The 
Collected Poems, among a selection of other undated poems under the category “Juvenilia,” an article covering the 
Glascock Poetry contest published in The Christian Science Monitor, which features a photograph of Plath reading 
from a typescript with lines from the poem published beneath it (Letters 908n), indicates that Plath composed the 
poem no later than the spring of 1955, about two years after she wrote her extended paper on Sitwell. While it’s 
certainly possible she wrote the poem concurrently with the paper in 1953, Plath’s entry of the poem into the 
Glascock Poetry contest in April of 1955 suggests, possibly, a later date, given Plath’s tendency to discredit her 







“Edith Sitwell’s Façade with the bizarre music of William Walton in the background” (Letters 
682). Relaying her defense of Sitwell’s sound experiments in the face of familial disapproval, 
Plath writes, “Mother doesn’t like it, and general family concensus [sic] makes me shut all the 
doors while I listen to what they think [is] incomprehensible gibberish, while I insist that vowels 
do have wave lengths and can give a pure sensuous listening pleasure, even when dissociated 
from meaning” (682). 
Several years later, during the spring semester of 1958, while Plath was teaching at 
Smith, Sitwell played a repeated role in Plath’s negotiation of the institutional canon she was 
teaching as well as the living “canon” of “modern” greats that had, through their endorsement of 
Hughes, begun initiating him into Eliot’s line of modernism, concentrated around Faber and 
Faber, Eliot’s editorial hub. While Sitwell proved largely, if not entirely, absent from these 
canons, she nonetheless features prominently in the “canon” taking shape in Plath’s journals. At 
the end of January, on the eve of her second semester of teaching, during which her unit on 
poetry would devote two full weeks to Eliot’s work, Plath—a couple of years before meeting 
Alvarez—locates Eliot, like Alvarez, at the “source” of modern poetry. However, decidedly 
unlike Alvarez (who questioned whether Sitwell was ever truly “modern,” as we have seen, a 
view contemporaneous with Plath’s own, his review of Sitwell’s Collected Poems appearing 
about six months before Plath writes her journal here) Plath locates Sitwell along with Eliot, 
indeed before Eliot, at this source: “To see all those old venerable originals before we die—Edith 
Sitwell, TS Eliot, Robert Frost: all the slick forties & fifties give us is gin-drinking politic poetry-
pandering businessmen” (Unabridged Journals 319). As Alvarez will do a couple of years later 
in his essay, Plath here eschews the intervening generations, “the slick forties & fifties,” to find 







poetics might proceed. Whereas in eschewing the forties and fifties, Alvarez, on the other side of 
the Atlantic, was dismissing the current (“anti-Eliot” and “anti-modernist”) Movement and the 
romanticism of Dylan Thomas and his followers (against which, in part, the Movement had 
formulated itself), Plath, immersed as she was in the American academy, was eschewing, at least 
in part,70 the New Critical formalism that had, in Lowell’s estimation as we have seen, produced 
a rather “Alexandrian age.” In bypassing the forties and fifties, Plath was eschewing, in other 
words, an age marked, as Lowell observes, by a “proficien[cy] [of] forms,” of which Lowell 
himself, in his Lord Weary’s Castle (1947) phase, served as both the apotheosis as well as the 
breath by which this style had caught its second wind, and in doing so, become increasingly 
brittle—“pure craft” “divorced from culture.” 
That semester Plath would find the line of modernism of which Eliot was the “source” 
effectively blocked. Having during the fall semester decided not to return to Smith the following 
year, teaching having proven incompatible with her writing, Plath that spring repeatedly records 
the connection between Eliot’s presence in the institutional (as well as “living”) canon and her 
own inability to produce. At the beginning of March, this connection subtly begins to emerge as 
she explores in her journal “[w]hat [it is] that teaching kills”(Unabridged Journals 346):  
The juice, the sap—the substance of revelation: by making even the insoluble 
questions & multiple possible answers take on the granite assured stance of 
dogma. It does not kill this quick of life in students who come, each year, fresh, 
quick, to be awakened & pass on—but it kills the quick in me by forcing to 
                                               
70 In this journal, expressing a sense of release during winter break after her first semester teaching, Plath writes in a 
“we,” suggesting the inclusion of Hughes and possibly her mother, who she was visiting at the time. Studying and 
writing at Cambridge, and then teaching in America, Hughes’s experience of the forties and fifties would have been 
akin to Alvarez’s, but also Plath’s. Likewise, having been reared in the New Criticism, and then studied and written 
at Cambridge, Plath’s perception of the forties and fifties would have been akin to Lowell’s, but also Alvarez’s. And 
in identifying Eliot and Sitwell as well as Frost as venerable originals, Plath suggests the degree to which her 







formula the great visions, the great collocations and cadences of words and 
meanings. (346) 
As a result, Plath finds herself “living & teaching on rereadings, on notes of other people, sour as 
heartburn, between two unachieved shapes: between the original teacher & the original writer: 
neither” (346). Having just six weeks earlier identified Sitwell, Eliot, and Frost as “those [ . . . ] 
venerable originals,” Plath—identifying herself here as “in between,” as neither an “original 
teacher” nor an “original writer”—implicitly embeds her struggle for originality within 
modernism, or, rather, locates modernism as her struggle’s “origin.” While later she would 
discover how to make fruitful use of “in-between” spaces, to tap their transformative potential, 
for  now the position offered her nothing but negation. In the journal, then, Plath longs for the 
brief reprieve of spring break, which would allow her to concentrate solely on becoming 
“original” as a writer, on becoming a writer “original” enough, in other words, to stake a claim to 
a modernist heritage.  
 Shortly before beginning at Smith that fall, Plath had come close, if not to securing a 
modernist heritage, at least to landing a modernist endorsement on par with those Hughes had 
received. By this point, they had heard that The Hawk in the Rain had “won the Harper’s first 
publication contest” (Unabridged Journals 270), which had been judged by Marianne Moore 
along with Auden and Stephen Spender. Three months after hearing the news, it seemed it might 
be Plath’s turn, Plath having received word that she’d been selected as a finalist for the Yale 
Younger Poets Series prize to be judged by Auden. However, while Auden had approved of 
Hughes’s work (the panel’s decision was unanimous), Plath had some concerns when it came to 
her own. She had met Auden during his brief visit to Smith while she was a student there, and, as 







final decision, “My heart sank as I remember[ed] his judgments on my early Smith poems” 
(Letters Home 315).71 Plath knew all too well what was at stake; if her book won, “Auden would 
have to write a foreword to it then” (315). However, that August, Plath reports in her journal, “It 
Came Back” (294). Auden’s rejection of her manuscript, the loss, in other words, of her hopes 
for his endorsement, prompted Plath to make some stark assessments of where her work stood as 
she headed into her first semester of teaching. In the same entry in which she records the return 
of her manuscript, she concludes, “That’s my trouble. I see it very clear now: bridging the gap 
between a bright published adolescent which died at 20 and a potentially talented & mature adult 
who begins writing about 25” (293). A published manuscript endorsed by Auden would have 
been just the thing to bridge the gap not only between adolescent and mature writer, but between 
exceptional student and beginner teacher: “It would have backed me up at Smith in my work, 
given me that toehold on my adult work” (295).  
As it stood, without a published book under her belt, without something she felt could 
“authorize” her teaching, that first semester was enough to take teaching off the table. By early 
November, she had written to her brother, “this life is not the life for a writer. After I have 
written 20 stories and a book or two of poems, I might be able to keep up writing with work or a 
family, but I am needing to apprentice myself to my real trade, which I hope to do next year” 
(Letters Home 329-30). As a stand-out student returning to her alma mater, Plath felt particularly 
under-the-lens, writing of her plans for the following year to “write in the mornings and work 
part-time at odd jobs,” “to be anonymous for a while, not the returned and inadequate heroine of 
the Smith campus” (329). “If I knew how to teach a short story, or a novel, or a poem,” she 
confided, “I’d at least have that joy. But I’m making it up as I go along, through trial and error, 
                                               
71 Letters Home appears to be the only documentation of this exchange between Plath and Auden, and Plath’s 







mostly error” (330). And Plath, that week, was being observed: “I’m being ‘visited’ by other 
professors, which is enough to throw me into a cold twitch. I wish I were more conceited, it 
would be a big help” (328). Certainly having a published book and a modernist endorsement 
would have helped buoy Plath’s confidence not only as a new teacher but as a young woman 
among the very few women teaching in the department. “It’s easier for the men, I think, because 
the Smith girls respect them more,” she wrote, “and the older women have experience and a kind 
of authority and expertness which carries them through” (330).  
Although the observations seemed to have gone well (Plath reporting in her next letter to 
her brother at the end of November, “I have heard unofficially that I will probably be asked back 
for next year and would have ‘good chances of promotion’”), she nonetheless felt increasingly 
sidelined in terms of her writing as well as her teaching. Toward the end of January, after 
recovering from a bout of pneumonia over the holidays, Plath recorded her reaction to the release 
of Hall, Pack, and Simpson’s The New Poets of England and America (1957), for which her own 
work had not been selected. Although Hughes’s work hadn’t been selected either, Plath took 
issue with the fact that of the six women included in the volume, which collected the work of 
fifty-two poets in total, “[e]xcept for May Swenson & Adrienne Rich,” [as] she [saw it], “not one 
better or more-published than me” (Unabridged Journals 315).72 To secure herself among 
Swenson and Rich’s ranks, she wrote, she would have to wait out the spring semester, “[w]ait till 
June. June? I shall fall rust-tongued long before then” (315). The following day, having attended 
a “faculty meeting,” Plath perceived herself to have been excluded, too, by her fellow teachers 
(who, perhaps, had gotten word that she had chosen not to return the following year), perceived 
                                               
72 Along with Swenson and Rich, Americans Catherine Davis, Elizabeth B. Harrod, and Ellen de Young May, and 
the British Elizabeth Jennings, associated with the Movement, appear as the six women included in the 1957 edition 







herself not as a colleague but rather as “a naughty presumptuous student”: “Alone, going alone, 
among strangers. Month by month, colder shoulders. No eyes met mine. I picked up a cup of 
coffee in the crowded room among faces more strange than in September” (318). Indeed, “[a]ll 
the faces of [her] student shining days,” Plath felt, had “turned the other way” (318). “And a 
story,” she chastised herself, “a lousy sentimental novel chapter 30 pages long & utterly 
worthless at my back:73 on this I lavish my hours, this be my defense, my sign of genius against 
those people who know somehow miraculously how to be together, au courant, at one” (318). “I 
must bridge the gap,” she resolved, as she had the previous August on the heels of her loss of the 
Yale prize, “between adolescent glitter & mature glow” (J 318).   
There was a good bit weighing, then, on that spring break of 1958. And it didn’t 
disappoint. Plath produced eight poems in eight days (Unabridged Journals 356), a pace 
prefiguring the poem-a-day (or more) clip of her fall 1962 Ariel burst. Bolstered by her new 
work, by her sudden prolificness, Plath wrote what are among the most oft-cited lines from her 
journals: “Arrogant, I think I have written lines which qualify me to be The Poetess of America 
(and Ted will be The Poet of England and all her dominions)” (360). “Who rivals?” she asks, 
initiating a list of women from “history,” creating, in effect, her own “canon” of women poets: 
“Sappho, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Christina Rosetti, Amy Lowell, Emily Dickinson, Edna 
St. Vincent Millay—all dead. Now: Edith Sitwell & Marianne Moore, the ageing giantesses & 
poetic godmothers” (360). Here Sitwell and Moore, as “ageing giantesses,” become, in effect, 
living “history,” part of Plath’s living “canon” into whose ranks younger women poets—“May 
Swenson, Isabella Gardner, & most close, Adrienne Cecile Rich”—vie to join. In the wake of 
Auden’s rejection, as well as her exclusion from The New Poets of England and America, then, 
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Plath turned specifically to women modernists to explore a lineage, indeed a career, apart from 
Hughes’s—she as “Poetess of America,” he as “The Poet of England and all her dominions”—a 
gendered and nationalized separation that she would, with the help of Sitwell’s model, eventually 
surmount, engaging Hughes (as we saw in the case of “Ariel”), as well as the contemporary 
London scene more generally, as she positioned her poetry in direct response to Alvarez’s call 
for a “new seriousness.”  
By claiming both Sitwell and Moore as “poetic godmothers,” Plath offers herself, in 
effect, two lines of modernism. While in this journal she lists both women modernists, two 
months earlier, when she identified “those [ . . . ] venerable originals,” Moore in fact was not 
among them. Whereas by the fifties, Sitwell, as we have seen, had fallen out of critical favor, 
and, in Alvarez’s (influential) estimation, had become primarily a popular, rather than literary, 
figure, Moore, on the other hand, as Vivian R. Pollak sums up in “Moore, Plath, Hughes, and 
‘The Literary Life,’” “had emerged as an icon of popular culture without losing her place in the 
modernist hierarchy of greats” (96). Following a period during which Moore had been 
particularly withdrawn from public life as she attended her ailing mother, the release in 1951 of 
her Collected Poems, for which she was awarded the Pulitzer and Bollingen prizes as well as a 
National Book Award, had indeed further cemented her status as a stalwart of the modernist 
canon at the same time that it launched her on a path toward literary celebrity. While the fifties 
brought Moore renewed acclaim and increasing public attention—Moore appearing, for example, 
on the Tonight Show to discuss the Brooklyn Dodgers (Chiasson, “All About My Mother”)—her 
position within the modernist canon had in fact long been confirmed. In 1934, ten years since she 
had last published a volume of poetry, Moore’s Selected Poems appeared and did so with an 







Moore, and the Gendered Operations of Literary Sponsorship,” “definitively settled Moore’s 
status as a Modernist poet” (121). In the introduction, Eliot indeed handpicks Moore for his own 
(minimalist) canon of modern poetry: “My conviction, for what it is worth,”—and as his readers 
well knew, his “conviction” at the time was worth much—“has remained unchanged for the last 
fourteen years: that Miss Moore’s poems form part of the small body of durable poetry written in 
our time” (“Introduction” 12).  
Even “as a publishing poet, and, after 1925, as editor of Modernism’s largest circulation 
magazine, The Dial,” Kineke writes (122), Moore herself acknowledged, albeit with a certain 
playful ambivalence, the critical boon that would be an introduction by the poet of The Waste 
Land, writing to Eliot, “if you would care to introduce the book, or preface it with comment, I 
should be grateful. That the things would profit by being sponsored is perhaps a reason against 
your undertaking them, so I leave it to you” (qtd. in Kineke 123). In this sense, then, as 
“sponsored” by Eliot—a term that Kineke argues is well-suited by its “ecclesiastical, agonistic, 
and commercial” definitions to describe not only Moore and Eliot’s relationship, but “the 
gendered operations of Modernist literary mentoring” more generally (123)—Moore can be read 
as belonging to Eliot’s line of modernism (his “small body of durable poetry”), “his reading” of 
Moore’s work in his introduction, as Kineke writes, having “shaped and continue[d] to shape 
Moore criticism” (122).  
Therefore, despite later claiming her as a “poetic godmother,” Plath perhaps hadn’t 
identified Moore as a “venerable original” because she perceived the modernist, at least to an 
extent, as stemming from Eliot’s “origin.” While Plath that spring would compose her list of 
women poets over against the canonical male poets she would soon be teaching, that is not to say 







Perceived as an exception to the “rule” of the woman poet, Moore offered Plath a line of 
modernism that was indeed canonical, rooted in (or at least sponsored by) Eliot, while Sitwell —
as Plath hinted in her essay as she described Sitwell’s work, in part, in terms of “eccentric 
grotesqueries”—stood as “something apart” from the canonical. Not truly “‘modern’ in any 
significant sense,” according to Alvarez, and indeed Leavis before him, Sitwell had certainly 
never “profited,” as Moore had, by a direct endorsement from Eliot.  
And, at least in part, as a result of Eliot’s sponsorship (and lack thereof), Moore and 
Sitwell, representing as they did, in effect, two lines of modernism, themselves offered Plath two 
distinct—though not, as we will see, incompatible—modes of sponsorship. While Plath claimed 
both modernists as “godmothers,” Kineke’s tripartite conception of modernist sponsorship serves 
as a helpful model for more fully articulating—and distinguishing—the sponsorship Plath sought 
in and from Sitwell and Moore, and later, as we will see, in his efforts to secure a modernist 
heritage for the “new seriousness,” from Alvarez. As “poetic godmothers,” Sitwell and Moore 
serve Plath in her spring break journal in what Kineke calls the “ecclesiastic” sense of 
sponsorship, pointing to the first of the Oxford English Dictionary’s three definitions of 
“sponsor” as “[o]ne who answers for an infant at baptism; a godfather or godmother” (qtd. in 
Kineke 123). However, while Plath claims both as such in her journal, when it comes to the 
spring break poems themselves, it is Sitwell, as we will see, whom Plath explores as a 
“godmother,” as, in other words, an “ecclesiastic” sponsor, a source of guidance, of literary 
mentoring, on the page. 
And yet, it was actually Moore to whom Plath had first affixed the label. Moore had 
served as a judge for the Glascock poetry contest hosted by Mt. Holyoke, for which Plath had 







her mother that the elder poet was “as vital and humorous as someone’s fairy godmother 
incognito” (Letters Home 168). By this point, Plath had already written her two essays on 
Sitwell—she would write none on the more canonical Moore—and had experimented with 
Sitwell’s jewel-blood-sap worldview in “April Aubade,” a poem that she selected to read for the 
contest. Indeed, Plath wins (along with another undergraduate) this contest judged by Moore, in 
part we could say, with a poem written in homage to Edith Sitwell. Whereas she had, in other 
words, apprenticed herself to Sitwell’s work by this point, she was new enough to Moore’s, as 
she indicates in a letter to her mother, that she felt she needed to do some research before 
meeting her: “I took to Marianne Moore immediately and was so glad to have bought her book 
and read up about her, for I could honestly discuss my favorite poems” (168). Whereas Plath, 
then, had researched Sitwell because she had happened upon her poetry and found herself, as she 
put it in her essay, “struck and entranced by [it],” she had researched Moore because 
circumstances had presented the canonical modernist as a potential sponsor in the “commercial” 
sense of the term. 
In the fifties, having been “commercially” sponsored by Eliot—a sense of sponsorship, as 
Kineke argues, that Moore herself had invoked as she noted that her poetry would “profit” by his 
introduction—and having, more specifically, been sponsored by Eliot at a time when he had 
become institutionalized within the American academy and, in London, become a central figure 
in the publishing industry at the helm of Faber and Faber—Moore indeed stood particularly well-
positioned herself as a source of modernist “commercial” sponsorship. And by this time, she had 
certainly proven herself willing, having quite notably sponsored Elizabeth Bishop, we could say, 
both “ecclesiastically” and “commercially.”74 And indeed, Plath herself would later describe the 
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relationship between Moore and Bishop in terms of the relationship she herself wished from 
Moore: “[R]eading Elizabeth Bishop with great admiration,” Plath praised “[h]er fine originality, 
always surprising, never rigid, flowing, juicier than Marianne Moore, who is her godmother” 
(Unabridged Journals 516).  
As a judge, then, of a contest she had won as an undergraduate, and, two years later, as a 
judge (along with Auden and Spender) of a contest her husband had won for his first collection, 
Moore’s sponsorship, for Plath, or rather the sponsorship she wished from Moore, indeed began 
with (but was not, as we will see, limited to) the “commercial” sense of the term. Weathering 
Auden’s rejection of her bid, in effect, for “commercial” sponsorship as a finalist for the Yale 
prize—noting to her mother at the time, as we have seen, that if she won, “[he] would have to 
write a foreword to [her book] then”—Moore, given her praise of Plath’s work, must have 
seemed a promising option. For the Glascock festival, Moore had written to request, so as “not 
[to] darken the horizon of any contestant by letting him or her see [her] notes verbatim,” that 
only “what surely might be helpful” be “quote[d],” “and nothing else” (qtd. in Pollak 157). As a 
result, Plath learned, as Pollak writes, “that Moore admired her ‘spirit, patience, craftsmanship, 
and strong individuality’ and that ‘her main adverse criticism is of a too adjectival manner at 
times bordering on formula,’” a criticism amply counter-balanced by Moore’s praise of her 
“talented compactness” and her “true ear—an independent ear” (157).  
What Plath wasn’t told, however, was that Moore had written the officials of the contest 
that “Sylvia Plath is my choice for the prize,” an endorsement she then qualified with “unless 
                                               
introduced the younger, unpublished poet in Trial Balances (1935), a collection of poetry in which older, established 
poets paired themselves with and introduced new and upcoming ones.74 And indeed, Moore’s sponsorship of Bishop 
had, by the fifties, proven particularly “profitable” in terms of both the critical and financial economies of the 
literary marketplace, Bishop having won, in 1956—two years before Plath would claim Moore as a “godmother” in 







Mount Holyoke is willing to divide it between Sylvia and William Key Whitman,” whom Moore 
thought had written the strongest poem of the contest, but not necessarily the strongest group of 
poems (qtd. in Pollak 156, Moore’s emphasis). “The balance is even, I think,” she wrote; “I 
wish—very much wish—you may feel you can divide it” (qtd. in Pollak 156). While Moore 
recommended Plath for the prize, in other words, she at the same time recommended Plath not be 
awarded the prize alone. Moore’s rather equivocal recommendation perhaps points, then, to 
certain unspoken reservations, reservations that would grow more pronounced—and that would 
be communicated, indeed, far more directly—as Plath, spurred by her surge of writing over 
spring break and by her hopes for the full-time writing the summer promised, turned to Moore 
for a recommendation for a Saxton fellowship. Moore’s response to this request would set the 
stage not only for Plath’s Ariel-era demotion of Moore from “poetic godmother” to maiden aunt 
in “The Tour,” but for Plath’s wielding of what we might call the Sitwellian grotesque—in the 
service of the larger project of her response to Alvarez’s call for a “new seriousness”—as a 
means of countering “gentility.” And as Plath emerged from this exchange, it was precisely 




 Toward the end of January, in the journal in which she registers her disappointment at not 
being included in The New Poets of England and America, Plath—looking ahead to the summer, 
to when she would have, as she writes, “all my time forever ahead of me,” with “no meals to get, 
no books to prepare”—established a regimen by which she might forge herself, within a year, 







I plot, calculate: twenty poems now my nucleus. Thirty more in a bigger, freer, 
tougher voice: work on rhythms mostly, for freedom, yet sung [ . . . ]. No coyness, 
archaic cutie tricks. Break on them in a year with a book of forty or fifty—a poem 
every ten days. (Unabridged Journals 315) 
In the meantime, she writes, “[p]rose sustains me. I can mess it, mush it, rewrite it, pick it up any 
times [sic]—rhythms are slacker, more variable, it doesn’t die so soon” (315). Though prose 
appeared less exacting for Plath, she set for it, too, a similar goal, a goal that becomes, by way of 
repetition, something not simply stated, but pleaded: “What is my voice? Woolfish, alas, but 
tough. Please, tough” (315).  
 Plath’s repeated insistence on “toughness” here—and, more specifically, on “toughness” 
conceived over against “coyness” and “archaic cutie tricks” (not to mention Woolf)—suggests 
that underlying this regimen, in part, was Alvarez’s endorsement of Hughes’s talent, an 
endorsement, as the terms of her regimen suggest, that Plath read over against his nearly 
concurrent dismissal of Sitwell. Alvarez had published his review of The Hawk in the Rain, 
entitled “Tough Young Poet,” just three months before Plath establishes her regimen to become 
“tougher” here. And it was in this review that Alvarez described Hughes’s poetry, at its best, as 
“original, powerful and difficult,” a poetry that, like Thom Gunn’s, with which he paired it, 
cultivates “a deliberate anti-poetical toughness” (12). While Alvarez found Hughes’s first 
volume at times “‘literary’ in the debilitating sense: that is, wordy and imitative,” it contained, he 
declared, “half a dozen pieces that only a real poet could have done” (12). Whereas for Alvarez, 
Hughes had the makings of a “real poet,” then, Sitwell was not a poet but a “poetess,” a point he 
makes emphatically (albeit implicitly) in his review of her Collected Poems, published three 







frequently “charming,” lacking—with its “delicious games,” as we have seen—depth and 
“seriousness,” its effects “a matter of sophisticated ornament” having “nothing to do with the 
feel of the thing” (“Sitwellism” 11). Sitwell, for Alvarez, then, was not only not-serious; she was 
genteel—her work “charming,” “ornament[al],” and “delicious,” qualities that prompt Alvarez to 
question whether her poetry “really matters” (Alvarez’s emphasis).  
A few years later in The New Poetry, in which Alvarez, as we have seen, would grant 
Hughes top billing as a “serious” response to the Movement and to “gentility” more broadly, he 
would frame his “personal anthology” in the very terms with which he ultimately dismisses 
Sitwell here—as a collection of the poetry from the recently concluded fifties “that really 
matters” (15). By questioning whether Sitwell’s poetry “really matters” and then positioning “the 
new poetry” as precisely that which really does, Alvarez suggests the degree to which Sitwell 
indeed informs—albeit in the negative—his conception of a new, anti-gentility postured poetry. 
Sitwell, it would seem, helped to mark for Alvarez the long roots of “gentility” in English poetry, 
the newest manifestation of which he had come to identify in the Movement. When Alvarez 
situates Hughes and “the new poetry” within the literary landscape of the early sixties, then, he 
does so not only as a counter to the Movement, but as a counter to the “old” poetry of gentility, 
of which Sitwell—as his phrasing suggests—appeared emblematic. And by questioning whether 
she was “ever truly modern,” Alvarez locates Sitwell and her early experiments (as well as her 
alleged “gentility”) outside of—and indeed, as his identical phrasing suggests, as antithetical 
to—the modernism he considered “truly modern,” the line of modernism, that is, stemming from 
Eliot, in dialectical relation to which Alvarez would place “the new poetry” in efforts to 
legitimize its “newness.” In other words, having dismissed Sitwell’s work by (quite strongly) 







and, by association, its modernist heritage as precisely that which really does—effectively 
establishes Sitwell, on the one hand, and “the new poetry” and Eliot’s line of modernism, on the 
other, as indeed mutually exclusive. However, for Plath, while Sitwell certainly functions 
“outside” of Eliot’s line of modernism, the boundary that excludes her proves not absolute but, 
rather, negotiable, a boundary that will become for Plath herself negotiable by way of some of 
the very “outsider” strategies she gleans from Sitwell. 
 A couple of years after his review of Sitwell’s Collected Poems, in his review of The 
Colossus, Alvarez illustrates the degree to which the charm and “delicious[ness]”—that is, the 
“gentility”—that he associated with Sitwell was bound up for him, in the case of the woman 
writer, with what he calls “the act of being a poetess,” “act” here functioning to distinguish the 
“poetess,” as a performer, from the “poet,” who was, for Alvarez, then, not performing the role, 
but was the role, was, in other words, the real deal. Indeed, as suggested by the title of the 
column in which his review of Plath appeared—“The Poet and the Poetess”75—Alvarez’s 
assessment of Plath’s work reads as an exercise in classification, Alvarez already beginning to 
identify Plath as an exception to the “rule” of the woman poet (21). Beginning, as we have seen, 
with the announcement that Plath’s volume doesn’t require “the usual throat-clearing 
qualifications,” he soon reveals that such qualifications (which he then offers us) are those 
                                               
75 The title of Alvarez’s column, “The Poet and the Poetess,” at first seems to suggest that Plath is the “poet” of the 
title in contradistinction to Jean Garrigue, whose A Water Walk by Villa D’Este Alvarez reviews immediately after 
The Colossus. While noting that Garrigue “comes with all sorts of accolades from the famous,” Alvarez 
“confess[es]” to “find[ing] her verse almost unreadable.” Indeed, Alvarez writes of the volume, “it is work you 
either like [“love” here seemingly not an option] or hate,” both the praise and criticism of the volume, as Alvarez 
sums it up, serving us here as a sort of litmus test for “poetessness”: “Those in favor say ‘She has a purely lyrical 
sensibility’; those against, ‘She can’t think’” (21). In comparison, Plath, in “simply writ[ing] good poetry,” would 
seem the “poet” to Garrigue’s “poetess,” however, Alvarez begins his review of Garrigue by introducing her, 
following Plath, as “another American poetess.” It would seem, then, that for Alvarez, Plath, at least at the time, in 
“steer[ing] clear [ . . . ] of the act of being a poetess,” was a “poetess” who didn’t “act” as such, but “simply wr[ote] 








generally attending the “poetess.” The word “poetess”—with an emphasis on the “-ess,” with an 
emphasis, in other words, on feminine “difference”—indeed functions syntactically as the 
foundation upon which his other descriptions of Plath (first-volume author, young, American) 
rest: “impressive, considering, of course, that it is a first volume by a young (excuse me), 
American poetess” (21, Alvarez’s emphases). While Alvarez declares that Plath’s work does not 
require such “usual” qualifications, by in fact presenting them, he effectively frames his 
assessment in these terms, Plath emerging as a sort of “poetess” manqué, her poetry sheered of 
(most of) the fluff and “fuss” and “[excuse]” associated with the woman writer. Alvarez’s 
assessment of Plath indeed reads in terms of an absence of “feminine” excess, her poetry “no-
nonsense,” its “language [ . . . ] bare” and marked by “a concentration that implies a good deal of 
disturbance with proportionately little fuss,” a quality that lends her work its 
“undemonstrativeness” (21). And his overall assessment of Plath fulfills the syntactical promise 
of the qualifications he offers as example; his description of the “usual” qualifications, in other 
words, boils down to “poetess”: “Miss Plath neither asks for excuses for her work nor offers 
them. She steers clear of feminine charm, deliciousness, gentility, supersensitivity and the act of 
being a poetess” (21).  
 Describing Plath as having managed to avoid “charm” and “deliciousness”—two of the 
very (and specific) charges he had leveled at Sitwell’s Collected Poems, charges which are here 
explicitly bound up with both “gentility” and “the act of being a poetess”—Alvarez implicitly 
presents Plath’s work as a counter to, or corrective of, Sitwell’s. That Plath echoes Alvarez’s 
dismissal of Sitwell (over against his praise of Hughes) as she articulates the regimen by which 
she might remake her work in the face of her exclusion from The New Poets of England and 







suggest that in her efforts to sidestep the pitfalls of the “poetess,” to make her writing “tougher,” 
Plath had resolved to steer clear of Sitwell, as Alvarez’s review, in effect, would advise. Seeming 
to recall Alvarez’s characterization of Sitwell’s work as “tricks of rhythm and rhyme”—those 
which “make the early poems into [ . . . ] delicious games,” and which thereby warrant her 
dismissal as a “poetess” unable to be taken “seriously” (“Sitwellism” 11)—Plath focuses her 
efforts to become “tougher” indeed on rhythm, admonishing herself that to achieve “a bigger, 
freer, tougher voice,” she must “work on rhythms mostly,” and in working on rhythms, avoid 
“coyness, archaic cutie tricks” (Unabridged Journals 315). As “archaic,” Plath situates such 
“tricks” of “rhythm”—as Alvarez situates an affinity for Sitwell’s poetry as “a taste for the 
baroque”—at a distant remove from the modern and contemporary, from what Alvarez 
characterizes in his review of Hughes as “real” poetry. In addition to the “tricks of rhythm and 
rhyme,” Alvarez identifies Sitwell’s “exotic, improbable, nursery-tale objects” as contributing to 
the overall effect of her poems as “delicious games,” something which Plath seeks to avoid, too, 
it would seem, as she shifts her efforts of “toughening” her voice to her prose. “Must avoid,” she 
tells herself, “the exotico-romantico-glory-glory slop” (315).  
 However, not only does Plath not steer clear of Sitwell, but it is less than a week after she 
establishes her regimen of “toughness” as a counter to the “exotic” and to “tricks” of “rhythm” 
that she locates Sitwell—as a “venerable original”—at the “origin” of modern poetry. In effect, 
then, by the end of January, Plath had already begun to create a modernist lineage markedly 
different from (even, it would seem, incompatible with) Alvarez’s. And in establishing her 
regimen, rather than seeking to avoid Sitwell’s work itself, then, it would seem Plath sought to 
avoid, instead, the charge of “poetess” with which Alvarez (however implicitly) had associated 







“feminine” guises, the “charm,” “tricks,” and the “exotic,” with which “poetess,” for Alvarez, 
was bound up. Indeed, Plath’s Sitwell differs strikingly from Alvarez’s. Rather than functioning 
as a figure of gentility to be dissociated from modernism—Alvarez questioning whether Sitwell 
was “ever ‘modern’ in any significant sense”—Plath’s Sitwell, situated (before Eliot) at 
modernism’s “origin,” emerges instead as a figure of the grotesque, a figure by which gentility 
might, in fact, be duly interrogated. 
 A couple of months later, during spring break, her first real opportunity to put her 
regimen into practice, Plath begins such an interrogation. And while Plath identifies both Sitwell 
and Moore as “poetic godmothers” as she completes her eight poems in eight days, and while 
Moore will soon play an important role as both an “ecclesiastic” as well as a (potential) 
“commercial” sponsor, it is Sitwell who informs Plath’s examination of “gentility” and its 
“feminine” embodiment, the “poetess.” Such is the case, in particular, with “The Disquieting 
Muses.” One of several poems Plath wrote that spring for Art News, “The Disquieting Muses” 
responds to de Chirico’s painting of the same title, but also, or perhaps even more so, to Sitwell’s 
long poem, The Sleeping Beauty (1924). More precisely, we could say, Plath casts de Chirico’s 
“muse” figures into her own adaptation of the fairy tale, an adaptation sharply inflected by 
Sitwell’s own. While de Chirico depicts two “muses,” the third figure in the painting 
representing Apollo, Plath translates all three figures into the “three ladies”—whom the speaker 
will claim during the course of the poem as “Godmothers”—sent in lieu of an “[u]nasked” 
relative (Collected Poems 75):  
Mother, mother, what illbred aunt  
Or what disfigured and unsightly 







Unasked to my christening, that she 
Sent these ladies in her stead [ . . . ]? (74) 
Instead of appearing herself, as in the fairy tale, the “unasked” relative here sends the de Chirico 
figures, “[w]ith heads like darning-eggs,” in her place “to nod / And nod and nod at foot and 
head / And at the left side of [the speaker’s] crib” (75). And it is precisely by way of these 
godmother figures—who function in the poem, as we will see, as the grotesque—that Plath puts 
pressure on the “genteel” category of “the poetess.” 
In the journal in which she records the feat of her eight poems, just a day before she 
claims Sitwell and Moore as “poetic godmothers,” Plath describes the eight as “long poems, 
lyrical poems, thunderous poems: poems breaking open my real experience of life in the last five 
years: life which has been shut up, untouchable, in a rococo crystal cage, not to be touched” 
(Unabridged Journals 356). In characterizing the poems as “thunderous,” Plath suggests the 
degree to which “The Disquieting Muses”—which includes a chant the speaker’s mother teaches 
her children to help ward off their fears during a hurricane (“Thor is angry: boom, boom, 
boom!”)—served for her as emblematic of the spring break poems. And in describing her life as 
having been enclosed in “a rococo crystal cage,” Plath suggests the degree to which she had in 
mind Sitwell’s The Sleeping Beauty—Sitwell’s “first world,” which she had described in her long 
essay as “a bucolic landscape ranging from incarnate animalistic scenery to rococo fairytale 
gardens”—as she wrote “The Disquieting Muses,” her own take on the fairy tale (“Edith 
Sitwell”). Whereas Alvarez faults Sitwell for her “ornament[ation],” for Plath the “rococo” in 
Sitwell always has “another side,” a darkness underlying the surface—a “heavy brutish greedy 







And this other side indeed functions—as Plath suggests in her paper, describing Sitwell’s 
“grotesqueries” as “eccentric”—as, we might say, a particularly Sitwellian grotesque.  
In The Female Grotesque: Risk, Excess and Modernity (1994), Mary Russo identifies 
“two discursive formations which dominate contemporary discussion of the grotesque, organized 
around the theory of carnival on the one hand and the concept of the uncanny on the other” (6). 
Having at their base Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World (1965), discussions of the grotesque 
centered on carnival tend to share with Bakhtin his emphasis on the collective, his use of the 
carnivalesque, as Russo phrases it, “to conceptualize social formations, social conflict, and the 
realm of political thought” (8). On the other hand, theories that center on “the strange and 
uncanny”—drawing from “Wolfgang Kayser’s The Grotesque in Art and Literature,” “the horror 
genre,” and Freud—entail a shift to the individual (8). As Russo summarizes the distinction,  
In the language of classical political theory, [the grotesque as Bakhtin conceived 
it] is a virile category associated with the active, civic world of the public. In 
contrast, the grotesque as uncanny moves inward towards an individualized, 
interiorized space of fantasy and introspection, with the attendant risk of social 
inertia. Emerging with the concept of the Romantic sublime, the category of the 
uncanny grotesque is associated with the life of the psyche. (8) 
Indeed, Bakhtin himself offers an account of both conceptions of the grotesque, situating them in 
terms of a historical shift that registers the later, Romantic grotesque—the “uncanny” grotesque 
in Russo’s formulation—as loss. And it is just such a shift (and its attendant loss), we could say, 
that structures the “early world” of Sitwell’s The Sleeping Beauty, and that allows us to articulate 
more fully the particular character of her “eccentric grotesqueries” and the uses to which Plath, 







In Bakhtin’s terms, what Alvarez misses when he condemns Sitwell for her 
“sophisticated ornaments,” and what Plath herself calls our attention to when she describes the 
other side (the dark and “brutish” side) of Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, is the “two-world condition” 
of “medieval cultural consciousness” (6). So important is this “two-world condition,” Bakhtin 
argues, that “[i]f we fail to take [it] into consideration,” “neither medieval cultural consciousness 
nor the culture of the Renaissance can be understood” (6). Given the feudal, folk roots of the 
fairy tale genre, attending to this two-world condition in The Sleeping Beauty—and to the ways 
in which it in turn helps to shape the world of Plath’s “Disquieting Muses,” and, later, that of 
“The Tour” and her Ariel poetics more generally—proves perhaps, for our purposes, just as 
imperative. Positioned within a wider narrative that traces the development of class and political 
structure, this “two-world condition” reads not only as essential for understanding the shift from 
the medieval and Renaissance grotesque to that of the Romantic, but as symptomatic, more 
broadly, of a fall from what Bakhtin postulates as a “preclass and prepolitical social order” (7). 
For Bakhtin, “[a] boundless world of humorous forms and manifestations”—including “folk 
festivities of the carnival type, the comic rites and cults, the clowns and fools, giants, dwarfs, and 
jugglers, the vast and manifold literature of parody”—had emerged in the medieval period as 
“sharply distinct from the serious official, ecclesiastical, feudal, and political cult forms and 
ceremonials” (6). So distinct were these forms that for Bakhtin “[t]hey offered a completely 
different, nonofficial, extraecclesiastical and extrapolitical aspect of the world, of man, and of 
human relations”; what they offered, in other words, was “a second world and a second life 
outside officialdom” (6). While “[t]his double aspect of the world and of human life” has always 
structured cultural consciousness, according to Bakhtin, at “the earliest stages of cultural 







stages of preclass and prepolitical social order,” Bakhtin writes, “it seems that the serious and the 
comic aspects of the world and of the deity were equally sacred, equally ‘official’” (6).  
However, with the eventual “consolidat[ion of] state and class structure,” “such an 
equality of the two aspects became impossible” (6), precipitating what we might call a fall from 
the original “wholeness” of the community, a splitting of the two aspects into the two separate 
worlds that Bakhtin identifies in the medieval period—one official, one nonofficial. As a result, 
“[a]ll the comic forms were transferred [ . . . ] to [the] nonofficial level” where “they acquired a 
new meaning, were deepened and rendered more complex, until they became the expression of 
folk consciousness, of folk culture” (6). Thus cordoned off, this culture of folk humor found 
expression “without distortion” in the medieval period “only in the carnival or in similar 
marketplace festivals” (9), spaces in which “all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and 
prohibitions” were “suspend[ed]” (10). It is this culture of folk humor, then, and more 
specifically, its expression during carnival, that serves for Bakhtin as the mainspring of the 
grotesque:  
[The] temporary suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created 
during carnival time a special type of communication impossible in everyday life. 
This led to the creation of special forms of marketplace speech and gesture, frank 
and free, permitting no distance between those who came in contact with each 
other and liberating from norms of etiquette and decency imposed at other times.  
[ . . . ] During the century-long development of the medieval carnival, prepared by 
thousands of years of ancient folk ritual, including the primitive Saturnalias, a 
special idiom of forms and symbols was evolved—an extremely rich idiom that 







This idiom, then, became a manifestation of what Bakhtin calls “grotesque realism,” the 
“peculiar aesthetic concept” particular to folk culture, the aesthetic we find governing—with its 
“material bodily principle, that is, images of the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and 
sexual life”—the pre-Romantic grotesque (18).  
It is with the Romantic period, then, that the fall from “the preclass and prepolitical social 
order”—in which life and death, glorification and degradation, the serious and the comic found 
balance—a fall indeed registered in the medieval period and the Renaissance, arrive[s] at a point 
of crisis. With the consolidation of the bourgeoisie and its concomitant individualism and 
privatism, the collective and communal spirit of carnival, of folk culture (increasingly 
suppressed) ceased to have a public outlet by which it could be expressed “without distortion.” 
As a result, “[u]nlike the medieval and Renaissance grotesque, which was directly related to folk 
culture and thus belonged to the people, the Romantic genre acquired a private ‘chamber’ 
character. It became, as it were, an individual carnival, marked by a vivid sense of isolation” 
(37). As Russo puts it, “the grotesque goes underground in the course of the nineteenth century, 
becoming increasingly hidden and dispersed—a private and ‘nocturnal’ category to be retrieved 
by Freud as socially disembodied in the theory of the unconscious” (33, Russo’s emphasis). No 
longer experienced in an embodied form—as “bodily participation in the potentiality of another 
world” (Bakhtin 48), as “the second life of the people, who for a time entered the utopian realm 
of community, freedom, equality, and abundance” (9)—“the carnival spirit was transposed” 
during the Romantic period “into a subjective, idealistic philosophy” (37). Lost when this 
carnival spirit was thus transposed into “abstract thought” and “inner experience” (48), according 
to Bakhtin, was “the concrete (one might say bodily) experience of the one, inexhaustible being” 







The loss of such an embodied collective experience, then, registers aesthetically in the 
Romantic grotesque. Whereas grotesque realism, the aesthetic principle of the culture of folk 
humor, survives into the Renaissance “only somewhat modified”—indeed, Bakhtin argues, 
grotesque realism reaches “its summit [in] the literature of the Renaissance” (32)—it “differs 
sharply from the aesthetic concept of the following ages” (18). For Bakhtin, “the most important 
transformation” that takes place in the Romantic grotesque occurred in the quality of its laughter, 
a core feature of the grotesque, “since no grotesque, even the most timid, is conceivable in the 
atmosphere of absolute seriousness” (37-8). The laughter of carnival is “festive,” “not an 
individual reaction to some isolated ‘comic’ event” but “the laughter of all the people,” a 
laughter “universal in scope,” “directed at all and everyone,” and one that is markedly 
“ambivalent”: “it is gay and triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding. It asserts and 
denies, it buries and revives” (11-12). With the Romantic grotesque, however, this laughter “was 
cut down to cold humor, irony, sarcasm” and “its positive regenerative power was reduced to a 
minimum” (38). Such a transformation then “[led] to a series of other essential differences,” 
“differences that appear most distinctly in relation to terror”: “The world of the Romantic 
grotesque is to a certain extent a terrifying world, alien to man. All that is ordinary, 
commonplace, belonging to everyday life, and recognized by all suddenly becomes meaningless, 
dubious and hostile” (38-9). And the extent to which the world of the Romantic grotesque is a 
terrifying one, it is also a dark one. Whereas “light characterizes folk grotesque,” which 
functions as “a festival of spring, of sunrise, of morning,” the Romantic grotesque “is in most 
cases nocturnal”—“[d]arkness, not light, is typical of this genre” (41).  
And, we could say, it is such a darkness—which, with the shift to the Romantic, comes to 







“[t]here is another side to [Sitwell’s] bucolic world,” one in which “all is mired in ‘heavy brutish 
greedy darkness.” Indeed, at its core, The Sleeping Beauty reads as a parable of the grotesque, a 
warning against the kinds of suppressions that transformed the collective, regenerative spirit of 
folk culture into the dark isolation and alienation of the Romantic grotesque. As such, it enacts 
for us the formation of the grotesque when the grotesque no longer has a public, communal 
outlet, when it becomes, as Russo puts it, “increasingly hidden and dispersed,” forced 
“underground.” The tale opens with fairies arriving for the christening of the infant princess, and 
the christening (as what Bakhtin might call an “ecclesiastical [ . . . ] ceremonial”) serves to mark 
for us the “official” feudal world. All fairies have been invited, as the tale goes, except one—and 
it is this “unbidden” fairy, Laidronette (the precursor, I will argue, of Plath’s “unasked” relative 
in “The Disquieting Muses”) who functions as the grotesque, who has been relegated to the 
“unofficial” world over against which the “official” world has come to define itself (Collected 
Poems 49). Paraphrasing Peter Stallybrass and Allon White’s argument in The Politics and 
Poetics of Transgression (1986), Russo writes that “the grotesque returns as the repressed of the 
political unconscious, as those hidden cultural contents which by their abjection had consolidated 
the cultural identity of the bourgeoisie” (9). In Sitwell’s take on the fairy tale, it is as much the 
exclusion of Laidronette (what prompts her curse) as it is the curse itself that condemns the 
“official” world to darkness. When she arrives, in other words, she arrives indeed as the return of 
the repressed, as that which has not only been “unbidden,” but forgotten (“I see / You have 
remembered all the fays but me!”) (Collected Poems 49, 50). And such exclusion and forgetting 
is precisely what enabled “the bourgeoisie,” as Stallybrass and White put it, to “consolidat[e] 
itself as a respectable and conventional body” (193); Laidronette, then, as a “wicked” fairy, 







fairies, those who have indeed been bidden—as well as the royal family who has performed the 
bidding (and unbidding)—might, in contrast, be cast as “good” (50). When she arrives at the 
christening, she has already been unbidden (the grotesque, in other words, has already been 
created by way of its repression), so that the world she returns to is an already dark and sleeping 
one, even before she casts her curse. When she arrives, that is, she emerges as “a darker shade” 
from “within the dark shade of a deep-dreaming tree” (49), as a darkness emerging from a 
darkness already present, one that prefigures—indeed, mirrors—the dark sleep of her collective 
curse: “sleep as dark as the shade of a tree / Shall cover you” (50). According to Stallybrass and 
White, “The bourgeois subject continually defined and re-defined itself through the exclusion of 
what it marked out as ‘low’—as dirty, repulsive, noisy, contaminating. Yet that very act of 
exclusion was constitutive of its identity” (191). And indeed, in Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, the 
unbidding is as dark as the unbidden, suggesting the degree to which the “official” world, in 
casting out the grotesque to consolidate its identity, is indeed dependent upon it, the degree to 
which the two, in other words, prove interdependent, “constitutive” of the identity of the “other.” 
And, as Sitwell emphasizes, there are consequences for such suppressions. As Laidronette casts 
her curse, condemning the infant princess to “be lost” in sleep upon the prick of a spindle needle, 
she informs the queen that her “dark” curse is the consequence of the “dark” act of exclusion that 
precipitated it: “This, madam, is the cost / Of your dark rudeness” (51).  
 Having cast her curse as the cost of her exclusion, Laidronette then returns to her palace, 
leading us through the “dark woods” that signal the transition between the “official” world of the 
christening and the grotesque world of her seclusion, that mark, more specifically, the 
repressions by which the grotesque is necessarily created and by which, to travel in the opposite 







woods,” in other words, serve as a psychic space, a repository of those “abjection[s]” necessary, 
as Russo puts it, for “consolidat[ing] the cultural identity of the bourgeoisie.” As such, the 
“deepest woods” of Sitwell’s fairy-tale world are “haunt[ed]” by “satyr-broods,” by the progeny 
of those half-goat companions of Bacchus, that is, by the Dionysian impulses associated with 
carnival and the grotesque.76 And it is “old Bacchantes black with wine” with whom 
Laidronette—within her room, “in Night’s deep domain”—“monstrous lies,” along “[w]ith every 
little wicked dream that flies / And crawls,” with “ancient satyrs whose wry wig of roses / 
Nothing but little rotting shames discloses” (52). Laidronette, then, “l[ying] / [w]ith” Bacchantes 
and satyrs and “every little wicked dream,” embraces in her  “wicked[ness]” the sexual impulses 
suppressed by conventional norms of femininity.  
As Russo notes, “[the] positioning of the grotesque [in relation to the “classical”]—as 
superficial and to the margins—is suggestive of a certain construction of the feminine” (5). 
Summarizing Naomi Schor’s Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (1987), which 
“traces the association of the feminine and the particular in normative treatises”—the feminine 
“often described by poststructuralists and feminist critics as bodily surface and detail”—Russo 
writes that “the metaphorics of the particular, as [Schor] shows, tend to give way to the strange, 
the peculiar, the monstrous” (6). In terms of the repressions of such a “construction of the 
feminine,” then, the Dionysian-embracing Laidronette, “promiscuous” in Sitwell’s construction 
here, indeed reads explicitly as “monstrous.” Her grotesqueness, too, reads as “peculiar” in its 
particularity, and it is this peculiarity, we could say, that embodies Sitwell’s “eccentric 
                                               
76 As the half-goat companions of Bacchus, the Roman equivalent of the Greek god, Dionysus, satyrs function in 
Sitwell’s fairy tale as markers of carnival and the grotesque. For the connections between the grotesque and the 
Dionysian, see “Philosophy as Grotesque: The Case of Nietzsche,” in which Sara Cohen Shabot explores 
Nietzsche’s conception of the Dionysian as the foundation for Bakhtin’s grotesque. “As various scholars have 
shown,” Shabot writes, “there is a close affinity between the grotesque and the Dionysian, one of the mainstays of 







grotesqueries,” as Plath puts it. When Laidronette first arrives home, we find her “unwigged” 
and flanked by figures of the grotesque, by “[h]er dwarves” and “her apes” who “beg” her (with 
what Alvarez refers to as Sitwell’s “exoticisms,” along with a bit of grotesque humor) to “leave 
uncurtained that Roc’s egg, / [h]er head,” a grotesque “mount” for feminine particularity, for 
artificiality and ornament, for “diamonds bald and big”—mirroring the baldness they’re meant to 
disguise—“[i]n the ostrich feathers that compose her wig” (51). Here in this fallen world of the 
Romantic grotesque, Laidronette—monstrous and peculiar—“lie[s]” with her companions 
“where shadows, cold as the night breeze, / Seem cast by rocks, and never by kind trees” (52). 
And so, as the scene ends, we leave Laidronette “in Night’s deep domain,” in a darkness that, as 
Bakhtin might say, “differs sharply” from the darkness of the medieval and Renaissance 
grotesque, in a darkness, that is, unmitigated by the light, by the regenerative principle 
encapsulated in the final image not simply of “kind trees,” but of “kind trees” contrasted with the 
cold harshness of “rocks.”  
 In Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, we arrive at the figure of Laidronette because there is no 
longer a collective outlet for the folk culture of humor, for the grotesque, which has been—
through the consolidation of bourgeois “cultural identity”—suppressed, driven “underground.” 
“[O]rganized on the basis of laughter” (8), carnival, for Bakhtin, was marked by a “joyful and 
triumphant hilarity” (which counterbalanced its “mocking” and “deriding” qualities), its 
“symbols [ . . . ] filled with [a] pathos of change and renewal, with the scene of gay relativity of 
prevailing truths and authorities” (11). However, in The Sleeping Beauty, the “country Fair” 
serves as no such outlet; instead, it expresses, as Plath puts it, “dull animalism,” its “gaiety” not 
full of the spirit of change and renewal but “empty,” “hectic” and “mechanical,” characterized 







“desperation.” Indeed, it is through the fair—with its carnival heritage, its “special idiom of 
forms and symbols” from which grotesque realism, for Bakhtin, arises—that Sitwell’s world 
perhaps registers the fall to the Romantic grotesque most strikingly. More specifically, it is 
through the laughter of the fair—which, as the organizational principle of carnival, signals, for 
Bakhtin, the “most important transformation” of the grotesque—that Sitwell’s world identifies 
itself as “fallen.” The “regenerative power” of the laughter of Sitwell’s country fair is certainly, 
as Bakhtin says of the laughter characterizing the Romantic grotesque, “reduced to a minimum,” 
reduced here to “rags”—distorted (and disembodied) through the fair’s “music,” that music 
which “seems” “[l]ike harsh and crackling rags of laughter” (81). While “bright flung as an 
angel’s hair,” this music—the expression not so much of laughter, then, as of the rags of it—is 
marked not by joy and hope, but by “the ultimate despair / [o]f angels and of devils” (81). 
Distorted, the music conveys its “rags of laughter” through indirection, through its “sound that 
shrieks both high and low / [l]ike some ventriloquist’s bright-painted show,” a line that Plath 
herself quotes in her paper to characterize the “whole world” of Sitwell’s early poems (81). The 
laugher of Sitwell’s fallen world, then, indeed rings “hollow” and (as “bright-painted”) artificial 
(81).  
 As in Bakhtin’s formulation, this “transformation of the principle of laughter which 
permeates the grotesque” then “leads to a series of other essential differences,” which “appear 
most distinctly in relation to terror” (39). Indeed, as The Sleeping Beauty demonstrates, “the 
world of the Romantic grotesque is to a certain extent a terrifying world, alien to man,” a world 
in which “[a]ll that is ordinary, commonplace, belonging to everyday life, and recognized by all 
suddenly becomes meaningless, dubious and hostile” (38). In Sitwell’s country fair, the music 







painted show” animates “half-human puppets,” and “[a] little hurdy-gurdy waltz sounds hollow / 
[a]nd bright-husked as the hearts of passing people”—people for whom life has become not full 
of the “pathos of change and renewal,” but static: “Life goes, Death never comes,’ / They sigh” 
(Collected Poems 81). The music of the fair gives way, finally, to “terrible and quick drum-taps / 
That seem the anguished beat of our own heart”—the heart of the collective, of the carnival 
“whole”—a heart “[m]aking an endless battle without hope / Against materialism and the world” 
(81), when the world has become not “gay and gracious” in the spirit of carnival (Bakhtin 19), 
but alienated and full of threat. Here, where the common and everyday indeed becomes 
“hostile,” “foliage” “flares [ . . . ] like hell’s fires” and “clouds seem” “[l]ike crazy creaking 
chalets hanging low / From the dark hairiness of bestial skies” (Collected Poems  81, 80). In 
Sitwell’s early world, as Plath writes, “[a]ll is animal” (“Edith Sitwell”). And it is by way of a 
“terrible,” beast-like “lumbering” that “Darkness”—as the return of the repressed, as that ushered 
in by the exclusion of Laidronette—“comes / Breaking the trivial matchboard floors,” the 
artificial surfaces of Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, “that hide / From us the Dead we dare not look 
upon: O childish eyes, O cold and murdered face— / Dead innocence and youth that were our 
own!” (81). The juxtaposition of the beating heart in this stanza with the “murder” hidden 
beneath the floorboards would seem an allusion to Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart,” and indeed 
Sitwell makes explicit reference elsewhere in the poem—with “waves [that] sigh, ‘Never more’” 
(61)—to “The Raven,” effectively aligning the darkness of her world with the “terror” that Poe 
claimed as his “thesis,” for example, in Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque (1840) (Poe 6). 
 While “sometimes terrible lumbering Darkness” “[breaks] the trivial matchboard floors,” 
evoking terror as it reveals the repressed, at other times the repressed remains hidden, lying 







characterizes The Sleeping Beauty (172). As the “cost” of Laidronette’s “unbidding,” this “sleep” 
serves, I would argue, as the byproduct of the expulsions and repressions by which bourgeois 
cultural identity was formed, by which consciousness and experience were circumscribed by the 
“norms of etiquette and decency” that Bakhtin identifies as imposed by the “official” world. 
Such a sleep marks, in particular, the “country gentlemen” who populate Sitwell’s early world 
and who embody for us the shift from the medieval and Renaissance grotesque to that of the 
Romantic period. When we first encounter the gentlemen as the fairies arrive for the christening, 
they appear as distinctly grotto-esque “ornaments.” As Bahktin points out, the term “grotesque” 
has its etymological roots in the Italian Renaissance, in “the finding at the end of the fifteenth 
century of a certain type of Roman ornament, previously unknown” (32). “These ornaments,” 
Bahktin writes, “were brought to light during the excavation of Titus’ baths and were called 
grottesca from the Italian word grotto” (32), which the Oxford English Dictionary notes was 
“the popular word for the chambers of ancient buildings which had been revealed by 
excavations” to be housing such ornaments, in this case the discovery beneath Titus’ baths of 
“Nero’s Domus Aurea or Golden Palace across from the Coliseum” (Russo 3). We can see the 
impact of the strange paintings found in these “caves,” or grottos, in the work of Raphael and 
Michelangelo, for example, who found themselves struck by the “combin[ation] [of] vegetation 
and animal and human body parts in intricate, intermingled, and fantastical designs” (3). And 
this at a time when “renewed interest in aesthetic treatises such as Vetruvius’ De Architectura 
(ca. 27 B. C.) [ . . . ] linked classical style with the natural order and, in contrast, pointed to the 
grotesque as a repository of unnatural, frivolous, and irrational connections between things 
which nature and classical art kept scrupulously apart” (3). Ruskin, in his post-Romantic 







Raphael’s juxtaposition of the classical and the grotesque: “If we can draw the human head 
perfectly, and are masters of its expression and beauty, we have no business to cut it off, and 
hang it up by the hair at the end of a garland. If we can draw the human body in the perfection of 
its grace and movement, we have no business to take away its limbs, and terminate it with a 
bunch of flowers” (qtd. in Russo 5). In this light, we can assume Ruskin would have been no fan, 
either, of Sitwell’s “country gentlemen,” who appear “so countrified / That in their rustic grace 
they try to hide / Their fingers sprouting into leaves” (Collected Poems 49).  
For Bakhtin, such images, as “the heritage” of “the peculiar aesthetic concept” he calls 
“grotesque realism”—which, as we have seen, “differs sharply from the aesthetic concept of the 
following ages”—serve as a key marker of the medieval and Renaissance grotesque (18). “In 
grotesque realism,” Bakhtin writes, “the bodily element” that informs such grotto-esque images 
as Sitwell’s “countrified” gentlemen “is deeply positive,” “presented not in a private, egotistic 
form, severed from the other spheres of life”—as it is in the Romantic grotesque—“but as 
something universal, representing all people”; “as such it is opposed to severance from the 
material and bodily roots of the world; it makes no pretense to renunciations of the earthy, or 
independence of the earth and the body” (19). Sitwell’s “countrified” gentlemen, then, “root[ed] 
deep in earth,” “sweet as cherries growing from a tree” (Collected Poems 80, 49), function in this 
feudal world of the fairy tale as a hallmark of the pre-Romantic grotesque, embodying as they do 
the “leading themes” of its “images of bodily life”: “fertility, growth, and a brimming-over 
abundance” (Bakhtin 19).  
However, while Sitwell’s country gentlemen indeed “grow,” they “never move” 
(Collected Poems 49), a stasis suggestive not of the medieval and Renaissance grotesque, which, 







grotesque as the uncanny—the grotesque that “[e]merges with the concept of the Romantic 
sublime”—that moves, as Russo puts it, “inward,” becoming “individualized” and “interiorized,” 
and thereby carrying with it the “risk of social inertia” (8). It is in this sense, as grotto-esque 
“ornaments” steeped in stasis, that Sitwell’s country gentlemen encapsulate for us the shift to the 
Romantic grotesque (Collected Poems 80). And in The Sleeping Beauty, this stasis is indeed 
figured as sleep. In Sitwell’s particular take on the tale, the “curse” of sleep extends beyond the 
princess and the inhabitants of the castle to function collectively as the “cost” of bourgeois 
repression.77 “[S]leep[ing] as in the grave” (80), “smiling dim as satyr-broods / [ . . . ] that haunt 
[the] deepest woods” of this fairy-tale world, Sitwell’s country gentlemen signal the repression 
of the “cultural contents” that have been cast out of the “official” world, and as markers of such 
repression, they are associated with the “deepest woods” that serve, as we saw with Laidronette, 
as a repository for these expelled contents, as well as with the “satyr-broods” “that haunt” such 
woods, that are, in other words, suppressed within them (48). Indeed, when we encounter the 
country gentlemen at the christening, they are associated with Laidronette herself, rooted in the 
darkness (the “shade”) from which she emerges to cast her curse (48). The country gentlemen, 
then, as grotto-esque images of “fertility, growth, and [ . . . ] abundance” transplanted into the 
Romantic grotesque, both signify the Dionysian impulses that Laidronette embraces, as well as 
their repression. It is precisely “the sensual”—a pale shadow of “carnival licentiousness” 
(Bakhtin 13)—that they have suppressed when we later encounter them in the “country Fair” 
scene, “dream[ing] far beyond / The sensual aspects of the hairy sky / That something hides, they 
                                               
77 In Charles Perrault’s 1697 version of the tale, upon which Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm would later base theirs, the 
uninvited fairy dooms the infant princess to death upon the prick of the spindle needle—a fate ameliorated by 
another fairy to a hundred-year sleep from which the princess would be awoken by a prince’s kiss. So that the 
princess would not find herself the only living member of her family when she awoke, the good fairy put the 
inhabitants of the castle to sleep as well. Here, in Sitwell’s version, the collective sleep is part of the curse of “the 








have forgotten why!” (Collected Poems 80). “The sensual,” in other words, has been “hid[den]” 
by “something” for reasons the gentlemen no longer remember, having repressed the “cultural 
contents” deemed “low” according to the “norms of etiquette and decency” that have, in turn, 
rendered them “high.”  
According to Stallybrass and White, when “[t]he bourgeois subject [ . . . ] defined and re-
defined itself through the exclusion of what it marked out as ‘low’” (191)—establishing its 
identity as “an identity-in-difference” (193)—“the low was internalized under the sign of 
negation and disgust” (191). And “disgust,” as they point out, “always bears the imprint of 
desire”; as a result, “[t]hese low domains, apparently expelled as ‘Other,’ return as the object of 
nostalgia, longing, and fascination” (191). Such is the case, we could say, with Sitwell’s country 
gentlemen. The “sensual” hidden for reasons they’ve “forgotten,” they set out in search of the 
“something [that] hides,” the “[s]omething [that] dreams/ [w]ithin” the distorted music of the 
fair. Indeed, Sitwell establishes their “hunt” as a direct response to their “forget[ing]”: The 
country gentlemen 
  [ . . . ] dream far beyond 
 The sensual aspects of the hairy sky 
 That something hides, they have forgotten why! 
 And so they wander, aiming with their gun 
At mocking feathered creatures [ . . . ]. (80) 
In an earlier scene, soon after the poem opens, the prince, Sitwell’s (singular) speaker, informs 
us,78 
                                               
78 Sitwell alternates between two speakers, between the prince’s “I” and a collective (and nostalgic) “we,” 
generating a certain tension between the “individualized” perspective characteristic of the Romantic grotesque, and 
the “lost” communal focus of the pre-Romantic. Drawing from Bakhtin, Russo describes the Romantic grotesque as 







I hunted with the country gentlemen 
Who, seeing Psyche fly, thought her a hen 
 
And aimed at her; the mocking wingèd one  
Laughed at their wingless state, their crooked gun. (47)  
In this light, the “mocking feathered creatures” that the gentlemen hunt in the later fair scene 
read as Psyche (mistaken for a “hen”), these “creatures” in turn positioning the gentlemen as 
wayward, bumbling Cupids, marking this hunt, indeed, in terms of desire. This allusion to the 
fairy tale’s origins,79 in which the prince is told the story of the sleeping beauty while out 
hunting, underscores the changes Sitwell makes to the original tale, changes that situate her tale 
firmly within the register of the Romantic grotesque. Considering that the sleeping beauty 
functions in Sitwell’s version as shorthand for the consequences of Laidronette’s exclusion and 
suppression (for “the sleep of adult consciousness”), when the country gentlemen (and the prince 
who joins them) are spurred to the hunt—spurred to “wander, aiming with their gun”—by the 
“something [that] sleeps,” the princess emerges not simply as the object of rescue, but as the 
object of the hunt. Indeed, by the end of Sitwell’s version, the sleeping beauty has not been 
rescued, has not been, in other words, awoken by the prince’s kiss; instead, as the tale draws to a 
close, “brutish forests close around [her],” in effect (“brutish[ly]”) containing her in continued 
sleep (106). And meanwhile the prince, for his part, continues “in [his] hunt” (106). Such 
changes, and the sinister tone they produce, effectively align Sitwell’s version with one of the 
                                               
away in the ‘chamber’ of bourgeois privatism” (34). And, indeed, Sitwell’s collective speaker repeatedly pines after 
“our innocent paradise” that “age has dimmed” (Collected Poems 69). 
79 The plotline of the prince hearing the tale of the sleeping beauty while hunting appears in Jacob and Wilhelm 
Grimm’s 1812 version of the fairy tale, as well as in the version upon which it is based, Perrault’s “The Sleeping 







earliest precedents of the fairy tale, Giambattista Basile’s Sun, Moon, and Talia (1634). In 
Basile’s tale, it is not a prince who happens upon the sleeping beauty, but a married king; and it 
is not a kiss that awakens her, but the suckling of her newborn twins, to whom she’s given birth 
while unconscious. What Perrault and the Grimms displace with a kiss in their versions, based as 
they are upon Basile’s, then, is rape.80  
As Greene points out, it is “at the age of sexual awakening” that Sitwell’s sleeping 
beauty, Malinn, “pricks her finger on the spindle and enters a darkness from which, at the end of 
the sequence, she has not awoken; she has learnt caution” (172). And in the case of Malinn, this 
caution reads as a response to the undercurrent of sexual threat generated by the “hunt.” The 
entire tale, in fact, is framed by a lesson of caution, a lesson, I would argue, that Sitwell 
fundamentally critiques. In the poem’s first stanza, the “gardener,” who “plays his old bagpipe / 
[t]o make the melon’s gold seeds ripe,” who is charged, in other words, with the upkeep of the 
bucolic, sings of a “felon” who paid for safe passage to another land, only to be drowned, 
betrayed (Collected Poems 46). And so it is “far best,” the gardener counsels, to steer clear of 
experience, a broadening of consciousness, to exchange desire in favor of a “sleep” as safe and 
comfortable as death; it is “far best,” in other words,  
To sleep as snug as in the grave 
                                               
80 In Basile’s tale, the sleeping beauty’s newborn twins suckle her fingers and in doing so manage to extract the 
“splinter of flax” that had caused her slumber. In this version, the king, who “believed she was asleep” but 
discovered, after “call[ing] her,” that she was “unconscious,” raped her: “Crying aloud, he beheld her charms and 
felt his blood course hotly through his veins. He lifted her in his arms, and carried her to a bed, where he gathered 
the first fruits of love. Leaving her on the bed, he returned to his own kingdom, where, in the pressing business of 
his realm, he for a time thought no more about this incident” (Basile, “Sun, Moon, and Talia”). And in Perrault and 
the Grimm’s versions, where the rape is replaced by the far less violent, though still nonconsensual, kiss, the 
violence of the tale is displaced to the second part of the story, which some scholars believe to have originated 
separately. In the second part of the tale, we get the sleeping beauty’s “ever after,” discovering that marriage does 
not secure her happiness, or even her safety in this case; once she has married and born children, we learn, she is 
nearly eaten, along with her children, by her new ogre-descended mother-in-law (Perrault, “The Sleeping Beauty in 







In your kind bed, and shun the wave, 
Nor ever sigh for a strange land 
And songs no heart can understand. (47) 
And it is with the repetition of these lines that The Sleeping Beauty ends. Following on the heels 
of “brutish forests clos[ing] around” Malinn and the continued hunt of the prince, this caution 
reads ironically, knowing as we do the threat that continues to gather, that encloses the princess 
“brutish[ly]” as she lies unconscious. As she lies unconscious, in fact, the winds—imbued with 
all the bestial qualities that mark this world, that signal its suppression of the Dionysian impulses 
that Laidronette embraces and that the country gentlemen can’t see (hidden as they are by the 
“something” that “dreams”)—become “swinish hairy beasts,” “[w]ild boars tearing through the 
forests” (106). And these are the winds that, as the prince tells us, “[a]ll night [ . . . ] help me in 
my hunt,” winds that, come morning, “go [home] to their rough sty / The clouds . . . and home go 
I,” the “sty”/“I” rhyme underscoring here the alignment of the prince with the “[w]ild boar” 
winds. 
 Whereas in this world—a world that is, as Plath emphasizes in “The Disquieting Muses,” 
structured as a “kingdom” (Collected Poems 76)—“the sleep of adult consciousness” transforms 
Sitwell’s country gentlemen into hunters, it transforms women, as we see in the case of Malinn, 
into the hunted. It is far best, then, Sitwell suggests, for women to remain “awake.” And it is in 
this sense that “the sleep of adult consciousness” functions indeed for Malinn as a “curse.” To 
become “good,” in other words, Malinn must undergo this rite of passage into bourgeois cultural 
identity, must enter into (or be forced into) “the sleep of adult consciousness” that renders her 
“unconscious”; she must, in other words, repress all the “cultural contents” that Laidronette 







they become, then, as Stallybrass and White predict for us, precisely what Malinn longs for. As 
she grows from the infant cursed at the christening into a young woman whose “beauty” stands 
in sharp contrast to Laidronette’s grotesqueness (63), the “moon  [ . . . ] sings [to] her ancient 
songs” of the suppressed, “[o]f lovely ladies and forgotten wrongs,” “whisper[ing],” too,  
[ . . . ] that within the wood 
An ancient satyr, wiser than the brood 
 
From which he sprang, within a cloudy cave 
Teaches philosophies both old and grave. (63) 
Here, Sitwell alludes to Silenus, the satyr companion and tutor of Dionysus, whose “wisdom” 
King Midas sought in a story Nietzsche relays early on in The Birth of Tragedy (“The Wisdom of 
Silenus” 1). When Malinn then sets out in search of the satyr (that “uncouth” half-man, half-
beast), fascinated by these “philosophies,” she seeks, we might say, the knowledge and 
consciousness that has been circumscribed by “official” “norms of etiquette and decency,” that 
has been cordoned off, in other words, along with the grotesque: “The Princess said ‘With my 
light step I will be gone / To peep within that far cave’” (63). However, fear—another hallmark 
of the Romantic grotesque, symptomatic of its suppressions—gets the best of her, and she flees, 
prey-like: “in the darkness her gazelle-light footsteps ran / Far from the cave of that wise satyr-
man” (63).81  
 However, what fear doesn’t succeed in doing is suppressing her fascination. Later, 
immediately before Laidronette enters Malinn’s room under the pretext of mending a rip in her 
                                               
81 As Bakhtin writes, “[t]he images of Romantic grotesque usually express fear of the world and seek to inspire their 
reader with this fear. On the contrary, the images of folk culture are absolutely fearless and communicate this 







dress, and Malinn pricks her finger on the spindle needle—that is, immediately before Malinn 
undergoes, at the “age of sexuality maturity,” as Greene points out, the rite of passage that marks 
her entry into “the sleep of adult consciousness”—she sings, “All night I hear my animal blood / 
Cry to my youth, ‘Come to the Wood’” (76). With the “earthy” and the “low” repressed, 
sexuality in this world becomes animality, becomes displaced onto the external until, as Plath 
writes in her longer Sitwell essay—noting the “incarnate animal imagery” of Sitwell’s “first 
world”—“[a]ll is animal: fire,” for example, is ‘furry as a bear’” (“Edith Sitwell”).  
The line Plath quotes here is from Sitwell’s “Dark Song,” a Façade (1922) poem 
published about a year before Sitwell set to work on The Sleeping Beauty (Greene 170). In her 
shorter Sitwell essay, too, Plath concentrates on “Dark Song,” the poem serving, in effect, as her 
“initiation” into Sitwell’s early poetics; “[f]or the uninitiated,” Plath writes, “a detailed 
explanation and analysis of Sitwell’s technique is needed as a sort of guide to the opening of a 
new and more highly sensitive response mechanism” (“A New Idiom”). And for such a guide, 
she draws from Sitwell’s remarks on the poem from her introduction to both The Canticle of the 
Rose and her Collected Poems: “‘Dark Song,’ Sitwell writes, “is a poem about the beginning of 
things, and their relationship—the fire that purrs like an animal and has a beast’s thick coat” (The 
Canticle of the Rose xxiv). In “Dark Song,” all is indeed animal, the fire bear-like and the woods 
“hairy”: 
 The fire was furry as a bear  
And the flames purr . . .  
The brown bear rambles in his chain 
Captive to cruel men  







In the next lines, juxtaposing the bear’s ramblings with her own, the “maid” of the song reveals 
that she, too, is “animal”: 
The maid sighed, “All my blood 
Is animal. They thought I sat 
Like a household cat;  
But through the dark woods rambled I . . .  
Oh, if my blood would die!” (59) 
Here, as in The Sleeping Beauty, the sexual is suppressed, displaced onto the image of the fire so 
that the maid might become duly “domesticated,” “a household cat” whose “animal blood” is 
kept in check by “norms of etiquette and decency.” And yet, such suppression, such 
“internaliz[ing] [of the ‘low’] under the sign of negation and disgust,” as Stallybrass and White 
instruct us, generates “desire,” as we saw with Malinn, the “‘low’ [ . . . ] return[ing] as the object 
of [ . . . ] longing.” 
And so the maid, positioning herself as the “low” and longed-for, “rambles” like the bear 
“through dark woods,” disgust and desire intermingling as she at once longs for her “blood” to 
“die” and despairs that it should. Indeed, the image of the fire itself (of desire itself) underscores 
such a positioning, effectively fusing the maid (associated as she is with a cat) and the bear, the 
fire “furry as a bear” with flames that “purr.” And as the fire (its heat indeed associated, then, 
with pleasure, with “purr[ing]”) along with the maid’s “animal” blood suggests, in this world in 
which the full range of experience and consciousness (rambling in dark woods, in other words) is 
denied and in which all, therefore, becomes animal, to reach sexual maturity for a young woman 
is to be, indeed, “in heat.” And in the final lines, the fusion of maid, fire, and bear becomes even 







affirmation of her “animal” blood, her cry, “if my blood would die!”—and “knew” (59). “The 
dark earth, furry as a bear,” we learn, “grumbled too” (59). As Sitwell in her introduction 
describes her, the maid is “a girl whose blood has the dark pulse and instinct of the earth” (xxv), 
a girl who inhabits a poem in which “[t]he long, harsh, animal-purring ‘r’s [ . . . ] are intended to 
convey the uncombatable animal instinct” (xxv). She is a girl, in other words, whose connection 
with the earth and the animal—a connection based, it would seem, on shared knowledge, as the 
fire’s “kn[o]w[ing]” and the earth’s commiserating “grumbl[e]” implies—marks her body (her 
“animal” blood) as grotesque, as “not separated from the world by clearly defined boundaries,” 
but rather “blended with the world, with animals, with objects”82; such bodies, Bakhtin writes, 
become “cosmic,” “an incarnation of this world at the absolute lower stratum” (27).  
And it is this longing for “the absolute lower stratum,” for the fuller range of knowledge 
and experience offered by the earthy and the animal—the “cry” of her “animal blood” to “[c]ome 
to the wood”—that Malinn expresses, then, as she sings a variation of “Dark Song” on the eve of 
her “dark” sleep. Malinn’s version of the song begins, too, with the image of a purring, furry fire 
that conjures the “wildness” of a bear: “(She sings) ‘The purring fire has a bear’s dull fur, / Its 
warmth is sticky, dark as a burr’” (Collected Poems 76). Here the “household cat” and the 
pleasure of the purr have been subsumed into the image of “the purring fire,” the undercurrent of 
rebellion originally attending the image—“they thought [she] sat / Like a household cat” when 
all the while she was out “ramb[ling]” in “dark woods”—both evoked and contained. The 
“purring fire,” its original “warmth” now “sticky,” emboldens Malinn to beckon to an open-
ended auditor, “Come drowse, for now there is no eye / To watch, no voice to ask me why!” 
                                               
82 It is such a grotesque “blending,” then, that Plath identifies in Sitwell when she notes in her long essay that “in 
‘Green Song,’ jewels run in the blood of birds and humans and in the sap of plants alike”; and it is this blending, too, 








(76). Here the “heat” of the fire distinguishes the “drowse” Malinn proffers from the kind of 
(cold) sleep “as in the grave” that characterizes the “sleep of adult consciousness” at the same 
time that it prefigures it, suggesting that this “sexual awakening” in effect precipitates the “dark 
sleep” that will soon contain it. Free of the strictures of propriety, of what registers here as 
surveillance, Malinn longs, then, like the maid of “Dark Song,” to “‘[c]ome to the wood’” (76). 
For Malinn, the bear (evoked by its “fur”) serves, as it does in “Dark Song,” as a kindred spirit, 
connected to her—through the logic of the grotesque—by way of her “animal blood.” However, 
here in The Sleeping Beauty, where the focus is on “the sleep of adult consciousness,” on the 
consequences of expelling and suppressing “cultural contents” deemed “low,” the bear—that is, 
“Darkness [that] lumbers like a bear” (76)—functions, at the same time, as a sort of sentinel, 
keeping her at bay (“cumber[ing] floor and stair,” effectively blocking her exit into the night) 
and keeping her, so to speak, in the dark, from the knowledge (the “philosophies”) to be found in 
the woods.  
It is this emphasis on the “cost” of the exclusions and repressions, which generate the 
Romantic grotesque, in Bakhtin’s terms (the grotesque as “uncanny,” in Russo’s)—which 
generate, then, the “other” side of Sitwell’s fairy-tale world—with which Sitwell, we could say, 
puts her particular stamp on the fairy tale.83 And it is this emphasis that Plath channels in “The 
Disquieting Muses.” In Plath’s version of the tale, the “[g]odmothers” play the role of the 
“unbidden” Laidronette, sent in lieu of an “unasked” relative, whom the speaker imagines, 
indeed, in terms of the grotesque, as “illbred,” “disfigured and unsightly,” as, in other words, the 
“cultural contents” that her mother, in the interests of decorum—in the interests, more 
                                               
83 Given Plath’s fluency in Freud, designating the grotesque that we find in her poem as the “uncanny” grotesque 
would seem apropos. I have chosen, however, to use the “Romantic” designation to help concentrate my focus on 







specifically, of raising a well-bred daughter—had wished suppressed (Collected Poems 74). 
These godmothers, with “heads like darning eggs,” are marked, too, by the grotesque, evoking 
the figures from de Chirico’s The Disquieting Muses at the same time that they recall 
Laidronette, with her “Roc’s egg” “unwigged” (75). And like Laidronette, the godmothers 
function as the grotesque, as the return of the “cultural contents” expelled by the mother, 
returning not merely to attend the speaker’s christening, but to “darken” her world, “nodding by 
night around [her] bed, / Mouthless, eyeless, with stitched bald head” (75). Associated 
throughout the poem with night and shadow, and doing much, then, to establish the poem’s 
tone—redolent of the fear and dread we find in The Sleeping Beauty—the godmothers function, 
we could say, as images of a specifically “Romantic” grotesque. However, while in The Sleeping 
Beauty it is Laidronette who frames her curse as a “cost,” in “The Disquieting Muses,” it is the 
speaker herself, in the role of Malinn, who does so. Giving voice to the godmothers—who, 
“[m]outhless” and “eyeless,” underscore the repressions by which they were created—the 
speaker, in effect, aligns herself with the repressed (with, in effect, Laidronette), an alignment 
that becomes explicit, as we will see, by the end of the poem.  
From the very first stanza, the speaker presents her mother’s decision to “[unask]” her 
“illbred” or “disfigured and unsightly” relative as “unwis[e]” (74). And the remainder of the 
poem then reads as a catalogue of the “costs” of this “unask[ing],” of the various ways in which 
the presence of her godmothers (as the return of her mother’s expulsions), thwart her mother’s 
attempts to instill in her daughter “good breeding.” Standing in for the “good” fairies of the 
original tale, who bestow upon the newborn princess the “feminine” charms (such as beauty, 
grace, dance, song, and music), the mother enrolls her daughter in dance and piano lessons 







here underscoring, in effect, the performative nature of gender itself—the speaker experiences 
herself as “something apart,” a part of the darkness rather than the light, which, itself artificial, 
serves to highlight the artificiality of the performance. In Sitwell’s fairy tale, as we have seen, 
the suppression of the “natural”—what Sitwell calls the “uncombatable animal instinct” and 
what Malinn identifies as her “animal blood”—renders the world “unnatural,” a world in which 
“all [becomes] animal,” where, for example, “[t]he clouds seem” “[l]ike crazy creaking chalets 
hanging low /[f]rom the dark hairiness of bestial skies” (Sitwell, Collected Poems 80).84 In “The 
Disquieting Muses,” “nature,” too—by way of its suppression, by way of the “impos[ition]” of 
the “norms of etiquette and decency” that govern the “feminine”—appears “unnatural.” While 
the performance deploys “fireflies” and “glowworm[s]”—an attempt, it would seem, to 
naturalized the performance, or, rather, to naturalize the conception of femininity upon which the 
performance is based—these “lights” are indeed artificial, an effect created by the girls as they 
“[blink] flashlights” while “singing the glowworm song” (Collected Poems 75). And while the 
girls dance “on tiptoe,” the speaker recalls,  
[ . . . ] I could  
Not lift a foot in the twinkle-dress 
But, heavy-footed, stood aside 
In the shadow cast by my dismal-headed 
Godmothers [. . .] (75) 
Seeing her daughter, in effect, align herself with the darkness, the speaker’s mother “cried and 
cried” (75). Like Laidronette, who ascribes her “dark” curse to the queen’s “dark rudeness,” 
pointing to the mother’s role in her daughter’s fate, Plath’s speaker, too, links the mother to the 
                                               
84 Plath quotes this line from the fair scene in The Sleeping beauty to illustrate what she calls “the dull animalism 







very darkness she had wished suppressed, that she had generated by her “unask[ing].” While the 
speaker stands in the “shadow” of the godmothers, and the godmothers themselves (“dismal-
headed”) cast unbefitting gloom upon the performance, it is the mother’s response to this 
darkness that in effect amplifies it—as the grotesque is amplified, distorted, we might say, by the 
“gentility” of the “official” world, which can only be rendered as such by repressing it. As Plath 
suggests (by way of a colon), it is the mother’s crying that shifts the darkness of the poem from 
shadow (signaling as it does the presence of light) to utter blackout: “you cried and cried: / And 
the shadows stretched, the lights went out” (75). 
 When the mother tries again, this time with “piano lessons,” things appear to be on the 
upswing, the mother “prais[ing] [her daughter’s] arabesques and trills” (75), the ornamental 
qualities of those feminine “charms,” song and music. However, as the speaker reveals, while the 
mother has nothing but praise for her daughter’s music, this praise reads—as the music at 
Sitwell’s country fair reads, with its “rags of [the generative] laughter” of the folk grotesque—as 
hollow and false: 
  Mother you sent me to piano lessons 
  And praised my arabesques and trills 
  Although each teacher found my touch 
  Oddly wooden in spite of scales 
  And the hours of practicing, my ear 
  Tone-deaf and yes, unteachable. (75) 
The speaker here, in other words, is no “natural,” finding herself unable (or perhaps unwilling) to 
assimilate “feminine” charms into naturalized performance. As in The Sleeping Beauty, where 







Malinn not with the “official” world of etiquette and decorum (and the strictures of “femininity” 
it would “impose”), but with the grotesque, Plath’s speaker likewise associates knowledge and 
experience not with her mother’s “lessons,” but with, as she puts it, “muses unhired by you, dear 
mother” (75). Having characterized her mother’s “unask[ing]” as “unwis[e],” as, in other words, 
a foreclosing of knowledge and experience, the speaker associates a broadening of consciousness 
(underscored here by the triple repetition that generates a sense of expansiveness) with the 
grotesque, with her godmothers, from whom, she tells us, “I learned, I learned, I learned” (75).  
 Claiming her godmothers as her “muses,” then, the speaker effectively rejects—declaring 
herself “unteachable”—the “feminine” charms the mother would impart, the kinds of inspiration, 
in other words, that generate the “art” with which she associates her mother. While the mother 
certainly crafts the bedtime stories she tells her daughter (the speaker describing them as “made 
to order”), these stories prove specially tailored, we might say, to suit the demands of 
“femininity.” Indeed, the world conveyed by the mother’s stories and fairy tales differs strikingly 
from the fairy-tale world of The Sleeping Beauty, the mother’s stories effectively neutralizing the 
“wildness,” threat, and knowledge embodied by the bear in Malinn’s “Dark Song.” In the 
mother’s stories, in other words, the bear rambling in dark woods with its “animal blood,” the 
“dark pulse and instinct of the earth” that it shares with Malinn, becomes “Mixie Blackshort the 
heroic bear,” a restorer of order in the face of danger rather than danger itself. And the mother’s 
fairy tales likewise contain the “wicked[ness]” Laidronette embodies; as the speaker tell us, the 
“witches” in her mother’s stories “always, always / Got baked into gingerbread” (75).  
 What the mother lacks in her tales, we might say, is precisely what Alvarez misses in 
Sitwell’s—the other “side,” the side “where the storybook animals turn harsh and grunting, and 







casts the mother, the instiller of “feminine” charms, indeed in the role of Alvarez’s Sitwell, in the 
role, that is, of “poetess.” That spring break, then, as Plath set to work on making her poems 
“tougher,” hoping to sidestep the pitfalls of the “poetess,” Sitwell, with her “eccentric 
grotesqueries,” served Plath not as a “poetess,” as she did for Alvarez, but as a means by 
which—in the form of the speaker’s godmothers—the “feminine” category of “poetess” might be 
interrogated. When the speaker, then, declares herself in relation to her mother’s lessons as 
“unteachable” and locates in her godmothers a fuller range of knowledge and experience, 
“learn[ing]” from them, she effectively rejects the limited register and range of experience—
circumscribed by the niceties of rhythm and sound, as the dance and piano lessons suggest—
afforded the woman poet.  
 And it is this rejection that Plath frames as the ultimate cost of the mother’s “unask[ing].” 
When the “unasked” relative “[s]ent [the godmothers] in her stead,” she sent them, specifically, 
“to nod / And nod and nod at food and head / And at the left side of [the speaker’s] crib” (75). 
The godmothers’ nodding, repeatedly emphasized as it is—elsewhere the godmothers are noted 
“nodding by night around [the speaker’s] bed” (75)—reads generally as a nodding to sleep, but, 
more specifically, we might say, as a nod to the particular “sleep of adult consciousness” that 
Laidronette casts as the cost of her own “unbidd[ing].” However, whereas in The Sleeping 
Beauty Malinn succumbs to the curse and remains sleeping at the end of the poem, Plath’s 
speaker is in effect awoken by her godmothers. At the beginning of the stanza immediately 
following the speaker’s declaration that she “learned elsewhere, / From muses unhired by [her] 
mother,” she reflects,  
I woke one day to see you, mother 







On a green balloon bright with a million 
Flowers and bluebirds that never were 
Never, never, found anywhere. (75-6) 
Once the speaker aligns herself with her godmothers, then, what she “learn[s]” from them—the 
knowledge they embody of the “cultural contents” expelled by the “official” world, by “etiquette 
and decency”—effectively awakens her, Plath suggests, to a clearer vision of her world, a world 
indeed bifurcated, as Bakhtin might say, by its “two-world condition.” By defining itself as 
“official” over against the grotesque, which it expels and represses, and thereby exaggerates and 
distorts, the “official” world likewise becomes exaggerated and distorted. And so the mother 
becomes, by way of the speaker’s wakened vision, no longer simply the teller of fairy tales, 
but—as sheer artifice, an unnatural lightness “[f]loating above [her daughter] in bluest air” on a 
“green balloon”—something straight out of one. And just as Alvarez reduces Sitwell to surface, 
to “ornament” and “froth” (lacking as she does, for Alvarez, seriousness and depth), the mother, 
likewise lacking the counterweight of the other “side,” of the grotesque, “bob[s] away” on her 
separate “planet,” as insubstantial as a “soap-bubble” (76). In response to her mother’s 
command—“Come here!”—the speaker instead “face[s] [her] traveling companions,” and with 
this implied acceptance of what we might call their “ecclesiastic” sponsorship (with her turning 
from her mother, that is, to “face” them), her rejection of the role of “poetess” is complete.   
In contrast to her mother, off in “Never Never Land,” in effect, in a world in which 
flowers and bluebirds are merely ornamental (“[n]ever, never, found anywhere”), in a world no 
more substantial than a “soap-bubble,” the speaker’s godmothers indeed prove considerably 
more substantial—“stand[ing] their vigil in gowns of stone”—as well as natural, their “stone,” as 







of the two options, the “poetess” and the grotesque, the grotesque lies considerably closer to 
what Sitwell calls “the dark pulse and instinct of the earth.” However, rather than fully 
naturalizing the grotesque, Plath, like Sitwell, suggests that it, too, is not altogether “natural,” 
distorted as it is by that which would suppress it, by that which would keep it “unasked.” As in 
Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, where the country gentlemen “grow” but “never move” and the 
fairgoers “sigh” that “‘Life goes, Death never comes,’” the world of “The Disquieting Muses” is 
rendered static. While by the end of the poem, the source of the darkness, of the shadows cast by 
the godmothers, has shifted from the artificial light of the stage to the light of “the setting sun,” 
the sun, drawn from de Chirico’s painting, “never brightens or goes down” (76).  
In both Sitwell’s and Plath’s versions, “the sleeping beauty” is not awoken by a prince; 
there is, in other words, no “happy” ending. However, such “happiness,” both poems imply—
based as it is in the expulsion and repression of the “low,” and thereby in the denial of the fuller 
range of consciousness afforded by the grotesque—proves merely “empty gaiety,” as Plath 
describes Sitwell’s “official” world. The hope in the poems lies, then, not in rescue, but in 
awareness. In Sitwell’s tale—where, (just prior to the gardener’s reprisal of his song of caution, 
which officially ends the poem), the princess sleeps on while the prince, having aligned himself 
with dark, animalized nature, by night “hunt[s]” her—the hunt ends with “dawn,” an allusion to 
the sleeping beauty’s name, Aurora, in Tchaikovsky’s ballet, staged in London by Serge 
Diaghilev a couple of years before Sitwell began composing The Sleeping Beauty (Sitwell, 
Collected Poems 106).85 For Bakhtin, while the “nocturnal” marks the Romantic grotesque, it is 
“light [that] characterizes the folk grotesque,” which functions as “a festival of spring, of sunrise, 
                                               
85 Greene writes that Sitwell’s “long sequence of poems [ . . . ] must have owed something to Diaghilev’s production 
of The Sleeping Princess at the Alhambra in 1921” (170-1). Alvarez seems to make this connection to Diaghilev’s 







of morning” and, as such, is filled with “the pathos of change and renewal” (41, 11). When “at 
morn,” then, “young dawn creeps / Tiptoe through [the prince’s] room,” nature (which has 
become personified here rather than animalized) aligns itself with the sleeping beauty, who in 
turn becomes aligned with the change and renewal signaled by the folk grotesque. These 
alignments serve a protective function, keeping the princess secret; as the dawn tiptoes though 
the prince’s room, it “[n]ever speaks of one who sleeps / In the forest’s gloom” (Collected Poems  
106). However, the potential for such change and renewal would itself seem to be rendered static 
when we consider that in helping to keep the princess hidden, to protect her from the hunt, the 
dawn also helps to ensure that her sleep will continue uninterrupted. And yet for Sitwell (and for 
Plath in her reading of Sitwell), the renewing possibilities of dawn, of the folk grotesque, reside 
not so much in the poetry itself, per se, as in the poetry’s relation to the reader. By way, in part, 
of the various “shocks” it produces through its “fusion of sense images” and its use of the 
grotesque,86 Sitwell’s poetry, in both Sitwell’s and Plath’s conception of it, possesses the 
potential to “awaken a new awareness in the reader,” to borrow Plath’s phrasing (“A New 
Idiom”). Indeed, in helping to keep the princess hidden (by keeping her secret), the dawn helps 
to prevent the prince from fulfilling his allotted role as rescuer, as, that is, awakener. In this 
essentially vacated role, then, Sitwell (and Plath in her reading of Sitwell) effectively positions 
her readers, charging them with the task of awakening themselves, in effect, from their own 
“sleep of adult consciousness.”  
                                               
86 The phrase, “fusion of sense images,” is Plath’s (“Edith Sitwell”). And Plath herself describes the effect of 
Sitwell’s poetry in terms of shock; “conditioned” as she was “to comprehend the broken images of Eliot’s 
Wasteland, the tragic gaiety of Yeats’s gyring universe, and lyric paradoxes of Auden’s Age of Anxiety,” as we 
have seen, “it was nonetheless with a shock,” she writes, “that I catapulted into Edith Sitwell’s ‘first world,’ a 
bucolic landscape ranging from incarnate animalistic scenery to rococo fairytale gardens” (“Edith Sitwell”). And 
later in the essay, she writes that “Sitwell makes the dull animalism and the raucous, empty gaiety of the world so 
pervade the whole that the images, while shocking, are pertinent and, on the whole, justified,” a claim she then 







 In “The Disquieting Muses,” such an awakened awareness stems, too, from an alignment, 
a declaring of loyalties and a keeping of secrets. In her own fairy tale, Plath takes Sitwell’s 
emphasis on the costs of expelling and repressing the “low,” her critique of the “empty gaieties” 
of the “official” world, one step further by aligning the speaker, as we have seen, with the 
expelled and repressed itself. In the final stanza, this alignment becomes explicit as the speaker 
shifts from “fac[ing] [her] traveling companions,” accepting their presence, to actively 
“keep[ing]” “company” with them (Plath, Collected Poems 76). And by here adopting the same 
verb she had used to describe her mother’s “[unwise]” decision to “keep” her “grotesque” 
relative “unasked”—a decision which had set the creation of her daughter’s “dark” world in 
motion—the speaker positions her act of alignment (her “keep[ing]” “company”) as a direct 
counter to (even a corrective of) her mother’s act of exclusion. This alignment, then, and the un-
alignment with her mother that it entails, serves as the ultimate cost of her mother’s decision. 
And as the speaker emphasizes, it is this decision which has left her in a “[d]isquieting” world, in 
a world in which the sun “never brightens or goes down”: “And this is the kingdom you bore me 
to, / Mother, mother” (76). And yet as unsettling as this world may be, the speaker—like 
Sitwell’s dawn that “[n]ever speaks of [the] one who sleeps”—declares her loyalties and, in 
doing so, commits herself to secrecy: “But no frown of mine / Will betray the company I keep” 
(76). Such an alignment, as we have seen, rather than serving to initiate the speaker, as Malinn 
was initiated, into “the sleep of adult consciousness”—the “sleep” by which the bourgeois 
subject renders itself “respectable”—instead awakens her to it, to the artificial (and necessarily 
partial) world generated by the abjection of the “low,” a world the speaker envisions, then, as her 
mother’s “Never Never Land,” the “little planet” with its unreal “[f]lowers and bluebirds,” 







 In “The Disquieting Muses,” the awakening implicit in the “dawn” of The Sleeping 
Beauty resides, as it does in Sitwell, in the relation between the poem and its readers, but so too 
is it enacted, then, within the poem itself. And for Plath, such an awakening is indeed imbued, as 
Bakhtin describes the grotesque, with the potential for change. For Bakhtin, the “excess” that is 
the grotesque, which “emerge[s],” as Russo puts it, “only in relation to the norms which it 
exceed[s],” returns to reveal that the world created by its expulsion is not in itself whole and 
absolute, but is instead “relative” and “limited” (49). In doing so, as Bakhtin argues, it 
“uncrown[s]” “the prevailing concept of the world” (49), “lead[ing] men out of the confines of 
the apparent (false) unity, of the indisputable and stable” and “discloses,” even in its “Romantic 
form,” “the potentiality of an entirely different world, of another order, another way of life” (48). 
In “The Disquieting Muses,” we could say, the grotesque—in revealing to the speaker the 
artificiality of her world, of the world her mother’s abjections have created for her—does just 
that. As fatalistic as the speaker’s pronouncement that “this is the kingdom you bore me to, / 
Mother, mother” might sound, the speaker faults her mother not for bringing her into the world, 
but for bringing her into a world constructed as a “kingdom,” as a fantasy world structured to 
compel the “proper” (well-bred) performance of her gender. And as constructed, then, this fate, 
by implication, can be reconstructed. And it is indeed the grotesque, the godmothers themselves 
who figure such a possibility. In the final stanza of the poem, the godmothers, to whom the 
speaker has turned to “face,” have themselves, the speaker tells us, “[f]aces blank as the day I 
was born,” as if awaiting her inscription, her reinterpretation, we might say, of the role of 
“poetess” (Collected Poems 76). And likewise, it is the godmothers in the poem—the excess of 
the well-bred, the embodiment of a fuller range of knowledge and experience, of a fuller poetic 







celebrating her eight new poems, to shatter the “rococo crystal cage” that had shut off her “real 
experience of life” (Unabridged Journals 356).87 Describing the eight poems in her journal as 
“thunderous poems [ . . . ] breaking open my real experience” (356), Plath indeed seems to have 
had the godmothers of “The Disquieting Muses” in mind, those figures who—during “the 
hurricane,” as “father’s twelve / [s]tudy windows bellied in / [l]ike bubbles about to break,” and 
despite the “choir” of the mother-led “Thor is angry” chant—“broke the panes” (Collected 




 Having completed modules on the short story, the novel, and drama before break, Plath 
was set to teach modern British and American poetry when she returned, and even in the midst of 
her surge of writing, her uneasiness about her preparations had begun to weigh on her. In fact, 
the journal in which she celebrates her new poems begins with such uneasiness. In the same 
journal, in other words, in which she claims Sitwell and Moore as “poetic godmothers,” Plath 
begins by recounting a “horrid dream of teaching, which means I am oppressed by my work and 
must do my work,” a dream that seemed well on its way to becoming a recurring one, Plath 
noting that she had dreamt it “for about the second time” (Unabridged Journals 357). In the 
dream, she hurries to class “in a coffee-gulped rush” and “[t]rie[s] to cover [her] lateness & 
unpreparedness by reading the attendance cards” piled on her desk (357). “Most of [the students] 
strangers, as for the beginning of a new term,” the “[c]lass restive, defiant socialites” (357), Plath 
stumbles through the cards, which morph as she reads them “into an immense bundle of scarves 
                                               
87 As we have seen, Plath’s use of “rococo” here recalls—especially given her reference here, it would seem, to “The 







& belts, with names embroidered and sewn on them every which way” (358). In the midst of this 
embroidery, this midcentury “woman’s work,” we could say, Plath discovers a “Saturday 
Review” and “tr[ies] to read the titles of sections which were written in a queer patois French: 
Ezra Pound’s translation of T. S. Eliot” (358). And “in the classroom at the rear” sat Miss Drew, 
Plath’s mentor from her undergraduate days, whose book on Eliot she would draw from as she 
prepared to teach The Waste Land. Miss Drew, looking “pale, mournful, cadaverous,” 
“observ[ed], skeptical,” and as she “got up to leave,” she offered some parting words: “‘I just 
don’t see how you’re going to do this’” (358).  
After relaying the dream, Plath then settled into charting out just how she did plan on 
doing this, offering us a snapshot of her syllabus: “Looked through & through my calendar: eight 
weeks: seven actual teaching weeks. Each week will diminish my pile of preparation: Hopkins, 
Yeats, Eliot, Thomas, Auden, Crowe Ransom, e e cummings” (358). Of these seven poets, who 
were either required teaching or presented in a list from which she could choose,88 Eliot, as her 
dream as well as her teaching notes suggest, loomed large. In notes dated three days later, on the 
first of April, Plath outlined the poems she intended to cover as well as the number of days she 
planned to dedicate to each poet. Eliot would get the most coverage—five days—and would be 
represented by “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” “Journey of the Magi,” and The Waste 
Land.89 While Hopkins and Yeats were both set to receive four days—with Dylan Thomas 
                                               
88 On March 13, 1957, when Plath wrote to accept the teaching position at Smith, she requested “a list of the novels, 
stories and poems from which we select our course material” so that she might begin preparing that summer. In a 
letter that June from Daniel Aaron, the director of English 11, the course Plath would be teaching, he indicates that 
while some texts were mandatory, there was a degree of flexibility in the list: “Please note that only selected parts of 
the books listed in Groups I and II are to be assigned. For example, in William James’ The Varieties of Religious 
Experience two chapters (the religion of healthy-mindedness and the ‘sick soul’) will be discussed. You may wish to 
assign only one story from each of the four collections listed in Group II. We wanted to escape from the tyranny of 
the anthology, and to encourage students to read independently” (Aaron, “Letter”). In the letter, Aaron mentions that 
he has included “a syllabus of the first semester,” so there does not appear to be any documentation concerning the 
spring, at the end of which the poetry unit was scheduled for the course.  







getting three, Ransom two, and Auden and Cummings one90—the fact that it is Eliot’s work that 
appears in the dream, work she “tries” to read, suggests the degree to which he had become a 
focal point for her uneasiness as she headed into the final stretch of the semester.  
And Plath’s “poetic godmothers,” in turn, had become a means of mitigating this 
uneasiness. As she works through the sense of trepidation that had manifested itself in her 
“horrid dream,” charting her organization for the remainder of the term, she assures herself,  
I should have fun if I face preparations & do them very tight, very well. Must do a 
list of definitions for the first day. Illustrate on the board. How much better the 
day looks as I wake: it moves by steady laws which are as much for me as against 
me. Eight weeks. This work, teaching, has done me much good: I can tell from 
the way my poems spouted this last week: a broad wide voice thunders and sings 
of joy, sorrow and the deep visions of queer and terrible and exotic worlds. (358) 
On the verge of teaching the midcentury canon of (male) modernists, represented by the seven 
poets she lists in her journal, she is able to assure herself, in the face of the coming “[e]ight 
weeks,” that teaching had indeed “done [her] much good” by pointing to her eight new poems as 
proof. And in pointing to her new poems, Plath, in effect, points us toward Sitwell’s ecclesiastic 
sponsorship. Describing the voice of her new work as “broad,” “wide,” and “thunder[ing],” Plath 
suggests that the regimen of “toughness” she had established for herself in response, it would 
seem, to Alvarez’s nearly concurrent praise of Hughes and dismissal of Sitwell, a regimen that 
demanded “a bigger, freer, tougher voice,” seemed to be paying off. And as in the journal from 
                                               
90 While originally Plath had indicated that Thomas would receive three days, she amended this in a marginal 
notation to two. Cummings is listed for the final day of class and beneath his name Plath has indicated Marianne 
Moore, Wallace Stevens, Elizabeth Bishop, and Richard Wilbur under the category “[i]f possible.” From the 








the day before, in which she had envisioned her spring break poems as “thunderous poems [ . . . ] 
breaking open [her] real experience of life,” it seems that Plath had in mind “The Disquieting 
Muses,” in particular, as she describes the voice of the new work as indeed “thunder[ing].” 
Channeled through the figures of Plath’s “godmothers,” Sitwell’s “eccentric grotesqueries”—the 
Romantic grotesque, as we saw in The Sleeping Beauty with its allusions to Poe, signaled by 
terror—indeed seem to underlie the “visions of queer and terrible and exotic worlds” that Plath 
attributes to her new work, Plath here embracing a quality (the “exotic”) in Sitwell’s work that 
Alvarez had singled out for censure and that she herself had originally set out to avoid. And it is 
on the basis of these new poems that Plath stakes her claim, at the end of this journal entry, to the 
title of “Poetess of America,” “poetess” now reading, through the lens of “The Disquieting 
Muses,” as a rather rigorously interrogated classification. It is here that Plath establishes her list 
of “rivals” to the title, effectively establishing (and evaluating) her own “canon” of women poets, 
with Sitwell and Moore, as “ageing giantesses & poetic godmothers,” at its center. In effect, 
then, this canon of women poets takes shape in Plath’s journal in response to the canon of male 
poets with which the entry begins. And whereas the male canon of “moderns” that Plath was on 
the verge of teaching proved a source of trepidation, the canon of women poets, in relation to 
which she situated her own writing,91 left Plath feeling “eager, chafing, sure of [her] gift, 
wanting only to train & to teach it” (360).  
Shoring up her “poetic godmothers” indeed helped Plath to bolster herself as she 
continued to prepare for her poetry unit and to face the looming specter of Eliot, not only as an 
eminent figure of the “modern” canon that she was about to teach, but as a sponsor of her 
                                               
91 Plath use of “rivals” here serves, of course, a competitive function, emphasizing difference and distinction, a 
striving to set herself apart, but it serves, too, an inclusive one, situating the women (herself included) in relation to 
one another as indeed comparable, “arguably equal,” to borrow from the Oxford English Dictionary, “in quality of 







husband at a time when this sponsorship had begun to demonstrate just the kinds of rewards it 
could reap. Toward the end of April, just before she was to begin teaching Eliot, she recorded in 
her journal a review of Hughes’s The Hawk in the Rain.92 While “the critic criticizes the 
maelstroms & cataclysms” of the collection, Plath notes, he also “echoes Eliot & says ‘very 
considerable promise’” (375).93 Indeed, not only had the volume been published by Faber, it had 
received Eliot’s personal stamp of approval. When the book had first been accepted in London 
the previous winter by “Britain’s premier poetry publisher,” as Hughes biographer Jonathan Bate 
describes it, Hughes had written to his parents that “Faber & Faber wrote to me & told me that 
Mr T.S. Eliot likes my poems very much indeed, congratulates me on them, and they will publish 
the book” (Hughes, Letters 98). In fact, Faber not only wished to publish the volume; they were 
in a rush to do so. In efforts, it would seem, to ensure that their edition would be published in 
tandem with Harper’s in the U.S., “Faber sent the poems in proof,” Bates writes, “[w]ithin a 
week of acceptance,” “well before Harper had set up the New York edition in type” (Bate 127).94 
And the two editions were indeed released at the same time, an event whose auspiciousness 
Hughes conveyed to his parents, indicating that he would be “the first poet ever to publish his 
first book in both countries and only about the 3rd to publish any book of poetry simultaneously 
in both countries” (Letters 98). “Dylan Thomas and Auden,” he added, “have beaten me to that I 
think” (98).  
                                               
92 The review appeared in Sewanee along with four of Hughes’s poems (Unabridged Journals 375).  
93 Eliot would indeed prove a considerable and consistent sponsor for Hughes, offering two years later, for example, 
to serve Hughes not only “commercial[ly],” but also “ecclesiastic[ally]”; as Plath would write her mother, “Eliot has 
offered to read and discuss any plays in verse Ted does” (Letters Home 389).  
94 According to Bate, while the process was indeed a speedy one once the volume was accepted, the acceptance 
itself was delayed by an initial misunderstanding. When Plath and Hughes had first received news that the collection 
had won the prize judged by Moore, Auden, and Spender, Plath had sent a copy to Faber and Faber, noting the prize 
and the imminent publication by Harper (127). However, Hughes having won an American prize, Faber mistook him 
for American and sent the typescript back “with a curt note saying that they did not publish first volumes by 
American writers” (127). Once Plath promptly straightened things out, though, they accepted the collection with 







And with the publication of Hawk, Hughes had made his auspicious entry onto the 
literary scenes in both New York and London just as Plath was making her return to Smith as a 
former star student and aspiring writer, one, as we have seen, with no book yet to her credit. On 
October 6, during her first semester of teaching, the most important reviews of Hawk had also 
appeared simultaneously on either side of the Atlantic, as Bate points out, one in the New York 
Times by W. S. Merwin, who would soon become a close friend of Hughes’s,95 and the other the 
review by Alvarez applauding the “Tough Young Poet” in the Observer (135-6). For his part, 
Merwin, in his words, “acclaim[ed]” Hughes as “an exciting new writer,” one who “trusts his gift 
and his art, both of which are considerable” (Merwin, “Something of His Own to Say”). When 
Faber had released the volume, the publisher’s blurb had cited the prize that Hughes had won in 
the U.S. and listed the judges, as we would expect, and the front flap of the dust jacket had added 
that “Mr. Hughes’s work is distinguished by a very considerable originality, by strong 
imaginative force, and already by a marked degree of technical assurance. The Hawk in the Rain 
is outstanding both for its achievement and its promise” (my emphases).96 Merwin’s description 
of Hughes’s talent as “considerable,” then, along with the Sewanee reviewer’s indication, that 
spring, of his “very considerable promise,” tracks for us a discursive path that Plath herself, with 
her comment that the Sewanee reviewer “echoes Eliot,” traced back not simply to Faber and 
Faber but to the poetry editor at its helm. On the verge of teaching Eliot that spring, then, Plath 
demonstrates that she was certainly aware that to the list of Moore, Auden, and Spender, Hughes 
                                               
95 When Plath and Hughes met Merwin that fall at a dinner party, “[he] suggested that Ted and Sylvia should move 
back to England”—he himself was planning a move to London—because the BBC offered opportunities for poets to 
make their living apart from, or at least with a lessened reliance upon, teaching” (Bate 136). In London, the two 
couples would indeed become close.  
96 The British Library owns a copy of the first Faber edition of Hawk, a presentation copy that Hughes autographed 









could now add Eliot himself as a “commercial” sponsor. And in identifying the Sewanee review 
as an echo of Eliot, Plath demonstrates an awareness, too, of the power such a sponsorship could 
bring to bear on inflecting a poet’s critical reception.97 
 And that spring, the impact of this sponsorship on their daily lives was becoming 
increasingly apparent as the doors to the literary world began cracking open. On the weekend 
immediately following her return after the break, for example, Hughes gave a reading at 
Harvard, and although Plath was recovering from a feverish cold, she refused to miss it, 
indicating, too, that she was “look[ing] forward to meeting the long looked-at Adrienne Cecile 
Rich,” whose work she had been following; it was in relation to Rich that Plath had described 
herself in her spring break “canon” of women poets, those vying to join the ranks of Sitwell and 
Moore, as “most close” (Unabridged Journals 365). By this time, although she was only about 
three years older than Plath, Rich had already published two volumes of poetry, the first having 
won Plath’s coveted Yale prize nearly a decade earlier, in 1950. After the reading, Plath records 
that she did indeed get the opportunity to rub elbows with Rich, whom she described as “little, 
round & stumpy, all vibrant short black hair, great sparking black eyes and a tulip-red umbrella: 
honest, frank forthright & even opinionated” (368). Later, on the way to a party hosted by Jack 
Sweeney, “the director of the Woodberry Poetry Room,” who had introduced Hughes at the 
event (Bate 136), “the Sweeney’s, Ted & I & Adrienne,” Plath recounts, “slogged through the 
rain to a taxi” (Unabridged Journals 368); once there, Plath was seated between Rich’s husband 
Al Conrad, an economist at Harvard, with whom she enjoyed a discussion of “trudo” and 
“tuberculosis,” and “Jack,” as she writes, “who asked me to make a recording in June” (369).  
                                               
97 When the volume had first won the award, Hughes had aptly summed up the perks of such sponsorship, reminding 
his sister that since “Auden, Spender and Marianne Moore” had judged the contest, winning “means that the book 
will be published [ . . . ] with the considerable publicity of having such selectors, and probably a forword [sic] to 







Plath could not have failed to notice that this taste of the literary world and its 
connections had been afforded her on the basis of her husband’s achievements. And so that 
spring, as she began teaching her list of poets that included Dylan Thomas and Auden (among 
whose ranks the auspicious publication of Hawk had situated Hughes), and Eliot himself, 
(Hughes’s newest “commercial” sponsor), Plath found herself continually assessing her own 
work in relation to this canon, something she had managed to avoid in her entry over break by 
aligning herself with a canon composed exclusively of women. While over break, Plath had read 
the connection between her teaching and writing as a productive one—teaching having “done 
[her] much good,” as evidenced by her eight new poems—once she began teaching some of the 
very poets, those of the midcentury “modern” canon, who had become, in effect, a daily presence 
in her life, this connection effectively shut her own work down. The day after she detected 
Eliot’s presence in the Sewanee review of Hawk, Plath took to her journal “to record [ . . . ] a 
conscious change of tone, of heart”; she had “suddenly realized [she was] no longer a teacher” 
(376). There were still three weeks left in the term, but “just as I jitterily became a teacher a 
month before my first class,” she wrote, “so my prophetic Pans & Kevas are free already” (376). 
However, this perceived release from the academic world is belied by the degree to which Eliot’s 
work can be found structuring her transition from teaching to full-time writing. Training her 
sights on the summer, Plath found herself feeling “ridiculously apathetic” toward her teaching 
(377), so much so that she could declare, on the verge of teaching Eliot, “Suddenly I no longer 
care—let the Wasteland [sic] run how it may—I am already in another world” (376). Yet as she 
continues, this other world shifts from a world separate from The Waste Land to one informed by 







be born” (376).98 In her teaching notes for The Waste Land, Plath includes an overview of Jessie 
Weston’s From Ritual to Romance, which Eliot cites as a source in the poem’s endnotes. In her 
notes, Plath highlights the Fisher King legend and the ancient vegetation rites and fertility rituals 
upon which Weston argues the legend is based. The Fisher King, according to Weston, can be 
traced back to the dying and resurrecting gods that vegetation cults linked with the changing of 
seasons and the cycles of the harvest. As Weston emphasizes, resurrection, rather than the death 
that necessarily precedes it, formed the core of these rituals (Weston ix). However, while death is 
posited by the fourth section of The Waste Land (“Death by Water”), “the possibility of 
rebirth”—as Plath indicates in an annotation to her copy of the poem—remains an open question 
as the poem moves to its final section, “What the Thunder Said.”99  
And for Plath, by the end of the poem, it is not resurrection but “death-in-life” that 
prevails.100 Beneath the poem, just before Eliot’s endnotes begin, Plath has recorded Drew’s final 
word on The Waste Land, quoting a line from her mentor’s full-length study of Eliot: “the 
surrender has been made,” Drew writes, “but still it seems a surrender to death and the possibility 
of rebirth is still without substance or outline” (Eliot, The Complete Poems).101 And it is 
precisely into this state of what Plath refers to in her notes as “suspended animation” that she 
                                               
98 As Plath indicates about two weeks later, this conception of the in-between derives from Matthew Arnold. In this 
later entry, reiterating that “[she] feel[s] between two worlds,” Plath cites Arnold directly: “as Arnold writes—‘one 
dead, the other powerless to be born’” (Unabridged Journals 386). That Plath, in the earlier journal, substitutes 
“dying” for “powerless” suggests that she was reading Arnold here through an Eliotic lens. 
99 Just above the section break, Plath has written, “death—possibility of rebirth?” (Eliot, The Complete Poems). 
100 The phrase “death-in-life” features prominently in Plath’s teaching notes for The Waste Land. For example, 
comparing The Waste Land to Joyce’s work, pointing out that the city “for modern writers no longer has [the] old 
meaning of COMMUNITY,” she jots down, “DEATH IN LIFE: PARALYSIS: utter powerlessness, incapacity of 
action: state of being crippled, helpless, impotent.” And Plath’s annotations to her copy of The Waste Land also 
include the phrase (“Teaching at Smith College”). 
101 In her teaching notes, Plath sketches a quick outline of Drew’s argument: “Conclusion: ruins, fragments: Fisher 
King: lack of order: Possibility of rising from Purgatory, restoring lands, song of spring, sanity? Not achieved: 







casts herself as she contemplates the final weeks of the semester.102 Noting that she and Hughes 
“are treated as ghosts by permanent members of the faculty—as shadows already departed with 
no flesh & blood interest in their future” (Unabridged Journals 376), she describes herself as 
“living thus a living death, which I shall expatiate upon at length as we deal with TS Eliot this 
week and next” (377). And two days later, on May 3rd, Plath suggests the degree to which this 
“living death”—the specter of Eliot’s work and sponsorship—had cast its pall on her own 
writing. Demonstrating the link between Eliot’s work and her own lack thereof, Plath begins 
with a teacherly to-do list and then shifts—The Waste Land serving as the pivot—to an 
assessment of her writing: “Tomorrow I must correct all my exams which I should do in one 
day—they’re short & all on the same subject. Then a close outline of The Wasteland [sic] which 
should take all week. I pick up my ms. of poetry & leaf through it, unable to invent, to create” 
(377).  
 While over break, Plath’s “godmothers,” along with the other members of her women’s 
canon, had left Plath feeling “eager, chafing, sure of [her] gift,” here The Waste Land leaves her 
feeling as barren as its landscape. However, as they had over break, her “godmothers”—in 
particular Sitwell, who, as we have seen, served as the “ecclesiastic” sponsor of “The 
Disquieting Muses,” which served in her journals as representative of her eight new poems—
helped to mitigate this sense of sterility.103 Two weeks after recording being “unable to invent, to 
create” as she prepared to teach The Waste Land, she finds herself again “between two worlds,” 
                                               
102 Plath’s notes variously translate “death-in-life”; one such translation is “suspended animation,” in which one is 
“neither living nor dead” (“Teaching at Smith College”).  
103 In her teaching notes on The Waste Land, under the heading “Theme,” Plath has written, “blindness + numbness 
of external contemporary consciousness—sterility, emptiness, impotence, aridity—loss of vital relationship with 







this time citing her source directly, “as Arnold writes—‘one dead, the other powerless to be 
born’”: 
My teaching has lost its savor: I feel the students are gone & have none of the 
satisfaction as a teacher of planning a better more vital course next year: that is 
done. Then, on the other hand, I have nothing but a handful of poems—so 
unsatisfactory, so limiting, when I study Eliot, Yeats, even Auden and Ransom—
and the few written in spring vacation to link me umbilically to a new-not-yet-
born world of writing. (386) 
When Plath turns here to her writing, we can see her spring-break strategy of separate canons 
play out as she separates the poems she had written over break from the “handful of poems” she 
had written earlier, poems she was still keeping in the running for her book manuscript. While 
she disparages the older “handful of poems” in comparison to the work of Eliot and that of some 
of the other male poets who comprised her canon of modern British and American poetry that 
semester, “the few” she wrote during spring break104—which surely included “The Disquieting 
Muses”—move, in effect (placed as they are within the sentence after the disparagements linked 
syntactically to the older poems), beyond such “unsatisfactory” and “limiting” comparisons. 
These poems, it would seem, help to shift Plath’s conception of the world the summer promised, 
a world of full-time writing, from one that was “powerless to be born” to one that becomes, after 
she invokes her spring break poems, “not-yet-born.” This shift, in effect, entails a shift from the 
paradigm of The Waste Land, which had prompted Plath’s first between-two-worlds 
formulation—a paradigm in which the balance between life and death (which can tip, in effect, 
                                               
104 Plath here seems to have winnowed down her eight new poems to a few she deemed strong enough to include in 
her book manuscript. Considering how steeped in “The Disquieting Muses” her overall descriptions of her new 







toward either death-in-life or life-in-death) skews indeed toward death, as Plath and Drew 
indicate in their reading of the poem’s ending as “a surrender to death,” one in which “the 
possibility of rebirth” remains “without substance or outline”—to one in which rebirth is not 
only a possibility but an imminent certainty, a birth that hasn’t yet happened, but will. And this 
rebirth indeed has “substance” and “outline,” figured as it is “umbilically.” The spring break 
poems, then, woman-rooted as they are in their “ecclesiastic” sponsorship, function here, at least 
in part, as Plath’s lifeline to the other side of the semester, helping indeed to mitigate the feeling 
of stasis and sterility in which The Waste Land, in comparison to her own work, had left her.  
 In her preparations for the final day of class, Plath indicates the degree to which this 
sense of death-in-life pervaded the modernist texts in her institutional canon and, in doing so, 
became a major theme of her course. In her teaching notes, she mocked up a pep talk of sorts for 
her students, effectively translating this sense of death-in-life from what could be perceived as 
simply a depressing topic to what she would like to impart as a life-affirming call to action:  
people ask: why is there so much death, so much living death in the stories, 
poems, plays, and novels we’ve read: [from Joyce’s short story] the dead to the 
wasteland of death-in-life: DEATH IS ONE OF THE MOST MOVING AND 
TROUBLING EXPERIENCES OF LIFE: DEATH*IN*LIFE EMERGES AS 
ONE OF THE MOST TERRIBLE STATES OF EXISTENCE: NEUTRALITY, 
BOREDOM, become worse sins than murder, worse than illicit love affairs: BE 
RIGHT OR WRONG, don’t be indifferent, don’t be NOTHING. (“Teaching at 
Smith College”) 
In her original plans for that last day, drafted toward the end of spring break, Plath had slated 







Elizabeth Bishop, and Richard Wilbur (“Teaching at Smith College”). Later, this list shifts to 
Ransom, Cummings, Sitwell, Bishop, and Wilbur, and then appears to boil down, as her journal 
for May 19th, that last day, indicates, to “Ransom, cummings & Sitwell” (388). Within this 
context of death-in-life, the not-originally-slated Sitwell appears—as she had five days earlier in 
the entry in which the spring break poems she had “ecclesiastically” sponsored had helped to 
move Plath from the stasis of the in-between, informed by The Waste Land, toward the birth of a 
world of full-time writing—to tip the balance indeed toward life, toward action. In Plath’s notes, 
at least in those that have survived, Sitwell’s “Aubade” is the only poem for that last day to 
receive an outline, and from the outline it appears that Plath, in her efforts to inspire and 
motivate her students, used the poem to illustrate the power of poetry to affect the world of the 
living, to inspire, that is, the living with a sense of agency. Pointing out that an aubade is a 
“morning song to [a] loved one,” Plath underscores in her notes the irony of the poem’s title; 
Jane, the “loved one” in the poem, is “not praise[d]” as convention would have it, but is instead 
depicted as a “stupid farm girl.” In Jane’s world, Plath writes, “Everything [is] transformed into 
wooden animal or vegetable terms, like Jane’s own inner world: hair like cockscomb, cockscomb 
flowers, even cluck; flames like carrots & turnips, borrow color, dawn whines like dog, Jane’s 
mind weak as milk. ETERNITY for Jane will be a kitchen-garden.” As such, the poem readily 
lends itself to a warning against the dangers of insularity and ignorance, Jane’s “bucolic” world 
becoming, in effect, the entire world, translating her “inner world,” her “weak” mind, into its 
own “animal or vegetable terms.” However, what Plath chooses to emphasize as she concludes 
her outline is the transformative power of the individual imagination. Addressing her students, 
she writes, “YOUR OWN SPECIAL IDENTITY HAS POWER TO TRANSFORM [THE] 







meaning in nature, or simply an ordinary kitchen garden full of clucking flowers & creaking 
rain” (“Teaching at Smith College”). 
  While Moore, on the other hand, had dropped from the original list for that last day, that 
isn’t to say that Plath had removed her from the course entirely. In notes for the final paper, Plath 
indicates that students would have their “choice of one of three poets we won’t have time to 
discuss in class” and Moore is indeed among them105 (“Teaching at Smith College”). And Moore 
and Sitwell indeed serve, as Plath’s teaching notes indicate, as the only women writers in the 
course.106 As Plath headed into the summer, then, her “poetic godmothers” were both a clear 
presence on her radar. However, while Sitwell had served as the “ecclesiastic” sponsor of the 
spring break poems, it was to Moore, the more “well-bred” of her godmothers, we could say—
Sitwell, with her “eccentric grotesqueries,” standing as “something apart” from the canon—that 
Plath would turn in her bid, that summer, for a “commercial” sponsor of her own.107  
 And not long after the semester ended, Plath had a prime opportunity to gauge how 
willing Moore might be to step into the role. Toward the end of May, Plath and Hughes set off 
for New York to enjoy more of the perks that Hughes’s success had begun to yield. As Plath 
described it to her mother, despite being “very tired” from wrapping up the semester, in their five 
days in the city they “managed an amazing lot of fun”:  
                                               
105 Wallace Stevens and John Crowe Ransom round out the options (“Teaching at Smith College”). 
106 While Plath had originally listed Elizabeth Bishop as a possibility, the journal she wrote describing that last day 
indicates that Plath went to class “[a]rmed with various poems by Ransom, cummings & Sitwell” (Unabridged 
Journals 388).  
107 Indeed, we see Plath perhaps gearing up for such a bid in the same entry in which she had declared that she “no 
longer care[d]” how The Waste Land would “run.” In this entry, Plath reported “appl[ying]” the “impatient tugs” of 
her “free” “Pans & Kevas [ . . . ] toward writing [ . . . ] by reading Marianne Moore, Wallace Stevens, etc.” 









We just caught Ted’s two publishers before they sailed and had a posh pink-table-
clothed dinner with them at the Biltmore. . . . Went to two parties . . . one, a rich 
Fifth Avenue party where we rode up in the elevator with Lionel and Diana 
Trilling. The place was full of publishers, editors and Columbia professors; the 
novelist Ralph Ellison; old Farrar of Farrar, Straus, Cudahy; the editor of the 
Hudson Review, and such like. (Letters Home 339-40)  
And Plath, too, had a chance to do some networking of her own: “We [ . . . ] lunched with our 
editor friend at World Publishing Company, and they are still interested in seeing my poetry 
book as it is early this fall” (340). And while in New York, they stopped off in Brooklyn to see 
Moore. In her letter to her mother, Plath seemed pleased with the visit. However, given that Plath 
had claimed Moore as one of her “poetic godmothers” and that she was in the process of finding 
a home for her book manuscript, as we can see here, the letter, when read within this context, 
appears to register some underlying uncertainties. Based on this letter, Pollak surmises that 
“[p]ossibly [Plath] ignored signs that Moore admired Ted more than herself, and on her return to 
Northampton, she wrote to Moore, asking her to be a recommender for a Saxton grant” (Our 
Emily Dickinsons 162). Yet, revealing perhaps more by what it doesn’t say than by what it does, 
the letter, I would argue, suggests that Plath was only too aware that she was becoming eclipsed 
by Hughes in Moore’s esteem. When Plath sums up the visit for her mother, she conspicuously 
casts herself in the background; Moore, Plath writes, “was lovely at her home in Brooklyn and 
admires Ted very much and served us strawberries, sesame-seed biscuits and milk and talked a 
blue streak” (Letters Home 340). By mentioning that Moore “admires [Hughes] very much” and 
not mentioning Moore’s estimation of herself, Plath could very well be expressing modesty, but 







comparable) admiration to her. The very next sentence, a question for her mother, seems to 
suggest that modesty here wasn’t the key issue: “Can we reserve tickets and take you to see her 
this Sunday?” (340). While a seemingly innocuous request, the question recalls Plath’s initial 
meeting of Moore at the Glascock poetry contest, during which the elder poet had asked after her 
mother. As Plath had written to her mother at the time, “Interestingly enough, [Moore] asked 
about you and said she hopes to meet you some day” (168). Seeming, then, to register her 
shifting position within Moore’s esteem, Plath makes an attempt to follow through with Moore’s 
earlier suggestion, hoping perhaps that forging a connection between her mother and her “poetic 
godmother” might incline Moore to take up the role into which she had cast her.108  
 In a letter to her brother, written the day after the letter to her mother describing the visit 
to Moore, Plath discloses that there had been a change of strategy for funding this new life of 
full-time writing. Originally, the plan had been that Hughes would apply for a Saxton fellowship, 
but because of an unanticipated conflict of interest—Hughes’s “editor at Harper’s” turned out to 
be an “advisor to the trustees” of the award—Plath resolved to apply herself (Unabridged 
Journals 393). Hughes, then, would apply “for a Guggenheim this next year” and in doing so, he 
would be, as Plath perceived him, “trying to rank TS Eliot, WH Auden, Marianne Moore, etc., 
behind him” (393). For her part, Plath simply hoped to secure some funding. With Hughes as the 
applicant, the Saxton had seemed a “sure” thing, Plath indicating to her brother that “Marianne 
Moore, et al., [had] volunteered to write” (Letters Home 343). However, now that Plath was 
applying, and doing so with no book to her credit, their chances were far less certain, and with no 
sponsors volunteering on her own behalf, Plath would need to solicit one. An almost month-long 
gap in her journal between the last day of class and the entry in which she catches up after her 
                                               







return from New York makes it difficult to determine whether Plath knew at the time of her visit 
to Moore that she, rather than Hughes, would be trying for the Saxton. However, in her letter to 
her brother, Plath reveals, at the very least, that sponsorship was very much on her mind not long 
after her return. Justifying her decision to give up the potential of the “well-paid security” that 
teaching offered—a decision that, within the context of midcentury American consumerism, as 
Plath notes, indeed seemed to warrant justification109—she writes,  
I am sure, for example, that Ted has the makings of a great poet, and he already 
has some loyal supporters like Marianne Moore and T. S. Eliot, whom we hope to 
see when we go to England. Ted is better than any poet I can think of ten years his 
senior, and I feel as a wife the best I can do is demand nothing but that we find 
workable schemes whereby we both can write and live lives which are dictated by 
inner needs for creative expansion and experience. (Letters Home 341-2) 
As the wife of “a great poet” in-the-making, Plath at once “demand[s]” a space in the marriage 
for her own writing—“that we find workable schemes whereby we both can write and live”—
and casts her writing in the background. It is Hughes, in other words, who has “loyal supporters.” 
Identifying Moore as a “supporter” of Hughes, but saying nothing of the modernist’s opinion of 
her own work, Plath suggests, as she had in her letter to her mother, that she had indeed come 
away from the visit hopeful, perhaps, but with no definite sense of what the tenor of Moore’s 
recommendation might be, should she agree to provide one.  
                                               
109 As Plath writes in that same letter to her brother, recalling her first semester at Smith as she and Hughes were 
settling into Northampton, “There is something suspect, especially in America, about people who don’t have ten-
year plans for a career or at least a regular job. We found this out when trying to establish credit at a local general 
store. We fitted, amusingly enough, into none of the form categories of ‘The Young American Couple’: I had a job, 
Ted didn’t; we owned no car, were buying no furniture on the installment plan, had no TV, had no charge accounts, 







 That July, what Plath refers to as the “ambigu[ity]” of Moore’s reply to her request for 
sponsorship perhaps muddied the waters more than it cleared them. Although Moore had 
responded in the affirmative, for Plath the letter read in some ways more in terms of rejection 
than acceptance: “Marianne Moore sent a queerly ambiguous spiteful letter in answer to my 
poems & request that she be a reference for my Saxton. So spiteful it is hard to believe it: 
comments of absolutely no clear meaning or help, resonant only with great unpleasantness” 
(Unabridged Journals 406). Combing through the letter for clues as to what had triggered this 
“ambiguous spiteful[ness],” Plath settled on Moore’s “remarks about ‘typing being a bugbear’” 
(406). Plath had sent Moore copies rather than originals, and Moore had returned them: “I cannot 
believe she got so tart & acidy simply because I sent her carbon copies (‘clear’, she remarks). 
This, I realize, must be my great & stupid error—sending carbon copies to the American Lady of 
Letters” (406). As Pollak writes,  
The whole interaction was complicated [ . . . ] by the fact that, while Plath was 
waiting for a response, someone—either Plath or Hughes or Plath acting for 
Hughes—had sent Moore an original, not a carbon, of Hughes’s poem “Pike.” In 
her praise of the poem, Moore referred to the “largess of a first copy,” so Plath’s 
reading has at least this much to be said for it. Moore compares valuable clear 
carbons, valuable, that is, to the sender, to the generosity of an original, an 
original valuable to both sender and receiver. Moore wrote that “[t]yping is a 
bugbear and clear copies, valuable, so here are the pages you scrupled to supply 
me.” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 104) 
For Pollak, Moore’s use of “‘[s]crupled’ seems to mean ‘troubled,’ as in ‘you took the trouble’” 







in the standard usage of its verb form, meaning “to hesitate or be reluctant (to do something), 
esp. on conscientious grounds, or out of regard for what is fit and proper” (“scruple, v.”). Moore, 
then, in her comment about the copies that “[Plath had] scrupled to supply [her],” would seem, in 
this sense, to be calling attention to propriety, implying that the proper protocol in such a 
situation would be to send originals, not copies, and that to have sent copies would have required 
some hesitation—“out of regard for what is fit and proper”—on Plath’s part. While Moore does 
affirm the value of “clear copies,” even as she points to their impropriety, Plath’s interpretation 
of the comment does not appear, then, wholly unfounded.  
And yet, Moore’s comments suggest that there was something else (or, perhaps, 
something more) underlying the ambiguity. Moore had agreed to serve as a reference, but her 
“yes” proved hardly an all-embracing endorsement of Plath’s work; it was a “yes” laden with 
qualifications, cautioning Plath to rethink the direction her work was taking: “Now, let me say 
you may give my name at need (henceforth); but Sylvia, don’t be quite so grisly” (qtd. in Pollak 
164). As Pollak observes, “[Plath’s] focus on Moore’s concern with propriety—the carbon 
copies rather than the originals—deflects the more obvious criticism of her choice of subject 
matter” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 104). And yet, Plath’s focus on propriety isn’t entirely off the 
mark; in fact, it seems that it was just Moore’s sense of propriety that Plath had piqued by her 
choice of subject matter. And when Plath notes that Moore’s comments communicated “no clear 
meaning or help,” that they communicated, in effect, “great unpleasantness,” she comes closer 
still. Moore’s comments indeed appear focused on what she perceived as the “great 
unpleasantness” of Plath’s work. In response to what Plath refers to in her journal as her 







Journals 406).110 When Moore’s attention then turns to “Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor,” she 
begins by praising its “verisimilitude,” “especially that thin sluggish thread as the tide recedes”; 
however, in the very next sentence, without transition, she effectively rescinds this praise by 
repurposing Plath’s verisimilitude as evidence of unpleasantness: “There again, you are just too 
unrelenting.” Perhaps this last bit of criticism stung the worst. Plath had composed “Mussel 
Hunter” sometime before the beginning of June, 1958 (Letters Home 344), around the time of 
her visit to Moore, and she had written it, if not in homage to Moore, than certainly as an 
exercise in Moore’s syllabics and perhaps, in part, as an effort to garner her favor. Writing to her 
brother, in the same letter in which she had listed Moore, along with Eliot, as “loyal supporters” 
of Hughes, Plath describes having composed the poem as “a pattern varying the number of 
syllables in each line [ . . . ] as M. Moore does it” (344).111   
 While in her journal Plath records Moore’s comments on “November Graveyard” and 
“Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor,” she skips over Moore’s specific criticism of her poem “Sow.” 
However, by quoting Moore’s overall advice not to be “quite so grisly”—considering that 
Moore’s “grisly” is in fact a quotation from “Sow,” in which Plath describes a wild “[b]oar” as 
“grisly-bristled”—Plath indeed underscores the overall bent of Moore’s objections. 
“Accomplished as the sow is,” Moore writes, “as it gathers ninnies, knotweed, smirch and 
                                               
110 Pollak writes that the “graveyard” poem that Moore refers to here is “Moonrise” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 103). 
However, Plath’s journals indicate that she didn’t begin composing “Moonrise” until July 19th, almost a week after 
Moore composed and dated her response to the poems Plath had sent her (Unabridged Journals 409). (Moore’s 
response is dated the 13th and 14th of July.) It seems that Plath sent Moore her earlier poem “November Graveyard,” 
which includes a reference, unlike “Moonrise,” to the flies that Moore bats away in her criticism. Also, “November 
Graveyard” had been accepted for publication in February, which makes it a likely candidate for inclusion (338).   
111 As Plath explained to her brother, the poem “is written in what’s know as ‘syllabic verse,’ measuring lines not by 
heavy and light stresses, but by the number of syllables, which here is 7. I find this form satisfactorily strict (a 
pattern varying the number of syllables in each line can be set up, as M. Moore does it) and yet it has a speaking 
illusion of freedom (which the measured stress doesn’t have) as stresses vary freely” (Letters Home 344). Moore’s 
syllabics indeed seem to have helped Plath to loosen the tight meter and rhyme patterns that characterize a good 
portion of the poems that would later comprise The Colossus, as evidenced perhaps by the New Yorker’s acceptance 







kitchen slops, I am glad that we are not on a boat” (qtd. in Pollak, “Moore, Plath, Hughes” 105). 
Moore’s comment here indicates, as Pollak puts it, that “Plath’s ‘Sow’ [had] violated [her] sense 
of decorum” (104). Indeed, “Sow” generates much of its meaning from how it deploys such 
“distasteful” or “disgusting” details (as Moore’s “grisly” renders them),112 to ruffle the feathers 
of just this sense of decorum. “Sow,” in other words, doesn’t simply revel in the earthy, the 
bodily, in what Stallybrass and White might call the “low”; it does so, in part, as a way of 
countering what we might call, then, the “high,” that which must expel the “low” to secure itself 
as “conventional” and “respectable,” that must, in other words, keep the “low” in check with its 
“norms of etiquette and decency.” It is in this sense that “Sow”—using the “low” to underscore 
the artificiality of the “high”—reads as a precursor to the interrogations of the “well-bred” that 
we find in “The Disquieting Muses.”  
Written almost a year before “The Disquieting Muses,” Plath’s barnyard poem, like the 
representative of her spring break poems, situates the “low” in contrast to the storybook or fairy 
tale, as Sitwell, in her fairy tale, as we have seen, positions the grotesque as a counter to the 
“bucolic” and “rococo.”113 In the poem, the speaker, along with her companion, “tour[s]” a 
neighbor’s farm to get her eyes on “[h]is great sow,” a “tour” Plath will both recall and recast in 
her later sendup of Moore in the Ariel-era “The Tour,” as we will see (Collected Poems 60). In 
an effort to fully convey the enormity that is the farmer’s sow, the speaker begins by contrasting 
it with the neutralized, cleaned-up “piggyness” offered to children, a version of the “animal” not 
unlike the one the mother will offer her children in her story of the “heroic” bear in “The 
Disquieting Muses”: “This was no rose-and-larkspurred china suckling / With a penny slot / For 
                                               
112 Merriam-Webster defines “grisly” as “inspiring horror or intense fear” and, alternatively, as “inspiring distaste or 
disgust” (“grisly, adj.”).  
113 The first mention that Plath makes of “Sow” in her journal is in an entry dated July 17, 1957 (Unabridged 







thrifty children” (60). This pigness, sanitized of the “low,” is soon contrasted with “one of [the 
farmer’s] common barnyard sows” by way of what we might call, borrowing from Plath’s 
description of Sitwell’s “early world,” the poem’s “incarnate animal imagery,” the very imagery 
that had prompted Moore to declare herself grateful she wasn’t on a boat. This “common” sow 
stood 
  Mire-smirched, blowzy 
 
  Maunching thistle and knotweed on her snout-cruise— 
  Bloat tun of milk 
  On the move, hedged by a litter of feat-foot ninnies 
 
  Shrilling her hulk 
  To halt for a swig at the pink teats. (61) 
  As “incarnate” and “animal” as this “common” sow appears, she nonetheless pales in 
comparison to the farmer’s “great sow,” that “great grandam” the speaker spies napping “belly-
bedded on [ . . . ] black compost” (61). Indeed, this was no common sow: “This [was a] vast / 
Brobdingnag bulk / [o]f a sow” whose “[f]at-rutted eyes” the speaker interprets as “[d]ream-
filled” (61). Imagining the sow imagining, the speaker fantasizes the kind of dream that could 
befit such a “grandam,” who, unlike the “common” sow with her “ninnies,” is “old enough to be 
a great-grandmother” and “whose opportunities for satisfactory sex,” as Pollak puts it, “are 
unfortunately diminished” (163): 








Thus wholly engross 
The great grandam!—our marvel blazoned a knight, 
Helmed, in cuirass, 
 
Unhorsed and shredded in the grove of combat 
By a grisly-bristled  
Boar, fabulous enough to straddle that sow’s heat. (Collected Poems 61) 
This passage, then, which serves in key ways as the core of the poem, does not focus so much on 
the sow, per se, as on the speaker fantasizing about the sow’s sexual fantasies. In fact, the entire 
poem is framed in terms of sexual fantasy. It begins with the speaker’s exclamation, “God knows 
how our neighbor managed to breed / [h]is great sow,” a comment that initiates the line of 
thinking that will then culminate in the speaker’s imagining of the sow’s “dream” (60). And this 
line of thinking, this question, drives the poem forward because “[w]hatever [the farmer’s] 
shrewd secret, he kept it hid” and did so “[i]n the same way / [h]e kept the sow—impounded 
from public stare, / [p]rize ribbon and pig show” (60). Framed as the poem is in terms of sexual 
fantasy, then, the farmer’s hidden secret of how the sow was bred, and his keeping secret of the 
sow herself, “impounded from public stare,” resonates, in effect, as the suppression of the sexual 
and its displacement, as it is in The Sleeping Beauty, onto the “animal.”  
 For Bakhtin, as we’ve seen, the earthy and the bodily is the province of “grotesque 
realism,” that “aesthetic concept” informed by “the material bodily principle, that is, images of 
the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and sexual life” (18). In effect, the “common 
barnyard sow,” with her appetite, her “mire-smirche[s]” and nursing “ninnies,” embodies such a 







that informs the grotesque into the realm of the grotesque itself, in which “all that is bodily 
becomes grandiose, exaggerated, immeasurable” (19). It is the grandam, rather than the common 
sow, after all, whose legendary bulk (and the question of how one goes about breeding such 
legendary bulk) draws the speaker, along with her companion, to the barnyard. And this bulk is 
indeed of such proportions that the speaker must exceed the strictly “natural” and “bodily” to 
convey it. The grandam was no ordinary sow, in other words, and the speaker conveys as much 
by in effect transposing her, with her “Brobdingnag bulk,” into the world of fantasy, into the 
literary, Plath’s evocation of Swift’s land of the giants from Gulliver’s Travels underscoring the 
subtly satiric undertones of the poem, the pleasure the poem takes, that is, in prodding decorous 
sensibilities.114 And in the sow’s “dream,” the poem takes aim, specifically, at conventional 
notions of romance, rooted, indeed, in the literary. At first, the speaker seems to be envisioning 
for the sow a dream of no less than a knight in shining armor: “our marvel blazoned a knight / 
[h]elmed, in cuirass” (61). And yet already, the expectations of romance evoked by the knight, as 
well as the expectations of gender evoked by the nod here to the Petrarchan blazon, are unsettled; 
the sow is the author rather than object of this blazon.115 And with a stanza break, the knight—
and all the conventions of courtly love that he embodies—is unseated, not only “[u]nhorsed” but 
“shredded in the grove of combat,” not by a fearsome and worthy enemy (an expectation set up 
by Plath’s use of “combat”) but “[b]y a grisly-bristled boar.” In positioning the wildness of the 
boar (a wildness itself positioned in stark contrast to the domestication of the “common barnyard 
sows”) against the fairy-tale decorum of the knight, or, more specifically, by unseating this 
                                               
114 For Bakhtin, satire has its roots in, but is a fall from, the culture of folk humor from which the grotesque arose 
(12).  
115 The primary meaning for “blazon” here would be “[t]o depict or paint (armorial bearings) according to the rules 








decorum by the boar’s wildness, Plath effectively enacts the degradation—the bringing low—of 
chivalric romance. Bakhtin defines degradation, which he identifies as “[t]he essential principle 
of grotesque realism,” as “the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer 
to the material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity” (20). “Not only 
parody in its narrow sense,” Bakhtin writes, “but all the other forms of grotesque realism 
degrade, bring down to earth, turn their subject into flesh” (20). And indeed, the knight here 
(including the courtly ideals that attend him) is both lowered, knocked from his horse to the 
earth, and, as “shredded,” turned to flesh.  
 And yet, the “grisly-bristled” wildness of the boar, with which the fantasy and romance 
of the knight is degraded, is itself a fantasy, imagined by the speaker as “fabulous enough to 
straddle that sow’s heat” (Collected Poems 61, my emphasis). And “with a jocular fist thwacked 
[on her] barrel nape,” the sow awakens, disrupting the speaker’s “chivalric” fantasy as the pig 
heaves into flesh:  
[ . . . ] the green-copse-castled 
 
Pig hove, letting legend like dried mud drop,  
Slowly, grunt 
On grunt, up in the flickering light to shape 
 
A monument 
Prodigious in gluttonies[.] (61)  
With the romantic duly degraded, the sow—as those “cultural contents” repressed (“impounded 







becomes, in the “flickering light” of the farmer’s lantern, no less than “[a] monument” to the 
grotesque. “Prodigious in gluttonies”—all appetite—the sow, exaggerated as such, indeed 
“concern[s] [her]self” (or rather, the speaker, in describing the sow, concerns herself) “with the 
lower stratum of the body,” as Bakhtin writes of degradation, with, in this case “the life of the 
belly” (Bakhtin 21).  
As we have seen, the grotesque body, as Bakhtin describes it, becomes “cosmic,” a 
“represent[ation of] the entire material bodily world in all its elements,” “an incarnation of this 
world at the absolute lower stratum, as the swallowing up and generating principle” (27). The 
sow, then, as a monument to the grotesque, stands “[p]rodigious in gluttonies as that hog whose 
want / [m]ade lean Lent // [o]f kitchen slops, stomaching no constraint” so that by the end of the 
poem she has indeed achieved “cosmic” proportions, becoming in effect a legend herself, as 
“[p]rodigious” as “that hog” that “[p]roceeded to swill / [t]he seven troughed seas and every 
earthquaking continent” (Collected Poems 61). 
 And in the two other poems that Plath sent Moore, and in Moore’s comments on these 
poems, we can see, too, the grotesque at work, particularly in its function as degradation. In 
“November Graveyard,” the “grandiloquent” trappings with which a “starving mind” would try 
to shield itself from the starkness of death, attempting to turn graveyard trees into “elegiac 
dryads” or to set “ghosts [ . . . ] howling in their shrouds across the moor,” are undercut, brought 
low by the sheer materiality of death (56). Against such attempts, “[t]he scene [of this autumn 
graveyard] stands stubborn”; lowered to the earth and the body, such abstract conceptions of 
death become flesh: “Here’s honest rot / [t]o unpick the heart, pare bone / [f]ree of the fictive 
vein” (56). And the flies that Moore bats away in her criticism here turn witness to such 







no resurrections in the sun” (56).116 In “Mussel Hunter at Rock Harber,” the natural world, too, 
stands stark, resistant to the speaker’s attempts to peer into this “otherworld” of mussels and 
crabs, to translate its curiosities into human terms (96). The speaker, as she tells us, “[stands] 
shut out,”  
Puzzling the passage of [the crabs’] 
Absolutely alien 
Order as I might puzzle 
At the clear tail of Halley’s  
 
Comet coolly giving my  
Orbit the go-by, made known 
By a family name it  
Knew nothing of. (96-7) 
This scene, too, stands stubborn, we might say, bucking any romanticisms; the beach here is all 
earth and body, all “[m]ud stench, shell guts, gulls’ leavings” (95). And the “husk of a fiddler-
crab” that the speaker finds and imagines as “[a] samurai death mask done / [o]n a tiger’s tooth, 
less for / [a]rt’s sake than God’s” arrives at this state naturally, “by much sun and wind,” its 
“green color / [a]nd innards bleached and blown off” (97). And yet, the stark materiality of the 
natural world, rendered here by Plath in the bodily and earthy detail characteristic of grotesque 
realism, is mitigated, as it is in “Sow,” by humor and a certain playfulness.117 And Plath 
                                               
116 “November Graveyard,” along with Hughes’s “Pennines in April,” had been accepted for publication by 
Mademoiselle before Plath sent the poem to Moore. In her journal, Plath considered the two poems as companion 
pieces, describing them as encompassing “spring & winter on the moors, birth & death, or, rather, reversing the 
order, death & resurrection” (Unabridged Journals 388). By the time Plath composes Ariel, as we will see, she will 
no longer need Hughes to balance out her vision of death and rebirth.  
117 We see such humor, for example, in these lines immediately following the Halley’s comet passage, lines which 







ultimately places the emphasis of the poem, as she does in both “November Graveyard” and 
“Sow,” on the power of the mind—however undercut, rendered artificial and critiqued its 
attempts might become once subjected to the grotesque, to its degradations—to render the 
world’s materialities palatable, to make meaning of them.118   
 Yet, for Moore, the poems were simply too “grisly.”119 Hughes’s “Pike,” however—with 
its two six-pound pike “[h]igh and dry and dead in the willow-herb— / [o]ne jammed past its 
gills down the other’s gullet” (Collected Poems 85)—hadn’t elicited such censure. Now one of 
Hughes’s most famous poems—one that he would first collect in Lupercal, the release of which, 
as the British Library puts it, “sealed his reputation as a major poet,” a claim Alvarez’s response 
to the volume, as we have seen, would certainly support—“Pike” is unquestionably a striking 
achievement (“‘Pike’ by Ted Hughes”). And Moore’s response to the poem, added toward the 
bottom of her letter to Plath and dated a day later, indicates as much: “I had not mailed the 
enclosed when the PIKE and accompanying letter came. ‘Jungled in weed’ is most accurate, ‘the 
black leaves’ and ‘suddenly there were two.’ The piece has tone. I feel the largess of a first 
                                               
  [ . . . ] So the crabs 
  Went about their business, which  
Wasn’t fiddling, and I filled 
A big handkerchief with blue 
 
Mussels. From what the crabs saw, 
If they could see, I was one  
Two-legged mussel-picker. (97) 
118 As bleak as “November Graveyard” is, it ends with the speaker’s directive to the reader to “stare, stare” “[a]t the 
essential landscape [ . . . ] [t]il your eyes foist a vision dazzling on the wind” (56). And it is this power of “the 
starving mind,” capable of conjuring dryads or howling ghosts, that in the poem’s final line “[p]eoples the bare 
room, the blank, untenanted air” (56). And in the final lines of “Mussel Hunter,” the speaker imagines the “husk of 
[the] fiddler-crab” as a “relic”; and as such, the crab is able to “save face”—in comparison to its fellow crabs dead in 
the sea, “their soggy / [b]ellies pallid and upturned” as they “[p]erform their shambling waltzes”—“to face the bald-
faced sun” (97).  
119 Not all readers were of the same opinion as Moore about these poems. At least two of the three had been 
accepted for publication by the time Plath sent them to Moore, and the third, at the latest, shortly thereafter. As we 
have seen, Mademoiselle had accepted “November Graveyard” in February. In April, PEN had taken “Sow,” along 
with Hughes’s “Thrushes,” and in late June, The New Yorker—Plath’s holy grail of publications—had written to 








copy—won’t engross it” (Pollak, “Moore, Plath, Hughes” 105). While Plath doesn’t explicitly 
mention Moore’s response to “Pike” in her journal, her focus on Moore’s comments about typing 
and carbon copies registers, it would seem, the contrast Pollak points out between the “clear 
copies” that Plath had “scrupled to supply” of her poems and “the largess of a first copy” of 
“Pike.” That Moore describes the copy of “Pike” as a “first copy” rather than an original would 
seem to suggest, too, that Moore wasn’t simply expressing gratitude for a non-carbon copy, but 
was indicating the value she felt a “first copy” of “Pike,” in particular, might hold—given the 
extent of Hughes’s accomplishment in the poem—a value that would indeed render the provision 
of a “first copy” of the poem a “largess.”  
While Plath was certainly unable to find any “clear meaning or help” in Moore’s 
comments on her own poems, thrown off as she was by the “ambigu[ity]” of a letter that would 
accept her request for sponsorship and at the same time give her poems what likely felt like a 
rather rigorous going-over, the gap between Moore’s criticism of her work—in the case of 
“November Graveyard,” not simply criticism but what amounts to dismissal: “I only brush away 
the flies”—and Moore’s unqualified praise of “Pike” could not have failed to impress itself upon 
her. Moore, though, had tried to soften the edges of her critique. Closing the letter with “Yours 
warmly,” she added an empathetic apology: “sorry to have made you wait and wait. (I know 
what it’s like to need something and never hear because the callous idler idles.) Only my idling 
was an abscess and mounds and mounds upon letters.”120 And beneath her post-scripted 
comments on “Pike,” she added by hand a commiserating “I hope you will not have too many 
hardships, depressing when one is qualified” (Pollak, “Moore, Plath, Hughes” 105). 
                                               
120 As Moore indicates at the beginning of the letter, she had left for Boston before she could reply to Plath’s request 







 Whereas in her letter, Moore, with her “ambigu[ity],” registers a certain ambivalence 
about serving as a reference for Plath—an ambivalence that recalls her Smith-era 
recommendation, as we have seen, that Plath be awarded the Glascock prize but not be awarded 
it alone—Plath herself, it would seem, wasn’t without her own reservations. While “Sow” had 
already been published by the time she sent it to Moore, making it a strong candidate for 
inclusion in her bid for sponsorship, it was at the same time—given what Plath knew about 
Hughes’s exchanges with Moore over the publication of Hawk—a rather risky choice. As Plath 
had written at the time to Lynne Lawner, who, as Pollak reminds us, had also been an entrant in 
the Glascock contest, “Dear familiar Marianne Moore [ . . . ] objected to 3 ‘bawdy’ poems which 
weren’t really” (qtd. in Pollak 100). According to Pollak, “In judging The Hawk in the Rain, 
Moore wrote that ‘[t]he work has focus, is aglow with feeling, with conscience; sensibility is 
awake, embodied in appropriate diction’” (qtd. in Pollak 100). However, despite this overall 
praise,“[Moore had] wanted Hughes to eliminate three of the 40 or so poems altogether” 
(100).121 As Bate writes, drawing from Hughes’s notes on Hawk, “Moore had considered them 
‘too lewd’” (135). That Plath uses “bawdy” to describe the poems Moore took issue with 
suggests that she had in mind, in particular, Hughes’s “Bawdry Embraced,” a poem that indeed 
made Moore’s “no” list. And in just the first four lines, this poem indeed goes a long way toward 
living up to the “bawdry” in its title: 
Great farmy whores, breasts bouncy more 
Like buttocks, and with buttocks like 
                                               
121 As Pollak writes, “Ted first refused to withdraw the poems, then thought better of it and capitulated to Moore’s 
demand. Consequently, The Hawk in the Rain was published by Harper in the US and by Faber in England without 
‘The Little Boys and the Seasons,’ ‘The Drowned Woman,’ or ‘Bawdry Embraced’” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 100). 
Hughes, however, managed to incorporate (rather pointedly, it would seem) at least one of the poems into the 
reading arranged by “The Poetry Centre and Harpers” to celebrate the release of Hawk (Hughes, Letters 111). As 
Hughes wrote at the time to his friend, Daniel Huws, “I was swamped by dowagers [after the reading] who wanted 







Two white sows jammed in a sty door,  
Are no dunghills for bawdry’s cock. (Collected Poems 13) 
What’s striking about these lines, for our purposes, is the degree to which they resonate with 
Plath’s “Sow.” Plath’s farm poem about a sow, a poem, as we have seen, framed in terms of 
sexual fantasy, seems, in effect, to recast the beginning of “Bawdry Embraced,” in particular 
Hughes’s “farmy whores,” “sows” and “sty door,”122 embedded as they are within a poem about 
“[b]awdry.” And by imagining a boar “fabulous enough to straddle [a great] sow’s heat,” Plath 
indeed accomplishes a “bawdiness” comparable to that of Hughes’s “dunghills for bawdry’s 
cock.” That Plath would send Moore a poem calculated as “Sow” is, not unlike “Bawdry 
Embraced,” to ruffle the feathers of decorum and to do so by way of the grotesque123—and that 
she did so knowing Moore’s objections to Hughes’s “‘bawdy’ poems which weren’t really”—
suggests that, at least on some level, she herself harbored a degree of ambivalence about the 
terms such a sponsorship might carry. At the very least, given that “Sow,” with its grotesqueries 
and degradations, in fact triggered Moore, making her, in effect, nauseated (“glad” not to have 
been “on a boat”), and given the degree to which Plath, in her journal, registered Moore’s letter 
as a concern with propriety, Plath surely left the exchange having aligned Moore rather 
decisively with decorum, with what reads in “The Disquieting Muses” as the “well-bred,” itself 
aligned, as we have seen, with the role of  “poetess.”  
 While knowing that all of the poems that Moore had criticized had been accepted for 
publication must have provided some solace—especially “Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor,” 
Plath’s experiments with Moore’s syllabics having been rewarded by her first and long-tried-for 
                                               
122 In “Sow,” it is through a “sunk sty door” that the speaker and her companion encounter the “great grandam” 
(Collected Poems 60).   
123 Hughes’s poem not only embraces the “bawdy,” but also, with its “vomitorial gluttony,” the grotesque (Collected 







publication in The New Yorker124—Moore’s “ambigu[ity]” had indeed shaken her. Two days 
later, Plath took to her journal to take stock of her life: 
Paralysis still with me. [ . . . ] Suddenly my life which always had clearly defined 
immediate & long-range objectives—a Smith scholarship, a Smith degree, a won 
poetry or story contest, a Fulbright, a Europe trip, a lover, a husband—has, or 
appears to have none. I dimly would like to write (or is it to have written?) a 
novel, short stories, a book of poems. And fearfully, dimly, would like to have a 
child: a bloodily breached twenty-year plan of purpose. Lines occur to me & stop 
dead: “The tiger lily’s spotted throat.” And then it is an echo of Eliot’s “The tiger 
in the tiger pit,” to the syllable & the consonance. (408-9) 
Paralysis here—while triggered, it would seem, by Moore’s letter—is entangled, as it had been 
while she was teaching, with Eliot. Just as she had found herself, while preparing to teach The 
Waste Land, “unable to invent, to create,” likening the experience of feeling caught between the 
world of teaching and the world of writing to the “death-in-life” in Eliot’s work, here she 
associates Eliot’s influence again with “death,” describing lines that “echo” Eliot as “stop[ped] 
dead.” And whereas Plath’s Sitwell-inflected spring break poems had helped to shift her, as we 
have seen, from the “death-in-life” of the in-between toward her new life of full-time writing—
the poems, in effect, serving as her lifeline to this new “world”—she would again, almost a year 
later, turn to her “poetic godmothers” to help chart for her poetry a way forward.  
                                               
124 On June 25th, Plath records her excitement: “The black thick print of Howard Moss’s letter banged in my brain. I 
saw ‘MUSSEL-HUNTER AT ROCK HARBOR seems to me a marvelous poems & I’m happy to say we’re taking it 
for the New Yorker . . . ’—at this realization of ten years of hopeful wishful waits (& subsequent rejections) I ran 
yipping upstairs to Ted & jumping about like a Mexican bean. It was only moments later, calming a little, that I 








 By the following February, Plath had set a plan into motion for her first book. She was 
giving the Yale Prize another shot, and if that didn’t pan out, she would make the rounds to the 
publishers. As she told Lynne Lawner in a letter that March, Dudley Fitts would be replacing 
Auden as the editor of the prize that year, and while on one hand this switch might be considered 
a “fall,” on the other it might well work out in her favor, since “Auden never liked what I wrote” 
(“Nine Letters” 45). However, the prospect of not winning the prize (or any prize) dogged her:  
I hate the idea of trying to publish a book of poems without having got some sort 
of excuse for it which will get it reviewed. It is bad enough to go through the 
trauma of selecting and rejecting (I have done an immense amount of the latter, 
and have a ghost-book larger, and more-published than my present slim volume) 
without thinking nobody will even notice it: better scathing reviews than a dead 
silence. (45)  
About two weeks earlier, Plath had sent off her manuscript, and as she indicates here, it was the 
product of a good deal of pruning.125 Much of her older work, she felt, no longer cut it, and even 
her newer work seemed in need of bolstering. As she wrote in her journal shortly before 
submitting the manuscript, “I feel I should add a couple of powerful poems [ . . . ] and this 
paralyzes me” (470). In the same entry, she rooted around in search of what it might take to 
produce such “powerful” work: “What inner decision, what inner murder or prison-break must I 
commit if I want to speak from my true deep voice in writing [ . . . ] and not feel this jam up of 
feeling behind a glass-dam fancy-façade of numb dumb wordage” (469). At this point, Plath and 
Hughes had moved to Boston, and Plath was auditing, along with George Starbuck and Anne 
Sexton, Robert Lowell’s poetry course. She “admire[d]” Lowell “immensely as a poet,” she 
                                               
125 At this point, Plath called the manuscript, which would move through a series of titles, The Bull of Bendylaw 







wrote Lawner that March, and she and Hughes had been “see[ing] a good bit of [him]” (45). And 
at this time, Lowell was indeed the Lowell of Life Studies, which would be released that April 
(Hughes, Letters 139). And perhaps we can detect Lowell, who would criticize Plath’s work that 
spring for its “rhetoric” (Unabridged Journals 475), in both Plath’s search for her “true deep 
voice” as well as her dissatisfaction with her “numb dumb wordage.” Indeed, Plath’s hypothesis 
of a “prison-break” as what it would take to break through her work’s brittle surface prefigures to 
a significant degree the statement Lowell would make in his interview with The Paris Review a 
couple of years later. As we saw in the Chapter 1, Lowell’s diagnosis for contemporary poetry 
was that it had “become a craft, purely a craft”—a state that Plath figures here as a “glass-dam 
fancy-façade”— and the only remedy for such a state was a “breakthrough back into life” (“The 
Art of Poetry”).  
And yet, at the same time, Plath’s prison-break hypothesis predates her time in Lowell’s 
classroom. As we have seen, she had envisioned her spring break poems as helping her to 
“[break] open [her] real experience of life,” “which had been shut up, untouchable, in a rococo 
crystal cage.” And in her letter to Lawner, Plath offers us, in effect, a status update on how her 
regimen of “toughness,” which she had put into practice the previous spring, had been working 
out for her:  
I grind out little very minor poems. I had 3 of a longer sort in the latest, March I 
think, London magazine, which I wrote last Spring after a year’s silence. I am 
leaving the rather florid over-metaphorical style that encrusted me in college. The 
“Feminine” (horrors) lavish coyness. I have done many in syllabic verse which 







bare. The ones in the London magazine are the last of the lyric florid picture-
poems. (46) 
Indeed, London Magazine’s publication of three of her spring break poems—“picture-poems,” 
since they had been commissioned by Art News—provided her with the occasion to assess this 
work with a more critically distanced eye.126 Describing herself as “leaving the rather florid 
over-metaphorical style that [had] encrusted [her] in college,” Plath posits this “leaving” as an 
ongoing process, one in which the spring break poems had played a role—written as they were 
after she had graduated from Smith—and yet, from the vantage point of a year later, that role 
now proved insufficient in and of itself to have accomplished her goal. And this goal hadn’t 
changed. Plath was still working to break through the excessively ornate, hard and brittle 
surface—her “florid over-metaphorical style that [had] encrusted” her work now stepping in for 
her earlier “rococo crystal cage”—behind which her “real” voice, her “real experience of life” 
stood. And this goal, too, remained informed by her regimen of “toughness”—itself informed, it 
would seem, as we saw at the beginning of the chapter, by Alvarez’s praise of Hughes as a 
“[t]ough [y]oung [p]oet” and his dismissal of Sitwell as a “poetess”—Plath here reiterating, with 
“Feminine (horrors) lavish coyness,” her original self-commandment: “No coyness, archaic cutie 
tricks.”  
Plath had planned, that January before spring break, to write “[t]hirty more [poems] in a 
bigger, freer, tougher voice: work on rhythms mostly, for freedom, yet sung” so that she could 
“[b]reak on them in a year with a book of forty or fifty,” and now, a little over a year later, then, 
she was taking stock of where this book, and her work more generally, stood. The spring break 
poems that London Magazine had just published had surely made the cut into The Bull of 
                                               
126 That March, London Magazine published “Snakecharmer,” “Lorelei,” and “The Disquieting Muses” (Steinberg, 







Bendylaw—they would end up, indeed, in The Colossus—and yet while they were strong enough 
to serve as “book” poems, Plath now envisioned them as the end of a line, “the last of the lyric 
florid picture-poems,” at a time when she had dedicated herself to “leaving” her “florid [ . . . ] 
style” behind. As Plath indicates to Lawner, her experiments with syllabics had indeed seemed a 
way forward, a way of achieving the sort of rhythmic “freedom” that she had sought in her 
regimen, a freedom that emboldened her to drop, in effect, her original “yet sung” caveat, that is, 
the “lyric” rhythms she now disparaged as she dismissed her “lyric florid picture-poems.” 
However, while syllabics had indeed offered her a sense of “freedom” and a way of paring down 
her “lyric florid[ity],” she now found her syllabic experiments—including, perhaps, even 
“Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor”—“pretty bare.”  
By effectively rejecting the Sitwell-inflected spring break poems as well as the later 
Moore-inspired syllabic ones, Plath, it would seem, was leaving behind not only the poems 
inspired by her “poetic godmothers,” but also her godmothers themselves. However, as she 
revisited her spring-break poems on the occasion of their publication, she also revisited her 
spring-break canon of women writers, and Moore and Sitwell were still very much present. In 
her letter to Lawner, after assessing Vassar Miller and May Swenson, who had both been among 
the very few women included in The New Poets of England and America—the release of which, 
as we have seen, had inspired Plath’s “toughness” regimen—Plath in effect reframes the very 
question that had sparked her original list. Rather than “[w]ho rivals?” Plath now asks, “Except 
for M. Moore & Elizabeth Bishop what women are there to look to?” (46). At this point, eight 
months after sending her letter, Moore had indeed maintained her status as a “poetic godmother,” 
her presence in Plath’s list here serving as a given. However, in Sitwell’s case, something has 







Edith Sitwell, Amy Lowell. And the perennial Emily” (46). Classifying Sitwell separately from 
Moore as an “eccentric,” Plath in effect registers the difference in their canonical status. Sitwell, 
it would seem, had undergone a bit of a demotion. However, it is this “eccentric” status—and the 
“eccentric grotesqueries” with which she earned it—that allows us to trace her continuing role in 
helping to shape Plath’s poetics as it begins shifting further ahead toward Ariel. As Plath 
indicates to Lawner, with the spring-break poems and the “bare” syllabics out, she was now 
writing poems that were “grim, antipoetic [ . . . ] & I hope, transitional” (45).127 And in this 
moment of transition, the principle that seemed to be moving her poetry forward was “ugliness”: 
“The poems I have written in this last year”—poems that included “The Disquieting Muses” as 
well as “Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor”128—“are, if anything, ugly” (46). Here, Plath seems, 
too, to be recalling and, indeed, slightly recasting her regimen of “toughness.” In his review of 
The Hawk in the Rain, in which he had lauded Hughes for his “toughness,” Alvarez had 
described Hughes as “mak[ing] use [ . . . ] of the same occasionally belligerent ugliness” as 
Thom Gunn (12). By now embracing “ugliness,” at a time when she was indeed recalling her 
spring break poems and the regimen that had helped to inspire them, Plath effectively integrates 
Sitwell into this regimen that had been based, in part, on Alvarez’s dismissal of her. Indeed what 
“The Disquieting Muses” and “Mussel Hunter,” these two “ugly” poems, have in common—
regardless of whether they are “lyrical” and “florid” or “syllabic” and “bare”—is the grotesque. 
What’s more, the most recently written of the three poems that Plath chose to enclose in her 
                                               
127 Plath had last published poems in Poetry in 1957. In January of 1957, she had published six, including what we 
might call the “florid” poems, “Wreath for a Bridal” and “Epitaph for Fire and Flower.” Later that July, Poetry had 
published four more. While one wouldn’t readily describe “Sow,” with its grotesqueries, as “florid,” Poetry also 
published, for example, “On the Difficulty of Conjuring Dryads,” the title itself suggestive of its “floridity” 
(Steinberg, “A celebration this is”). 
128 It is here, as examples of her “ugly” poems, that Plath writes, “I have done many in syllabic verse which gives 
freedom of another sort & excited me for a good while, but they are pretty bare. The ones in the London magazine 







letter to Lawner, a poem recent enough—as well as “grim” and “antipoetic” enough—to 
represent the poems she was “now writing,” poems she “hope[d]” were “transitional,” has the 
grotesque at its core (47). In the first few lines of “Suicide off Egg Rock,” written, as Plath puts 
it, “this spring (winter, rather),” we are introduced to the man who will, by the end of the poem, 
“[walk] into the water” (Collected Poems 115). And in these first few lines, we learn that his 
“madness,” a common motif of the grotesque, according to Bakhtin (39), is indeed structured by 
its logic. Rather than feeling detached from the world, the man feels all too connected to it, his 
body, in effect, so “blended with the world,” “with its objects” (Bakhtin 27), that the beach, 
where “hotdogs split and drizzled / [o]n the public grills, and the ochreous salt flats, / [g]as tanks, 
factory stacks” become “that landscape / [o]f imperfections his bowels were part of” (Collected 
Poems 115).  
In her continuing embrace of the grotesque, then, in her continuing embrace, in effect, of 
her “dismal-headed godmothers” and the degradations of the sea, Plath indeed carries Sitwell—
certainly the more conducive of her two “poetic godmothers” to “ugliness”—forward with her in 
her pursuit of a poetics capable of cracking through the ornate surfaces of her work to make a 
breakthrough into “her real experience of life,” experience that midcentury decorum and 
propriety—with which Plath now associated Moore—wished cordoned-off and suppressed. And 
indeed Sitwell’s role here dovetails with the role the confessional will play in helping to shift 
Plath’s poetics toward Ariel. That spring, Lowell’s criticism of Plath’s “rhetoric” was paying off. 
On March 20th, the day after she wrote her letter to Lawner, Plath recorded in her journal, 
“Lowell sets me up with Ann [sic] Sexton, an honor, I suppose. Well, about time. She has some 
very good things, and they get better, though there is a lot of loose stuff” (475). Already we can 







“discipline” that she would place, within a few years’ time, as we saw in Chapter 1, into 
dialectical relation with the “confessional.” While a bit chagrined by the comparison,130 Plath 
nonetheless took it to heart, and as she began to mine her “real experience,” her “personal” 
experience, Sexton served, in effect, as a litmus test for detecting in her work any signs of 
“floridity” and “rhetoric.” In the same journal in which she recorded Lowell’s comparison of 
herself to Sexton, Plath also recorded that she had written “Electra on Azalea Path,” her first 
attempt at addressing the loss of her father when she was nine. A month later, she would revisit 
the poem and reject it (echoing Lowell) as “[t]oo forced and rhetorical.” And it was Sexton to 
whom she looked for help cracking open the rhetoric: “A leaf from Ann Sexton’s book would do 
here. She has none of my clenches and an ease of phrase, and an honesty” (477). And this 
rejection of “Electra on Azalea Path” as “[t]oo forced and rhetorical” would help clear the way 
for one of Plath’s most famous and anthologized poems, “Daddy.”131  
 Also in the same entry, just after exhorting herself to “[p]roduce, produce” and jotting 
down her strategy for funding and awards—“To get the Yale thing would be good. No word 
from Guggenheim. If not Yale this year, Lamont the next”—Plath reported, “Old panic back 
yesterday” (475). Recalling the “paralysis” she had experienced soon after receiving Moore’s 
“ambiguous” response to her request for a Saxton, a paralysis that had spurred her to take stock 
of her life, Plath demanded of herself, “What am I and what am I doing in the world? Write 
another N[ew]Yorker story. Or any story. Look up German concentration, I mean American 
detention camps. Read TS Eliot” (475). As with her previous “paralysis,” her previous effort, 
that is, to take a hard look at her life and work, her line of thinking takes her, eventually, to Eliot. 
                                               
130 While Plath had been at the work of poetry for most of her life, Sexton, as she wrote to Lawner that March, 
“ha[d] the marvelous enviable casualness of the person who is suddenly writing and never thought or dreamed of 
herself as a born writer: no inhibitions” (“Nine Letters” 45).  







And the logic by which she arrives there is well on its way toward becoming, in a few years’ 
time, the logic that will compel her to place her personal experience in relation to the “bigger 
things.” Asking “what [she was] doing in the world,” Plath responds, in effect, with her vocation 
as a writer, and as she continues, the question shifts, then, to what it was that her writing was 
doing in the world. Moving from a “N[ew]Yorker story [, . . . ] [o]r any story” to what might be 
read as possible subject matter for a story intent on making a connection to the world, Plath then 
arrives at Eliot. And the route by which she does so—the subject matter of “German 
concentration” and “American detention” camps serving as the segue from prose to poetry—
effectively identifies Eliot as a writer whose work indeed engages the “bigger things” of the 
world. And Plath’s slippage here between “German concentration, I mean American detention 
camps” not only gestures provocatively toward a similarity in the logic undergirding the two, but 
demonstrates a desire to engage the atrocities of World Ward II—what Alvarez would later call, 
as we have seen, the “public faces” of “the forces of destruction”—a good two years before 
Alvarez would publish the first version of his article.132  
 Already by the spring of 1959, then, key pieces of the puzzle were in place—modernism 
and “confessionalism,” the grotesque and the “bigger things.” That Plath was looking to her 
“poetic godmothers,” and looking to them in part as a way of negotiating Eliot’s legacy, as she 
studied with Lowell and compared herself to Sexton, suggests that she indeed conceived of the 
two projects—the “confessional” and the modernist—as compatible, or, at the very least, not 
entirely antithetical. That spring, then, it would be the “ugli[ness]” of the grotesque that would 
help shift her toward a poetics capable of cracking the surface of her “floridity,” of “breaking 
open [her] real experience of life.” And this cracking open of the surface to gain access to her 
                                               
132 Indeed, Plath’s engagement of the Holocaust in her work goes back even further to “The Thin People,” a poem 







“real experience” would in time open up a space, as we will see in the next chapter and in the 
Conclusion, for exploring the parallel not only between personal experience and the “bigger 
things,” but between the atrocities of World War II and the contemporary realities of the Cold 




Despite whatever reservations she may have had about the terms that Moore’s 
sponsorship might entail, Plath again tried her luck a few years later, in the fall of 1961, asking 
Moore to recommend her, this time, for a Guggenheim. By this point, Plath had at long last 
published her first book, that “long hard book in coming” (“Nine Letters” 49). Her hopes for the 
Yale prize having fallen through—she had missed, Dudley Fitts informed her, “by a whisper” 
(492)—and her subsequent rounds to U.S. publishers having turned up nothing but rejection, 
Plath had succeeded with the first British publisher she had tried, signing a contract with 
Heinemann—who had accepted the manuscript after only a week of review—within the first two 
months of her move to England.133 However, despite the swift acceptance of the volume, its 
reception—without an award to recommend it—was much as she had feared in her spring 1959 
                                               
133 Plath and Hughes moved to England in December of 1959. As Plath wrote to her mother, “the first British 
publisher I sent my new collection of poems to (almost one-third written at Yaddo; 48 poems in all, after countless 
weedings and reweedings) wrote back within the week accepting them!” (Letters Home 366). Plath and Hughes had 
stayed at the artists’ colony, Yaddo, from September 9-November 19, 1959. The Yaddo poems that constituted a 
third of her newly weeded collection, then, were quite new, Plath having written them within one to three months of 
moving to England. At this point, the volume had now acquired its final title, The Colossus, after a poem she indeed 
wrote at Yaddo. Originally, she considered her Yaddo poems as material for a new collection. As she wrote in her 
journal on November 11th, “How it consoles me, the idea of a second book with these new poems: The Manor 
Garden, The Colossus, The Burnt-out Spa, the seven Birthday poems, and perhaps Medallion, if I don’t stick i[t] in 
my present book. If I were accepted by a publisher for the Lamont, I would feel a need to throw all my new poems 
in to bolster the book” (Unabridged Journals 526). As Plath had predicted, then, she did indeed bolster the volume 







letter to Lawner.134 Besides the very notable exception of Alvarez’s review in December of 
1960—Plath and Hughes had met Alvarez in March of 1960, about eight months before 
Heinemann released The Colossus—the volume was greeted, for the most part, with silence.  
And, what’s more, one of the few reviews that the volume did receive “accused Plath of 
imitating established poets, giving John Crowe Ransom and Moore as examples” (Pollak, 
“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 106). The reviewer, it would seem, had detected Plath’s experiments 
with Moore’s syllabics, something that Dudley Fitts, as Plath had surmised upon receiving his 
letter of rejection for the Yale prize, had failed to notice. As she had written in her journal at the 
time, “This morning woke to get a letter in the mail from the estimable Dudley Fitts, which I 
numbly translated to be a kind refusal of “The Bull of Bendylaw,” saying [ . . . ] my lack of 
technical finish (!) was what deterred him, my roughness, indecision, my drift in all but four or 
five poems” (Unabridged Journals 492). For Plath, that she would be accused of a “lack of 
technical finish” was a bitter irony since what she perceived to be “[her] main flaw [was] a 
machinelike syllabic death-blow” (492). “How ironic,” she mused, “that all my work to 
overcome my easy poeticisms merely convinces them that I am rough, antipoetic, unpoetic” 
(492). This must have seemed all the more ironic considering Alvarez’s praise of Hughes’s 
“belligerent ugliness” in his review of The Hawk in the Rain, in the review, that is, underlying 
Plath’s regimen of “toughness” and her embrace of the “ugly” in an effort, indeed, “to overcome 
her easy poeticisms,” to overcome what she had referred to at the time as her “lyric florid[ity],” 
as she had indicated in her letter to Lawner, just after sending off her manuscript to the Yale 
prize. In his review, Alvarez—unlike Fitts, who accused Plath’s work of a “lack of technical 
finish”—indeed credited Hughes’s “belligerent ugliness” with intentionality, writing that this 
                                               







effect “had nothing to do with the lack of technical means” (12). Instead, Alvarez argued, “it is 
part of a deliberate antipoetical toughness and a desire to talk straight” (12). So whereas, for 
Alvarez, the “antipoetic” in Hughes was a matter of praise, for Fitts, the “antipoetic” in Plath was 
a matter of censure, an effect generated not by “deliberate” means but by a “lack” of “technical” 
skill, an interpretation which could be read, through the lens of the “decorum” both expected 
from and maligned in the midcentury “poetess,” as a failure to achieve the “lyrical.” 
Unlike Hughes, who, over the course of 1960, had effectively been ushered into the 
canon under Eliot’s tutelage, as I will discuss more fully in the Conclusion, and who had, in 
addition to Eliot himself, Moore and Alvarez to support his work, Plath, as she wrote in the 
journal in which she registered the loss of the Yale prize, “ha[d] no champions”: “They will find 
a lack of this, or that, or something or other. [ . . . ] How few, if any, will see what I am working 
at, overcoming” (Unabridged Journals 492). It was with no champions, then, no one to 
appreciate, she felt, the direction in which her work was headed that Plath approached Moore in 
the fall of 1961 with a second bid for sponsorship. While she had no champions, however, she 
had received news about six months earlier that Knopf, motivated it would seem by 
Heinemann’s publication of The Colossus, had agreed to produce an American edition. And 
what’s more, the past couple of years had seen a significant transformation in her writing. 
Indeed, the first poem that Plath wrote after “Mushrooms,” the last of the Yaddo poems, was 
“You’re,” the earliest that she would collect in her Ariel manuscript. Indeed, by the time Moore 
wrote what Pollak calls her “letter of disrecommendation” (109), Plath had already written seven 
Ariel poems.135 And as “Barren Woman” demonstrates, Plath had indeed taken important strides 
toward paring down her “lyric florid[ity]” to get at her “real experience”:  
                                               
135 “You’re,” the earliest of the Ariel poems, is dated January/February 1960 (Collected Poems 141). By the time 







 Empty, I echo to the least footfall, 
Museum without statues, grand with pillars, porticoes, rotundas. 
In my courtyard a fountain leaps and sinks back into itself, 
Nun-hearted and blind to the world. Marble lilies 
Exhale their pallor like scent.  
 
I imagine myself with a great public, 
Mother of a white Nike and several bald-eyed Apollos. 
Instead, the dead injure me with their attentions, and nothing can happen.  
The moon lays a hand on my forehead, 
Blank-faced and mum as a nurse. (Collected Poems 157) 
Plath, it would seem, had indeed taken a page from Sexton’s book, and in doing so, placed it 
alongside one of her own.136 Here, she achieves some of the poem’s dramatic effects by 
strategically deploying her previous “clenches,” appropriate here to the museum conceit, 
undercutting them with the kind of “ease of phrase” with which she credited Sexton. Beginning 
                                               
“Tulips,” “The Rival,” and “The Moon and the Yew Tree,” all of which she would include in Ariel. Indeed, during 
this time Plath was writing what are generally considered transitional poems, poems which, I would argue, stem 
from the “transitional” moment in her poetics that Plath had described in March of 1959 to Lynne Lawner. Most of 
these poems would be collected in the posthumous volume Crossing the Water (1971).  
136 Along with Sexton and Lowell, Theodore Roethke also played a significant role in helping to shape Plath’s 
“confessionalism.” Roethke, with the “greenhouse” poems of The Lost Son (1948), for example, rooted in his 
childhood and his relationship with his father, is often classed with the “confessionals”; Pollak, for example, 
includes him in the following list: “Anne Sexton and Plath, W. D. Snodgrass, Theodore Roethke, Robert Lowell, 
Randall Jarrell, and John Berryman—these “confessional’ poets are seen, collectively, as composing a school of 
intimate revealers” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 108). And as she’s beginning to write the earliest of the Ariel poems, 
indeed just a few weeks before she would write “Barren Woman,” Plath told her mother that she had gotten to meet 
Roethke: “Ted and I went to a little party last night to meet the American poet I admire next to Robert Lowell—Ted 
(for Theodore) Roethke. I’ve always wanted to meet him, as I find he is my influence. Ted gave me his collection 
Words for the Wind this Christmas and it’s marvelous. Look it up in the library. I think you would like the 
greenhouse poems at the front very much. He’s a big, blond, Swedish-looking man, much younger-seeming than his 
52 years . . . Ted and I got on well with him and hope to see him again” (407). And at this point, Roethke wasn’t a 
new influence for Plath. Indeed, Knopf refused to publish the full series of Plath’s “Poem for a Birthday” in the 







with the “clenche[d]” line, “Empty, I echo to the least footfall”—a line tightly constructed to 
achieve, indeed, an echo, “echo” and “footfall” effectively spring-loading the line, generating its 
internal tension—and then opening the poem up with the expansive, scene-setting “grand with 
pillars, porticoes, rotundas,” the grandeur effectively collapses by the end of the third line, the 
slightly stilted and “poetic” “echo to the least footfall” ultimately stripped down by the simple 
syntax and diction we find in “a fountain leaps and sinks back into itself,” an image that 
effectively reproduces, in stripped-down form, the spring-loaded effect—the line closing back 
into itself—with which the poem begins. And this stripping down, at one point, occurs across the 
span of a single line, “the dead injure me with their attentions” undercut by the rather 
devastatingly bare “and nothing can happen.” And it is this bare “nothing[ness]” that collapses 
the mythic expansiveness—an expansiveness that will become characteristic of Ariel as a whole 
and that will mark, as we will see in Chapter 3, Plath’s engagements with modernism—of the 
“white Nike and several bald-eyed Apollos” the speaker had “imagine[d] [her]self [ . . . ]  
[m]other[ing].” Indeed, as she had tried for in “Suicide off Egg Rock”—as she had explained to 
Lawner in the letter in which she had identified her current writing as “transitional”—Plath 
achieves here “certain absolutely ‘plain’ lines [ . . . ], pure statement,” lines like “I imagine 
myself with a great public” and “[t]he moon lays a hand on my forehead.”137 And this paring 
down is indeed accompanied here by an exploration of the “personal.” That February, a couple 
of weeks before writing “Barren Woman,” Plath had suffered a miscarriage (Letters Home 408).  
And indeed, just weeks after writing “Barren Woman,” Plath’s exploration of the 
“personal” hit full steam. In March of 1961, it took Plath just six weeks to produce The Bell Jar 
(Middlebrook 127). And by November, around the time that she wrote to Moore for a second 
                                               
137 In the moon, we already see one of the key recurring symbols of Ariel. I will discuss Plath’s use of recurring 







recommendation, Plath had heard that she’d received a Saxton for her autobiographical novel. In 
a letter dated November 20, 1961, Plath, who was now, following her miscarriage, pregnant with 
her second child, eased her mother’s concern that she was “taking on” too much with the grant: 
“Just between the two of us (and don’t tell anyone), I figured nothing was so sure to stop my 
writing as a grant to do a specific project that had to be turned in at the end with quarterly 
reports—so I finished a batch of stuff this last year, tied it up in four parcels and have it ready to 
report on bit by bit as required” (437). “Guggenheims, such as Ted had,” Plath explained, “are 
much easier. They ask for no reports or work; once you get it, you are perfectly free” (437). And 
it had been Moore who had recommended Hughes for his Guggenheim in 1958, and it was to 
Moore that Plath now turned in hopes of her own. However, this time Moore refuses—without 
“ambigu[ity]”—to take on the role into which Plath had cast her. In her letter to Henry Allen 
Moe, Moore writes, “I thought and think her very gifted but feel cold toward this ‘project.’ And 
way of presenting it.”138 In keeping with her earlier criticism of the “grisly” in “Sow,” 
“November Graveyard,” and “Mussel Hunter at Rock Harbor,” two of which—essentially 
against Moore’s implicit advice—Plath had included in the now-released Colossus,139 Moore 
complains that Plath “has been specializing lately in gruesome detail, worms and germs and 
spiritual flatness.” Plath, it would seem, with the “gruesome detail” of her new work, had indeed 
not taken Moore’s advice; she had not stopped being “so grisly,” and by this time, as Pollak 
writes, “Moore was out of patience” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 107). 
Plath’s cover letter to Moore has not survived (107), so it’s impossible to know for sure 
which poems Plath sent to her, which ones Moore had in mind when referring to her “project,” 
                                               
138 This letter is reproduced in facsimile in Pollak’s article (107) and is housed in the Rosenbach Museum and 
Library in Philadelphia.   







the quotation marks Moore places around the word undercutting the claim of Plath’s work to the 
status of a project and at the same time seeming to serve, in this context, a sort of sanitary 
function. And as Moore’s “worms” (the earthy) and “germs” (the bodily) suggest, she was 
indeed, as she had been in her “ambiguous” letter to Plath, responding to Plath’s use of the 
grotesque. Of the poems that Plath was writing around this time that could be said to represent a 
new project—poems written, in other words, after the last to be included in either edition of The 
Colossus—the only one that might be characterized as “wormy” (and this is a stretch) is Plath’s 
“Zoo Keeper’s Wife,” which includes spiders, snails, and eels, for example, but is, as are the 
other poems of this period, at least explicitly worm-free. What the poem is not free of, however, 
is the grotesque, the “ugliness” that Plath was cultivating in her “transitional poems” at the time 
of her letter to Lawner. Imagining the kinds of nightmares that might keep the wife of a zoo 
keeper awake at night, the poem indeed inhabits an “animal” world, “the lower stratum of the 
body, the life of the belly” in which the grotesque is based (Bakhtin 21): “I am lungless and ugly, 
my belly a silk stocking / [w]here the heads and tails of my sisters decompose” (Collected Poems  
154). “Should I stir,” the speaker muses, “I think this pink and purple plastic / [g]uts bag would 
clack like a child’s rattle” (154). As for poems that might be said to involve “germs,” Plath had 
recently written several “hospital” poems: “Face Lift,” “In Plaster” (about a broken leg), 
“Tulips” (based on Plath’s appendectomy that March, and one of the seven Ariel poems Plath 
had written by this point), and “The Surgeon at 2 a.m.” “The Surgeon,” with its opening lines, 
indeed seems a good contender for the object of Moore’s “germ” criticism: “The white light is 
artificial, and hygienic as heaven. / The microbes cannot survive it” (170). Although Moore 







description, I would say, of the strength of Plath’s “Parliament Hill Fields,” a bleak, grieving 
poem about her miscarriage.140  
Indeed what is striking when we look at the poems that Plath is working on around this 
time is that a good number are not about “worms and germs,” but about pregnancy, miscarriage, 
and motherhood. In terms of the poems that Plath was publishing—poems, in other words, that 
would be likely candidates for inclusion in her letter to Moore—twelve might be said to 
represent a new project.141 And of these twelve, nearly half took maternity (including 
miscarriage) as their subject.142 And the only poems of the twelve to make the cut into Plath’s 
manuscript for Ariel are in fact the maternity poems: “Morning Song,” with which she begins the 
collection, “Barren Woman,” “Magi,” and “You’re.”143 And Moore’s comments to Moe suggest 
that she was in fact familiar with the maternal bent of Plath’s new work: “You are not subsidized 
for having a baby especially in view of a world population explosion.” Considering that Moore 
“fe[lt] cold” not only toward Plath’s project, but toward her “way of presenting it,” Pollak 
suspects that Plath had offended Moore by “unwisely assert[ing] the value of her experience as a 
mother in putting herself forward” (“Moore, Plath, Hughes” 107). “It seems,” Pollak writes, “that 
                                               
140 Plath indeed wrote the poem soon after her miscarriage, before she wrote “Barren Woman.” It is dated February 
11, 1961 (Collected Poems 153).  
141 During the period between January and November of 1961, which in proximity to Moore’s letter to Moe we 
might call “recent,” Plath published seventeen poems and of these seventeen, twelve could be said to represent a 
possible new “project,” in other words, did not or were not appearing in either edition of The Colossus or were not 
composed alongside the poems in this first collection. I’m excluding “Private Ground” from possible new project 
poems since, while it was not collected in either edition of The Colossus, it was written during the period Plath was 
composing the poems for her first volume, before she composed her first Ariel poem, “You’re,” and before any of 
the poems included in the “transitional” volume Crossing The Water were written.  
142 Plath published five maternity poems during this period: “You’re,” “Magi,” “Parliament Hill Fields, “Morning 
Song,” and “Barren Woman.”  She composed an additional poem on the theme during this time, “Heavy Women,” 
which was later published in March of 1962 and included in Crossing the Water. “Parliament Hill Fields” is the sole 
published poem on maternity from 1961 that does not appear in Ariel, appearing later in Crossing the Water. 
Interestingly, while Plath includes “Barren Woman” in her manuscript for Ariel, it does not appear in Hughes’ 
version of the collection, nor in the posthumous collections, Crossing the Water or Winter Trees (1971), according 
to the “concordance with published volumes” included with The Collected Poems (1981).   
143 Indeed, considering that Plath had written by this time seven of the poems she would include in Ariel, these four 







Plath unwittingly stepped into a debate that Moore was having with herself about personal and 
social responsibility” (109); “Although The Population Bomb (1968) had not yet been published, 
overpopulation was a concern at the time, and perhaps Moore had been reading Richard Martin 
Fagley’s The Population Explosion and Christian Responsibility (1960), which, in exploring the 
attitude of various religions to birth control, concluded that birth control was indeed compatible 
with Christianity” (107). Indeed, Moore follows up her statement that “[y]ou are not subsidized 
for having a baby” with this further pronouncement: “You should look before you leap and 
examine your world-potentialities of responsibility as a contributory parent” (107). Pollak 
suspects, too, that Moore, in reacting to Plath’s “fe[eling] that,” through motherhood, “she was 
reaching to deeper levels in her ‘real’ self,” was reacting, more generally, to Plath’s embrace of 
the “personal” (107). “Asked at about this time about her own ‘inordinate interest in animals and 
athletes,’” Pollak writes, “Moore replied”—with what might be construed as an avoidance or 
rejection of the “personal”—that they “[mind] their own business. Pangolins, hornbills, pitchers, 
catchers do not pry or prey—or prolong the conversation; do not make us selfconscious” (108-9). 
“Notwithstanding,” Pollak concludes, “the social logic of Moore’s letter does not show her at her 
best, especially since Hughes is not faulted for fathering children” (108). And not only is Hughes 
not faulted as a “contributory parent,” but Moore recommends him, in place of Sylvia, for the 
Guggenheim: “Her husband Ted Hughes has moral force and twice the talent that she has” and 
“I’d rather give the money to him” (107).  
According to Pollak, “It is highly unlikely that Plath ever saw [Moore’s] letter” to Moe 
(107). However, when Plath makes one final attempt to secure Moore’s endorsement, she is at 
last left unambiguously sure of where she stood. In April of 1962, Plath’s editor at Knopf, Judith 







Although Moore seemed to regret her inability to praise the volume, she not only declined 
Jones’s request, she took the opportunity to rake Plath over the coals a bit. “I need 
commiseration,” she wrote Jones; “I do like to like a book, especially anything by Sylvia Plath” 
(as qtd. in Pollak, Our Emily Dickinsons, 169). However, as Pollak writes, “she called Plath 
‘bitter,’ ‘frostbitten,’ ‘burnt out,’ ‘averse’” (169-70). This time, Plath got the word (170). And in 
October, when she was in, as Pollak describes it, “full Ariel bloom,” she wrote “The Tour,” 
giving Moore a bit of a raking over of her own (170). Interestingly, Plath wrote “The Tour,” on 
October 25th, just two days before she composed “Ariel,” with which, as we saw in the 
Introduction, she inscribes herself into Alvarez’s introduction to The New Poetry. And, what’s 
more, Alvarez had published The New Poetry that April, the same month that Plath had heard 
just what it was that Moore thought of her work. It is highly likely, then, that as Plath was 
reading Alvarez’s take-down of gentility, she would have had Moore’s criticism in mind. If Plath 
had come away from the earlier Saxton exchange having aligned Moore with decorum and 
propriety, by October of 1962, then, she would come to align this decorum and propriety with 
Alvarez’s conception of gentility. Indeed, it would be less than a week after writing “The Tour” 
that Plath would cite Alvarez’s essay in her interview with Peter Orr. Affirming “[Alvarez’s] 
arguments about the dangers of gentility in England” as “very pertinent, very true,” Plath, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, classified herself as “not very genteel” (Orr 168). “I feel that gentility has a 
stranglehold,” Plath tells Orr; “the neatness, the wonderful tidiness, which is so evident 
everywhere in England is perhaps more dangerous than it would appear on the surface” (168).  
Although Plath here, like Alvarez himself, focuses on gentility as a British phenomenon, 
less than a week earlier, she interrogated the principle in the guise of the “maiden aunt” 







reconfigures the “tour” that the couple is offered of the farmer’s barnyard in “Sow,” a poem that 
Moore had singled out for particular censure, indicating that it made her, at least rhetorically, 
sick to her stomach. In “Sow,” the couples’  
[ . . . ] questions commended us to a tour 
Through [the farmer’s] lantern-lit 
Maze of barns to the lintel of the sunk sty door 
 
To gape at it[.] (60) 
“It” here is the sow. And in Plath’s reconfigured tour, Moore has become the onlooker, afforded 
an opportunity to “gape” at the speaker’s “sty” (“a mess!”) as well at the speaker herself, who, in 
her alignment with the “great sow,” is not freakishly large but rather freakishly strange and, like 
her home, a “mess”: “And I in slippers and housedress with no lipstick!” (237). While the 
“maiden aunt” is not to be outdone in the way of eccentricities—the speaker, addressing her 
aunt, noting that her home is “[n]ot a match on your place, I guess, with the Javanese / [g]eese 
and the monkey trees”—the aunt’s eccentricities are of the genteel variety, the aunt arriving, for 
example, wearing what would appear to be a “bold / [g]ecko” broach, “[a]ll cogs, weird sparkle 
and every cog solid gold” (237). And while the speaker’s home is “a bit of a mess,” “[a] bit of a 
wild machine”—something having gone awry here, as we will see, in terms of domesticity—it is 
also “a bit burnt-out” (237). Plath’s “maiden aunt” isn’t just any maiden aunt, then; she’s, rather 
explicitly, Marianne Moore. As Pollak observes, Plath here “evok[es] Moore’s penchant for 
exotic flora and fauna” and “her interest in machines,” as she will evoke Moore’s “trademark 







Dickinsons 170). What’s more, as Pollak points out, Plath here integrates the very language—
“burnt-out”—with which Moore had dismissed her work.  
And as “burnt-out,” “a wild machine, a bit of a mess,” the speaker’s home is indeed just 
what would offend the sensibilities—the “neatness, the wonderful tidiness”—of the genteel, of 
its embodiment, more specifically, in the “maiden aunt,” “that perennial symbol,” as Wootten 
puts it, “of genteel respectability” (113). For Alvarez, “gentility is a belief that life is always 
more or less orderly, people always more or less polite, their emotions and habits more or less 
decent and more or less controllable; that God, in short, is more or less good” (21, my 
emphases). And indeed these qualities accord with more general conceptions of Moore’s work. 
As Anthony Hecht, Plath’s one-time colleague at Smith, for example, would write upon the 
release of Moore’s Complete Poems in 1967, lamenting the “[o]missions” Moore had made to 
some of her early poems, especially “Poetry,” which she had drastically reduced to three lines, “I 
wish Miss Moore had been more sparing of her work, and as an admiring reader I feel that I have 
some rights in the matter” (208). By this time, Hecht felt, Moore’s poems had become “partly 
[his],” and he “delight[ed] in them because they exhibit[ed] a mind of great fastidiousness, a 
delicate and cunning moral sensibility, a tact, a decorum, a rectitude, and finally and most 
movingly, a capacity for pure praise that has absolutely biblical awe in it” (208). For Hecht, then, 
Moore had a mind, we might say, very much in keeping—with its emphasis on what we might 
call the “orderly,” the “polite,” the “decent,” and the “good”—with Alvarez’s sense of gentility. 
 And as Plath’s nod to “Sow” suggests, it isn’t simply the “mess” of the speaker’s house, 
or the fact that the aunt has found her decidedly not dressed for such an occasion, that she 
imagines as offending her aunt’s sense of propriety; it’s the grotesque, and, more specifically, the 







Plath’s appropriation of Moore’s criticism that she had become “frostbitten,” that Plath subtly 
invokes not only the grotesque, but Sitwell’s particular “eccentric grotesqueries”:  
O I shouldn’t put my finger in that 
Auntie, it might bite! 
That’s my frost box, no cat, 
Though it looks like a cat, with its fluffy stuff, pure white. (238) 
For Pollak, the “‘frost box’ [ . . . ] represents the speaker’s anger, her poems, and something 
vaginally obscene” (Our Emily Dickinsons 170). Indeed, the image recalls, and inverts, the 
sexuality—or, rather, vaginality—that we find in “Dark Song” and Malinn’s reprisal of it in The 
Sleeping Beauty. In “Dark Song,” as we have seen, the sexual is conceived as “animal,” 
displaced onto the image of a purring, furry fire—whose “warmth,” when Malinn sings, becomes 
“sticky”—and it is such displacements that generate a world in which, in arriving at sexual 
maturity, a young woman is rendered, in effect, in “heat.” Here, Plath has inverted such “heat” 
into frigidity, her subtle gesture toward Sitwell suggesting that similar displacements were at 
work in midcentury gentility. In “The Tour,” in other words, fire has become ice, and this image 
of ice is clustered, as Sitwell’s fire is, with purring (a cat) and hairiness. That is, like Sitwell’s 
image cluster of the purring, furry fire, the “frost box” is associated with a cat, indeed “it looks 
like a cat, with its fluffy stuff, pure white,” a cat not duly domesticated, then, like the “household 
cat” the speaker of “Dark Song” is thought to be, but a cat that retains a bit of the wildness of 
Sitwell’s bear, a cat, in other words, that has a “bite.”  
 Indeed, the poem renders the shiny appliances (like the “frost box”) of the midcentury 
American kitchen (which had been made the focus of global attention in 1959 by the Cold War’s 







a conduit of domesticity but a tool of mass conformity.144 And such tools, in the speaker’s “wild 
machine” of a home, indeed go awry in a particularly “gruesome” (or “grisly”) way. As the 
speaker shows off her “Morning Glory Pool”—with its Yellowstone “wildness” that “boils for 
forty hours at a stretch”—she cautions her aunt not to “dip [her] hanky in, it hurts!” (Collected 
Poems 238). In fact, the “Pool,” a riff, it would seem, on Whirlpool, had acquired quite a 
reputation over the summer as a producer of “stiff shirts”:  
Last summer, my God, last summer 
It ate seven maids and a plumber 
And returned them steamed and pressed and stiff as shirts. 
I am bitter? I’m averse? 
Here’s your specs, dear, here’s your purse. (238) 
After “flinging Moore’s words back at her,” as Pollak puts it, the speaker sends her maiden aunt 
on her way: “Toddle on home to tea now” (Our Emily Dickinsons 170). And so the speaker and 
her aunt will take their tea separately, the speaker’s tea standing in sharp contrast to “the sesame 
seed biscuits and strawberries and milk” that Moore had offered Plath and Hughes on their visit, 
as Pollak points out (170). Coopting Moore’s criticism that she had become “bitter,” Plath’s 
speaker tells her aunt, “It’ll be lemon tea for me, / Lemon tea and earwig biscuits—creepy, 
creepy” (Collected Poems 238, Plath’s emphasis). Soon to be noshing on earwigs—much in 
keeping with Moore’s focus on Plath’s “gruesome detail,” on her “flies” and “worms”—the 
speaker evokes with her tongue-in-cheek “creep[iness]” a bit of the fear associated with the 
                                               
144 This view is certainly in keeping with midcentury concerns about conformity such as those voiced in Sloan 
Wilson’s The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, the 1955 novel that became within a year a movie starring Gregory 
Peck, as well as The Lonely Crowd (1950), by Erich Fromm’s protégé David Reisman, a copy of which Plath owned 
and which is now housed in the Smith archives. 








uncanny (“Romantic”) grotesque. And by the end of the poem, this grotesque has taken on a 
familiar form. “Toddle on home, before the weather’s worse,” the speaker advises her aunt; 
“Toddle on home, and don’t trip on the nurse!” (238). For Pollak, the nurse is “a weirdly 
unexplained [ . . . ] figure, introduced in the last two stanzas,” and she “speculate[s] that this 
wiggly fingered, imperfectly sexualized figure (‘bald . . . no eyes’) represents Hughes, who, in 
Plath’s imagination of him/her, ‘can bring the dead to life’” (Our Emily Dickinsons 170). While 
this may certainly be the case, Plath here in the figure of the nurse, with her baldness and her 
lack of eyes, has invoked the “godmothers” of “The Disquieting Muses,” who, “[m]outhless, 
eyeless, with stitched bald head,” themselves recall, as we have seen, The Sleeping Beauty’s 
Laidronette with her “Roc’s egg” “unwigged.” And like the godmothers and Laidronette, the 
nurse signals the return of the repressed “cultural contents” deemed “low”—“dirty, repulsive, 
noisy, contaminating,” as Moore had indeed deemed Plath’s work—according to the “norms of 
etiquette and decency” that govern Bakhtin’s “official” bourgeois world, according to what 
Alvarez, in other words, would call the principle of gentility. And as in Sitwell’s fairy-tale world, 
where the sexual is suppressed and by way of its suppression, becomes distorted and displaced, 
the nurse here—as we saw, too, with the “frost box”—is both “disfigured” (as the speaker of 
“The Disquieting Muses” imagines her uninvited relative, who had sent the godmothers in her 
stead) and, as Pollak puts it, “imperfectly sexualized” (“pink,” “bald,” and “eye[less]”). Like the 
“godmothers” in “The Disquieting Muses,” too, the nurse is enveloped in an eeriness befitting 
the uncanny grotesque; the nurse, “a born midwife,” “can bring the dead to life” (Collected 
Poems 238).  
 In effect, as the speaker dismisses her aunt, tells her to “[t]oddle on home,” she aligns 







the poem, with her “godmothers.” With her aunt to all effects out the door, she explains that her 
nurse “may be bald, she may have no eyes,  / [b]ut auntie, she’s awfully nice,” nice, that is, in an 
“awful” sort of way (238). And this alignment between the speaker and her nurse, forged upon 
the impending exit of the “maiden aunt,” is underscored by the fact of their mutual baldness; as 
the speaker had revealed earlier in the poem, one of her “wild machine[s],” “the furnace,” 
simply exploded one night, 
It went up in smoke.  
And that’s why I have no hair, auntie, that’s why I choke 
 
Off and on, as if I just had to retch.  
Coal gas is ghastly stuff. (238) 
In embracing, in effect, her nurse with her own baldness, the speaker indeed embraces the 
“ghastly,” embraces all that Moore, in her criticism of Plath’s “grisl[iness],” had rejected. And as 
she does so, she appropriates—with her feeling “as if [she] just had to retch”—Moore’s 
particular response to “Sow,” “the poem that made Moore happy not to be on a boat,” as Pollak 
puts it, “the implication being that she would lose her lunch” (Our Emily Dickinsons 163). 
In dismissing Moore in “The Tour,” then, in effectively demoting her from “poetic 
godmother” to “maiden aunt,”145 Plath aligns herself with Sitwell, with the “godmother” she had 
classified as “eccentric,” with the “godmother,” that is, whose “eccentric grotesqueries” she had 
chosen nine years earlier as the subject of academic study. And we see this alignment play out 
across the Ariel poems, as we will see in the following chapters, Plath in effect harnessing 
Sitwell’s “eccentric grotesqueries” in the service of answering Alvarez’s call for a “new poetry,” 
                                               
145 In identifying Moore as a “maiden aunt,” Plath certainly hasn’t severed all ties with her. However, in becoming a 







in the service of countering, in other words, gentility as Alvarez conceived it. And this 
conception of gentility had come to dovetail that fall of 1962 with the drive Plath had 
demonstrated four years earlier in her spring break poems and the following year in her letter to 
Lawner to crack open the “rococo crystal cage,” the “florid lyrical[ity]” of her poems—rejecting, 
with her dedication to “ugl[iness],” the “‘[f]eminine’ (horrors) lavish coyness” associated with 
the “poetess”—to get to her “real experience.” And for Plath, “real” experience was, in part, the 
kind not to be discussed in polite midcentury society, experience, in part, of what Alvarez had 
called “the forces of disintegration which destroy the old standards of civilization.” And as I will 
argue in the next chapter, Plath acquires from Sitwell not only a grotesque capable of cracking 
the surface of gentility, but a kind of regeneration—the kind we see across Sitwell’s body of 
work—with which she might mitigate the kinds of disintegration Alvarez diagnoses. Indeed, we 
see Plath gesture toward as much at the end of “The Tour.” In aligning herself with the nurse, the 
speaker not only aligns herself with the grotesque, but with the nurse’s ability to “bring the dead 
to life.”  
And for Bakhtin, the two—the grotesque and the power of regeneration—are one and the 
same. The grotesque itself, in other words, contains the potentialities of both death and rebirth. 
According to Bakhtin, as we have seen, “[t]he essential principle of grotesque realism”—which 
includes but extends well beyond “parody in its narrow sense”—“is degradation” (21). And 
degradation, for Bakhtin, “means coming down to earth,” when the earth, as a “topographical” 
marker of the grotesque, serves as “an element that devours, swallows up (the grave, the womb) 
and at the same time [as] an element of birth, or renascence” (21). “Degradation,” Bakhtin 
writes, “digs a bodily grave for a new birth” (21). There could hardly be a more apt description 







Tour,” gestures as she aligns herself with the ability to “bring the dead to life.” And it is to “Lady 










The Canticle of the Rose, Ariel, and the Modernist Gesamtkunstwerk 
Whereas in aligning herself with the nurse, the speaker of “The Tour” indeed aligns 
herself with the ability to “bring the dead to life,” the speaker of “Lady Lazarus” hasn’t any need 
of alignments. She herself lays claim to the ability (against the competing claims, as we will see, 
of gods and men), serving as she does as living proof of “resurrection” (“[a] miracle!”) (Ariel 
16). Drafted just two days before “The Tour,”146 “Lady Lazarus” likewise harnesses Sitwell’s 
“eccentric grotesqueries” in the service of countering gentility, functioning as a warm-up of sorts 
for the direct dismissal of gentility embodied, then, two days later, in Plath’s “maiden aunt.” Yet 
in “Lady Lazarus,” there is more at stake than gentility or a pointed send-up of Marianne Moore. 
While Plath certainly deploys the grotesque as a counter to gentility in the poem, the grotesque 
serves, too, as Bakhtin indicates, as a means of regeneration. And since the figure of Lady 
Lazarus embodies, as we saw in Chapter 1, both the public and private “faces” of the “forces of 
disintegration” (“my skin /[b]right as a Nazi lampshade” and at the same time “[a]t home on me / 
[a]nd I a smiling woman”), the “bodily grave” she “dig[s]” by way of the grotesque (the skin “at 
home on me” the same “flesh / [t]he grave cave ate”) positions her “resurrection,” which arises 
from it, in response to such forces (Ariel 14). It is just such a “resurrection”—situated in relation 
to what Plath would call less than a week later, in her interview with Orr, the “bigger things”—
that we find, in effect, in the margins of Plath’s copy of Sitwell’s “Green Song.”  
As we have seen, Sitwell wrote “Green Song” in response to World War II—the focal 
point of Plath’s “bigger things”—and it is indeed war that impinges upon “the youth of the 
world, the lovers” in the poem (The Canticle of the Rose 194). In the passage that Plath reprises, 
                                               
146 Plath drafted the poem on October 23rd (two days before she wrote “The Tour,” on the 25th) and finalized the 







repurposing the flight of Sitwell’s “naked Knight” on behalf of Lady Lazarus, what the knight 
tells the “[y]oung girl” in the poem to “[b]eware” of is that her lover will die in battle on foreign 
soil: 
 Young girl, you press your lips to lips 
That are already cold— 
For even the bright earthly dress 
Shall prove, at last, unfaithfulness. 
 
His country’s love will steal his heart— 
To you it will turn cold 
When foreign earth lies on the breast 
Where your young heart was wont to rest[.] (195)  
Sitwell’s repetition here of “cold” gestures toward what had become a predominant theme in her 
later work. In Sitwell’s mythopoesis, “the Cold” serves as a compendium of sin and cruelty, 
foremost among which, in “Green Song,” is war. As Plath wrote in her long essay on Sitwell, in 
a section entitled “The Epoch of the Cold,” the myth that encompasses Sitwell’s later poems 
situates “[t]he [human] race [ . . . ] on Oblivion’s brink,” where “[v]ast and ominous on every 
side stretch the ‘polar wastes of the heart’” (“Edith Sitwell”). The poem Plath quotes from here is 
“The Song of the Cold,” and like the other of Sitwell’s later poems that she references in this 
section, it signals Sitwell’s arrival (from her earlier bucolic fairy tales and nursery-rhyme 
rollicks), “[i]n the modern world,” in the modern world, more specifically, circa World War II 







As Sitwell indicates in her introduction to The Canticle of the Rose (which Plath certainly 
read, having referred to it in both of her Sitwell essays, as we saw with “Dark Song”), her earlier 
“experiments” with rhyme and rhythm, and with what Plath identified as “the striking union of 
sight-sound-touch-taste stimuli” (“A New Idiom”)—experiments we see, for example, in Façade 
(1922), Bucolic Comedies (1923), and The Sleeping Beauty (1924)—had “led, eventually, to the 
poem ‘Gold Coast Customs,’” a poem, as Sitwell describes it, “about the state that led up to the 
second World War” (xxxi). It is with World War II, then, and “Still Falls the Rain,” written after 
“several years” of silence following Gold Coast Customs (1929), that Sitwell announces, “My 
time of experiments was done” (xxxiii). It was time now for “The Epoch of the Cold,” for a 
poetry that she felt could register the current state of world war and, soon afterward, the atomic 
age. Indeed, in her section on “the Cold,” Plath addresses “Still Falls the Rain,” noting that it “is 
considered one of Edith Sitwell’s finest war poems, written during the 1940 air raids, yet 
nonetheless universal and timeless,” Plath here revealing a certain New Critical skittishness 
toward the “topical,” a skittishness she would certainly overcome (at least in terms of World War 
II) by the time of her interview with Orr. And it is in “poems like ‘Still Falls the Rain’” that Plath 
identifies “[v]ariations on the theme of the Cold, man’s inhumanity to man” (“Edith Sitwell”).  
  And it is in other “Song[s] of the Cold,” such as “Street Song” and “Green Song,” that 
Plath credits Sitwell with having “achieve[d] her mastery of subtle, disciplined tone and texture 
in perfect union with a profound and creative criticism of life” (“Edith Sitwell”). What Plath had 
found in these poems (in the Cold, in particular) was what she would later call “the bigger 
things.” And yet, as Plath writes, in the world of Sitwell’s later poems, “there is no cold so 
inhuman and so deadly but that it can be quickened to life by the affirming sun” (“Edith 







meaning and symbolism. It is God, Christ, the life force, the ‘world’s first lover,’ the redeemer, 
the affirmer, the ‘Ardent Belief that sees life in the aridities of the dust, / In the seed and the base 
excrement and the world’s fevers’” (“Edith Sitwell”). And it is with the return of the sun “[a]fter 
[its] long and portentous eclipse”—and with “[t]he sudden spring” that accompanies it, which 
replaces the sounds of world war (“the sound of the worlds that are breaking”) with “the sound 
when the bud bursts”—that “Green Song” begins (The Canticle of the Rose 194). As we can see 
in the case of “Green Song,” what Plath gleans from Sitwell’s later poems, then, is not only the 
“bigger things,” but the “bigger things” framed within a cycle of death and rebirth, or, rather, 
regeneration positioned in response to destruction wrought on a mass scale. In “Green Song,” 
functioning as he does (with his warning to the “young girl”) as a harbinger of war, the knight is 
indeed associated with “the Cold,” and he indeed wields this coldness in keeping with the rape 
and plunder of war, threatening a return to winter: “My frost despoils the day’s young darling” 
(195). Yet it is the “youth of the world,” with what Plath might call their “life force,” their love, 
whose response fends off the cold:  
But the youth of the world said, “Give me your golden hand 
That is but earth, yet it holds the lands of heaven; 
And you are the sound of the growth of spring in the heart’s deep core, 
The hawthorn-blossoming boughs of the stars and the young orchard’s emerald  
lore.” (195-6) 
At this, the knight, a mere “envious ghost in [this] spring world,” “fled like the winter rain [ . . . ] 
/ [a]nd spring grew warm again” (196).  
With the knight no longer a threat, “[a]ll names, sounds, faiths, delights, and duties lost / 







the pain of earth turning to spring again” (196). As we saw in Chapter 1, the underlining here is 
Plath’s, and it is next to this line that she has written “resurrection.” And indeed, in the fall of 
1962, Plath had effectively taken this line and recommissioned it on behalf of “Lady Lazarus” as 
a resurrection that isn’t simply a one-time rebirth, but one that is enacted cyclically, one that 
embeds death, in other words, within a cycle of rebirth (within, in effect, “spring”) so that death 
figures not simply in and of itself, but as part of a larger process of regeneration. Fittingly, then, 
it is with a transfiguration of this line, of its vision of death as the necessary precursor of rebirth 
(and with a borrowing of “again,” with which Sitwell underscored the cyclical nature of this 
process) that Plath begins “Lady Lazarus”: 
I have done it again.  
One year in every ten  
I manage it— 
 
A sort of walking miracle, my skin 
Bright as a Nazi lampshade,  
My right foot 
 
A paperweight,  
My face a featureless, fine  
Jew linen. (Ariel 14) 
The “it” that Lady Lazarus has “manage[d]” here, as a “sort of walking miracle,” is not simply 
death, then, but what she will call later in the poem the “[c]omeback” from death (16). And it is 







cyclically, once every decade), but a coming back to life inscribed by the public “forces of 
disintegration.” In a sense, coming back from suicide inscribed by the public “faces” of “the 
forces of disintegration,” Lady Lazarus serves to acknowledge, as Alvarez emphasizes, that “the 
same forces are at work within us.” “It is hard to live in an age of psychoanalysis,” Alvarez 
reflects, “and feel oneself wholly detached from the dominant public savagery,” and Lady 
Lazarus’s inscriptions serve to mark that she has indeed emerged from death not “wholly 
detached” from—that she has emerged, even, attached to—this “public savagery” (The New 
Poetry 23). Her inscriptions, in other words, function as an acknowledgment that the same forces 
at work within us have, on a collective scale, wrought the historical atrocities of the Holocaust, 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,147 an acknowledgement that at times borders, in Plath’s later work, 
on culpability, an effect, in part, generated by her reconfiguration of “the mythical method.” As 
we saw in Chapter 1, Plath recalibrates “the mythical method” as a means not of accentuating 
what Eliot calls “the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history” 
by contrasting “present squalor,” as Plath puts it in her teaching notes, “with past grandeur” 
(with the “more vital life of the past”), but as a means of “shap[ing]” this “immense panorama 
[...] of contemporary history” by examining the ways in which the atrocities of World War II 
were, under the escalating pressures of the Cold War, entering public “consciousness in a new 
way,” were becoming, that is, newly present (“Teaching at Smith College”). At the very least, 
Lady Lazarus “drop[s] the pretense that life” in this post-Holocaust, post-Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki world “is the same as ever” (The New Poetry 23). And it is with this “drop[ped] [ . . .] 
                                               
147 As Alvarez notes in The Savage God, Plath had originally included in “Lady Lazarus” the line “I may be 
Japanese” (32). Alvarez reflects that his criticism of this line, after which Plath removed it (after, first, a vigorous 
defense of it), had been misplaced (32). However, he refers to the line as an “apparently not quite relevant allusion” 
(32). As I will argue later in this chapter, the references to atomic victims is indeed relevant to the parallel the poem 







pretense”—with, that is, the lowering of her smiling mask to reveal “[t]he nose, the eye pits, the 
full set of teeth”—that she shocks the “gentility” of her readers (“Do I terrify?”) once every ten 




I will return to discuss “Lady Lazarus” more fully, but first, to flesh out the conversation 
taking place between “Lady Lazarus” and “Green Song,” and between Ariel and The Canticle of 
the Rose, more generally, we must trace a conversation Sitwell herself was engaged in, not only 
in “Green Song,” but in the various “songs” that we find throughout her later work. In “Green 
Song,” when the knight sweeps into the poem to level his warning at “the young girl”—the 
warning and flight that Plath repurposes in “Lady Lazarus”—he interrupts “the youth of the 
world, the lovers,” who had declared the coming of spring and who had come, increasingly, to 
define their young love as spring, a strategy Wagner uses to striking effect in one of the most 
famous sections of his Der Ring des Nibelungen cycle, “Spring Song” (The Canticle of the Rose 
194). Wagner’s version begins with the figure of Siegmund singing to his newfound lover, 
Sieglinde, that “Love has lured Spring here,” personifying a spring that speaks “[i]n blissful 
birdsong” (Wagner 135). Indeed, the “song” of Sitwell’s lovers (though “Green” rather than 
“Spring”), both begins with spring (“the youth of the world, the young lovers, said, ‘It is 
Spring!’”) and is rife with birdsong, “bird-sounds” and “bird-song” appearing early in the poem, 
in its third and fourth lines (The Canticle of the Rose 194). And the image of “flowers, / buds and 
shoots” “from [spring’s] warming blood bloom[ing]” in “Spring Song” (Wagner 135) resurfaces 
in Sitwell, whose “youth of the world” declare, young love having become spring, that their own 







the sap of grasses” (The Canticle of the Rose 194). It is this line, with its blood-jewel-sap image 
cluster, as we saw in Chapter 2, that Plath had rehearsed in her early “April Aubade,” 
demonstrating that her conversation with “Green Song” had begun well before she composed 
“Lady Lazarus.”148   
While Siegmund and Sieglinde sing “Spring Song,” it is Siegfried, of all the figures in the 
Ring, who is most associated with birdsong. Indeed, as the son of Siegmund and Sieglinde, and 
heir to their fated union (both die in the second opera of the cycle), Siegfried is charged with the 
task of restoring the gods’ imperiled reign, and at first he is guided in his quest by birdsong, 
which, with the help of a little dragon blood, he has come to understand. Birdsong in the Ring 
functions as the voice of prophesy, as it does in the opening of “Green Song,” in which “[t]he 
sudden spring began / [w]ith the bird-songs of Doom in the egg, and Fate in the bud” (194). In 
keeping, then, with Wagner’s association of the forest-dwelling warrior Siegfried with birdsong, 
prophesy, and doomed love—his love for the Valkyrie, Brünnhilde, thwarted by his enemies—
Sitwell’s own forest-dwelling warrior (her “naked Knight”), inhabiting as he does a Wagnerian 
world where “voices speak in the woods as from a nest / Of leaves” (196), “[s]hriek[s] like a bird 
that flies through the leaves” and levels the prophetic warning of the imminent death of the 
young woman’s lover. Sitwell’s Siegfried, however, emerges as “an envious ghost,” seemingly 
instilled with all the posthumous awareness of how he had been deceived by his enemies into 
betraying his love for Brünnhilde and of how his freedom had been the very condition of his 
servitude—Wotan, lord of the gods, having needed a free hero to restore the order of the gods—
                                               
148 In “April Aubade,” Plath transmutes this line into “diamonds jangl[ing] hymns within the blood / and sap 
ascend[ing] the steeple of the vein” (Collected Poems 312). Plath continued this conversation with “Green Song” in 
“November Graveyard,” one of the poems that Moore panned in her “ambiguous” letter. In “November Graveyard,” 
Plath retains Sitwell’s original jewel and indeed associates it with the grass: the “dour grass / [g]uards the hard-







all of which he had been able to glean, if at all, only the faintest hint of before his death at the 
end of Götterdämmerung, the final opera of the cycle. In effect revisiting the scene of his own 
doomed origins, the budding love of his own parents, then, Sitwell’s Siegfried would seem to be 
attempting to undo his own tragic fate. But in keeping with the immense naiveté and narcissism 
of Wagner’s Siegfried, he seems also to wish to deny others what he himself had been denied, 
declaring himself, with no little flare for the melodramatic, as “the world’s last love” (195).   
Indeed, at the same time that Sitwell had been “immers[ing] [herself] in the poetry of the 
First World War,” searching for a viable way of responding to the outbreak of the second, she 
had also been reading “Wagner’s prose works” (Greene 275). And as we see in the case of 
“Green Song,” Wagner leaves an indelible mark on Sitwell’s later “songs.”149 Having once 
considered becoming a professional pianist before turning to poetry, Sitwell was well-versed in 
the musical world, as her collaboration with composer William Walton on Façade (1922) can 
attest, and while for the most part she wasn’t much taken with Wagner’s prose—much to her 
credit considering the anti-Semitic polemics that is, for example, his “Das Judenthum in der 
Musik” (“Jewishness in Music”)—she did find that her own poetics resonated with statements he 
had made about the interplay between consonants and vowels (276).150 More importantly for our 
purposes, Wagner’s Ring, with its critique of corruption and capitalist greed, and of the wars for 
which they often served as the impetus, provided Sitwell with some of the raw material she 
                                               
149 For example, Sitwell, in effect, links “Anne Boleyn’s Song” with “Green Song,” the poem immediately after 
which it is placed in The Canticle of the Rose. In “Anne Boleyn’s Song,” Sitwell reprises the line Plath herself had 
rehearsed: “The bird-blood in the veins [ . . . ] has changed to emeralds” (198). And later in the volume, we find 
nothing less than “A Bird’s Song,” which itself resonates (with its “fire” bird) with the ending of “Lady Lazarus”: 
  The fire high up in air, 
The bird, cries, “I am the seed of fire 
From the Sun—although I wear  
A bird-mask.” (244) 
150 It is such an interplay that Plath noted as she defended Sitwell’s sound experiments in Façade around the time 
she was writing her long essay on Sitwell: her “vowels do have wave lengths and can give a pure sensuous listening 







would appropriate for her own condemnation of materialism, imperialism, and war, and, more 
specifically, it would help to shape—with its portrayal of the destruction wreaked by renouncing 
love in favor of worldly profit—what would prove, as Plath had noted in her essay, the 
overarching theme of her later poems, “the cold in the heart of Man” (The Canticle of the Rose 
190).  
Wagner, of course, was not a popular model at the time Sitwell began writing “Green 
Song.”  His anti-Semitic tracts having made him a Nazi favorite, his quest for a “total work of 
art,” viewed through such a retrospective lens, smacked of totalitarianism, just as his ideal fusion 
of the aesthetic and the political read as proto-fascist. Yet, his explorations of mythic structures 
and themes had made him a ready model for the first wave of modernism’s return to myth. As 
Raymond Furness argues in Wagner and Literature (1982), “the great European movement 
towards myth and symbolism owed an enormous debt to Wagner’s example” (84). However, 
Wagner was not a model that even those who were writing between the wars were likely to 
acknowledge, anxious as they were, in their search for a poetics capable of registering the 
fragmented realities of the postwar world, to sever themselves from any connection to idealism 
or Romanticism, as Eliot had been, as he developed what Alvarez calls his “rearguard action 
against the late Romantics.” Despite the silence of some of the key modernists and many of these 
modernists’ key critics on the topic of Wagner, references to Wagner suffuse a great number of 
what are now considered the period’s major texts. For example, references to the Ring alone 
range from the ashplant Stephen Dedalus walks about with in Ulysses, a play on the sword 
Wotan, lord of the gods, forges from the World Ash-tree (T. Martin, Joyce and Wagner 143), to 
Ursula Brangwen’s description of Gerald Crich, the iron-willed son of a mine-owner in 







underground caves over whom Alberich, who has stolen the Rhinegold and its powers of 
subjugation, rules despotically (Furness 77); from the recurring images of gold, fire, and rings in 
Woolf’s The Waves (21) to the song of the Rhine maidens that makes its way from The Twilight 
of the Gods, the fiery conclusion of the Ring cycle, to The Waste Land’s “Fire Sermon.”151 And 
what modernists didn’t draw directly from Wagner himself was readily available through the 
practices of the French Symbolists,152 who are often cited as key modernist influences, as is the 
case for Eliot as well as Sitwell. According to Greene, Sitwell, for her part, was busy in 1911 
recording “notes from Arthur Symons, the poet whose critical works introduced British readers 
to the French Symbolist poets” (76). She was busy, too, “transcri[bing] [ . . . ] twenty-seven 
poems by Baudelaire” and taking “notes on her reading of many more Symbolist poets, among 
them Albert Samain, Gustave Khan, Maurice Maeterlinck, Villiers de l’Isle-Adam, Rémy de 
Gourmont, and André Fontainas” (76). In all, Greene concludes, “This is the sort of reading that 
was having a decisive effect on Pound and Eliot at much the same time” (76). 
And Wagner served modernism as more than a source of allusions and images; the Ring 
itself offered modernists, thoroughly distrustful of notions of progress, an alternative to linear 
                                               
151 And in “Orchestrating The Waste Land: Wagner, Leitmotiv, and the Play of Passion,” Margaret E. Dana begins 
her discussion by quoting Hugh Kenner’s 1959 attribution of a key motif of The Waste Land to Wagner: “Wagner, 
more than Frazer or Miss Weston, presides over the introduction into The Waste Land of the Grail motif” (by way of 
Wagner’s Parsifal) (qtd. in Dana 267). Weston herself, of course often cited as one of the sources of the modernist 
turn to myth, including by Eliot himself in his notes to The Waste Land, was rooted in Wagner, in the preface of 
From Ritual to Romance giving a nod to conversations she had had at a Bayreuth Festival—held annually to 
showcase Wagner’s works, such as Parsifal, based on the legend of the Arthurian knight’s grail quest—for the 
inspiration for her study (v); and preceding her study of the grail legend, she had written a full-length study of 
Wagner, The Legends of the Wagner Drama: Studies in Mythology (1896).  
Wagner’s influence persisted, too, through the next generation, as W.H. Auden attests in his lost journal of 
September 1938 to November 1939, which recently surfaced at a Christie’s auction. In the journal, Auden 
apparently documents the importance to his work of music in general and Wagner in particular (Coe).  
152 In Wagner to “The Waste Land”: A Study of the Relationship of Wagner to English Literature (1982), Stoddard 
Martin concludes that “the Symbolist movement  [. . . ] develop[ed] along self-consciously Wagnerian lines” (8), by 
way, in part, of the Revue wagnérienne, which “was committed to the furthering of a Symbolist ideal through 
discussion of the Gesamtkunst theories of Wagner and the poetic ideal of Stéphane Mallarmé” (9). For more on 








narrative and structure. And it is indeed along these lines that Eliot describes “the mythical 
method”: “Instead of narrative method, we may now use the mythical method,” a method he 
credits as “a step toward making the modern world possible for art” (178). And this mythical 
method, rooted broadly in the modernist return to myth (a return at least partly inspired by 
Wagner), and rooted specifically in Joyce, who himself had long roots in Wagner, was 
particularly, then, Wagner-inflected. In “Joyce, Wagner, and the Artist-Hero,” for example, 
Timothy Martin defines Joyce “not [as] an ordinary opera-goer, but [as] a literary Wagnerite” 
(70), a description Sylvia Beach, whose Shakespeare and Company published Ulysses and who 
worked with Joyce closely, confirmed when she referred to the Joyce of the period as 
“Wagnerian” (qtd. in T. Martin, “Joyce, Wagner” 70).153 And Wagner made his way to Eliot in 
part through Joyce, through “the mythical method,” which some critics have noted perhaps better 
describes the technique of The Waste Land than it does that of Ulysses,154 an opinion not unlike 
that of Joyce himself. In “The Music of Poetry: Wagner in The Waste Land” (1993), for 
example, Philip Waldron writes, “Joyce felt that Eliot had pillaged the method of Ulysses in 
order to write The Waste Land”; “[i]f Ulysses did enable The Waste Land to be written,” 
Waldron concludes, “it was as a conductor of Wagnerian structuring technique” (qtd. in T. 
Martin, Joyce and Wagner 434). And Wagnerian structuring technique not only entailed the use 
of myth; it offered another alternative to linear narrative and structure, locating as it does its end 
                                               
153 For more on Joyce’s engagement of Wagner, see Timothy Martin’s full-length study, Joyce and Wagner (1991), 
as well as Robert Baines’ “Hegel (and Wagner) in James Joyce's ‘Drama and Life’” (2012), Geert Lernout’s 
“Richard Wagner's Tristan und Isolde in the Genesis of Finnegans Wake” (2000), Reed Way Dasenbrock’s “Mozart 
versus Wagner: The Operatic Roots of the Mythic Method” (1990), Vicki Mahaffey’s “Wagner, Joyce and 
Revolution” (1988), the chapter Stoddard Martin devotes to Joyce in his Wagner to “The Waste Land”: A Study of 
the Relationship of Wagner to English Literature (1982), and Joseph Kestner’s “Joyce, Wagner, and Bizet: Exiles, 
Tannhauser, and Carmen” (1980). 
154 As Pericles Lewis writes, “Many of Joyce’s readers have felt that Joyce himself did not necessarily aim for 
control and order, but most are in agreement that Eliot’s essay describes well the intention of The Waste Land” 







in its beginning, its beginning in its end, all the while circling back on itself with insistent 
repetition and variation. And we can see this circular structure (the Ring both begins and ends 
with the waters of the Rhine, with their powers of destruction and creation) and the 
interweavings enabled by the use of leitmotif (which Wagner, with whom the term had become 
closely associated, developed to an unprecedented degree of complexity and subtlety) in the 
oeuvres, especially, of Joyce, Woolf, and Eliot.155 In Eliot’s case, this structure is perhaps most 
strikingly apparent in the repetitions and variations of Four Quartets, a poem, as well as a 
historical vision, as we will see in the Conclusion, that Plath will address in “Getting There” just 
over a week after giving her interview with Orr and finalizing “Lady Lazarus” (who indeed finds 
her own beginning, as Eliot’s speaker does here, in her end): “What we call the beginning is 
often the end / And to make an end is to make a beginning. / The end is where we start from” 
(58).  
And yet modernism’s debt to Wagner was marked by still more than circular and 
leitmotivic structure and a return to myth; modernism also, to a substantial degree, owed its 
                                               
155 In Joyce and Wagner: A Study of Influence (1991), Timothy Martin offers a succinct overview of Joyce’s use of 
circular structure: “Finnegan ends with ‘a breath, a nothing, the article ‘the’ and thus circles back to its beginning 
sentence.  Molly Bloom’s soliloquy ends with ‘the most positive word in the human language,’ Yes, and thus circles 
back to the word with which it began.  Leopold Bloom’s voyage through Dublin ends at the jingling wife-filled bed 
from which it started” (153).   
 While Raymond Furness, in his Wagner and Literature (1982), notes the presence of Wagner in Woolf’s 
early novel The Voyage Out as well as Jacob’s Room, he states that “The Waves (1931) is, to use William Blissett’s 
words, ‘the most Wagnerian of all Virginia Woolf’s novels because the most despotically organized, the most 
‘composite’ in its use of musical and painterly, even sculpturesque and ballet-like effects, and the most pervasively 
leitmotivistic in its structure and symbolism’” (20).  He further notes that the novel’s “cyclical structure, the 
beginning and end in water, the images of light and burning gold, the arc of fire gleaming on the horizon and the 
blazing sea derive specifically from Wagner’s Ring des Nibelugen” (20-1). In her chapter “The Years as 
Gotterdammerung, Greek Play, and Domestic Novel” from Virginia Woolf and the Languages of Patriarchy (1987), 
Jane Marcus argues that “[Woolf] takes The Ring’s structure and technique, the interweaving of motifs and the story 
of the downfall of the old gods for money and the renunciation of love, and at the same time she suggests that the 
Wagnerian ideas, with their own superman hero and anti-Semitism which heralded the doom of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, betray the theme of freedom the music itself expresses” (50). For more on Woolf and Wagner 
see Jamie McGregor’s “‘The Sea, Music and Death’: The Shadow of Wagner in Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway” 
(2006), Gyllian Phillips’ “Re(De)Composing the Novel: The Waves, Wagnerian Opera and Percival/Parsifal” 







expanded scope and vision to Wagner’s conception of “the total work of art.” In “The State of 
American Writing, 1948,” written the year before Sitwell published The Canticle of the Rose, the 
visual art critic, Clement Greenberg, bemoaned what he saw as Wagner’s persistent influence on 
literature, an influence he traced back to its modernist roots: “what [Proust and Joyce] borrowed 
from most was the Wagnerian opera, that Gesamtkunstwerk, that work of “total art” (qtd. in Koss 
xxv). “Usually understood as the intention to reunite the arts into the one integrated work” 
(Roberts 1), as the fusion of “music, word, and gesture” (Furness 74), Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk also involved “a fusion of the epic and dramatic modes”156 (118). It is not 
surprising within this context, then, that Joyce, given his roots in Wagner’s art and theory, would 
write what is perhaps the most explicitly epic of modernist works. In describing Ulysses, Eliot 
indeed outlines the epic scope—the “immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is 
contemporary history”—of “the mythical method” (178).157 And it is precisely in terms of 
history—as a “poem including history”—that Pound, that famous editor of The Waste Land who 
described the poem as “[a]bout enough [ . . . ] to make the rest of us shut up shop” (qtd. in Lewis, 
The Cambridge Introduction 145), defines the epic (Pound, “Date Line” 86). And it is precisely 
in terms of the epic, more specifically in terms of Dante’s Divine Comedy, that Pound defines 
The Cantos: “For forty years I have schooled myself [ . . . ] to write an epic poem which begins 
‘In the Dark Forest,’ crosses the Purgatory of human error, and ends in the light and ‘fra i maestri 
                                               
156 In Wagner’s Ring Cycle and the Greeks (2010), David H. Foster sums up Wagner’s indebtedness to the Greeks, 
placing a particular emphasis on his indebtedness to the Greek epic:  
The influences of Greek epic, lyric, and drama can be found both in the whole and the individual 
parts of the Ring cycle. Wagner not only patterned each particular opera after a particular genre, he 
also wove the threads of each genre throughout the whole of the cycle. This is most clearly the 
case with his use of epic. To many a Wagner scholar and Wagner fan alike, the whole of the Ring 
seems epic in scope. (2) 
The principle epic hallmarks of the Ring include Siegfried as “a figure of great national or even cosmic importance,” 
as Abrams defines the epic hero (54). It is upon Siegfried, after all, that Wotan, Lord of the gods, places his hopes of 
retrieving the ring, saving the world from the tyrannical Alberich and restoring the order of the gods.  







di color che sanno’ [among the masters of those who know]” (qtd. in Sicari 5). Indeed, one of the 
ways in which The Waste Land is “characteristic of modernist poetry,” writes Pericles Lewis, 
whose genre section on poetry in The Cambridge Introduction to Modernism (2007) centers on 
the poem, is the fact “that it contains both lyric and epic elements,” and these epic elements, 
according to Lewis, are put into the service, in modernist poems such as The Waste Land and 
The Cantos—to which I will soon add Sitwell’s Gold Coast Customs (1929)—of “address[ing] 
broad, historical questions, the sorts of questions normally addressed by epic” (“The Waste 
Land”). This epic mode of inquiry, inherent to the mythical method, Eliot himself seems to have 
located in Wagner as he explicitly situated The Waste Land in relation to the Ring as a whole. In 
a 1974 article in The New York Review of Books discussing what was then the recent release of 
The Waste Land drafts, Stephen Spender recorded a conversation he had had with Eliot: “I once 
asked Eliot whether, when writing The Waste Land, he had been studying the libretto of 
Rheingold. He answered, ‘Not just the Rheingold—the whole Ring’” (“In Eliot’s Cave”). And 
such a situating of The Waste Land within the entirety of the Ring, indeed suggests that in 
writing the poem, Eliot had pulled more from Wagner, for example, than simply the song of the 
Rhinemaidens, that it was as a cycle, as a “total work of art” and therefore a project epic in scope 
that the Ring informed The Waste Land.   
Therefore, in engaging Wagner in “Green Song,” despite seeming to have distanced 
herself, as we saw in her introduction to The Canticle of the Rose, from modernist experiments, 
Sitwell was engaging what was in key ways the very heart of modernism. And in engaging 
“Green Song” in “Lady Lazarus,” Plath in effect locates a common (Romantic) ancestor for Eliot 
and Sitwell—an ancestor common, as we have seen, to a good number of first-wave “high” 







formulation, as “something apart,” into the “direct current of English poetry.” And beyond the 
Wagner that she “inherits,” we might say, from Sitwell, Plath came to Sitwell already with a 
working knowledge of the composer. In her interview with Orr the day after she finalized “Lady 
Lazarus,” Plath emphasized her own Austrian and Germanic heritage, and this heritage indeed 
included an exposure to Germanic myths and culture; she learned during her childhood, for 
example, a chant about the Norse god of thunder, Thor, which makes an appearance, as we saw 
in Chapter 2, in “The Disquieting Muses” (Wilson 29). But more importantly for our purposes, 
Plath indeed came to “Green Song” having read, in 1944, a blank verse version of the Ring (41), 
and having published, in 1946, her own “Spring Song” in The Phillipian, her junior high school’s 
literature review. And for Plath, the figure of Brünnhilde was the embodiment of the Ring, 
indeed of the entirety of Wagner’s oeuvre, as the Valkyrie’s central positioning in “Lady 
Lazarus,” as we will see, suggests. In a paper she wrote while at Smith on Jacques Barzun’s 
Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage (1941), which argues Wagner’s place among 
Darwin and Marx as one of the “three great prophets” of the twentieth century (Barzun 1), she 
summed up her knowledge of the composer in terms of the rebel Valkyrie: “Speak of Wagner 
and I will have an image of a fat Brünnhilde changing operatic tunes” (“Darwin, Marx, 
Wagner”).  
It comes as little surprise, then, that the passage of “Green Song” that Plath reprises—
which occurs toward the middle of the poem and which, we could say, “[s]peak[s] of Wagner” as 
it figures Siegfried’s flight and warning—becomes, in “Lady Lazarus,” the flight and warning of 
Brünnhilde, Plath reserving for the Valkyrie that prime dramatic real estate—as does Wagner—
of the poem’s ending. In “Brünnhilde’s Act,” Slavoj Žižek’s recuperative reading of the Ring, he 







ride into his funeral pyre. While Sitwell chooses Siegfried’s as her focus, the end result is by no 
means a glorification of the epic hero. Channeling Wagner’s negative overall portrayal of the 
figure, whom Žižek quite aptly describes as “basically a brutal and insensitive thug, one who is 
obviously lacking in basic intelligence and wisdom” (208), Sitwell, as we have seen, yokes her 
“knight” with war and “the cold.” Pushing this critique toward its vanishing point, Plath eclipses 
Siegfried’s presence with Brünnhilde’s. In Sitwell’s off-stage death and resurrection of Siegfried, 
Brünnhilde’s presence registers only obliquely in the “knight’s” claim to the “world’s last love.” 
Plath in turn inverts this dynamic, however implicitly Sitwell’s critique may serve in 
Brünnhilde’s favor, rendering the Valkyrie’s death and—moving beyond Wagner—her 
resurrection very much on-stage while it is Siegfried who appears obliquely, detectable only in 
the intertextual trace of “Herr Lucifer” (rooted in Sitwell’s description of him as a “dark bird 
proud as the Prince of the Air”) and the wedding ring left in the speaker’s ashes (an echo of the 
ring Wagner’s Siegfried gave Brünnhilde as a token of his faithfulness, which she promises the 
Rhinemaidens may reclaim once it has been purified by the flames of Siegfried’s funeral pyre 
and her own immolation). This inversion—the repurposing of the powers of flight and prophecy 
of Sitwell’s Siegfried on behalf of Brünnhilde, for whom flight in “Lady Lazarus” will become 
transcendence and the poem’s culmination—manifests itself formally in Plath’s reversal of the 
“air”/“beware” end rhyme in Siegfried’s warning,158 which, in Plath, becomes Brünnhilde’s. And 
                                               
158 As we saw in Chapter 1, Plath preserves Sitwell’s original “Air” / “Beware” end rhyme, and as we can see here, 
she also inverts it: 
The naked Knight in the coat of mail 
 Shrieked like a bird that flies through the leaves— 
 The dark bird proud as the Prince of the Air— 
 “I am the world’s last love. . . . Beware—”  (“Green Song,” The Canticle of the Rose 194-5) 
 
Herr God, Herr Lucifer 
  Beware 








not unlike Sitwell’s Siegfried, associated as he is with war and the cold, Plath’s Siegfried as 
“Herr Lucifer,” yoked in the same line with “Herr God”—both syntactical substitutions for the 
earlier “Herr Enemy” and both linked with the atrocities of World War II, as the German “Herr” 
and the poem’s Nazi references suggest—constitutes part of the corrupt order that Lady Lazarus, 
in red-headed Brünnhilde mode, razes with her final act. 
In her paper on Barzun’s study, Plath described herself as having “a strong personal 
interest” in his argument, as an “individual intent on developing a more thorough understanding 
of [her] ideological heritage” (“Darwin, Marx, Wagner”). Barzun portrays this heritage as both 
rooted in and helping to shape, as Plath paraphrased it, “an age of materialism and machinery.” 
Darwin, Marx, and Wagner, according to Barzun, served to “[form] a single stream of 
influence,” one that he termed “mechanical materialism” and defined, in nearly Sitwellian terms, 
as “the cold world in which man’s feelings are illusory and his will powerless” (Barzun 7). The 
Ring, indeed, reads as an allegory of the will, as, more specifically, dramatizing the problem of 
the will in relation to freedom that Hannah Arendt, as we will see, identifies as the inheritance of 
Western philosophy. In fact, it is standard in Wagner criticism to interpret the Ring, as Barzun 
does, in light of Schopenhauer,159 whom Wagner was reading while composing the opera cycle 
and whose philosophical conception of the will—which would later inform the “will to power” 
in Nietzsche, whom Plath was also reading at Smith and whose Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1891) 
she claimed around this time as her “bible of individualism at present!”—entails a determinism 
from which the will can do little but retreat (“The Age of Anxiety and the Escape from 
                                               
  Out of the ash 
  I rise with my red hair 
  And I eat men like air.  (“Lady Lazarus,” Ariel 17) 
159 Wotan, for Barzun, is “all-important as the bearer of our present ills—world weariness, embroilment in the 
intrigue for the possession of power (the ring), and in the deviation of love (incest) which has been cursed in order to 
obtain power. The senseless murder of Siegfried typifies the chaos” (264).  These ills and chaos Barzun 







Freedom”). When Brünnhilde, then, makes her appearance in “Lady Lazarus”—by way of 
Sitwell’s “Green Song” and still steeped, it would seem, in Plath’s reading of Barzun—the 
ideological inheritance she carries effectively centers the poem on the problem of the will, the 
dramatic tension of the poem arising from Lady Lazarus’ attempts to lay claim—as she does 
from the poem’s very first line, “I have done it again”—against the competing claims of both 
men and gods (“Herr Enemy” and “Herr God”) to her own death and resurrection. And given 
that Plath was recalibrating the “mythical method” during the fall of 1962 as she was writing 
“Lady Lazarus,” as we saw in her interview with Orr, this problem of the will in relation to 
freedom, then, becomes the focus, we might say, of her epic inquiry, this problem posed, in other 
words, in relation to the “bigger things” and within a historical process shaped indeed, as Eliot 




Before we begin to address these questions of will and freedom as Plath explores them—
by way of Wagner and Sitwell—in “Lady Lazarus,” I would first like to trace Sitwell’s role in 
helping Plath to arrive at “Lady Lazarus,” at a conception, in other words, not only of “the bigger 
things,” but of the “bigger things” framed within a cycle of death and rebirth. Before Plath had 
formulated “the bigger things,” she had first explored what she refers to in her essay “Context”—
written in response to a series of questions posed by the editors of London Magazine—as “the 
issues of our time” (45). While in 1956, as we have seen, Plath had written to her mother of a 
“shift” she was enacting in her poetry as she determined to “forg[e] into [her] discipline” “the 
world and the problems of an individual in this particular civilization,” this “progress toward 







Hughes, who attributed artistic development not to an engagement of the world, but to a 
positioning of oneself “outside” of it; for Hughes, as Peel paraphrases it, to develop as an artist, 
one had “to become a political outsider, live anonymously, and become introspective.” It was 
with the deterioration of her marriage, then, Peel argues, that Plath began to integrate into her 
poetry the more nuanced and critical view of global politics that her move to England at the end 
of 1959 had afforded her, as she had moved, as we saw in Chapter 1, “closer geographically to 
the political fault lines along which the two ideologies [of the Cold War] were grinding like 
tectonic plates.” While Peel indicates that it is with “the autumn of 1962 poems” that this 
“political and artistic convergence” “reappear[s],” we see Plath beginning to experiment with 
what a poetics engaged with the world—with the “issues”—might look like even before her 
marriage hit a point of crisis.  
At first “Context,” published in February of 1962, would seem to sketch a poetics that, 
rather than engaging the issues, disavows them. And this is indeed how critics have tended to 
read the essay, and in doing so, they have tended to cite the following lines: “My poems do not 
turn out to be about Hiroshima, but about a child forming itself finger by finger in the dark. They 
are not about the terrors of mass extinction, but about the bleakness of the moon over a yew tree 
in a neighboring graveyard. Not about the testaments of tortured Algerians, but about the night 
thoughts of a tired surgeon” (46). When compared with these lines, the statement of poetics that 
Plath offers in her interview with Orr in October that year, would seem a complete about-face, a 
move from “poems [ . . . ] not [ . . . ] about Hiroshima,” for example, to an insistence that 
“personal experience” prove “relevant to the larger things, the bigger things, such as Hiroshima.” 
And perhaps for this reason—the apparent reversal here, or, if the dates of the two statements 







both statements in their studies, and for those few who have, they’ve tended not to address them 
in relation to one another, or, for that matter, as statements of poetics.160  
Pamela Annas, however, is an early and very notable exception. In A Disturbance in 
Mirrors: The Poetry of Sylvia Plath (1988), in which she examines “the struggles within 
[Plath’s] poems to achieve transformation of self and of self in relation to the world” (11), Annas 
calls attention to the ways in which Plath should be considered a transitional writer, locating 
Plath on the cusp of a historical moment in which “American poetry became more explicitly 
political [ . . . ] and more concerned with narrating the poet’s personal engagement with a real 
world” (11). This was a moment in which “the United States moved into a period of social 
protest and increasing political consciousness, some, though not all of it, concentrated around the 
Civil Rights movement, the anti-Vietnam War movement, and the women’s movement” (11). 
While “[t]he changes in American consciousness that would make possible Denise Levertov’s 
anti-war poems in the late 1960s and Adrienne Rich’s feminist poems by the early 1970s were 
not available to Plath in the late 1950s and early 1960s,” Annas turns to “Context” and the Orr 
interview to examine the ways in which Plath points us toward such work. So while she wouldn’t 
experience these “changes in American consciousness,” “Plath does indicate, in two separate 
1962 comments about her own work,” according to Annas, “her concern about connecting 
personal experience with political commitment or at the least with putting personal experience 
into a political context” (11-2).  
 While Annas, then, establishes a connection between the two statements, the connection 
is that both serve as evidence of Plath’s interest in 1962 in the relation between the personal and 
                                               
160 Jaqueline Rose, in The Haunting of Sylvia Plath (1992), Al Strangeways, in Sylvia Plath: The Shaping of 
Shadows (1998), and Peel himself in Writing Back, for example, are three of the very few who do address both 
statements, but all three address them separately in their work and, therefore, do not address the apparent 







the political. Positioning the two statements as representative of Plath’s thinking about her work 
in 1962 in general—not, in other words, noting the at least eight-month gap between them—they 
become for Annas, in effect, interchangeable. And this interchangeability is evidenced by the 
fact that while Annas focuses her study chronologically, keenly observing “that Plath’s work 
gradually evolves into a dialogue between self and society, moving away from the initial 
influence of Hughes and Roethke to a more socially and historically centered poetic,” she 
surprisingly addresses “Context” and the Orr interview in reverse chronological order. Doing so, 
beginning with the Orr interview and ending with the earlier “Context,” which would seem a 
disengagement of the historical or political, prompts Annas to conclude that “as an artist writing 
about her own work, Plath had not yet resolved the current [historical moment’s] separation 
between personal and political”—as Levertov and Rich would later do—“or seen her poetry as a 
direct and conscious way of connecting the two or mediating between them” (12). In other 
words, having positioned the two statements as representative and therefore interchangeable, 
Annas, as she concludes with “Context,” positions her conclusions about “Context” as 
representative of Plath’s thinking about her work in 1962 in general. And given that 1962 would 
encompass the majority of the poems she included in her Ariel manuscript,161 these conclusions, 
then, would function as representative of Plath’s overall Ariel poetics, or, at the very least, her 
articulation of them. 
What such a construction offers us, then, if “Context,” as Annas reads it, were to serve as 
a statement of the overall poetics of Ariel, is a Plath who, despite “in her late poems [ . . . ] 
us[ing] the brutality of war and the alienation of bureaucracy as metaphors for the relation 
between self and world,” is unable to conceive of her poetry—throughout her Ariel period—as 
                                               
161 While the Ariel poems in total were written over about a three-year period, thirty-three of the manuscript’s forty 







“direct[ly] and conscious[ly]” `exploring the relation between personal experience and “the 
bigger things” (13).162  Especially considering, as we have seen, that the majority of the Ariel 
poems were composed in just six weeks, not attending to the at least eight months that separate 
the two statements leads us not only to overlook the degree to which Plath indeed viewed her 
work as “direct[ly] and conscious[ly]” examining the relation between personal experience and 
“the bigger things”—as directly and consciously addressing, we might say, Alvarez’s call for “a 
new seriousness,” as she does in her interview with Orr—but also to elide what I would argue is 
a crucial shift in poetics that takes place as we move from “Context,” published in February, to 
the Orr interview, given at the end of October. And considering that these two statements 
roughly bracket the period during which the majority of the Ariel poems were composed,163 they 
offer us an opportunity to distinguish between an earlier and later version of Ariel poetics, 
revealing, then, not a shift from a Colossus (or post-Colossus) poetics to an Ariel poetics proper 
(a shift that has received a good deal of critical attention), but a shift within Plath’s Ariel poetics, 
one that I argue is important not only for a fuller understanding of the dynamics and scope of the 
Ariel poems themselves, but also of the ways in which Plath envisioned her poetry as actively 
engaged in the complexities of both her literary and historical moment. And it is in relation to 
this shift that Sitwell, I will argue, plays a key role. 
                                               
162 One might argue that Annas here is addressing the relation between the personal and the political, whereas in 
addressing the relation between personal experience and “the bigger things,” I am addressing the relation between 
the personal and the historical. However, given that these historical events were entering public “consciousness in a 
new way” during the early sixties, as we saw in the Chapter 1, and that they were doing so, then, during a time of 
escalating Cold War tensions, these events read, at the very least I would argue, as politically charged. As Peel 
writes of the moment in which Plath gave her interview with Orr, “In October 1962, Cold War anxiety translated 
itself into widespread fears of an imminent apocalypse, fueling a heightened sense of the significance and urgency 
of the present,” and, we might add, of the urgent presentness of the past (Writing Back 16).    
163 Seven of the poems that Plath collected in her Ariel manuscript were written in 1960 and 1961, before she 
published “Context,” and seven were written after she gave her Orr interview at the end of October of 1962; twenty-







And while this shift within Plath’s Ariel poetics would seem, indeed, a complete about-
face, when we read “Context” more closely, in full, and in relation to the Orr interview, attending 
to the ways in which both statements indeed engage their particular literary and historical 
contexts, we do detect a critical shift in the poetics of Ariel, but it is one that proves considerably 
more subtle than it might at first appear. “Context” begins by addressing the first question posed 
by London Magazine: “Would poetry be more effective, i.e. interest more people more 
profoundly, if it were concerned with the issues of our time?” (27). In line, it would seem, with 
the New Critical bent of the American academy during the fifties, the question assumes a certain 
remove of poetry from contemporary issues, suggesting that poetry at the time was generally not 
“concerned” with such “issues,” and yet at the same time, the fact that the editors posed the 
question suggests that such a view was beginning to feel a little threadbare and that it merited, 
perhaps, revisiting. What we might be detecting in the question, then, is an early stage of the 
shift that Annas discusses (though she focuses on a specifically American context) toward the 
more overtly political poetry of the later ‘60s and ‘70s. And when the lines from “Context” that I 
quoted above (those which state what her poems are not about) are read in response to this 
question, it would seem that Plath was throwing her lot in not with the shift, but with the status 
quo.   
However, her (full) response proves more complex. Here the language Annas uses to 
describe both statements of poetics helps us to articulate, I would argue, the shift from one to the 
other. “Context” indeed suggests that Plath at this point “had not yet resolved the current 
[historical moment’s] separation between personal and political.” Just a few months before she 
wrote the essay, Alvarez had published, in September of 1961, the full version of his essay in 







following April, complete with his extended comparison of Larkin and Hughes. What the 
London Magazine questionnaire offered Plath, then, was an opportunity to begin articulating a 
poetics that acknowledged—and in doing so, began to align itself with Alvarez’s call for “a new 
seriousness”—“that all our lives [ . . . ] are influenced profoundly by forces which have nothing 
to do with gentility, decency, or politeness,” “forces of disintegration that destroy the old 
standards of civilization” and whose “public faces,” as we have seen, “are those of two world 
wars, of the concentration camps, of genocide, and the threat of nuclear war” (“English Poetry 
Today” 220). What we see in “Context” is Plath grappling with how to reconcile her desire to 
create poetry that engaged “the world and the problems of an individual in this particular 
civilization,” that engaged “social problems”—an interest that had dovetailed with, and been 
encouraged by, Alvarez’s call—with a New Critical skittishness toward the “topical,” toward 
what she calls in the essay “headline poetry” (46).  
There is another concern here, too, one that is even more explicitly poised at the 
intersection of the literary and the political. In both his earlier Observer essay and the fuller 
Commentary version, Alvarez is careful to clarify that he was not dictating subject matter for 
“the new seriousness.” As we have seen, Alvarez insists that he is “not suggesting that modern 
English poetry, to be really modern, must be concerned with psychoanalysis or the concentration 
camps or the hydrogen bomb or any of the other modern horrors” (“English Poetry Today” 221). 
“I am not suggesting, in fact, that it must be anything,” Alvarez writes, because “poetry that feels 
it has to cope with predetermined subjects ceases to be poetry and becomes propaganda,” a 
concern certainly steeped in its Cold War moment (221). In “Context,” in response to the joint 
questions of whether she “fe[lt] her views on politics or religion influence[d] the kind of poetry 







a question that asked poets to indeed revisit, in effect (and at least in part), the New Critical 
positioning of art as an autonomous object independent of its roots in an artist’s life (a position 
with which Alvarez, as we have seen, takes issue) or of any of its possible “uses,” Plath 
rehearses, like Alvarez, her own insistence that poetry, to be poetry, must steer clear of what 
might be construed as propaganda: “Surely the great use of poetry is its pleasure—not its 
influence as religious or political propaganda” (“Context” 46). The line that Plath was set to 
walk, then, if she were to engage “the issues of [the] time” in her poetry, seemed at this point to 
cut between generating “headline poetry,” on the one side, and full-out “propaganda” on the 
other (46).  
The problem with “headline poetry,” Plath writes, circling back to explicitly address the 
editors’ first question (adopting its language), is that it “would[n’t] interest more people anymore 
more profoundly than the headlines” (46). “And,” she adds, “unless the up-to-the-minute poem 
grows out of something closer to the bone than a general, shifting philanthropy and is, indeed, 
that unicorn thing—a real poem, it is in danger of being screwed up as rapidly as the news sheet 
itself” (46). Interestingly, Plath here doesn’t outright reject “the up-to-the-minute poem” but 
rather insists that first, it must “grow out of” a “close[]-to-the-bone” conviction rather than a 
“shifting philanthropy,” and second, it must achieve some sort of dialectical working out of a 
relation between the timely (current issues and events) and the timeless (the “real poem”). And 
this door that Plath leaves cracked for “the up-to-the-minute poem” would swing wide that 
November, for example, with “Thalidomide,” which, as Peel writes, “respond[ed] to the 
discovery that a tranquilizing drug that had been prescribed for pregnant women was causing 
deformities” (Writing Back 165). And for Plath, as she indicates by her inclusion of the poem in 







indeed managed such a dialectical working out and had thereby become that “unicorn thing—a 
real poem.” At this stage, though, Plath had yet to arrive at the boldness of “Thalidomide”—Peel 
indicates that Plath shifted to this “explicit title” from the more subtle “Half Moon” (165)—and 
for now, her working through of the dialectic is both exploratory and, indeed, subtle.  
To the question of whether poetry should be “concerned with the issues of our time,” 
Plath first begins her answer, and thereby her essay, by underscoring just how concerned she is 
with “the issues.” And unlike most of the respondents to the questionnaire published in London 
Magazine that February, including Ted Hughes, Plath lists the specific issues that not only 
concerned but “preoccup[ied]” her: “The issues of our time which preoccupy me at the moment 
are the incalculable genetic effects of fallout and a documentary article on the terrifying, mad, 
omnipotent marriage of big business and the military in America—‘Juggernaut, The Warfare 
State,’ by Fred J. Cook in a recent Nation” (45). While she establishes herself here as in fact 
concerned with the issues, the question then remains as to whether her poetry shares (or rather 
enacts) this concern: “Does this influence the kind of poetry I write?”164 It is in response to this 
question that Plath traces for us what her poems both are and are not about, lines which would 
seem (and have been used) to support readings of Plath as an apolitical and ahistorical writer. 
However, ironically, given the essay’s title, these lines have tended to be taken out of context, 
something which, I would argue, has helped to foster such fundamental misreadings.165 While 
                                               
164 Plath here is posing for herself the editors’ second question: “Do you feel your views on politics or religion 
influence the kind of poetry you write?” (27). 
165 In “‘Angst’ and Animism in the Poetry of Sylvia Plath” (1970), Marjorie Perloff offers an early and 
representative example of such misreadings. Indeed, Perloff reads these lines from “Context” as a disavowal of the 
political, a disavowal that then serves to support her overall view of Plath as apolitical and ahistorical, and that leads 
to her determination that the very poems that I argue are among Plath’s most accomplished are, instead, “[t]he less 
successful poems in Ariel,” “those like ‘The Swarm’ and ‘Getting There’ that try to make a comment on the horrors 
of war or the viciousness of the Nazi ethos. In an interview of 1962, Sylvia Plath insisted that, although she was 
naturally concerned about such issues as the ‘genetic effects of fallout,’ these contemporary problems were not the 
mainspring of her poetry” (73). And so for Perloff, Plath’s most successful poems are not, then, the ones in which 







her statements about what her poetry is not about (such as Hiroshima) have often served to 
encapsulate her answer to this question, framing her response in the negative,166 there are 
actually two sentences immediately preceding these lines (and immediately following the 
question of whether the issues she lists “influence the kind of poetry [she] write[s]”) that in fact 
frame them—albeit with a qualification—in the affirmative:  
Does this influence the kind of poetry I write? Yes, but in a sidelong fashion. I am 
not gifted with the tongue of Jeremiah, though I may be sleepless enough before 
my vision of the apocalypse. My poems do not turn out to be about Hiroshima, 
but about a child forming itself finger by finger in the dark. They are not about the 
terrors of mass extinction, but about the bleakness of the moon over a yew tree in 
a neighboring graveyard. Not about the testaments of tortured Algerians, but 
about the night thoughts of a tired surgeon. (46) 
                                               
distaste for the life of a person and her complementary yearning for union with that more intense life that is death” 
(74). As what she defines as an “oracular” poet, “in the tradition of such later eighteenth-century poets as Smart, 
Cowper, Collins, and Blake” (58), Plath, for Perloff, is an “emphatically” different poet from Lowell:  
Despite its intensely personal quality, its stress on selfhood, Sylvia Plath’s poetry is emphatically not, as is 
often argued, similar to that of Robert Lowell. In Life Studies, the poet is obsessed with his own past, a past 
he must recover if he is to come to terms with the present and, by implication, with the future. The sense of 
history, both personal and social, found in a poem like “For the Union Dead” is conspicuously absent from 
the Ariel poems. This is not mere coincidence: for the oracular poet, past and present are meaningless 
abstractions; emotion, as Northrop Frye has observed, is “maintained at a continuous present.” For Sylvia 
Plath, there is only the given moment, only now. (72-3) 
In effect, then, what makes Plath’s work so decidedly different from Lowell’s, for Perloff, is the fact that she 
perceives it to be intrinsically ahistorical. And this view of Lowell as a historically and politically engaged poet in 
comparison to a Plath who is perceived as having failed in these terms was a common and persistent one.  
 Strangeways offers a very effective critique of Perloff’s misreading of “Context,” pointing out, for 
example, that in “Context,” Plath chose to focus primarily on the two most political questions of the six posed by the 
editors; for her purposes, though, Strangeways hones in on what she reads in “Context” as “a contradiction in 
[Plath’s] ideas about the purposes of poetry,” rather than on what, as I argue, constitutes a shift between “Context” 
and Plath’s later interview with Orr (100). 
166 Even Peel, who is so attuned to Plath’s engagements with her political moment, reads these lines from “Context” 
in this way: “Invited to comment on the relationship between her poetry and contemporary events, Plath wrote that 
her poems were ‘not about the testaments of tortured Algerians, but about the night thoughts of a tired surgeon’” 
(Writing Back 127). “Even so,” he concludes, “Plath certainly voices concern elsewhere about world events,” Peel 







While in response to “Context” it would seem, Annas concludes that “as an artist writing 
about her work, Plath had not yet [ . . . ] seen her poetry as a direct and conscious way of 
connecting the [personal and the political] or mediating between them,” Plath, I would argue—
while she certainly does not envision her poetry as “direct[ly] . . . connecting” the two—sees her 
poetry as in fact a conscious way, we might say, of indirectly connecting them, of connecting 
them, in other words, “in a sidelong fashion.” In adopting the original language of the editors’ 
question—“Do you feel your views on politics or religion influence the kind of poetry you 
write?” (27)—as she reframes it for herself, Plath, in effect, positions her list of issues as her 
political views, views represented here by her characterization of the military-industrial complex 
as “terrifying, mad, [and] omnipotent” and “the genetic effects of fallout” as “incalculable,” 
views that had indeed made her proud, nearly two years earlier, that her daughter’s first outing 
was to a march for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.167 And so when she responds 
“[y]es,” she responds, in effect, that her political views do indeed “influence” her poetry, an 
early indication, it would seem, that—against the New Critical ethos in which she had been 
trained, an ethos which Alvarez refers to in his essay, as we have seen, as “the cult of rigid 
impersonality”—she had begun to align herself with Alvarez’s assertion that to live in the 
twentieth century was to be “influenced profoundly by [the] forces [ … ] of disintegration” 
specific to the modern world, and that modern poetry, “to be really modern,” must “drop the 
pretence” that nothing had changed. However, Plath’s “yes” here is a “yes, but”; what “Context” 
allows us to examine, then, are the ways in which Plath had begun to grapple, not with whether 
the issues or her political views should influence her poetry, but with the precise angle at which 
                                               







they might enter into her poems to ensure that her poetry becomes something more than news 
and something other than propaganda.    
And for the Plath of “Context,” this angle is “sidelong.” In other words, Plath’s response 
to this question of influence is in effect, we might say, a statement of indirection, or rather, more 
accurately as we will see, of redirection. Noting that she lacks Jeremiah’s “tongue”—while still 
maintaining “[her own] vision of the apocalypse,” an important distinction as we begin to 
explore Sitwell’s role in the development of Plath’s poetics—Plath suggests that a direct 
engagement with the “issues of our time” at a time when the issues were in danger of bringing on 
the end of time (as Peel notes, “Cold War anxiety” was about to “[translate] itself into 
widespread fears of imminent apocalypse”) would entail not a dialectical working out of the 
timely and the timeless, but an utter collapse of the distinction between the two, a condition that 
would require that she become a mouthpiece of the unknown and unknowable, that would 
require a shift, in effect, from the role of poet to that of prophet and a concurrent shift, then, from 
the medium of poetry to that of prophecy. Such shifting would seem to imply that at this stage, 
Plath had yet to discover a method for directly engaging the “issues” in her poetry—issues 
specific to her particular historical and political moment—that didn’t seem antithetical to poetry 
itself. And yet, her qualified “yes” both reserves space for indirect engagement and at the same 
time refuses to fully relinquish a claim to the visionary (to “[her own] vision of apocalypse”). In 
the next paragraph, Plath further refines for us the “sidelong” or indirect nature of such an 
engagement:  
In a sense, these poems are deflections. I do not think they are an escape. 
For me, the real issues of our time are the issues of every time—the hurt and 







buildings; and the conservation of life of all people in all places, the jeopardizing 
of which no abstract doubletalk of “peace” or “implacable foes” can excuse. (46) 
Here we see Plath indeed working out, in effect, a dialectical relation between the timely and 
timeless, which her discussion of “headline poetry” (which immediately follows this paragraph) 
establishes as a requirement for any poem wishing to address the issues and remain a “real 
poem.” In other words, Plath positions the “real issues” that she defines here—“the issues of 
every time,” issues that focus, we could say, on creation—as timeless, and so for a poem to be a 
“real poem,” it is the “real issues” it must address. And yet, that isn’t to say that “the issues of 
our time”—of one particular time, issues, therefore, that are timely rather than timeless and that 
are focused, in contrast, on destruction—don’t factor into Plath’s poetics. They factor, as we 
have seen, “in a sidelong fashion” that situates her poems, then, as “deflections,” but not—as 
Plath is careful to point out—as “an escape.”  
 Read within the entirety of Plath’s statement, then, the lines most often cited from 
“Context,” the lines in which she lays out what her poems are and are not about, read quite 
differently. Indeed, what Plath establishes in “Context” is what we might call, then, a poetics of 
deflection, and when these lines are read within this context, we find Plath charting for us just 
such a deflection, calling our attention to “the issues of our time” (“not _____”) in order to then 
redirect this attention to what she determines to be “the real issues,” “the issues of every time” 
(“but _____”). And what she arrives at, then, through this dialectical working out of the relation 
between the timely and the timeless—through this negation, that is, of “the issues of our time” by 
the “real issues”—is a poem, for example, “about a child forming itself finger by finger in the 
dark” that has become not only a poem about a child forming, but also a poem not about 







real issues,” Plath does not sever all connection with contemporary political matters, does not, in 
other words, “escape” from them, but instead arrives with us at timeless issues that have perhaps 
never been so timely. Indeed, the timeless issues she lists here (“the hurt and wonder of loving; 
making in all its forms”)—issues which dilate from private (the “making” of “children” and 
“loaves of bread”) to public (the “making” of “buildings,” as opposed, we might say, to 
homes)—culminate in the most explicitly political (and therefore timely) statement of the essay: 
“the conservation of life of all people in all places, the jeopardizing of which no abstract 
doubletalk of ‘peace’ or ‘implacable foes’ can excuse.” The rhetoric Plath quotes here situates 
her poetics, in other words, within a specifically Cold War context, pinpointing creation 
(“loving” and “making”) and the conservation of creation (“the conservation of life”) as 
precisely what is under threat in that Cold War moment by nationalist justifications of war as the 
preservation of peace. 
 In a letter to her mother dated December 7, 1961, written at approximately the same time 
as “Context”—the letter reading to a significant degree as either an early draft for, or reiteration 
of, key points of the essay—Plath provides the source of this rhetoric as she describes “all the 
warlike talk in the papers, such as Kennedy saying Khrushchev would ‘have no place to hide,’ 
and the armed forces manuals indoctrinating soldiers about the ‘inevitable’ war with our 
‘implacable foe’” (Letters Home 437-8). In deflecting our attention from “the issues of our time” 
and redirecting it toward “the real issues of our time,” then, Plath situates creation in response to 
a historically (and politically) specific moment of war and destruction. Shifting from destruction 
to creation—that is, framing creation as a response to destruction, a strategy we see at work in 
“Green Song,” and will soon see in “Lady Lazarus”—Plath’s poetics, as she constructs it here, 







enlists creation on behalf of the political. Already we see here in “Context,” rather than a 
disavowal of the political, then, the seeds of the poetics she would express some eight months 
later in her interview with Orr. The tension she establishes between destruction and creation, 
between “the issues of our time” and “the real issues,” undergoes a subtle though substantial 
transformation until it appears recalibrated in the Orr interview as a tension between personal 
experience and “the bigger things,” the relation Plath forges between the two becoming, indeed, 
increasingly direct.  
For now, though, Plath was feeling out this relation, and this feeling out would at first 
appear confined to “Context,” to the lines so often quoted from the essay. It is by way of these 
lines that Plath’s poem, for example, “about the bleakness of the moon over a yew tree” (“The 
Moon and the Yew Tree,” one of the earliest poems that Plath would collect in her Ariel 
manuscript) becomes a poem also “not about the terrors of mass extinction,” and her poem 
“about the night thoughts of a tired surgeon” (“The Surgeon at 2 a.m.”) becomes, at the same 
time, a poem “[n]ot about the testaments of tortured Algerians” (46, my emphasis). The 
redirection from the forces of destruction to those of creation that Plath enacts in “Context,” in 
other words, does not, in these two cases, take place within the poems themselves. Careful, in 
“Context,” as we have seen, not to present creation as an escape from the forces of destruction, 
Plath maintains the connection between them by framing each act of creation as a specific 
response to “the issue[] of [the] time” from which it deflects us. For example, transforming 
landscape into mindscape (“This is the light of the mind, cold and planetary”), the speaker of 
“The Moon and the Yew Tree” reflects on nature, but does so within the broader context of 
environmental crisis (of “the terrors of mass extinction”) (Ariel 65). And the “tired surgeon,” 







have perfected it”), nonetheless heals his patients, but does so within the context of news from 
the Algerian War, of “testaments of tortured Algerians” (Collected Poems 171). And in this case, 
the connection can be traced specifically, it would seem, to a November 10th article in The 
Guardian reporting “charges of torture” brought against members of “Algiers military police,” 
who “refus[ed] to supply photographs” necessary for the identification of the perpetrators 
(“Obstruction in Torture Case” 11). A witness had testified that the woman filing the charges had 
been “carried back [to her cell] unconscious” and battered “from a four-hour interrogation” (11). 
(Intensifying the horror of the ordeal, and increasing the likelihood, perhaps, that this particular 
article would have helped form the “vision of apocalypse” in “Context” before which Plath had 
found herself “sleepless,” The Guardian reported that the second time the woman was taken 
from her cell, “her interrogators impaled her on a beer bottle” [11]). And after stating that “[t]he 
conditions in the Vincennes internment camp ha[d] been described as scandalous by three 
deputies who visited it,” the article—offering Plath, perhaps, the link to her tired surgeon—
featured surgeons responding to the violence wrought by the military police: “[t]hirty surgeons 
and doctors of the Corentin-Celton hospital in Paris have signed a statement declaring that of the 
103 injured North Africans brought to the hospital between October 17 and November 1, 65 
needed hospitalization and most of them had received no medical care whatsoever before 
arriving” (11).  
However, neither “The Moon and the Yew Tree” nor “The Surgeon at 2 a.m.” itself 
contains references to these “modern horrors” or otherwise constructs the frame of reference 
necessary to situate the creation embodied in the poems in relation to these contexts. Yet, with 
the first poem that Plath describes, the poem that she frames in reference to Hiroshima, one of 







forces of disintegration”169—to which Plath had added, as we’ve seen here, environmental 
disaster and the Algerian War—we perhaps see evidence that she had indeed begun to 
experiment with how to do just that. Of the poems that Plath had written at this point, “You’re,” 
the earliest that she would include in Ariel, would seem the best fit for a poem “about a child 
forming itself finger by finger in the dark.” Written while Plath was pregnant with her daughter 
in early 1960, the poem is a lively romp through an ever-shifting series of metaphors and similes 
for the speaker’s developing baby, whom she describes as “wrapped up in yourself like a spool, / 
[t]rawling your dark as owls do” (Ariel 77). However, as we see here, while the poem does 
present the baby in darkness and does include images of the baby developing—the speaker 
addresses her as “O high-riser, my little loaf” and as “[a] clean slate, with your own face on”—it 
doesn’t present an image quite consistent with that of “a child forming itself finger by finger in 
the dark.” And its boisterous, playful tone seems markedly discordant with the note of quiet 
reflection we hear in Plath’s description. Yet, while “You’re” was the only poem about 
pregnancy that Plath had finalized at this point, it wasn’t, it would appear, the only pregnancy 
poem that she had drafted.170 As Peel points out, “around this time,” Plath had begun composing 
a series of what he calls “midwinter drafts” that “represent writing that is intended to—and does 
indeed—document the last month of pregnancy, the birth of the child, and its first outing” 
(Writing Back 127).171 And if we look at the first of these drafts, the first, that is, in the “Waking 
                                               
169 While Alvarez doesn’t list Hiroshima specifically, he does list the “two world wars” and “the threat of nuclear 
war,” the present threat that had brought Hiroshima into new focus (“English Poetry Today” 220). And when he 
insists that he isn’t dictating that poets specifically address the “modern horrors,” he lists “the hydrogen bomb” 
(221).  
170 For more on the approximate dating and sequencing of these drafts, see Peel’s chapter in Writing Back, “Revising 
and Revising: The Bell Jar Manuscripts, Two January 1962 Poems, ‘Elm,’ and Ariel,” pp. 121-32.  
171   To the invaluable work Peel has performed in detecting and correcting the chronology of these drafts, a couple 
of which had been categorized under the wrong year in Collected Poems, I would add that the poem Peel refers to 
here, “New Year on Dartmoor,” depicts not a newborn’s “first outing,” but instead a toddler’s attempts to make 
sense of an ice-encased world. In the poem, the child doesn’t “know what to make of the sudden slippiness, / The 







in Winter” series (which then carries over into a series entitled “Fever”), we find an image, I 
would argue, much closer to the one Plath offers in “Context”: “Some soul has been shaping all 
night, without effort or strategy” (“Waking in Winter” 1). Immediately preceding the draft 
originally entitled “Ninth Month,” “Woman as Landscape” reflects on pregnancy as its speaker 
broods on the landscape beyond her window, generating a tone considerably more in keeping 
(than the playful energy of “You’re”) with the quiet stillness of Plath’s description. 
And what’s more, “Woman as Landscape” indeed contains a reference to the specific 
“[issue] of [the] time” (Hiroshima) that Plath connects to her poem “about a child forming itself” 
in “Context.” And within this allusion, then—within, that is, the poem itself—we can detect the 
beginnings of a frame of reference capable of positioning the creation the poem reflects on in 
response to the destruction at work in the “modern horrors.” In the poem, in keeping with 
Bakhtin’s conception of the “grotesque” body—a body, that is, in flux, in a state of 
transformation—as a body that fuses with the world of objects and animals, with the earth (a 
conception we saw at work in The Sleeping Beauty), the pregnant speaker’s “head settles itself 
among the clods” beyond the window, and she muses, “[l]ike the red soil around me, I color the 
sheep and the cows” (“Waking in Winter 1”). The draft develops and discards, repeats and 
revises until it ends with the following lines, in which the speaker identifies painfully with the 
skeletal winter landscape:   
 The owls have packed themselves up. 
                                               
begun to talk: “There’s no getting up it by the words you know. / No getting up by elephant or wheel or shoe” 
(Collected Poems 176). In a letter to her mother, dated Dec. 29, 1961, Plath, who was due to give birth to her son in 
a matter of weeks, seems to confirm such a reading. After telling her mother that “[i]t’s the second coldest winter 
this century, the farmers say,” she adds “[t]ook Frieda for little trots on Dartmoor this week”  (Letters Home 441). 
At this point, Frieda would have been a few months shy of her second birthday. This would place “New Year on 
Dartmoor” before (rather than after) the “Fever” series of drafts that culminate in childbirth, and would therefore 
disrupt the narrative arc that Peel traces for the series. Plath’s son Nicholas was born on January 17th, a few weeks 







They had eaten the skin off the scenery[.] 
Toe-pebbles, ribcages, crania blanched like grudges 
In the killing milk of the sun[.] (“Waking in Winter” 1) 
According to Peel, during this period “there were increasing suspicions about the damage fall-out 
was doing to pregnant women, to their unborn babies, and to the milk being drunk by those just 
born” (Writing Back 72). Plath herself demonstrated an awareness of such suspicions—and not 
just with mothers’ milk—in a letter she had written to her mother just a few months earlier, at the 
end of October. As Tracy Brain points out in her chapter, “Plath’s Environmentalism,” Plath 
indicates in this letter an awareness, specifically, of Strontium 90, even before Rachel Carson 
had discussed it in Silent Spring, a book often credited with “spark[ing] off the beginnings of the 
North’s environmental movement” (qtd. in Brain 85). In Silent Spring, Carson offers the 
following introduction to the chemical: “chemicals are the sinister and little-recognized partners 
of radiation in changing the very nature of the world . . . Strontium 90, released through nuclear 
explosions into the air, comes to earth in rain or drifts down as fallout, lodges in soil, enters into 
the grass or corn or wheat grown there, and in time takes up its abode in the bones of a human 
being” (qtd. in Brain 88). To her mother, Plath wrote, “I hope the Strontium 90 level doesn’t go 
up too high in milk,” adding, “I’ve been very gloomy about the bomb news; of course, the 
Americans have contributed to the poisonous level,” Plath underscoring, as she will again in her 
December letter to her mother, American culpability (Letters Home 434). Here Plath refers to the 
series of nuclear explosions the Soviet Union had begun conducting that September, a series that 
by its end that November, would total 57 tests. That day, October 30th, had seen the explosion, as 
Peel describes it, of what “was—and, still is—the largest nuclear bomb ever tested in the 







the sum total of all the explosions in the Second World War” (Writing Back 127). Such concerns, 
then, Plath would invoke as she describes herself in “Context” as being “preoccup[ied]” with 
“the incalculable genetic effects of fallout,” concerns she appears to invoke here in “Woman as 
Landscape,” then, with “the killing milk of the sun.”  
And here, too, in the symbol of the sun, we can begin to detect, I would argue, the 
presence of Sitwell and her “Epoch of the Cold” in Plath’s developing poetics. In her long essay 
on Sitwell, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Plath had demonstrated how attuned she 
was to the “complex wealth of meaning and symbolism” that Sitwell achieved in her later work 
in the image of the sun: “It is God, Christ, the life force, the ‘world’s first lover,’ the redeemer, 
the affirmer” (“Edith Sitwell”). And it is Sitwell’s symbolic use of the sun that inspires the 
young Plath into “sun-worshipp[ing]” rhapsodies which culminate in her declaration that—
despite having read that semester, for example, Yeats, Eliot, and Auden—it was Sitwell who had 
“struck and entranced” her:  
A sun-worshipper myself, after a fashion, I find a fervor approaching mystic 
revelation in Edith Sitwell’s recurrent paeans to the Sun. (I wish I could quote 
them all here, or read them aloud to an appreciative audience, or dance and sing 
them on the banks of Paradise Pond in the springtime. Indeed, I do not know 
when I have been so struck and entranced by any poet; it is as if my life had been 
a twilit room, and suddenly the walls had fallen away, and the many-faceted gold 
of the sun came streaming in, momentarily blinding, transfiguring and permeating 
the ordinary day-by-day world until the whole universe sang with vibrant 







“But above all,” Plath concludes—giving us a slight indication of how she had begun to integrate 
Sitwell’s Catholicism into her own self-described “agnostic humanism” (a world-view, as we 
will see later in this chapter, intercut with existentialism)—“the Sun is the transfiguring splendor 
of mystically powerful light” (“Edith Sitwell”; “Religion as I See it”). And for Plath’s purposes, 
Sitwell’s exploration of a “mystical union of earth and spirit” reads as a vision of the world 
specific to “a pagan fertility goddess, rather than a Christian virgin” (“Edith Sitwell”).  
And yet, just as we saw in the case of Sitwell’s “early world,” there is another side to 
Sitwell’s sun. As Sitwell writes in her introduction to The Canticle of the Rose, with the start of 
World War II, she developed a mythopoesis focused on “the change from the worship of the 
holy, living, life-giving gold of the wheat to the destructive gold of Dives—the change from the 
warmth of love that makes all men brothers to the state in which men only call their fellowmen 
‘Brother’ in order to act the part of Cain” (xxxiv). And so her poems “spoke [ . . . ] of the 
summer of the earth and of the heart, and of how the warmth of the heart faded and only a false 
brotherhood remained” (xxxiv). However, with “the fall of the first atom bomb,” this mythos 
took a turn “toward the final disaster” (xxxiv). In response to the news of Hiroshima, Sitwell 
wrote “The Shadow of Cain,” a poem “about the fission of the world into warring particles, 
destroying and self-destructive” (xxxvi). As such, the poem extends Sitwell’s mythos beyond 
“that Second Fall of Man that took the form of the separation of brother and brother, of Cain and 
Abel, of nation and nation” as it follows “the gradual migration of mankind [ . . . ] into the desert 
of the Cold, towards the final disaster, the symbol of which fell on Hiroshima” (xxxiv). For 
Sitwell, with Hiroshima, “the Sun itself had [ . . . ] been harnessed to a war-machine and used 







“Woman as Landscape,” the source of “killing milk,” the source of “the incalculable genetic 
effects of fallout.”  
In her letter to her mother, written around the same time as “Context,” and, therefore, 
around the same time as her midwinter drafts, Plath makes this connection between Hiroshima 
and the current state of Cold War tensions more explicit. Plath, who was due to give birth in just 
a little over a month, confided in her mother the depth of her concerns about the “issues of our 
time”—issues that include those she would list in “Context”172—into which her son was soon to 
be born:   
The reason I haven’t written for so long is probably quite silly, but I got so 
awfully depressed two weeks ago by reading two issues of The Nation—
“Juggernaut, the Warfare State”—all about the terrifying marriage of big business 
and the military in America and the forces of the John Birch Society, etc.; and 
then another article about the repulsive shelter craze for fallout, all very factual, 
documented, and true, that I simply couldn’t sleep for nights with all the warlike 
talk in the papers [. . . . ] I began to wonder if there was any point in trying to 
bring up children in such a mad, self-destructive world. The sad thing is that the 
power for destruction is real and universal, and the profession of generals, who, 
on retirement, become board heads of the missile plants [to which] they have been 
feeding orders. I am also horrified at the U.S. selling missiles (without warheads) 
to Germany, awarding former German officers medals. As the reporter for the 
liberal Frankfurt paper says, coming back to America from his native Germany, it 
is as if he hadn’t been away. (Letters Home 437-8) 
                                               
172 In her letter to her mother, Plath mentions, for example, the “Juggernaut” article that she references in “Context” 







Already we see here Plath forging connections between personal experience (raising children) 
and “the bigger things” (the military-industrial complex, the Cold War). And as we saw in 
“Context,” Plath articulates the “issues of our time”—this time explicitly—in terms of 
destruction (“the power for destruction is real and universal”) and this destruction, in turn, in 
relation to creation (“trying to bring up children in such a mad, self-destructive world”). As the 
letter continues, Plath describes the state of Cold War tensions in America in terms not unlike 
Sitwell’s “Second Fall of Man”: “One of the most distressing features about all this is the public 
announcements of Americans arming against each other—the citizens of Nevada announcing 
they will turn out bombed and ill people from Los Angeles into the desert (all this official), and 
ministers and priests preaching that it is all right to shoot neighbors who try to come into one’s 
bomb shelters” (438). And as she continues, her discussion of Cold War anxieties takes on a 
Marxist inflection: “I think it appalling that the shelter system in America should be allowed to 
fall into the hands of the advertisers—the more money you spend, the likelier you are to survive, 
etc., when 59 percent of taxes go for military spending already” (438).  
What follows next is a section of the letter that was edited out of Letters Home, a section 
in which Plath indeed makes an explicit connection between Hiroshima and the present state of 
nuclear threat, a connection that underscores American culpability in the crisis of fallout and in 
escalating Cold War tensions. Admonishing the U.S. for having detached itself from the 
“incalculable genetic effects of fallout,” from the devastation it had left in the wake of its end to 
the war, Plath writes, “I think the boyscouts & the American Legion & the rest of these ghastly 
anti-communist organizations should be forced to sit every Sunday before movies of the victims 
of Hiroshima, & the generals each to live with a victim, like the human conscience which is so 







registering for herself the “new way” in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki were entering into public 
consciousness during the early sixties, the way in which the atrocities of World War II had 
become a past that was all too present.  
 All of this, then, formed the context out which Plath’s essay as well as her midwinter 
drafts arose. And as Peel demonstrates, these issues in the news—issues that, as Plath put it to 
her mother, made it so she “simply couldn’t sleep for nights,” “sleepless” as she was, as she put 
it in “Context,” “before [her] vision of the apocalypse”—enter into the drafts by way of the 
speaker’s nightmares, a thread that, begun in the second “Waking in Winter” draft, carries not 
only through this series of drafts but in through the next series, “Fever.”173 In this second draft, 
with the variant title “The Ninth Month,” the “all night” during which “some soul ha[d] been 
shaping” in “Woman as Landscape” becomes laden with apocalyptic nightmares: “All night I 
have dreamed of destruction, annihilations— / An assembly line of cut throats” (“Waking in 
Winter” 2). In addition to manifesting fears of full-scale nuclear war—of what Plath had 
described about a year and a half earlier, in a letter recording her attendance at the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament march, as “world-annihilation” (Letters Home 378)—the speaker’s 
nightmare registers the concerns about the Algerian War she voices in “Context.” According to 
Peel, Plath here, with this image of “cut throats,” “was responding  [ . . . ] to the disturbing news 
from Algeria [ . . . ] that came throughout December and early January”; “in the New Year,” for 
example, “reports appeared in The Times and other newspapers describing the violence and 
anarchy in Algeria, where ‘[m]achine gun raids from cars, stealthy throat-cutting, shots fired in 
                                               
173 In large part on the basis of this thread, Peel argues persuasively that what are housed in the archives as two 
separate series of drafts—“Waking in Winter” and “Fever”—are in fact drafts of what should be considered a single 







broad daylight, lynching and sporadic communal clashes have all become . . . a part of the daily 
scene” (Writing Back 127).  
Within these first two drafts, then, Plath has established what Peel calls “the two 
competing and contrasting dialectical strands that run consistently through all pages” of the two 
series:  “Contrasting with the images of destruction is the presence of new human life” (129). In 
the typescript Plath arrives at by the end of the “Waking in Winter” series, the lingering residue 
of the speaker’s nightmare—contrasting the subtle suggestion of the speaker’s pregnancy, a 
suggestion made in large part by the original titles of the first two drafts—effectively transforms 
the barren winter landscape, to which she has awoken at dawn, into post-atomic ruin:  
I can taste the tin of the sky—the real tin thing. 
Winter dawn the color of metal.  
The trees stiffen into place like burnt nerves. 
All night I have dreamed of destruction, annihilations— (“Waking in Winter 4”) 
Such “destruction” and “annihilations,” in other words, have translated winter trees into “burnt 
nerves,” which “evok[e],” as Tracy Brain writes, “the skeleton-like figures that are now familiar 
post-nuclear photographic images” (89). In the speaker’s nightmare, the “destruction” and 
“annihilations” merge into a dream of “you and I [ . .  . ] on the way to the sea resort,” where 
they happen upon images, as Brain puts it, “that we might find in museums dedicated to 
Hiroshima” (89), images such as “[c]ot legs melted into terrible attitudes” (“Waking in Winter 
4”). What’s more, “[v]isualizing the devastating and immediate effect of an atomic explosion 
upon the human bodies in its epicenter,” Brain writes, “[the speaker] remarks, ‘How the sun lit 







With these strands of destruction and new life in place in the “Waking in Winter” drafts, 
Plath begins, then, in the “Fever” series—which progresses from pregnancy to childbirth—to 
experiment with the poetics of deflection she charts in “Context,” exploring, that is, how she 
might enact a poetics that places creation in response to destruction and, in doing so, places “the 
real issues” in response to “the issues of [the] time,” those by which the “real issues” had become 
precisely what is at stake. In the first of the “Fever” drafts, the trees of the final “Waking in 
Winter” typescript consolidate, in effect, into a single elm (which, a few months later, will 
become, as we will see, the “Elm” Plath includes in Ariel): “The elm is a clot of burnt nerves” 
(“Fever 1”). With the image of the “burnt nerves” carried over into the “Fever” drafts, then, we 
don’t only get in this series images of atomic aftermath; we get the “sickness” engendered by it 
(“Fever 1”). Observing the elm as dawn breaks through the haze of the same nightmare we see 
threading through the drafts of “Waking in Winter,” the speaker concludes, “The day is a parable 
of the soul. / White, cowardly, it arrives at a late hour / Bringing sickness in its cupped hands” 
(“Fever 1”).  
The “fever” of the series, then, first enters the drafts externally, by way of a “day” 
configured by the speaker’s dream as a post-atomic dawn; the “fever” enters, we might say, by 
way of a sun that is “late” in its “arriv[al],” a sun that has been, as Sitwell might put it, 
“harnessed to a war-machine and used against us.” As such, the “sickness” the day carries “in its 
cupped hands” is a “fever,” as the poem’s title designates it, wrought on a world scale, fever 
symptomatic of fallout—of radiation sickness and “killing milk.” The “fever” of the series, then, 
as well as that of the later “Fever 103°,” as we will see, reads not only as the speaker’s individual 
fever, but as what Sitwell designates in her later work as “the world’s fever” (The Canticle of the 







sin and hate as they manifest on the collective level as war and destruction, as we see in her 
World War II poems. And with her “Three Poems of the Atomic Age,” with their “epoch of the 
Cold” (272), in which the sun has been “harnessed” indeed for purposes of “the Cold,” Sitwell’s 
earlier World War II poems, those “Song[s] of the Cold” with their “fevers of the world” (225), 
take on a post-atomic resonance. By categorizing in her essay Sitwell’s later poems from the start 
of the war onward under the heading “Epoch of the Cold,” a line, in fact, from the atomic-age 
“The Shadow of Cain,” Plath suggests that she herself read the war poems in general through the 
lens of this “epoch,” structured as it is, as were the earlier war poems, by what Plath identifies as 
“the opposing symbols” of Sitwell’s later work: “the Cold and the Sun” (“Edith Sitwell”). And 
reading these poems through the lens of Sitwell’s introduction—as Plath’s references to the 
introduction in her essay suggest she did—“the world’s fever” we find in Sitwell’s war poems 
indeed reads as a consequence of the sun having “been harnessed to a war-machine.”   
Around the time that she wrote her long essay on Sitwell, Plath demonstrated her 
familiarity with “the world’s fever” in Sitwell’s later work, trying it out in a poem of her own. In 
her essay, Plath had indeed quoted one of the myriad lines in which Sitwell invokes such fever; 
in Plath’s words, it is “[t]he [a]ffirming [s]un” (as opposed, we might say, to the atomic sun) in 
Sitwell’s poems that figures, as we have seen, the “Ardent Belief that sees life in the aridities of 
the dust, / In the seed and the base excrement and the world’s fevers” (“Edith Sitwell”). Around 
this time, too, as we saw in the last chapter, Plath had experimented with images from “Green 
Song” in “April Aubade,” an experiment she would later continue in “November Graveyard,” in 
her bid for Moore’s sponsorship, and return to, as we will see, in “Lady Lazarus.” And “Green 
Song,” a poem, then, with which Plath would repeatedly engage, opens with such fever, “[w]ith 







(The Canticle of the Rose 194). In “danse macabre,” written, then, around the same time as 
“April Aubade,” Plath appropriated this image as she deployed Sitwell’s “opposing symbols” of 
“the Cold and the Sun”: “Arranged in sheets of ice, the fond / skeleton still craves to have / fever 
from the world behind” (Collected Poems 321). 
And in the first “Fever” draft, “Fever in Winter,” Plath establishes a parallel that 
resonates indeed with Alvarez’s parallel between the private and public “faces” of “the forces of 
disintegration,” a parallel that resonates with the one she herself will establish in her interview 
with Orr between “personal experience” and “the bigger things.” While, as we have seen, death 
will serve to structure such a parallel in “Lady Lazarus,” here “fever” serves the purpose of 
aligning “the world’s fever” that has rendered the elm “a clot of burnt nerves” with the speaker’s 
fever that figures “the nerves” “[i]n her hands” as “little red, burnt trees” (“Fever 1”). But in this 
draft, the other strand of the dialectic, the strand associated with the speaker’s pregnancy, is 
absent, and so this poem that begins, in effect, with “the world’s fever” ends—by way of the 
nightmare of “destruction, annhiliations” and “cut throats”—with the “issues of [the] time,” with 
“[d]arkness boiling at the tongue-root. The injustice!” (“Fever 1”).174  
However, in the second draft, entitled, like its Ariel offshoot, “Fever 103°,” the strand of 
creation figures materially through the process of childbirth. Here, the fever begins not beyond 
the window pane but in “[t]he nerves [that] sleep in [the speaker’s] hands, little red, burnt trees” 
(“Fever 2”). In this draft, “the world’s fever” enters the poem through the body of the speaker, a 
body, as we saw in “Woman as Landscape,” that is “grotesque,” a body very much in-process, 
not fixed but fluid, and as such, as Bakhtin would put it, “not separated from the world by clearly 
defined boundaries”; rather it is “blended with the world, with animals, with objects.” For 
                                               







Bakhtin, as we have seen, such bodies become “cosmic,” “an incarnation of this world at the 
absolute lower stratum” (27). And such is the speaker’s body in the process, as we discover in 
the last lines of the poem, of childbirth: “Along [the] filaments” of “[t]he nerves [a]sleep in [the 
speaker’s] hands,” “what a gossiping! / Voices possess them that they know nothing about” 
(“Fever 2”). Fever, then, by way of the speaker’s network of “burnt” nerves, indeed connects her 
with the world:  
Now I am humming 
Disjointed, without a name[,] 
My glass eyes sit on hot wires. 
I hook up the universe. (“Fever 2”) 
The speaker becomes so connected with the world, in fact, that she finds herself ready, unlike 
Plath herself in “Context,” to take on “the tongue of Jeremiah,” though it is indeed before “[her 
own] vision of apocalypse”: “I am ready to prophesy[.] / Destruction, destruction, an assembly-
line of cut throats” (“Fever 2”). However, while Plath crosses out the first of these two lines, she 
in effect retains the act of prophecy, the speaker eventually displaced by her nerves in this 
prophetic role: “My cheap fibers stretch miles. / Crying destruction, destruction, annihilation, 
ash” (“Fever 2”). In effect, then, “hook[ed] up [to] the universe,” the speaker becomes a conduit 
of “the issues of [the] time”: “The business of sullen continents is my news” (“Fever 2”). And by 
the end of the draft, this “news,” this destruction, is countered by the arrival of new life, by what 
Plath figures as “the brain of creation”: “They will bury the purple afterbirth on the back hill. / 
Overnight it froze in its bowl, like the brain of creation. / Red, in a crust of blood, in its glass 







 Likewise, the remainder of the drafts, as Peel describes them, effectively “chart a process 
by which the earlier nightmares of the speaker, expressed in images drawn from the violence of 
international politics retreat and dissolve in the miraculous freshness of new life” (Writing Back 
126). And this new life, as the drafts progress, becomes more and more an embodied presence. 
While the baby is evoked indirectly by its afterbirth in the second draft, by the fourth, the 
afterbirth is rendered “silent as my baby,” and the baby, refusing to stay silent, erupts onto the 
page, effectively interrupting the material reworked from the previous drafts: “The nerves cramp 
in my hands—little red burnt trees. / Along their filaments what a gossiping! / Voices possess 
them that they know nothing about (“Fever 4”). Immediately beneath this material, Plath has 
drawn an emphatic line, demarcating it from the following stanzas, in which the speaker 
addresses the baby directly, stanzas that directly depict—unlike any of Plath’s other maternity 
poems—the moment of childbirth: 
  You stuck and would not come. 
The pain grew back and contained me like the mouth of a flower, 
Black, blood-sweet. My eyes squeezed shut on it.  
So we fought our first fight.  
 
It was so quiet. 
 
You came in spite of it, a rocket 
Sailing in a wall of water, on to the sheet. 
Head, shoulders, feet, dragging three shrieks 







As a totem[.] (“Fever 4”) 
In her introduction, Sitwell defines “[a] totem pole” as a “symbol of creation” (The Canticle of 
the Rose xxxiv). And in “The Shadow of Cain,” the image arises—not unlike the child here in 
Plath’s draft—in contrast to “annihilation.” Describing the genesis of the poem, Sitwell identifies 
the source of this image as “a paragraph in the Times, a description by an eye-witness of the 
immediate effect of the atomic bomb upon Hiroshima. That witness saw a totem pole of dust 
arise to the sun as a witness against the murder of mankind. . . . A totem pole, the symbol of 
creation, the symbol of generation” (xxxiv). And Sitwell’s poem itself includes an image of the 
blast:  
  [ . . . ] there came a roar as if the Sun and Earth had come together—  
  The Sun descending and the Earth ascending 
To take its place above . . . the Primal Matter 
Was broken, the womb from which all life began, 
Then to the murdered Sun a totem pole of dust arose in memory of Man. (274-5) 
While the totem, here, serves a memorial purpose, in the fourth draft of “Fever,” it serves to 
mark not only the arrival of new life, but of the speaker’s own rebirth, Plath here planting the 
seeds of the purification and ascendance that we will see in the “Fever 103°” of Ariel: 
  Bleached and finished, I float up, 
Shedding annihilations, cries,  
The long sigh of water in my wake[.] (“Fever 4”) 
It is in the pared-down arc of the last draft of “Fever,” however, that Plath’s poetics of 







newsprint,” the poem then redirects us, through a process of purification, to the physical 
presence of the baby:  
Four o’clock, and the fever soaks from me like honey. 
O ignorant heart! 
All night I have heard 
 
The meaningless cry of babies. Such a sea 
Broods in the newsprint! 
Fish-grease, fish bones, refuse of atrocities. 
 
Bleached and finished, I surface 
Among the b[l]anched, boiled instruments, the virginal curtains.  
Here is a white sky. Here is the beauty 
 
Of cool mouths and hands open and natural as roses.  
My glass of water refracts the morning.  
The baby is sleeping. (“Fever 6”) 
Fittingly for a poetics of deflection, we might say, an image of refraction (of, in other words, 
redirection) marks the poem’s shift from destruction to creation, to “[t]he baby [ . . . ] sleeping.” 
In effect, then, by integrating references to the “atrocities” “in the newsprint,” the draft moves us 
from “the issues of [the] time” to the “real issues” under threat in that intensified Cold War 
moment. 







first child. Written three weeks after Frieda’s birth, on April 21, 1960, Plath described having 
“attended the arrival of the Easter weekend marchers from the atomic bomb plant at Aldermason 
to Trafalgar Square in London,” a march organized, as we have seen, by the CND: 
I saw the first of the 7-mile-long column appear—red and orange and green 
banners, “Ban the Bomb!” etc., shining and swaying slowly. Absolute silence. I 
found myself weeping to see the tan, dusty marchers, knapsacks on their backs—
Quakers and Catholics, Africans and whites, Algerians and French—40 percent 
were London housewives. (Letters Home 378) 
Aligning herself here with these “London housewives,” Plath positions Frieda, only two weeks 
old at the time, in relation to “the issues of our time”: “I felt so proud that the baby’s first real 
adventure should be as a protest against the insanity of world-annihilation. Already a certain 
percentage of unborn children are doomed by fallout and no one knows the cumulative effects of 
what is already poisoning the air and sea” (378). Rather than envisioning herself and her baby as 
simply observers of the march, Plath here factors their attendance as indeed part of the protest. 
Rather than positioning herself and Frieda (mother and baby) as simply peripheral to the march 
and the issues, in other words, Plath instead foregrounds her baby’s direct connection to (and 
stakes in) the issues the march was organized to protest, pointing to the effects of fallout on 
unborn children and the dangers lingering for the living in the “air and sea.” And by the time she 
writes Lynne Lawner five months later, on September 30th, she had arrived at a way of 
structuring this connection, explicitly placing creation in response to destruction: “Frieda is my 
answer to the H-bomb” (“Nine Letters” 50). 
The fact that Plath never finalized these drafts might seem to suggest that such a poetics 







we might say, a few months later in the verse drama she wrote for the BBC in March, Three 
Women: A Poem for Three Voices, and in April’s “Elm.”175 In Three Women, the “competing 
strands” of creation and destruction that we see at work in the midwinter drafts manifest 
themselves in the opposition of roundness and flatness, an opposition not entirely unlike, we 
might say, that of Sitwell’s Sun and the Cold. Set, as the poem indicates, in “[a] Maternity Ward 
and round about,” Three Women begins with a line that—like the first “Waking in Winter” draft, 
“Woman as Landscape,” and the second draft of “Fever,” “Fever 103°,” in which the speaker 
“hook[s] up the universe”—establishes the pregnant woman (the first of the three “voices”) as 
“cosmic”: “I am slow as the world. I am very patient, / Turning through my time, the suns and 
stars / Regarding me with attention” (Collected Poems 176). And with the second of the three 
women, the thread of destruction enters the poem. Having suffered a miscarriage, the second 
voice associates this death with the “flatness” of men:  
 When I first saw it, the small red seep, I did not believe it. 
 I watched the men walk about me in the office. They were so flat! 
There was something about them like cardboard, and now I had caught it,  
That flat, flat, flatness from which ideas, destructions, 
Bulldozers, guillotines, white chambers of shrieks proceed, 
Endlessly proceed—and the cold angels, the abstractions. (177) 
                                               
175 While the “Fever” drafts, like those of “Waking in Winter,” are undated, we can arrive at an approximate date for 
at least the second draft of “Fever,” “Fever 103.°” Plath gave birth to her son, Nicholas, on January 17th, and the 
letter she wrote to her mother the following day depicts the birth in much the same terms as her drafts: “I had used 
up the cylinder and was just beginning to push down when the baby stuck and the membranes didn’t break. Then at 
five minutes to 12, as the doctor was on his way over, this great, bluish, glistening boy shot out onto the bed in a 
tidal wave of water that drenched the four of us [Plath, Hughes, the midwife, and presumably Frieda] to the skin, 
howling lustily!” (Letters Home 443). “It is heavenly to be in my own home,” Plath adds, referring to the family’s 
move to Devon that August; “I’m in the guest room, which is ideal. Beautiful clear dawn; a full moon tonight in our 
huge elm” (443). And a letter to her mother about a week and a half later, on January 27th, suggests an even later 
date for the “Fever 103°” draft: “Interrupted by a nasty bout of milk fever—a temperature of over 103 for two 







Indeed, as the poem proceeds, these men become “jealous gods / [t]hat would have the whole 
world flat because they are” (179), a thread—in which “flatness” becomes associated with 
“destructions”—that Plath will pick up (along with the repetition) seven months later in 
“Daddy,” the speaker attempting to “recover” her dead father “[i]n the German tongue, in the 
Polish town / Scraped flat by the roller / Of wars, wars, wars” (Ariel 74). And later the second 
woman wonders whether hers is a “flatness” contracted indeed by such “destructions,” from the 
havoc they wreak on the earth and in the atmosphere, and, as Rachel Carson put it, “in the bones 
of a human being”: “Is it the air, / The particles of destruction I suck up?” (177). And the 
nightmares that make their way across the drafts of both “Waking in Winter” and “Fever” 
resurface—with their news from Algeria, with the image of “stain[ed]” “newsprint” and their 
vision of apocalypse—in the second woman’s dreams: 
  I am accused. I dream of massacres. 
I am a garden of black and red agonies. I drink them, 
Hating myself, hating and fearing. And now the world conceives 
Its end and runs toward it, arms held out in love.  
It is a love of death that sickens everything. (180-1) 
Invoking (as the speaker of “Woman as Landscape” had with the “killing milk of the sun”) 
Sitwell’s sun “harnessed to a war-machine,” which becomes in “The Shadow of Cain,” “the 
murdered Sun,” this voice associates her repeated miscarriages, in effect, with a world 
contaminated by fallout: “A dead sun stains the newsprint. It is red. / I lose life after life. The 







 And in Three Women, this voice, which, in effect, gives voice to the ramifications of 
destruction, is contrasted by the first woman whose childbirth proves a reworking of both Plath’s 
letter to her mother and the moment in which the baby enters the “Fever” drafts:  
  Who is he, this blue, furious boy, 
Shiny and strange, as if he had hurtled from a star?  
He is looking so angrily!  
He flew into the room, a shriek at his heel. (181) 
The third woman of the poem, who has had an abortion, imagines herself “solitary as grass,” and 
it is indeed by way of grass, with its stubborn persistence, that the second woman’s grief—this 
woman whose recurrent miscarriages the poem links with the “flatness” the men would make of 
the world—is mitigated by the end of the poem:  
  I find myself again. I am no shadow 
Though there is a shadow starting from my feet. I am a wife. 
The city waits and aches. The little grasses 
Crack through stone, and they are green with life. (187) 
Sitwell, too, had used grass to similar effect in “Green Flows the River of Lethe—O,” a poem 
that Plath had quoted in her long paper: “Yes, long is the ‘terrible Street of Blood; / It stretches 
forever and there is no turning, / But only fire, annihilation, burning’” (“Edith Sitwell”). A poem, 
as we will see in the Conclusion, that Plath invokes in her last transcendence poem, “Getting 
There,” “Green Flows the River of Lethe—O” indeed clusters the “destruction, annihilations” we 
see throughout the “Waking in Winter” and “Fever” drafts:  
I fled, for I was a Pillar of Fire, I was Destruction 








I was Annihilation  
Yet white as the Dead Sea, white as the Cities of the Plains. (The Canticle of the 
Rose 180) 
And like Plath’s “Fever” drafts, Sitwell’s poem begins with “the world’s fever,” and here it is 
grass that “flows” over the “fire,” that seeds life in destruction:  
  Green flows the river of Lethe—O 
Long Lethe river 
Where the fire was in the veins—and grass is growing  
Over the fever— 
The green grass growing. . . . . (180) 
 And a month later, with “Elm,” Plath will pick up and “finalize” the post-atomic image 
from “Fever in Winter” of “[t]he elm [a]s a clot of burnt nerves,” of “the nerves [a]sleep” in the 
speaker’s “hands” like “little red, burnt trees.” However, before emerging in “Elm,” the image 
first resurfaces reconfigured, along with the “killing milk of the sun” from “Woman as 
Landscape,” in the experience of the first of Plath’s three women of the throes of labor:  
I am the center of an atrocity. 
What pains, what sorrows must I be mothering?  
 
Can such innocence kill and kill? It milks my life.  
The trees wither in the street. The rain is corrosive. (180) 
This first voice, then, in effect gives voice, in “Elm,” to the elm of “Fever in Winter,” to an 







27). Chastising the speaker for her grief (“Love is a shadow. / How you lie and cry after it”), the 
elm asks, “shall I bring you the sound of poisons? / This is rain now, this big hush”(27). And this 
rain, like the rain in Three Women, is indeed (as “poison[]”) “corrosive”: “this is the fruit of it: 
tin-white, like arsenic” (192). It is here that the voice of the first woman (who identified herself 
as “the center of an atrocity”) comes across, perhaps, most directly: “I have suffered the atrocity 
of sunsets. / Scorched to the root / My red filaments burn and stand, a hand of wires” (27). Like 
“the killing milk of the sun” of “Woman as Landscape,” like “the dead sun [that] stains the 
newsprint” in Three Women—like, in other words, Sitwell’s “murdered Sun”—it is “sunsets” 
here that are an “atrocity,” that “scorch[]” the elm into a post-atomic landscape redolent of the 
“burnt” nerves and trees in the drafts.  
 And it is in this voice that critics have detected the emergence of the so-called “Ariel 
voice” that would become full-throated that fall. As Peel points out, “Elm” “is an interesting 
bridge between the midwinter poems and the poems of September and October of 1962,” and it 
is the voice of “Elm” that critics, such as Anne Stevenson, in her biography, Bitter Fame: A Life 
of Sylvia Plath (1989), have identified as such a bridge (Writing Back 128). However, the 
problem with such a formulation, as it is with Stevenson’s specifically, Peel argues, is that it 
“unhelpfully asserts that this is a new voice (the unique Ariel voice) and that it reflects a move 
away from the outward world to the world of the interior self” (128). In the particular passage 
that Peel takes issue with, Stevenson writes, “Ted Hughes’s work turned outward to the natural 
world beyond the self as Sylvia Plath’s never could. Her entire development as a writer had 
consisted of steps, in a halting progress, that often made it difficult for her to live, toward the 
revelation at the core of her being” (qtd. in Peel 128). However, as Peel demonstrates, and as we 







“[the poem] emerges not just from the contemplation of her own position in April, but from the 
situation and drafts that Plath had been exploring in midwinter,” drafts in which she engages not 
only the “natural,” but the manmade “world beyond the self” as she positions the “real issues” in 
relation to “the issues of [the] time.” A problem, too, with identifying “the” Ariel voice is that it 
subsumes the variety and complexity of voices and tones that Plath achieves across the collection 
into the (collective) voice and tone effectively generated by a handful of the forty poems, those 
that are Plath’s most famous, such as “Daddy” and “Lady Lazarus.” And tracking the 
progression of this “representative” voice has often resulted in a subsuming or discarding of 
anything that doesn’t quite fit the “narrative” of the emergence of “the Ariel voice.” However, 
while recognizing that the so-called Ariel voice is certainly not inclusive of the full breadth of 
work that Plath collects in the volume or that she composed along the way—just as the poetics 
she offers in her interview with Orr does not reflect the poetics made manifest in each of the 
volume’s individual poems—this designation is useful, for my purposes, in helping to isolate the 
ways in which Plath’s conceived of (and indeed enacted) her “confessional” poetry as an 
engagement with, rather than a break from, modernism, and the ways in which Edith Sitwell, in 
particular, helped her to negotiate such an engagement, helping her, indeed, to arrive at “the 
bigger things.”  
 And in “Elm,” with its roots in the midwinter drafts, in drafts, in other words, that engage 
“the issues of [the] time” and, in doing so, experiment with Sitwell’s world fever and atomic sun, 
we indeed hear, I would argue, a precursor to a voice that typifies Plath’s so-called 
transcendence poems, a voice itself possessing a depth and breadth of modulation. And we find 
this voice, specifically, in Plath’s “A Birthday Present,” bee sequence, “Fever 103°,” “Lady 







“I have suffered the atrocity of sunsets,” and also in lines like “A wind of such violence / Will 
tolerate no bystanding: I must shriek” and “I am inhabited by a cry” (192-3). In other words, we 
hear this voice in Ariel most often and most strongly in statements of “I,” in statements in which 
the “I,” that is, transcends itself, becomes more than just “I.” And in Plath, such transcendence, 
as we will see, is not, as she put it in “Context,” “escape,” but is instead a movement that is both 
self-abolishing and self-preserving, patterned as it is—as is Eliot’s theory of impersonality, as we 
saw in Chapter 1—on the Hegelian dialectic.  
 This voice that we hear here in “Elm” has its roots to a considerable degree, I would like 
to suggest, in what Plath had described as Sitwell’s “mature poetry,” poetry which “approaches 
the visionary’s instinct of revelation” (“Edith Sitwell”). In the spring of 1961, about a year 
before Plath composed “Elm,” a critic writing in the Chicago Review traced the arc of Sitwell’s 
career, offering us an example of how it was perceived at a time roughly contemporaneous with 
both Plath’s paper on Sitwell as well as “Elm.” Describing “three phases” in the development of 
Sitwell’s poetry, Ralph J. Mills, Jr., characterizes this development in terms of “broadening” and 
“expansion” (34). Each “new phase of [Sitwell’s] work,” Mills writes,  
presents a new conception of the author’s role as poet—but supported by the 
previous one—and a broadening of themes and the means of expressing them. 
From the more restricted, and also flamboyant, devices of the early poetry to the 
different achievement of Gold Coast Customs, and then to the latest phase, of the 
prophetic odes and songs, there is an accompanying expansion of range and 
technique, as well as an alteration in the poet’s role from ironist and satirist to the 







It is in such “prophetic odes and songs,” and in Sitwell’s all-encompassing “religious vision,” 
that we discover a voice that sounds quite akin to that of “Elm.” In “Song of the Cold,” in 
particular, a poem that Plath references in her paper, Sitwell gives voice, in effect, to a “tree” as 
“suffer[ing]” and “[s]corched” by “the world’s fever,” we might say, as Plath’s “Elm”:  
But the great sins and fires break out of me 
Like the terrible leaves from the bough in the violent spring . . .  
I am walking fire, I am all leaves— (The Canticle of the Rose 191) 
And the “violen[ce]” of this conflagration—akin to “the atrocity of sunsets” that Plath’s elm has 
“suffered”—carries over into “Elm,” in effect, by way of “[a] wind” that is indeed “of such 
violence” that it “[w]ill tolerate no bystanding: I must shriek” (192). And such prophetic cries of 
revelation as we hear in “The Song of the Cold,” we hear, indeed, across Sitwell’s later poems, 
from the “I was Destruction,” “I was Annihilation” of “Green Flows the River Lethe—O” 
(180)—cries we hear, as we have seen, in Plath’s second “Fever” draft, in which the speaker 
finds herself “ready to prophecy,” “her cheap fibers [ . . . ] / Crying destruction, destruction, 
annihilation, ash”—to the beginning of “A Bird’s Song,” in which “The fire high up in the air, / 
The bird cries, ‘I am the seed of fire / From the Sun,’” lines which, in effect, combine this image 
of a phoenix with the flight and warning of the  “naked knight” of “Green Song” to help generate 
Lady Lazarus’s rise from the ash: “Out of the ash / I rise with my red hair / And I eat men like 
air” (Ariel 17).  
 While Plath, then, claimed in “Context” that “[she was] not gifted with the tongue of 
Jeremiah,” she had certainly retained space for “[her] own vision of apocalypse,” to which she 
indeed gives voice in some of the most striking poems of Ariel. At times bordering on the 







carries with it different implications, rooted as it is, not in Catholicism—as is Sitwell’s later 
work, as well as Eliot’s Four Quartets, as we will see in the Conclusion—but in Plath’s 
“agnostic humanism,” a world view that aligns the endings of “Lady Lazarus” and “Getting 
There,” in particular, with the insistence on human responsibility and agency that we find at the 
end of the Ring cycle. And indeed, as Sitwell’s “broadening of themes” (themes capable of 
addressing World War II and the atomic age) was “accompan[ied]” by an “expansion of range 
and technique” (including, we might say, an “I” expanded to include the prophetic), so Plath’s 
“I” expands toward the visionary, I would argue, in keeping with the broadening of scope we see 
in her engagement of the “issues,” which will soon shade over into “the bigger things,” into a 
poetics patterned, in part, on the modernist epic.   
 And this process of broadening and expanding jump starts with “A Birthday Present,” a 
poem that indeed ends with a visionary “I,” one that is a reworking of the end of Gold Coast 
Customs (1929), Sitwell’s own modernist epic. By this time, Plath’s marriage had collapsed, and 
the experiments with “the issues” that we saw “finalized” in Three Women and “Elm” were 
effectively put on hold by the poems that arose from what Eliot might call “the state of mind” 
generated by her break with Hughes, poems starting in May with “The Rabbit Catcher” and 
“Event,” carrying into July with “Words heard by accident, over the phone,” into August with 
“Burning the Letters,” and through the end of September with “For a Fatherless Son.” And it is 
here, at the end of September, that Plath writes “A Birthday Present,” launching her six-week 
burst of writing reminiscent of the pace of her spring break poems four years earlier. And like the 
spring break poems, this six-week burst, I would argue, is to a substantial degree both Sitwell-







a response to The Waste Land, a poem indeed epic in proportion and, like “The Shadow of 
Cain,” rooted in the news, Sitwell’s speaker utters the following prophecy:  
  Yet the time will come 
To the heart’s dark slum  
When the rich man’s gold and the rich man’s wheat  
Will grow in the street, that the starved may eat— 
And the sea of the rich give up its dead— 
And the last blood and fire from my side will be shed. 
For the fires of God go marching on. (The Canticle of the Rose 149) 
In “A Birthday Present,” invoking in its final lines Sitwell’s Christ-like bleeding “from my 
side”—from lines, as we see here, that Plath underlined in her copy of Canticle—Plath’s speaker 
declares,  
There would be a nobility then, there would be a birthday. 
And the knife not carve, but enter 
 
Pure and clean as the cry of a baby, 
And the universe slide from my side. (Ariel 68) 
 Sitwell describes Gold Coast Customs as having been inspired by “terrible processions of 
Hunger-marchers,—the real thing, not a political demonstration” (qtd. in Greene 199). Later, as 
Greene writes, “[she] learned of a ‘freak’ party on a barge, at which the guests were dressed as 
beggars and had to step over the homeless people sleeping on the Embankment” (199). This 
contrast between rich and poor would help years later to structure the opposition between the 







Lazarus. Making, like The Waste Land, its own statement about the disintegration and 
degradation of the modern world, the poem contrasts (or rather compares) contemporary London 
with an imperialist fantasy of Africa rooted in racist conceptions of the “primitive.”176 It is with 
an evocation of Sitwell’s modernist epic, then, that the scope of Plath’s poetry from the end of 
September onward opens back up toward the experiments of the midwinter drafts.  
And Sitwell’s reemergence in Plath’s poetry, after having lain dormant, for the most part, 
since April, happens, not coincidentally, I would suggest, at a time when Sitwell was receiving a 
good deal of attention in the press. September 7th marked the occasion of her seventy-fifth 
birthday, and, as Greene writes,  
[s]he was so inundated with cards, messages and flowers that she had to put 
notice in The Times (12 September 1962) thanking senders and promising to reply 
as she was able. Macmillan capitalized by bringing out two new books: The 
Outsiders, a slim volume of poems written since 1957, and [ . . . ] The Queens and 
the Hive. At the same time, they reissued Fanfare for Elizabeth. Within two 
weeks The Queens and the Hive, the size of which Sitwell compared to a 
telephone book, went into a fourth printing and was at the top of the bestseller 
lists. Reporters were beating on her door; she told Sir John Gielgud that Sister 
Farquhar spent much of her time throwing them downstairs. (434) 
And on October 9th, beneath a sizable photograph of Sitwell, The Times reported that a concert in 
celebration of her birthday would take place that night at the Festival Hall (“A Hall Roofed with 
                                               
176 Greene describes Sitwell, “[i]n an early draft of the poem,” as “tr[ying] to versify Hegel’s now derided 
observation in The Philosophy of History: ‘What we properly understand by Africa, is Unhistorical Undeveloped 
Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of 
the World’s History.’ As published, the poem includes a long note from Hegel on ‘the devouring of human flesh’ 
among Africans” (200). (In the expanded version of this project, I would like to explore—in the main body of the 
text—Plath’s own depictions of race, and how she draws not only from conceptions of race at midcentury, on the 







Copper” 20). As Sitwell wrote to a friend amid the preparations, “The Press is madly excited at 
my being 75, and is looking forward avidly to my funeral” (qtd. in Greene 436). According to a 
New York Times notice the following day, Sitwell had quite the turnout, having been “joined” in 
the Hall by “3,000 admirers” (“3,000 in London” 58).  
All of the press Sitwell was receiving coincided, in turn, with the deterioration of Plath’s 
marriage. By May, Plath had stopped showing her work to Hughes and was now sharing it, 
instead, with Alvarez, who had just published The New Poetry in April, the same month Plath 
had composed “Elm.”177 By the end of August, Plath had written to her mother that she was 
seeking “a legal separation from [Hughes],” that she “want[ed] a clean break” (Letters Home 
460), and on September 25th, she reported that she had gone to London to see a solicitor (463). 
While there, Plath stopped by to see Alvarez (Wootten 111). And with “A Birthday Present,” 
written just days after this visit, Plath in effect deploys Sitwell’s visionary voice for her own 
purposes, purposes which were by this time oriented toward Alvarez’s call for “a new 
seriousness.” At this particular moment—late September of 1962—in other words, Sitwell’s and 
Alvarez’s presence converges with the breakdown of Plath’s marriage to generate “the state of 
mind” out of which arise twenty-nine of Ariel’s forty poems. While Plath’s manuscript collected 
poems written over the course of about a three-year period (the earliest-written poem she 
collected for the volume, “You’re,” written in January of 1960, and “Death & Co.,” the latest, 
composed November 14, 1962), the majority of the poems, then, about three-fourths, were 
written within that six-week block of time from the end of September of 1962, starting with “A 
Birthday Present,” to mid-November, ending with “Death & Co.” In effect kicking off this six-
week burst, “A Birthday Present” marks a dramatic spike in Plath’s productivity. For example, in 
                                               








the six weeks following “A Birthday Present,” Plath wrote a little more than twice as many 
poems as she had in the previous six months. In those six months leading up to “A Birthday 
Present,” from April through late September, she had written fifteen poems, averaging about 
two-and-a-half poems per month. Of these fifteen, she would collect five in Ariel. In contrast, in 
the six weeks starting with “A Birthday Present,” Plath wrote thirty-three poems, about five-and-
a-half poems per week. And of these thirty-three, twenty-nine, as we have seen, became Ariel 
poems.178  
                                               
178 And if we track the day-by-day pace of composition, say, from July to September, in the three months leading up 
to “A Birthday Present,” and compare this with the pace during the six weeks following it, we get perhaps an even 
stronger sense of the sudden uptick. On July 2nd, Plath wrote “The Other,” followed nine days later by “Words 
heard, by accident, over the phone” on the 11th and “Poppies in July” another nine days after that, on the 20th; 
“Burning the Letters” appears a little over three weeks later on August 13th and “For a Fatherless Son” just over six 
weeks after that.  
While “A Birthday Present” is written only four days after “For a Fatherless Son,” I group it with the 
incredibly prolific six weeks following it rather than the six months preceding it because it initiates a broadening 
scope that characterizes the arc of Plath’s transcendence poems during those six weeks, helping to initiate, then, the 
poem-a-day writing pace that characterizes those six weeks in which the majority of the Ariel poems were written. 
“A Birthday Present” is the first poem in a five-day poem-a-day streak: written on September 30th, “A Birthday 
Present” is followed by “The Detective” (Oct. 1), “The Courage of Shutting Up” (Oct. 2), “The Bee Meeting” (Oct. 
3), and “The Arrival of the Bee Box” (Oct.4)—all of which Plath collects in Ariel. Two days later, she writes two 
more in two days—“Stings” (Oct. 6) and “The Swarm” (Oct. 7)—followed two days later with another four in four 
days—“Wintering” (Oct. 9), “A Secret” (Oct. 10), “The Applicant” (Oct. 11), and “Daddy” (Oct. 12)—and four 
days later, with seven in six days—“Medusa” (Oct. 16), “The Jailer” (Oct. 17), “Lesbos” (Oct. 18), “Stopped Dead” 
(Oct. 19), “Fever 103°” (Oct. 20), “Amnesiac” (Oct. 21), and “Lyonnesse” (Oct. 21). Plath begins “Lady Lazarus” 
on October 23rd and by the time she completes it six days later, on October 29th, she’s written another seven 
poems—“Cut” (Oct. 24), “By Candlelight” (Oct. 24), “The Tour” (Oct. 25), “Ariel” (Oct. 27), “Poppies in October” 
(Oct. 27), “Nick and the Candlestick” (Oct. 29), and “Purdah” (Oct. 29). At this point, Plath has written twenty-six 
poems in about four weeks.  
The run that begins, then, with “A Birthday Present” (the first “transcendence” poem composed and the 
first to contain echoes of Sitwell), peeks here with “Lady Lazarus” (another poem, as we have seen, in which Sitwell 
is a key presence), after which the pace begins to wane markedly. After finalizing “Lady Lazarus,” and writing 
“Nick and the Candlestick” and “Purdah” on October 29th, a full week lapses until the next new poem, “The 
Couriers,” appears on November 4th. Almost doubling the longest pause between poems in the six weeks following 
“A Birthday Present” (four days), a full-week lapse begins inching us back toward the slower and more intermittent 
pace of the months leading up to “A Birthday Present,” during which the shortest intervals were nine days long. 
With the exception of a surge of activity on November 6, on which Plath writes three poems—among which is 
“Getting There,” yet another (and not, as I will argue, coincidentally) Sitwell-inflected “transcendence” poem—
Plath’s pace drops to nearly half the rate of the first four weeks, from six-and-a-half poems a week to three-and-a-
half as she writes seven poems total over the next two weeks leading up to the final poem collected in Ariel, 








And with Plath’s claiming of the broadened, visionary voice that we see in “A Birthday 
Present,” she begins, too, to enlarge the scope of her poetics back to its midwinter-draft 
exploration of the “issues,” and forward toward “the bigger things.” And by way of the 
expansion we begin to detect in “A Birthday Present,” Plath begins, as she will do a month later 
in her interview with Orr, to chart for her “confessionalism” a direct line to Eliot, a direct line, 
that is, to the modernism that Alvarez had claimed for Lowell. In effect, “A Birthday Present” 
initiates a conversation with Eliot’s work, a conversation at least partly enabled—as her spring 
break poems had been enabled by her “poetic godmother”—by her engagements of the 
broadened scope of Sitwell’s work, which (in the case of her World War II poetry, particularly 
her atomic poems) indeed engages “the bigger things” and, what’s more, does so directly. This 
conversation would continue across the arc of the transcendence poems that fall of ’62 as they 
chart for us Plath’s engagement with the span of Eliot’s oeuvre, beginning with the early “Love 
Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” and arriving, as we will see, in “Getting There” with Plath’s 
reconfiguration of The Waste Land and Four Quartets.   
If “A Birthday Present” ends with Sitwell, it begins, we might say, with Eliot. In her 
teaching notes, Plath described Prufrock as representative of the kind of person who is 
“helpless[ly] conscious[] of having dared too little: realizing sadly too late in life that they have 
been living too cautiously and too poorly. Fear of life. Hesitation: suspension of decision” 
(“Teaching at Smith”). In this sense, Plath inverts “Prufrock,” centering “A Birthday Present” 
not on the speaker’s “[f]ear of life” but on what we might call her auditor’s fear of death, a fear 
that indeed leads to a “suspension of decision,” a withholding, in effect, of the “[b]irthday 
[p]resent” from the speaker, who is left waiting, lingering in the same “death-in-life of abdication 







of Eliot’s early poem, that Plath echoes one of its most memorable lines. In her teaching notes 
for “Prufrock,” Plath underscored her own slight paraphrasing of this line, describing Prufrock’s 
“[l]ife measured out with coffee spoons” (“Teaching at Smith”). Such a life, Plath jotted down, 
proves “meager, stingy,” adjectives which could just as readily describe how the speaker feels 
about her own life, which she spends “[m]easuring the flour, cutting off the surplus, / [a]dhering 
to rules, to rules, to rules” (Ariel 66). It is to Eliot, then, that Plath has turned for a method by 
which she might critique, as Eliot does, the “meager[ness]” of modern life, the constrictions of 
social niceties that, for Plath that fall, had come to read, through the lens of gentility, as an 
evasion of a full range of experience, as a failure to acknowledge “that all our lives [ . . . ] are 
influenced profoundly by forces which have nothing to do with gentility, decency or politeness.”  
In her preparations for teaching Eliot, Plath had identified the mythical method as the 
process by which he achieves such a critique in “Prufrock,” a method, as we have seen, well-
suited to the expansion of scope toward which Plath was now aiming. Defining the method first 
in relation to The Waste Land, Plath began her notes with a list of themes: “Inferiority of present 
to past: human life now ignoble, sordid or tame: haunted and tormented by intimations that in the 
past it was different” (“Teaching at Smith”). “How [does Eliot] show this?” she asked: 
“Contrast” (“Teaching at Smith”). And it is primarily as a method of contrast, then, that Plath 
here defines the mythical method. To establish the theme of “[i]nferiority of present to past” in 
The Waste Land, Eliot, according to Plath’s notes, performs, indeed, the following contrasts:  
Grand events of past history with present  
Great writers (Shakespeare) with modern slang 
Past myths and heroic legends ironically paralleled 







Beneath this list, Plath has written, “Mythical method: presentation of experience in symbolic 
form. Outlined clearly in Eliot’s review of James Joyce’s Ulysses (contrast of grand past voyage 
with sordid now)” (“Teaching at Smith”). This method, Plath noted, is “[p]articularly observable 
in The Wasteland [sic] where quotes from Shakespeare, Dante, in sordid present situation bring 
out contrast of old beauty & moral order & present ugliness & moral chaos, or indifference” 
(“Teaching at Smith”). And it is here that we arrive at “Prufrock.” With “method” written along 
the margins, Plath has added, “Also observable in different ways in use of story of Magi & 
journey to Christ Child in ‘Journey of the Magi’ and in the use of literary, artistic & biblical 
figures in the ironic ‘Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,’ as contrast to the unheroic hero” 
(“Teaching at Smith”).   
 Indeed, Eliot’s use of such figures, or rather the parallel that his use of such figures 
structures, enables him to underscore the constrictions of modern middle-of-the-way-ness, 
constrictions which appear all the more limiting when contrasted with the “[g]rand events” and 
“[g]reat writers” of a past age, or with the timelessness of the biblical. In “Prufrock,” Eliot 
achieves such a contrast, for example, as he echoes Ecclesiastes 3 (“There is a time for 
everything”). While in Ecclesiastes 3, what there will be time for are things like birth and death, 
planting and harvesting, war and peace, in “Prufrock” it is the “yellow smoke” of a smog-choked 
London, the “prepar[ing] [of] a face to meet the faces that you meet” that there will be time for 
(Collected Poems 3, 4). And while we appear on the cusp of reaching biblical (shading into 
ancient Greek) proportions as the speaker tells us that “[t]here will be time to murder and create, 
/ And time for all the works and days of hands,” this expansion of time toward the timeless 
contracts across the line break to the mundane and mannered: the “hands” are not the rough, 







more manicured hands, we might assume, in a parlor or kitchen, hands “that lift and drop a 
question on your plate”—all in time for “the taking of a tea and toast” (4).      
In “A Birthday Present,” Plath achieves such a contrast—and does so through the “use of 
[ . . . ] biblical figures”—by way of the “[p]resent” hidden “behind this veil” in the poem’s first 
line (Ariel 66). Imagining a presence behind the veil watching her as she “[m]easur[es] the flour” 
(a presence thinking, “‘Is this the one for the annunciation? / My god, what a laugh!’”), the 
speaker indeed establishes herself as an “unheroic hero” by way of contrast, then, with the Virgin 
Mary (Ariel 66). But not only do we have, in this comparison, a contrast between the triviality of 
the daily and the gravity of the biblical; we also (or more specifically) have a contrast between 
an idealized conception of womanhood (and motherhood) and things that shouldn’t be talked 
about, at midcentury, in polite company. Imagining the presence thinking, “‘Is this the one I am 
to appear for? / Is this the elect one, the one with the black eye-pits and a scar?” (66), the speaker 
gestures toward the source of this scar, which she offers several stanzas later:  
 I do not want much of a present, anyway, this year. 
After all, I am alive only by accident. 
 
I would have killed myself gladly that time any possible way.  
Now there are these veils, shimmering like curtains, 
 
The diaphanous satins of a January window 
White as babies’ bedding and glittering with dead breath. (66) 
Having linked the veils with her suicide attempt, the speaker reads the presence lurking behind 







defining the “new seriousness,” in calling, in other words, for a poet “to face the full range of his 
experience with his full intelligence,” Alvarez was calling for an acknowledgement in poetry of 
what psychoanalysis had established as the new reality: “the writer can no longer deny with any 
assurance the fears and desires he does not wish to face.” And in “A Birthday Present,” the 
speaker not only acknowledges her death-wish, she’d like it out in the open: “let down the veil, 
the veil, the veil” (68). And such an acknowledgment, which “let[ting] down the veil” would 
enable, the speaker indeed defines, with a nod toward Alvarez, in terms of “seriousness”: “If [the 
present] were death / I would admire the deep gravity of it, its timeless eyes. / I would know you 
were serious” (68). 
The veil here functions, in other words, to section off what Mary Russo refers to, as we 
saw in the last chapter, as “those hidden cultural contents which by their abjection had 
consolidated the cultural identity of the bourgeoisie,” or, in Alvarez’s terms, the gentility of the 
English. And so, behind the veil (just as behind Lady Lazarus’s smiling mask) lie “cultural 
contents” that gentility, to maintain itself as such, must repress; behind the veil, in other words, 
lies something capable of shocking the “polit[e]” and the “decent.” And it is the “you” of the 
poem that Plath positions, in effect, as the arbiter of the abjections necessary for maintaining 
gentility, as someone, in other words, who would care what the neighbors thought (“I know why 
you will not give it to me. / You are terrified // The world will go up in a shriek, and your head 
with it”), and yet is the only one who could pull what had been cast out of consciousness back 
into the light (“There is this one thing I want today, and only you can give it to me”) (67, 68). 
When the speaker calls for the lowering of the veil, then, she expresses not only a death-wish, 
but a desire to face “the full range of her experience,” experience not on “the edge of 







 And yet while death functions in the poem literally (in the speaker’s suicide attempt), 
Plath also retains for it a figurative register, in effect synthesizing personal experience (her 
“confessionalism”) with the modernist emphasis on rebirth that arose from its return to the 
mythic, and to the ancient vegetation rites (such as the ritual of the dying and resurrecting god) 
underlying it. And it is such a synthesis we will see, full-blown, in “Lady Lazarus.” Indeed, part 
of what Plath appropriates from “Prufrock” for “A Birthday Present” is Eliot’s casting of his 
speaker into biblical roles, and in “Prufrock,” it is the role of Lazarus—a role into which Plath 
will cast her own speaker, then, in a few weeks’ time—that Eliot devises for his speaker. 
Prufrock takes on this role as he wonders, “would it have been worth it, after all, /[a]fter the 
cups, the marmalade, the tea,”  
To say: “I am Lazarus, come from the dead,  
Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all”—  
If one, settling a pillow by her head  
                  Should say: “That is not what I meant at all;  
                  That is not it, at all.”  
Contrasting Lazarus, come to communicate the mysteries of the grave, with the utter failure of 
the speaker to communicate intimately (“That is not what I meant at all; / That is not it, at all”), 
contrasting, that is, the resurrected life of Lazarus (“come from the dead”) with the death-in-life 
of the speaker’s indecision (“would it have been worth it, after all”), Eliot indeed sets the stage 
for the shifting biblical roles that Plath’s speaker takes on in “A Birthday Present.” Beginning in 
(or rather, contrasted with) the role, as we have seen, of the Virgin Mary, being watched by the 
something “behind this veil” as if being eyed by Gabriel for worthiness, the speaker then shifts to 







the expansion of “Prufrock’s” sense of time to the biblical (“There will be time to murder and 
create”) and its subsequent deflation to the daily and domestic (time “to lift and drop a question 
on your plate”), the speaker of “A Birthday Present” also expands to the biblical—her kitchen 
table set for the Last Supper—but then contracts, too (in this case, within the space of a single 
line), to a plate: “Let us eat our last supper at it, like a hospital plate” (66). 
 If it is to Eliot that Plath looks, in effect, for a method by which she might critique—by 
way of expansions that are then duly contracted—the constrictions of gentility, by which she 
might establish, in other words, the death-in-life of the speaker’s waiting (“If you only knew how 
the veils were killing my days”), of the speaker’s anticipation, that is, of revelation (for the veil 
to be lowered), it is to Sitwell that she turns for a movement beyond such stasis (67). In Gold 
Coast Customs, Sitwell’s speaker aligns herself, in effect, with a spiritualized version of 
Bakhtin’s notion of the “cosmic.” After providing a litany of sins and sufferings, the speaker 
states (and Plath underlines), “These break my heart’s walls toppling in, / And like a universal 
sea / The nations of the Dead crowd in” (The Canticle of the Rose 147). Such an identification 
with the suffering of others moves the speaker beyond the isolated “I” and toward the prophetic, 
toward the “universal” that she now contains and that she will “shed,” at the end of the poem, by 
way of “Gomorrah’s fires [that] have washed [her] blood” (148): “And the last blood and fire 
from my side will be shed. / For the fires of God go marching on” (149). Ending with a Christ-
like bleeding from the side, Sitwell’s poem ends with death, we might say, but with a death that 
is a promise of purification (of God’s cleansing fires) and a promise, then, of resurrection. 
 While “Prufrock,” too, ends with death, this death is figured not as rebirth, but instead as 
a prolongation of death-in-life, a death arrived at, in other words, by not living. In contrast to 







“Do I dare / Disturb the universe?” (Collected Poems 4). And given his concern in the preceding 
lines that people might remark on the “bald spot in the middle of [his] hair” if he should “turn 
[...] and descend the stair,” we as readers suppose, indeed, that he does not. And so his continued 
indecision becomes figured, by the end of the poem, in the image of the sea, which, as Plath 
noted in her preparations for the poem, functions here in terms of ambivalence: “Psychological 
plight revealed in identification of both the positive and negative elements of his conflict with 
images of the sea, primordial symbol of both CREATION AND DESTRUCTION” (“Teaching 
at Smith”). Able to hear mermaids singing, though they do not sing to him, Eliot’s speaker finds 
himself suspended, in effect, in the sea alongside them: “We have lingered in the chambers of the 
sea /By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown” (7). So while in the end the speaker, by 
way of his lingering, does imagine himself beyond the singular, shifting from the individual self 
(“I do not think they will sing to me”) to the collective (“We have lingered”) and, even, toward 
the mythic (Eliot here making use of the mythical method, as Plath sketched it in her notes), the 
movement of the mythic proves not so much a liberating movement beyond the bounds of the 
individual self toward rebirth, but rather, instead, a collective “drowning”: the speaker, no 
Odysseus, lingers in the sea (in the plural), “[t]ill human voices wake us, and we drown” (7). 
Lacking any framework of rebirth or renewal, unlike the end of Sitwell’s Gold Coast Customs, 
the death at the end of “Prufrock,” then, has a decided ring of finality. While there is, so to speak, 
an awakening here (“human voices wake us”), this awakening reads far more in line with an 
awakening to (rather than from), for example, the “sleep of adult consciousness” we find in 
Sitwell’s The Sleeping Beauty.  
The ending of “A Birthday Present,” therefore, is markedly Sitwellian, we might say, 







in the face of the “universal,” but rather, moving beyond the singular self, contains it, and, in the 
end, shifts from the figure of the Virgin Mary, from the apostles (or even Jesus), to become, like 
Sitwell’s speaker, a Christ-like figure. As we move into the final lines of the poem, in other 
words, the speaker shifts from the death-in-life of waiting for revelation (for the “you” of the 
poem to “let down the veil”) to imagining her own revelatory vision, a vision marking a 
movement beyond the temporal: “If it were death / I would admire the deep gravity of it, its 
timeless eyes” (Ariel 68). And unlike the “drown[ing]” of Prufrock, Plath’s speaker explicitly 
frames the death she desires as a desire for rebirth, imagining that if the “present” were death, 
“There would be a nobility, then, there would be a birthday” (68).179 And the “birthday” she 
envisions, where “the knife [would] not carve, but enter // Pure and clean as the cry of a baby, / 
And the universe slide from my side,” is an image patterned so closely to Sitwell’s that it 
preserves some of Sitwell’s original language, her “univers[e]” (“like a universal sea / The 
nations of the Dead crowd in”) and “from my side” (“the last blood and fire from my side will be 
shed”). And yet, whereas at the end of Gold Coast Customs, transcendence is a promised 
future—“the time will come” (149)—at the end of “A Birthday Present,” even as the attending 
“cry of a baby” shifts the final image of a bleeding Christ toward that of a literal birth, of a 
“delivering” of the “universe,” the rebirth remains in the hypothetical (“If it were death,” my 
emphasis). It will take, at least in part, a continued engagement of Sitwell, and, by way of this 
engagement, a further exploration of “the bigger things,” to move the transcendence of Plath’s 
speakers from the hypothetical “if” of “A Birthday Present” to, as we will see, the present 
happening—“Out of the ash / I rise” (247)—of “Lady Lazarus,” and further still to the promised 
                                               
179 In her teaching notes, Plath records her understanding of the role ritual “death” plays in modernist notions of 
rebirth. In reference to D. H. Lawrence’s “The Woman Who Rode Away,” Plath wrote, “Sacrifice necessary for 
Rebirth” (“Teaching at Smith”). And in reference to the end of The Waste Land, she noted, “lose self to find self: in 







future—“I shall bury the wounded like pupas”—of “Getting There,” to the promising, in other 
words, of a transcendence that is a continuation into and transformation of, rather than an escape 
from, the future. And this continued engagement with Sitwell helps to enable Plath, in turn, to 
engage Eliot, moving from the exchanges with “Prufrock” that we see in “A Birthday Present” 
toward the larger reconfiguration, in “Getting There,” of the historical vision of The Waste Land 
and Four Quartets.  
While in “A Birthday Present,” Plath appropriates Eliot’s use of biblical figures in 
“Prufrock,” and in doing so, expands the scope of the poem, an expansion she mirrors in the 
voice bordering on prophecy that we hear in her appropriation of Sitwell’s ending, she does not, 
however, engage what she will soon define as “the bigger things.” Yet three days later, on 
October 3rd, as she begins the poems that will comprise her bee sequence—with which she will 
end her Ariel manuscript, and in doing so, end it on the word “spring”—she begins charting a 
movement through myth and ritual indeed to the “issues of [the] time” and, in lines that will 
become the core of “Getting There,” to history itself. Generally, Plath’s bee poems have been 
read in terms of her relationship with Hughes as well as with her father, who was a noted bee 
expert. In Revising Life (1993), her seminal work on the Ariel drafts, and the conversations 
taking place between these drafts and the texts on their versos, Susan Van Dyne, for example, 
describes “the bee poems [as] look[ing] backward to the unfinished emotional business of 
childhood and [Plath’s] relationship with her father” at the same time that “they respond to 
immediate betrayals or optimistically claim a certain future” (101). In the wake of her collapsed 
marriage, Plath was creating for herself what Van Dyne calls “a new vision of the female poet as 
singular,” rather than as “fertile partner to Hughes’s genius” (99-100). That October, “[i]n the 







rage, she repudiated both the partnership and the poetic silencing it entailed” (100). While 
readings such as (and building from) Van Dyne’s are crucial to an understanding of the 
sequence, charting for us, as they do, its core “narrative,” what hasn’t received as much attention, 
perhaps, are the means with which Plath, as Eliot might put it, “deals with” such “living 
material.” And here, again, we encounter Sitwell.  
While the sequence—which Plath ultimately entitled “Bees” (Van Dyne 101)180—is 
certainly rooted, then, in “personal experience” (Plath herself had begun to keep bees at Court 
Green that June), she began the sequence at a time when Sitwell’s The Queens and the Hive 
(1962) indeed sat atop the bestsellers list, at a time when, as her speaker puts it in “Stings,” she 
“ha[d] a self to recover, a queen” (Ariel 88).181 And as it happens, Sitwell, in her post-atomic 
phase, had composed a bee sequence of her own, one that, like Plath’s, moves from myth and 
ritual to engage history and “the bigger things.” Entitled “The Bee Oracles,” Sitwell’s sequence 
of two poems begins with “The Bee-Keeper,” a title (minus the hyphen) that Plath had originally 
designated for her own series (Van Dyne 101). And this beekeeper, like The Sleeping Beauty’s 
country gentlemen and like Plath’s speaker in “Woman as Landscape,” whose “head settles itself 
among the clods,” is a grotesque figure:  
 [ . . . ] an old woman stood—thick Earthiness— 
Half Sun, Half Clod,  
                                               
180 As Van Dyne observes, “the five separate poems” that comprise the bee sequence “are numbered consecutively 
in both [Plath’s] handwritten drafts and her typescripts, beginning with the draft of ‘The Bee Meeting’ and 
concluding with ‘Wintering’ five days later” (101).  
181 On the day that she composed “A Birthday Present” (and a few weeks after Sitwell’s own birthday had received a 
good bit of press), The Times had listed the biography in the number one spot (“Bestsellers, September 30, 1962”). 
Interestingly, Plath, whose birthday was at the end of October, wrote “A Birthday Present” a month earlier, at the 
end of September, inviting speculation that the poem, in addition to anticipating her own birthday, may have been 
inspired by coverage of Sitwell’s. On September 22nd and again on the 29th, for example, The Times ran an 
advertisement on its second page for the birthday concert planned for the Festival Hall on October 9th (The Times, 







A plant alive from the root, still blind with earth 
And all the weight of Death and Birth. (The Canticle of the Rose 237) 
“Bent to her hives,” this woman “hear[s] her sisters of the barren lives / Begin to stir . . . the 
Priestesses of the Gold Comb / Shaped by Darkness, and the Prophetesses,” who “sing the great 
Hymn of Being to the Lost”: 
  “This Earth is the honey of all Beings, and all Beings 
  Are the honey of this Earth . . . O bright immortal Lover 
That is incarnate in the body’s earth— 
O bright immortal Lover who is All!” (237) 
And this balance between earth and “all Beings” carries through the song’s remaining refrains, 
which shift from earth to water, fire, air, sun, and thunder until “the old woman in her mortal 
dress of clay / (That plant alive from the root, still thick with earth) / Felt all the saps of Day” 
(238). 
With “The Bee Meeting,” Plath starts her sequence off, too, with a ritual. As Van Dyne 
writes, “the speaker belatedly reads the setting up of the hive as her own initiation into the 
received meanings of female gender. She participates simultaneously as a willing accomplice 
and unsuspecting victim in a village ritual that seems to require female sacrifice or at least 
sedation” (105). Indeed, the speaker’s initial sense of foreboding when she first “meet[s] [ . . . ] 
the villagers” “at the bridge”—“[t]he rector, the midwife, the sexton, the agent for bees”—
develops into the budding awareness, as the poem nears its midpoint, that “they are making me 
one of them. / They are leading me to the shorn grove, the circle of hives” (Ariel 81). And here 
among the hives, the speaker wonders, “Is it some operation that is taking place? / It is the 







know?” (82). And all the while “[t]he white hive is snug as a virgin, / Sealing off her brood cells, 
her honey, and quietly humming,” a sealed-off-ness that is soon violated: “The villagers open the 
chambers, they are hunting the queen” (82). Here Plath establishes the (at first oblique) 
connection between the speaker and the hunted queen—an “old, old, old” queen under threat by 
“the new virgins” who “[d]ream of a duel they will win inevitably”—a connection that threads 
through the remaining poems, helping to shape the arc of the sequence (82). Indeed, it would 
seem the end for the queen (“the mind of the hive thinks this is the end of everything”), but 
“[t]he villagers [ . . . ] mov[e] the virgins, there will be no killing” (82). But in this process, 
something has happened, the speaker observing, 
 I am exhausted, I am exhausted— 
Pillar of white in a blackout of knives. 
I am the magician’s girl who does not flinch. 
The villagers are untying their disguises, they are shaking hands. 
Whose is that long white box in the grove, what have they accomplished, why am  
I cold? (82-3) 
It is this ritual death—which, according to Van Dyne, Plath had made even more explicit in her 
draft for the poem, in which she identified the “long white box” as “that coffin, so white & 
silent” (106)—from which the remainder of the sequence proceeds. In other words, in her bee 
poems, Plath puts pressure on the “sacrifice necessary for [modernist] rebirth” as she interrogates 
the power dynamics implicit in such a sacrifice, sacrifice that is necessarily performed on the 
level of the collective and that thereby brings to bear on the ritual societal and political structures 







reclaiming and reforging of the self, as it examines what it means, within such a context, to 
arrive at self-possession, at self-control. 
 In “The Arrival of the Bee Box,” the speaker shifts from the ritualized helplessness of 
“The Bee Meeting”—“I cannot run, I am rooted” (82)—to ordering, and controlling, a hive of 
her own: “I have [ . . . ] ordered a box of maniacs. / They can be sent back. / They can die, I need 
feed them nothing. I am the owner” (84). By the end of the poem, the speaker decides that it is 
not the destruction of the bees (“a Roman mob, / Small, taken one by one, but my god, 
together!”) that she wants, but their freedom, or rather, what she wants as she considers 
bestowing freedom, is to play God: “Tomorrow I will be sweet God, I will set them free” (84, 
85). Here the speaker’s foreboding in “The Bee Meeting” finds itself concentrated in the bee 
box, which at the beginning of the poem “is locked, it is dangerous,” but by the end, this danger, 
through the promise of the speaker to “be sweet God,” is on the verge of being unleashed: “The 
box is only temporary” (85).  
In the next poem of the sequence, “Stings,” this danger “f[i]nd[s] him out,” that “third 
person [ . . . ] watching” who “is gone // [i]n eight great bounds, a great scapegoat,” the bees 
“[m]olding onto his lips like lies, / [c]omplicating his features” (87). At the beginning of 
“Stings,” the speaker is engaged in a new ritual, one in which, very much unlike the ritual of 
“The Bee Meeting,” she is a willing (and witting) participant. Indeed, unlike in “The Bee 
Meeting,” where the speaker found herself, in contrast to “the villagers,” vulnerable—“In my 
sleeveless summery dress I have no protection, / And they are all gloved and covered, why did 
nobody tell me?” (81)—here a marked balance structures the relation between the participants 
(the speaker and the “bee-seller”) who are equally “bare-handed,” and it is the speaker herself, in 







  Bare-handed, I hand the combs. 
  The man in white smiles, bare-handed.   
  Our cheesecloth gauntlets neat and sweet, 
The throats of our wrists brave lilies.  
He and I  
 
Have a thousand clean cells between us. (86) 
And as the search for the queen begun in “The Bee Meeting” with the villagers’ “hunt[]” 
(“[t]he old queen does not show herself”) continues here (“What am I buying, wormy 
mahogany? / Is there any queen at all in it?”), the association between the speaker and the queen 
becomes more explicit (82, 86):  
  If there is, she is old, 
Her wings torn shawls, her long body 
Rubbed of its plush— 
Poor and bare and unqueenly and even shameful. (86) 
It is in the next lines that the speaker positions herself as this “old” and “shameful” queen: “I 
stand in a column / Of winged, unmiraculous women, / Honey-drudgers” not unlike the 
beekeeper’s “sisters of the barren lives,” in Sitwell’s sequence (86). And it is from these 
“unmiraculous women” that the speaker seeks to distinguish herself: “I am no drudge / Though 
for years I have eaten dust / And dried plates with my dense hair” (86). Working to reclaim 
“[her] strangeness,” which, in effect, had been taken from her as the villagers in “The Bee 
Meeting” had “ma[de] [her] one of them,” she begins to lay claim to the danger that had sat on 







evaporate, / Blue dew from dangerous skin” (87). And in an upending of the dynamic of the 
opening ritual, the speaker states, “It is almost over. / I am in control” (87). Whereas the bees 
(those “[h]oney-drudgers” that had “found [ . . . ] out” the “great scapegoat”) had stung him, 
“th[inking] death was worth it,” the speaker, on the other hand, determines, “I have a self to 
recover, a queen”:  
  Where has she been,  
With her lion-red body, her wings of glass? 
 
Now she is flying  
More terrible then she ever was, red 
Scar in the sky, red comet 
Over the engine that killed her— 
The mausoleum, the wax house. (88) 
While the speaker envisions for herself (and for the old queen) transcendence, this 
transcendence is, at this point of the sequence, ambiguous, or, perhaps more precisely, 
ambivalent. The flight, in other words, is, on the one hand, death (a flight “[o]ver the engine that 
killed her”), and a death, we would assume, at the hands of one of “the new virgins” that had 
“[d]ream[ed] of [the] duel they w[ould] win inevitably” in “The Bee Meeting,” a death that 
marks the continuation of the cycle of violence by which a queen bee gains control of a hive in 
the first place, stinging any rival queens while they’re still in the pupa stage, something Plath 
knew well, given her father’s background, her own beekeeping, and her own depiction in “The 
Bee Meeting” of the villagers “moving the virgins” to preserve the life of the old queen, who 







terms of her pursuit of “control” across the sequence; as Van Dyne puts it, “Stings” raises “the 
question of ownership, and of access to power” (108), power which, in the preceding “Arrival of 
the Bee Box”—in which the speaker, after first declaring, “I am not a Caesar,” determines to 
play God (Ariel 84)—becomes characterized, as Van Dyne describes it, as both “unconstrained” 
and “male” (107). “Plath’s choice of the queen to represent the woman poet as carnal subject,” 
Van Dyne writes, “is riven with contradictions”: “The queen’s singular status is uncontested 
inside and outside the hive. Without her, the hive dies, production ceases. Yet because her 
distinguishing characteristic is her excessive generativity, her queenly estate is, in fact, perpetual 
confinement: and the end of the queen’s story is her biological exhaustion and inevitable 
replacement by young virgins” (103). In response to such contradictions, Van Dyne argues, Plath 
“reinflects the gender” of her queen (112), “appropriat[ing] [ . . .] male potency” and 
“reinvest[ing]” it “in a transformed female body,” a body that is “lion-red” (110). 
And it is with the queen’s “lion-red body” that Plath gestures toward Sitwell’s bee 
sequence. Indeed, “The Bee-Keeper” begins by establishing an opposition between “the Lion and 
the Honey-Bee / In the Spirit” (The Canticle of the Rose 237). In “The Bee-Keeper,” it is the 
“Lion in the Spirit” that disrupts the balance between earth and “all Beings” that the old 
woman’s “sisters of the barren lives,” those “Priestesses” and “Prophetesses,” establish in their 
“great Hymn of Being,” “a song that came from the small span / Of thin gold bodies shaped by 
the holy Dark” (239, 238). The old woman, moved by the hymn to “[f]e[el] all the saps of Day,” 
is interrupted—not unlike the young lovers of “Green Song,” whose song is interrupted by the 
“naked knight”—by “[t]he Lion in the Spirit [who] cried, ‘Destroy—destroy / The old and 
wrinkled Darkness’” (239). Like the men in Three Women, whom the second voice perceives as 







chambers of shrieks proceed, / [e]ndlessly proceed,” the “Lion in the Spirit” functions as the 
impulse for destruction and, also, for the kind of control Plath interrogates in her sequence. The 
fact, then, that Plath—ever attentive to the elder poet’s use of recurring symbols, as she 
demonstrated in her essay on Sitwell—associates the queen in her flight with a lion, a symbol 
Sitwell uses, in particular, in her own bee sequence, suggests that while Plath places central 
importance in “Stings” on the recovery of the hiding queen, she at the same time frames this 
queen (in her rage, a “red / [s]car in the sky,” emerging from the hive “[m]ore terrible than she 
ever was”), as well as the queen’s fate, as an indictment of the cycle of violence that produced 
and now destroyed her, if we are to read her fate as indeed death. Plath positions the queen’s 
flight, in other words, as ultimately self-defeating. And this is precisely why, I would argue, that 
Plath—steeped as she is in Sitwell’s mythopoesis, which gestures always toward redemption and 
regeneration—does not end her sequence with this particular image of transcendence.  
Indeed, in the next poem of the sequence, “The Swarm,” Plath suggests that the queen’s 
appropriation of male power, associated as it is in the sequence with mastery and destruction, is 
not a viable solution to female subjugation. In “The Swarm,” Plath explores the consequences of 
the pursuit of such power, and it is here that she shifts from ritual to history, a shift that mirrors 
Sitwell’s shift in her own sequence. In the second and final poem of “The Bee Oracles,” entitled 
“A Sleepy Tune,” “a Gold man” who “lie[s] under the earth,” a man “who was King,” longs for 
“the time of our advance upon the Sun,” when the Sun will “kiss the loveless / And stretch 
himself on our earth in love once more” (239). As the martial “advance” here suggests, the king 
was in life a renowned conqueror, whom “the Thriae” (those part-nymph, part-woman 
“priestesses of the gold Comb”) reveal to be, Sitwell suggests, Nebuchadnezzar II: “There was a 







Mark writes, that “Babylon became the most powerful city-state in the region and 
Nebuchadnezzar II himself the greatest warrior-king and ruler in the known world” 
(“Nebuchadnezzar II”). Sitwell’s Babylonian king functions in the sequence as he does in the 
Bible, where he “is portrayed,” in Mark’s words, “in unflattering light,” “most notably in the 
Book of Daniel and the Book of Jeremiah (where he is seen as an ‘enemy of God’ and one whom 
the deity of the Israelites intends to make an example of or, conversely, the agent of God used as 
a scourge against the faithless followers of Yahweh)” (“Nebuchadnezzar II”). As such, the king 
serves to establish the power and mercy of Sitwell’s symbol of the Sun, which “sees,” in lines 
Plath quotes, as we have seen, in her essay, “life in the aridities of the dust, / In the seed and the 
base excrement and the world’s fevers” (240). The Sun “loves alike,” “the lovers’ lips like the 
gold fires of burning Troy” as well as “the loveless,” and “comes to the criminal whose nature,” 
in Sitwell’s post-atomic mythopoesis, “[w]as crippled before his birth by a new gravitation / That 
changed the solar system of the heart / To a universe reigned over by deformation” (The Canticle 
of the Rose 241). Even such a king, who functions, according to this schema, as part of the 
“deformation” that “reign[s] over” such a “universe,” can himself find redemption in the Sun: 
“None is condemned. . . .  Then why should we lie loveless? / He will clothe us again in gold and 
a little love” (241).  
In addition to Sitwell’s Babylonian king, one of the “golden heroes” that the Sun 
prophesies at the end of “The Bee-Keeper” arrives, too, in “A Sleepy Tune,” as that conqueror of 
the known world, “Great Alexander [who] lies in a mask of gold / White honey mummified . . . 
as if it were gold armor” (240). As the “priestesses of the gold Comb” proclaim in their 
invocation of Alexander,  







Wind from the honey-hive can know  
If still from strength comes sweetness—if from the lion-heart 
The winged swarms rise! (240)  
With the “lion-red body” of her queen—a body that echoes those of Sitwell’s “[p]rophetesses / 
[w]ho from a wingless pupa, spark of gold // [i]n the dark, rose with gold bodies bright as the 
Lion” (237)—Plath, we could say, poses a similar question at the end of “Stings.” And as we 
shift from this final image of the queen’s flight to “The Swarm,” it would seem that it is indeed 
from the “lion-red” queen that “[t]he winged swarms rise.”  
In other words, there is another possibility here, besides death, for the queen’s fate at the 
end of “Stings.” As the drafts of the poem suggest, Plath seems to have been aware that a queen 
only leaves the hive for two reasons, either for her “bride flight” or to swarm (Ariel 82). And as 
the drafts suggest, too, Plath originally considered the first of these options, imagining the queen 
who emerges at the end of the poem as “dream[ing] of a second bride-flight” (Van Dyne 112). 
Plath here indeed demonstrates her knowledge of the dynamics of the hive, of the fact that the 
majority of queens perform a single bride flight over the course of their lives, but in rare cases, a 
queen can undertake a second, at great risk to her own life, to ensure the growth of the hive. And 
yet, Plath rejects this line, which Van Dyne describes as “a specifically female identification of 
the queen,” based as it in the queen’s reproductive role, and “replace[s] [it] with the male 
association of her ‘lion-red body’” (112). There is the possibility, then, that the queen’s flight 
signals swarming rather than (literal) death, a reading that the title of this next poem in the 
sequence—a poem indeed entitled “The Swarm”—would seem to support, as would the drafts of 
“Stings” themselves. If a queen is particularly successful at her sole purpose in the hive, laying 







the colony in a swarm to a new location, leaving the remaining worker bees to raise a new queen 
in her absence. In these drafts Plath indeed demonstrates her knowledge of swarming, depicting 
her queen “[r]ising this time, on wings of clear glass, / Over the deserted nurseries” (qtd. in Van 
Dyne 110). The queen’s flight here reads, then, not as death, but desertion. And as Van Dyne 
points out, “‘deserted nurseries’ remains constant and appears as part of the closure in every draft 
until the last” (110).  
In her examination of the “Stings” drafts, Van Dyne traces a shift in focus from 
vengeance to the recuperation of a self. Earlier drafts of the poem focus on the mysterious male 
figure who survives in the final draft as that “great scapegoat,” a figure based, as the first draft 
indicates, on Hughes (109). As a letter to her mother in June suggests, this first draft, Van Dyne 
points out, is based on a bee-keeping incident in which Hughes was stung repeatedly, an incident 
that survives into the final draft as “[t]he bees found him out,” this mysterious male figure, 
“[m]olding onto his lips like lies” (Van Dyne 107, Ariel 87). In the earlier versions of the poem, 
Plath focused on this male figure as her “speaker engaged in a definition of herself that is 
primarily vengeful”: “She is the wronged wife and deserted mother whose verbal assault 
disfigures, emasculates, and finally destroys a male opponent” (Van Dyne 108). In a passage full 
of “name-calling” and “grotesque caricature,” “[Plath’s] representation of the male figure as a 
deformed troll who might hex her labor or appropriate its fruits” underscores what Van Dyne 
argues was, at the time, “Plath’s uncertainty about her self-engendering poetics” (109). However, 
when Plath returned to the poem “ten days later on October 16,” this passage that had been a 
staple of the drafts underwent a substantial transformation. “By then,” Van Dyne writes, “Plath 
had completed ‘Daddy,’ a poem wholly devoted  [ . . . ] to subduing this [figure of] male force” 







drafts” of “Stings,” she asserts, “but was later intentionally suppressed in favor of a primary 
focus on the transfiguration of the queen” (109). In other words, by the final draft, “the 
wounding of the male figure by the bees takes second place to the speaker’s recovery of the 
queen” (108).  
And yet, while the focus of the poem shifts from the male figure to the recovery of the 
queen, the queen, in her flight, still maintains Plath’s hallmark of vengeance, the red that will 
mark, a week later, the rise of “Lady Lazarus” who, with her “red hair,” rises from the ashes to 
“eat men like air” (Ariel 17). In “Stings,” Plath paints her queen red three times over: with her 
“lion-red body,” she is “[m]ore terrible than she ever was, red / [s]car in the sky, red comet / 
[o]ver the engine that killed her” (88). And by way of this “lion-red body,” by way of the swarm 
the queen leads, in effect, into the next poem, this vengeance—and, I would argue, Plath’s 
critique of it—carries over into her exploration, in “The Swarm,” of a figure akin to Sitwell’s 
historical “Lions,” those kings of war, of conquest and destruction. In other words, the 
“maleness” of the “lion-red” queen translates in “The Swarm” into a figure akin to Sitwell’s 
Alexander the Great, that conquering “Lion.” As Plath would tell Orr in her interview a couple of 
weeks later, at this time she was “find[ing] [her]self being more and more fascinated by history” 
and was “now [ . . . ] reading more and more about history”; and as we can see from “The 
Swarm,” Plath was, “at the present,” “very interested in Napoleon” (Orr 169).  
Associating the vengeance of the queen in “Stings”—a vengeance that stems, as we have 
seen, from the wronged woman of the drafts—with an appropriation of male power via her “lion-
red body,” Plath indeed suggests that this model of vengeance, and the cycle of violence in 
which it is embedded, is a problematic model for poetic selfhood. Such vengeance, Plath 







oppression from which the speaker, as a historical female subject, strives to free herself. Instead, 
vengeance serves to continue the cycle of violence from which she would wish to escape, a 
cycle, as we will see, that Plath explores more fully in “Lady Lazarus” and “Getting There.” And 
it is just such destructive emotions that become the focus of “The Swarm,” that Plath both 
associates with her speaker and at the same time locates at the heart of historical violence. As the 
poem opens, 
Somebody is shooting at something in our town—  
A dull pom, pom in the Sunday street.  
Jealousy can open the blood, 
It can make black roses. (Ariel 190) 
This sense of disembodied jealousy the speaker then positions within the context of the 
Napoleonic wars: “What are they shooting at? // It is you the knives are out for / At Waterloo, 
Waterloo, Napoleon,” Napoleon with “[t]he hump of Elba on your short back” (190). Here war 
becomes a game (“These are chess people you play with”), and, when read in the context of 
Plath’s midwinter drafts—in which the speaker’s nightmares center on the image of cut throats, 
an image, as Peel argues, as we have seen, taken from news coverage of the Algerian War—a 
perpetual cycle rooted in imperialism, a cycle that does not end, as the Algerian War (and Plath’s 
repurposing of the nightmare image) suggests, with Napoleon’s defeat:  
The mud squirms with throats,  
Stepping stones for French bootsoles. 
The gilt and pink domes of Russia melt and float off 
 







So the swarm balls and deserts 
Seventy feet up, in a black pine tree. 
It must be shot down. (190) 
The swarm that would follow the queen in her “desert[ion] [of the] nurseries” in “Stings,” 
here becomes the swarm that would follow Napoleon and desert in defeat. “How instructive this 
is!” the speaker declares (191). There is a lesson in “[t]he dumb, banded bodies / Walking the 
plank draped with Mother France’s upholstery / Into a new mausoleum” (191). When read within 
the context of the sequence, the swarm that would desert the hive, following the queen, in 
“Stings” finds itself led, here in “The Swarm,” essentially back to where it started; following a 
queen, in other words, who rises “[o]ver the engine that killed her— / [t]he mausoleum,” the 
swarm arrives at “a new mausoleum,” one that signals not the queen’s death, but its own. Shot, 
the bees “fall/ [d]ismembered, to a tod of ivy. / So much for the chariots, the outriders, the Grand 
Army. / A red tatter, Napoleon” (191). However, as the poem closes, we discover that the bees 
didn’t go down without a fight: “Stings big as drawing pins!” mark the man with the gun (192). 
“It seems bees have a notion of honor,” the speaker muses, “a black, intractable mind” (192). 
Meanwhile, “Napoleon is pleased, he is pleased with everything. / O Europe. O ton of honey” 
(192).182  
In Sitwell’s bee sequence, the “Lion of the Spirit” who would cry “[d]estroy—destroy,” 
has been subdued by the “Bee in the Spirit” who declares, “‘The gold combs lay / In the cold 
rock, and the slain Lion, amid spent golden thunders’” (The Canticle of the Rose 239). Those 
                                               
182 Plath’s envisioning of Europe as a massive, honey-producing hive has a precedent, it would seem, though 
admittedly on a smaller scale, in Sitwell’s The Queens and the Hive (1962). In the New York Times, for example, 
one reviewer noted, “The hive of the title, we are told, is the power and glory of England; the Queens are Mary 








“golden heroes,” who in life disturbed the earth’s balance, over which the Bee Priestesses 
preside, have in death been returned, as honey, to the earth, as “Great Alexander [himself] lies in 
a mask of gold / White honey mummified” (240). The balance, then, has been restored so that 
“Earth is the honey of all Beings, and all Beings / Are the honey of this Earth” (238). However, 
by the end of “The Swarm,” Napoleon is still alive and Europe sits a “ton of honey” for the 
taking, a line foreboding the world wars to come. For Plath’s sequence, it will take one more 
poem before we get a hint of the Sun that, in the end of Sitwell’s series, offers hope of 
redemption and carries the sequence toward regeneration.  
“Wintering,” the final poem of the sequence, offers a figure of poetic selfhood that stands 
in stark contrast to the vengeful queen in “Stings.” At the start of the poem, the speaker’s 
“honey, / [s]ix jars of it,” sits “in the wine cellar, / [w]intering in a dark without window / [a]t the 
heart of the house” (Ariel 89). What enables the poem to move through this literal as well as 
figurative winter to end on “spring”—the final word not only of the sequence, but of the Ariel 
manuscript itself, Plath having chosen to end the volume with the series and therefore, with a 
Sitwellian emphasis on renewal and rebirth—is an acknowledgement (akin to Alvarez’s call for 
poets to face, as Plath does, as we saw, in “A Birthday Present,” “the fears and desires [s]he does 
not wish to face”) of the rot in the cellar, of “Black asininity. Decay. / Possession” that lies 
within “the room I have never been in,” “the room I could never breathe in” (Ariel 89). It is in 
this poem that the speaker relinquishes her desire for control, which she had asserted as the bees’ 
“owner” in “The Arrival of the Bee Box” and declared explicitly as she set up her hive in 
“Stings”: “I am in control. / Here is my honey-machine” (87). While in “Wintering,” the speaker 
declares, “I have my honey,” the process by which she has obtained it is not mechanical but 







it was for Napoleon in “The Swarm”), but of something akin to birth, having been removed from 
the hive by the speaker with “the midwife’s extractor” (89). A midwife to, rather than owner of, 
the bees, the speaker in “Wintering,” then, states, “It is they who own me” (89). Like the swarm 
in the previous poem, the bees outside “ball in a mass, / [b]lack / [m]ind against all that white,” 
which “spreads itself out, a mile-long body of Meissen”—what stands as Plath’s first reference 
to the concentration camps of World War II—“[i]nto which, on warm days, / [t]hey can only 
carry their dead” (90). It is winter, and “[t]he bees are all women”: “[t]hey have got rid of the 
men, // [t]he blunt, clumsy stumblers, the boors” (90). “Winter,” the speaker concludes, “is for 
women— / [t]he woman, still at her knitting, / [a]t the cradle of Spanish walnut” (90). Within the 
context of the sequence, which positions “The Swarm” immediately after “Stings” and before 
“Wintering,” the bees can be read, in effect, as those deserted by the queen in her flight, and the 
speaker, “[h]er body a bulb in the cold and too dumb to think,” as a pupa the bees are raising to 
fill the void (90).  
While the speaker, this new queen, is still embedded, then, in the same cycle of violence 
that propelled the flight of the previous one, there are signs of hope in Plath’s final poem of the 
sequence, and, therefore, of Ariel itself. “Will the hive survive,” the speaker wonders, not only 
the winter, but, as the sequence suggests, its desertion by the old queen (90). All signs seem to 
point to the affirmative, Plath aligning this question with one for which the answer is an almost 
automatic “yes”: “will the gladiolas,” those perennials, “[s]ucceed in banking their fires / [t]o 
enter another year?” (90). “What will they taste of, the Christmas roses?” (90). To this final 
question, Plath positions the bees themselves in response: “The bees are flying. They taste the 
spring” (90). While the “spring” that the bees taste is, on a literal level, artificial, the speaker 







real spring is of course on the way, as is, Plath suggests—by way of “the midwife’s extractor” 
and the “cradle” next to which “[t]he woman, still at her knitting,” sits, “[h]er body a bulb in the 
cold”—the rebirth the season heralds. By the end, then, the queen’s vengeance has been 
channeled, through both a literal and figurative winter, into the promise of spring, and the 
speaker, in the guise of the queen, has lost herself and, in doing so, found herself in “the woman, 
still at her knitting,” a process that Plath describes in her teaching notes for The Waste Land as 
“the only way to rebirth, to life renewed” (“Teaching Notes”).183   
Once finished, Plath sent the series of poems off to The New Yorker, and, as Van Dyne 
notes, “by January 25 she had successfully placed all but ‘The Swarm’” (102). While Plath had 
originally included “The Swarm” in her table of contents for Ariel, at some point she placed the 
title in parentheses and removed the poem from her manuscript, perhaps because it hadn’t been 
accepted for publication, though at the time, neither had “Thalidomide,” “Lady Lazarus,” 
“Getting There,” and “Daddy,” all of which do make it into the collection.184 More likely, 
perhaps, Plath cut the poem—though, as I would argue, it constitutes an important stage in the 
progression of the sequence and an important context for a fuller understanding of the end Plath 
had envisioned for the series, casting its central figure, the vengeful queen, back in its original 
light that is one of celebration as well as caution—because it contains the seeds of that later 
transcendence poem, “Getting There.” About midway through “The Swarm,”  
 The bees argue, in their black ball. 
A flying hedgehog, all prickles. 
                                               
183 In her notes for The Waste Land, Plath has written, “GIVE: Give self, lose self to find self: in fire & water of 
baptism, purging. This is the only way to rebirth, to life renewed” (“Teaching Notes”).  
184 On a copy of her table of contents, Plath kept a running list of which poems had been accepted for publication 
and where. This copy is included as part of the “Facsimile of the manuscript for Ariel and other poems” in the 







The man with grey hands stands under the honeycomb 
Of their dream, the hived station  
Where trains, faithful to their steel arcs, 
 
Leave and arrive, and there is no end to the country. (Ariel 191) 
Indeed, these trains become, in “Getting There,” the train of history, carrying the speaker across 
such an expanse (“It is Russia I have to get across, it is some war or other”), its “wheels / [f]ixed 
to their arcs like gods” (57). “The Swarm,” then, can be read as a precursor for “Getting There,” 
in which Plath engages, as I argue in the Conclusion, both The Waste Land and Four Quartets. 
However, before Plath could arrive at “Getting There,” her fullest response to the cycle of war 
and destruction that the poem figures as history itself, she first had to readdress, and recast, the 




When Plath began drafting “Lady Lazarus” on October 23rd, she was about a week away 
from insisting to Orr in her interview for the BBC that “personal experience [ . . . ] should be 
relevant, and relevant to the larger things, the bigger things, such as Hiroshima and Dachau and 
so on.” As we saw in Chapter 1, Plath here is positioning her poetics in response to Alvarez’s 
call for a “new seriousness,” for poets to “drop the pretense that life, give or take a few social 
distinctions, is the same as ever, that gentility, decency, and all the other social totems will 
eventually muddle through.” In asking poets to drop such a pretense, Alvarez was asking them to 
acknowledge “the forces of disintegration” whose public “faces” were those of “two world wars, 







contended, psychoanalysis had forced an awareness that these “forces” were the same forces “at 
work within us.” It is this link between the public and private “faces” of the “forces of 
disintegration,” as I argued in Chapter 1, that Plath adapts in her interview as well as in “Lady 
Lazarus” itself. 
When Brünnhilde, that Wagnerian figure of vengeance,185 then, marks her entrance—by 
way of Sitwell’s “Green Song”—in “Lady Lazarus” about a week after Plath completes her bee 
sequence,186 Plath’s understanding of the “ideological heritage” the Valkyrie carries had become 
considerably more nuanced since the time she had written her essay on Barzun’s Darwin, Marx, 
Wagner. What seems, at least in part, to undergird the link Alvarez establishes between the 
public and private “faces” of “the forces of disintegration” is Erich Fromm’s Escape from 
Freedom. And Plath didn’t need to rely on Alvarez for a filtering down of Fromm’s argument 
about “the specific problem of freedom and the general problem of the interaction of economic, 
psychological, and ideological factors in the social process” (Fromm 98); she herself had written 
an essay on the volume while at Smith. What’s more, it would seem that Plath had returned to 
Fromm’s study that fall and winter of 1962. In a letter dated September 26, 1962, in the midst of 
the breakdown of her marriage, Plath had been reminded of Fromm by her therapist, Ruth 
Beuscher, who recommended she read The Art of Loving (1956). From the end of September 
until December, when she moved, alone with her children, from Court Green back to London, 
Fromm seems to have been a central enough figure for her that she brought Escape from 
Freedom along to the new, “cramped” flat (Becker 4). As Jillian Becker indicates in her memoir, 
                                               
185 As we will see, in revenge of what she perceived as Siegfried’s betrayal of her, Brünnhilde aids her lover’s 
enemies in killing him. 
186 While the Collected Poems lists October 9th as the date of composition for “Wintering,” the last poem of the bee 
series, Van Dyne, who examined the drafts, states that Plath returned to the drafts to finalize them on the 16th. I am 







during Plath’s final days, in February of 1963, she asked Becker, with whom she was staying, to 
drop by her flat to pick up some toothbrushes and clothes and two books, one of which was not 
the rather recently recommended The Art of Loving,187 as we might expect, but instead was 
Escape from Freedom (3).188 
And indeed it would seem that in “Lady Lazarus,” Plath explores suicide through the lens 
of Fromm’s “problem of freedom” (Fromm 98), a lens that would have offered Plath the kind of 
“immense panorama” that Eliot established for the modernist epic, structured as it was by the 
“parallel” the mythical method constructed between antiquity and the chaos of the modern 
moment. In his study, Fromm traces the rise of fascism back to a historical moment in which 
mankind in the Western world was shorn from its traditional roots. In a passage that Plath starred 
and next to which she added the marginal note, “ambivalence of freedom,” Fromm writes,  
The breakdown of the medieval system of feudal society had one main 
significance for all classes of society: the individual was left alone and isolated.  
He was free. This freedom had a twofold result. Man was deprived of the security 
he had enjoyed, of the unquestionable feeling of belonging, and he was torn loose 
from the world which had satisfied his quest for security both economically and 
spiritually. He felt alone and anxious. But he was also free to act and to think 
independently, to become his own master and do with his life as he could—not as 
he was told to do. (99) 
As Plath puts it in her essay, Fromm identifies, through the course of a series of historical 
changes, both social and economic, “two aspects of freedom in the modern world: freedom 
                                               
187 By this time, Plath owned a copy of The Art of Loving, which is now housed in the Ted Hughes archives at 
Emory University. Plath inscribed the volume with the date, November 1962.   







‘from’ traditional authoritarian forces (the family, the church, the state, a rigid social structure) 
and freedom ‘to’ new expanding scopes of individual initiative and development” (“The Age of 
Anxiety and the Escape from Freedom”). It is the “burden” of this freedom that triggers a host of 
what Plath, citing one of Fromm’s chapter titles, refers to as “Mechanisms of Escape,” the first 
of which he defines as “authoritarianism,” “the tendency to give up the independence of one’s 
own individual self and to fuse one’s self with somebody or something outside of oneself in 
order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking” (104, 141).189  
And it is here—through these “mechanisms of escape,” the various responses to the 
“burden” of freedom—that Fromm establishes what reads as a foundation for both Alvarez’s link 
between the public and private “faces” of “the forces of disintegration,” which psychoanalysis 
had revealed to be “the same,” and Plath’s link, in “Lady Lazarus,” between individual suicide 
and historical atrocities “such as Hiroshima and Dachau,” those which she will specify in her 
interview with Orr just days later. At the heart of fascism, for Fromm, lies sadomasochism: “The 
love for the powerful and the hatred for the powerless which is so typical of the sado-masochistic 
character explains a great deal of Hitler’s and his followers’ political actions” (231). And Fromm 
indeed seems to locate sadomasochism, as a method of escape from the “burden of freedom,” at 
the heart of historical violence more broadly. Historically, as well as philosophically, sadism, 
according to Fromm, had seemed inherent to human nature:  
That one wished to hurt others or to dominate them seemed, though not 
necessarily “good,” quite natural. Hobbes assumed as a “general inclination of all 
mankind” the existence of “a perpetual and restless desire of power after power 
                                               
189 The underlining here is Plath’s. I will be citing Plath’s personal copy of Fromm’s study, housed in the archives at 
Smith College. (See the entry for Escape from Freedom in my Works Cited for location information.) From here 








that ceaseth only in Death.” For him the wish for power has no diabolical quality 
but is a perfectly rational result of man’s desire for pleasure and security. (147) 
“From Hobbes to Hitler, who explains the wish for domination as the logical result of the 
biologically conditioned struggle for survival of the fittest,” Fromm writes—and Plath 
underlines—“the lust for power has been explained as a part of human nature which does not 
warrant any explanation beyond the obvious” (147). Not so, Fromm indicates, for masochism: 
“Masochistic strivings, however, tendencies directed against one’s own self, seem to be a riddle. 
How should one understand the fact that people not only want to belittle and weaken and hurt 
themselves, but even enjoy doing so?” (147). Yet, such strivings, Fromm argues, can be 
accounted for within the context of “the specific problem of freedom”: “The different forms 
which the masochistic strivings assume have one aim: to get rid of the individual self, to lose 
oneself; in other words, to be rid of the burden of freedom” (152, Fromm’s emphasis). “If the 
individual finds cultural patterns that satisfy these masochistic strivings (like the submission 
under the ‘leader’ in Fascist ideology), he gains some security by finding himself united with 
millions of others who share these feelings”; however, if such “cultural patterns” aren’t found, an 
individual might find escape through means such as “intoxication,” or, within a system of 
democracy, through what Fromm calls “automaton conformity” (185), or, as a very last resort, 
through “[t]he phantasy of suicide,” “the last hope if all other means have not succeeded in 
bringing relief from the burden of aloneness” (153).  
Plath here has drawn two lines under “suicide” and two lines in the margins. What she 
has marked, in other words, is not only a depiction of suicide as escape, but one that identifies 
the very same forces within the self, within, that is, “Lady Lazarus,” that are at work in fascism 







that Plath’s work, particularly in her transcendence poems, I would argue, at times borders on 
culpability. While a long line of critics have accused Plath of appropriating the Holocaust to 
aggrandize her own private suffering, of transferring to her own suffering the collective store of 
emotion associated with the Holocaust—a collective store of emotion newly engendered, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, as the event entered public “consciousness in a new way” in the early sixties 
“with the capture, trial, and execution of Adolf Eichmann”—Plath took pains, I would argue, to 
prevent such a transference, working to distance not only her speakers from herself, but her 
speakers from their audience. For example, as Margaret Dickie Uroff argues, while Plath uses 
autobiographical details, the characters in her poems are “generalized figures not real-life 
people,” and the speakers often “[do] not engage our sympathies” in the ways, for instance, that 
Lowell’s do (104-5).190 Uroff then concludes that it would be a mistake to confuse Plath herself 
with her speakers because such a confusion fails to acknowledge the ways in which she uses 
“techniques of caricature, hyperbole, and parody that serve . . . to distance the speaker from the 
poet” (110). Eliot himself, as we have seen, uses various means of achieving such distance, such 
as dramatis personae, myth, and biblical figures, all of which Plath, in her reconfiguration of the 
mythical method, employs in a wide array of her work.191 I would add, too, borrowing from 
Walter Benjamin’s analysis of Brecht’s epic theater, that what we could call the “epic acting” of 
Plath’s speakers, especially Lady Lazarus, in fact precludes such a transference of collective 
emotion. By removing the possibility of catharsis, epic theater, according to Benjamin, strives to 
elicit “astonishment rather than empathy” (150), as does Lady Lazarus, we could say, who 
                                               
190 In Life Studies, for example, Lowell addresses the father figure as “Commander Lowell,” the title of one of the 
poems in the collection.  
191 In “Purdah,” for example, Plath speaks as Clytemnestra; in “Edge,” as Medea; in “Getting There,” variously as 
Eve and Joan of Arc and perhaps, even, Antigone; and in “Lady Lazarus,” of course, as a female Lazarus who rises 








addresses her auditor (and by extension her reader) as “O my enemy,” asking “Do I terrify?” as 
she then reveals behind the mask of her smiling womanhood, “the nose, the eye pits, the full set 
of teeth” (Ariel 14). The epic actor, Benjamin notes, seeks to ensure such a response: he is to 
“demonstrate through his acting that he is cool and relaxed. He  . . . has hardly any use for 
empathy” (153). As Joyce Carol Oates puts it, “risen once again from the dead, Lady Lazarus 
does not expect a sympathetic response from the mob of spectators that crowd in to view her” 
(Brennan 46).  
Rather than seeking our sympathies as readers (as stand-ins for the spectators, “the 
peanut-crunching crowd,” within the poem itself), then, Plath works instead to interrogate the 
forces at work in both private suffering and historical atrocity, to ask, in a question indeed epic in 
scope, how one might free oneself from the cycle of historical violence without escaping it and 
thereby ensuring that it will continue uninterrupted, and in allowing it to do so, becoming, in 
turn, complicit in its horrors (Ariel 15). While the parallel that Plath structures is indeed one 
between private suffering and historical atrocity, a parallel structured, as we saw in Chapter 1, by 
death—private suffering is made “relevant,” in other words, by being put into the perspective of 
historical atrocity—there is another parallel at work here. Since for Fromm both suicide and 
historical violence are rooted in sadomasochism as a response to, and “escape” from, the 
“burden” of freedom—sadism and masochism “are the outcomes of one basic need, springing 
from the inability to bear the isolation and weakness of one’s own self” (Fromm 158)—the 
speaker of “Lady Lazarus,” as both agent and object of sadomasochistic violence, becomes 
aligned, then, not simply with the victims of mass, historical violence, but with its perpetrators. 
As Fromm puts the link in a passage that Plath has both starred and doubly underlined, “[p]eople 







passive side of” what he calls “the symbiotic complex” (158, my emphasis). When Lady 
Lazarus, then, returns from death inscribed by the public “faces” of “the forces of 
disintegration”—her skin “[b]right as a Nazi lampshade,” her “face a featureless, fine / Jew 
linen” (Ariel 14)—she acknowledges that the violence she has turned on herself is, while 
certainly not identical to, at the same time not wholly unlike the genocidal violence that has 
produced such spoils and atrocities as those she has returned inflected by. Lady Lazarus, then, 
we could say, embodies the “symbiotic complex”; however, rather than “oscillating between the 
active and passive side of” sadomasochism, she is the perpetrator of violence at precisely the 
same time as she is its victim.  
And what’s more, as indicative of masochism, there is an element of pleasure—a 
pleasure tinged, I would argue, with complicity—in Lady Lazarus’s return from the dead. From 
the first line of the poem, Lady Lazarus frames her recurring death and resurrection as an act, as 
something she has “done,” and the tension of the poem resides within her struggle to lay claim to 
this act against the competing claims of gods and men. It is something she has “managed” 
though “Herr Doktor” would claim her as his “opus,” his “valuable” (16), something she has “a 
call” for while the medical staff had “to call and call” to get her to return (15). And yet at the 
same time as she would claim her act, she criticizes it, and does so, specifically, using a term 
Fromm associates with masochism: “what a trash / [t]o annihilate each decade” (15). According 
to Fromm, the goal of masochism (and, therefore, of suicide, as one expression of it) is “[t]he 
annihilation of the individual self and the attempt to overcome thereby the unbearable feeling of 
powerlessness” (155, my emphasis). It is against such powerlessness, in other words, that Lady 
Lazarus struggles to establish her act as her own. And it is not only the “annihilation of the [ . . . ] 







times to die” (14). Her suicides, in other words, are not simply escape or annihilation; they are a 
return to life made all the more harrowing by constituting a return to, and thereby a facing of, the 
very conditions she would wish to escape:  
It’s easy enough to do it in a cell. 
It’s easy enough to do it and stay put.  
It’s the theatrical 
 
Comeback in broad day  




That knocks me out.  (16) 
The question, then, is not how to escape these “brute” conditions but how to be free of them. By 
escaping only to return and repeat the process, Plath suggests, Lady Lazarus is complicit in the 
cycle of violence she wishes to escape. Indeed, it is the return to the same “brute” conditions that 
is both at the core of the violence of her act as well as at the core of the pleasure she attains from 
it, as it “knocks [her] out.” However “theatrical” and harrowing Lady Lazarus’s deaths and 
resurrections might be, in other words, they change nothing. While her flesh is the flesh “the 
grave cave ate,” she is “a smiling woman,” “the same, identical woman” as she was before (14, 
15). And for Plath, that dedicated reader of Fromm, to be “a smiling woman” was quite an 







response, parallel to the response that was German fascism, to the “burden of freedom,” smiling, 
for Fromm, signals conformity to capitalist hegemony: 
the child is taught to have feelings that are not all “his”; particularly he is taught 
to like people, to be uncritically friendly to them, and to smile. What education 
may not have accomplished is usually done by social pressure later in life. If you 
do not smile you are judged lacking in a “pleasing personality”—and you need to 
have a pleasing personality if you want to sell your services, whether as a 
waitress, a salesman, or a physician. Only those at the bottom of the social 
pyramid, who sell nothing but their physical labor, and those at the very top do 
not need to be particularly “pleasant.” Friendliness, cheerfulness, and everything 
that a smile is supposed to express, become automatic responses which one turns 
on and off like an electric switch. (243)192 
According to Fromm, such “automatic responses” are symptomatic of “[a]utomaton conformity,” 
in which “the individual ceases to be himself” as “he adopts entirely the kind of personality 
offered to him by cultural patterns” (185-6). As a result, “he [ . . . ] becomes exactly as all others 
are and as they expect him to be. The discrepancy between ‘I’ and the world disappears and with 
it the conscious fear of aloneness and powerlessness” (186). In the figure of Lady Lazarus, then, 
this “smiling,” “automaton conformity” takes on a gendered cast, smacking of the housewife in 
her kitchen smiling, unwaveringly, from across scores of 1950s TV and magazine ads. Gesturing 
toward the violence to the self underlying such conformity—as Fromm puts it, 
“[p]sychologically the automaton, while being alive biologically, is dead emotionally and 
mentally” (255), a condition, it would seem, synonymous with the modernist “death-in-life” to 
                                               







which Plath had become so attuned as a student at Smith—Plath reveals the hollowed out 
emptiness (“[t]he nose, the eye pits, the full set of teeth”) lurking behind such a façade.193 In such 
conformity, Lady Lazarus, with her cyclical returns and the violent pleasure she derives from 
them, proves at least to some degree complicit, caught up, not unlike the speaker in the bee 
sequence, in her desire for control and ownership, for the claiming of her act as her own, in 
escaping (albeit also returning to) the “fear of aloneness and powerlessness.”  
 It might seem, then, as Fromm puts it, and as Lady Lazarus’s cyclical suicides would 
seem to demonstrate, “that there is an inevitable circle that leads from freedom into new 
dependence” (257). “Does freedom from all primary ties,” Fromm asks, “make the individual so 
alone and isolated that inevitably he must escape into new bondage?” (257). Such a circle—if the 
escape from the “burden of freedom” were to lie at the core of historical violence, as Fromm’s 
analysis of fascism and “automaton conformity” in relation to sadomasochism suggests—would 
read not unlike the cycle of war and destruction that we saw in Plath’s bee sequence and that 
Plath would soon identify in “Getting There” as history itself. How, then, might one free oneself 
of the cycle of violence, of war and destruction, without escaping it, without foregoing the 
chance to effect change within the very conditions that would inspire the desire for escape in the 
first place? As Plath puts it in her essay, Fromm’s solution to “the problem of freedom” lies 
within what he distinguishes as “positive freedom” (Fromm 258), as “a man’s spontaneous 
relation to the world ‘in love and work, in the genuine expression of his emotional, sensuous, and 
intellectual capacities; he can thus become one again with man, nature, and himself, without 
giving up the independence and integrity of his individual self’” (“The Age of Anxiety and the 
Escape from Freedom”). Such freedom, in other words, consists in “spontaneous activity,” as 
                                               







distinct from “compulsive activity, to which the individual is driven by his isolation and 
powerlessness” (Fromm 258). “Spontaneous activity,” Fromm concludes, is “free activity of the 
self” (25). 
And it is just such “free activity,” we could say, that Brünnhilde performs at the end of 
the Ring. As Žižek describes it, in terms not unlike Fromm’s, “Brünnhilde’s act is precisely that: 
an act, a gesture of supreme freedom and autonomy, not just resigned acquiescence to some 
higher power” (207). Earlier in the opera cycle, the Valkyrie’s father, Wotan, lord of the gods, 
unable to act himself, his hands tied by contractual obligations, had called his daughter his 
“Will,” as Barzun observes in his study (264). And Brünnhilde, in her very defiance of his 
will,194 both fulfills and transcends it with her final act. Wotan, that figure of Schopenhauerian 
world-weariness and resignation, confesses to Brünnhilde in the very monologue in which he 
calls her his “Will,” that he longs for the end of the rule of the gods,195 and Brünnhilde ends it, 
and yet, she does more than just that. And she does more, too, than simply satisfy her own 
personal revenge, a figure, in this sense, not unlike Plath’s queen bee in “Stings” and Lady 
Lazarus herself. According to Barzun,“[t]hat the world is a meaningless round of lust and death 
must therefore be the philosophy of the Ring, for even the intelligent and loving Brünnhilde 
cannot rise to self-sacrifice or forgiveness. She sacrifices others and seeks revenge” (264). 
Indeed, revenge certainly serves as a determining factor for Brünnhilde’s act, as it does for 
                                               
194 In the cycle, to uphold the sanctity of marriage and the injunction against incest, Wotan must ensure the death of 
his son, Siegmund, that lover of Sieglinde (who, unbeknownst to Siegmund, is his sister), the two lovers of “Spring 
Song,” which, as we have seen, Sitwell’s “Green Song,” in part, reprises. Siegmund must be defeated by Sieglinde’s 
husband in order to uphold the order of the law, which Wotan represents. And when Brünnhilde, moved by the love 
between Siegmund and Sieglinde, defies Wotan’s orders, supporting Siegmund in battle, Wotan severs his 
connections with her, rendering her mortal and declaring that he will place her, unconscious, on a mountainside prey 
to the first passerby, who happens to be Siegmund, Sitwell’s “naked knight” who declares himself “the world’s last 
love.” While Brünnhilde indeed defies Wotan’s order here, she argues that in defying it, she also fulfilled it, Wotan 
himself admitting that it was his true desire—overruled by his duty to the letter of the law—that his son should live.  
195 In his monologue to her, Wotan confides that what he longs for is in fact the end of his rule: “one thing alone do I 







Siegfried’s death, which precedes it. Unaware that Siegfried’s betrayal of her was unwitting, 
caused by the forgetfulness-inducing potion given to him by his enemies, Brünnhilde resolves to 
aid these enemies in killing him, advising them of his mortal weakness.196 Siegfried, she tells 
them, must die to atone for their betrayals as well as his own.197 Her final act, too, she frames in 
terms of revenge. Once Siegfried has been slain, she approaches his body, announcing to the 
conspirators, “His wife, whom you all betrayed, / comes in quest of revenge” (347). And not 
only are the mortal conspirators the aim of her vengeance. “[B]ehold your eternal guilt!” she 
demands of the “most mighty of gods,” expanding the scope of her revenge to encompass Wotan 
himself, chastising him for subjecting Siegfried to the curse Alberich placed upon the ring, that it 
should bring death to whomever wields its power.198  
However, her act ultimately transcends the motive of revenge she so vehemently avows. 
For Arendt, who, like Fromm, explores what she calls “the problem of freedom,” what enables 
an act to transcend its determining factors, such as motive and will, what enables an act to be 
free, then, is “something altogether different,” what “[she calls] a principle” (150). Enabling an 
act to move beyond its particulars, “[p]rinciples do not operate within the self as motives do [. . .] 
                                               
196 Brünnhilde reveals that she had cast a protective spell on Siegfried, one, however, that left his back vulnerable, 
sure as she was that he would never turn his back on his enemies.   
197 Brünnhilde speech begins, 
       You he betrayed 
and me have you all betrayed! 
     If I had my due,  
     all the blood in the world 
could never make good your guilt! 
     But one man’s death 
     will serve me for all: 
     may Siegfried fall 
to atone for himself and you! (Wagner 329) 
198 To Wotan, Brünnhilde declares, 
By the bravest of deeds,  
  which you dearly desired,  
       you doomed him  
       who wrought it to suffer 








but inspire, as it were, from without” (150-1); in other words, “in distinction from its motive, the 
validity of a principle is universal, it is not bound to any particular person or to any particular 
group” (151). And to act freely and politically, to act in such a way as to make manifest a 
principle, for Arendt, requires what she defines as courage, “one of the cardinal political virtues” 
that itself illustrates the shift from the particular to the collective necessary for any act to be free:   
Courage, which we still believe to be indispensable for political action, [ . . . ] 
does not gratify our individual sense of vitality but is demanded of us by the very 
nature of the political realm. For this world of ours, because it existed before us 
and is meant to outlast our lives in it, simply cannot afford to give primary 
concern to individual lives and the interests connected with them; as such the 
public realm stands in the sharpest possible contrast to our private domain, where, 
in the protection of the family and home, everything serves and must serve the 
security of the life process. It requires courage even to leave the protective 
security of our four walls and enter the political realm, not because of particular 
dangers which may lie in wait for us, but because we have arrived in a realm 
where the concern for life has lost its validity. Courage liberates men from their 
worry about life for the freedom of the world. (154-55)  
Brünnhilde’s ride into Siegfried’s funeral pyre exemplifies—contrary to Barzun’s reading of the 
act, which claims the Valkyrie fails to “rise to self-sacrifice”—just this sense of courage, her ride 
signaling a movement from the particulars of her motive and her connection to Wotan’s will to a 
concern with “the freedom of the world.” “Courage,” writes Arendt, “is indispensable because in 







free of any concern for her own life, it is precisely the world that is at stake and the world that 
she changes.   
 While personal revenge indeed propels Brünnhilde toward her final act, in other words, 
this act moves beyond this particular motive as it fulfills, in Arendtian fashion, the principles of 
love—one of Fromm’s examples of a “spontaneous act”—and what we might call, drawing from 
what Žižek refers to as the Bakuninian strand of the Ring—creative destruction. According to 
Žižek, “the ending of Götterdämmerung,” the final opera of the cycle, “oscillates [in terms of its 
“ideological content”] between three main positions best designated by the names Feuerbach, 
Bakunin, and Schopenhauer: the reign of human love, revolutionary destruction of the old world, 
resignation and withdrawal from the world” (205). While Wotan himself can be said to 
encompass the Schopenhauerian position of “resignation and withdrawal,” it is Brünnhilde who 
enacts the Feuerbachian and Bakuninian positions. During his period of forgetfulness, Siegfried 
had taken from Brünnhilde the ring he had given her as a token of his love. Preparing for her 
final ride, she retrieves the ring from his hand, declaring, “My inheritance now / I take as my 
own” and frames joining Siegfried in the flames as “in mightiest love / to be wedded to him” 
(Wotan 349). And yet at the same time, it is this ring, once it has been cleansed of its curse by 
the fire of Siegfied’s funeral pyre and Brünnhilde self-immolation, that Brünnhilde promises the 
Rhine maidens may reclaim, and as Valhalla burns, the waters of the Rhine wash the ring back to 
its watery depths and restore the natural order. As Philip Kitcher and Richard Schacht 
characterize this final moment in Finding an Ending: Reflections on Wagner’s Ring (2004), 
“[Brünnhilde] acts; and her act is  . . . a many-sided embodiment of her many-sided love . . . she 
does not simply see the world end; she ends it. She also vindicates it, illuminating it anew and 







simply avenge her betrayal and immolate herself, she razes the corrupt order of the gods, and in 
doing so, creates “the possibility of renewal.” And it is this possibility that she leaves, in effect, 
in the hands of “the crowd of men and women who, ‘in deepest emotion,’ bear witness to the 
final destruction in fire and water,” and upon whose shoulders now rests—since the rule of the 
gods has ended—the fate of the world (Žižek 205). Brünnhilde, then, doesn’t simply act for love 
of Siegfried; she acts, as Arendt might put it, for love of the world, a world now free as a result 
of the destruction she has wreaked, which, as Žižek describes the Bakuninian position, “clears 
the field for a new beginning” (205). Wotan, then, wanted the end. Brünnhilde gave it to him, but 
she also gave the world the potential of a new beginning. 
 As Žižek notes, in 1856, Wagner revised the ending of the Ring “under the influence of 
his discovery of Schopenhauer and his reading in Buddhist texts emphasizing the negation of 
suffering via a cycle of death and rebirth” (205). It is this Buddhist inflection of the Ring’s 
ending, we might say, that leaves the strongest mark on Sitwell’s work, on her various “songs,” 
including, as we have seen, “Green Song,” that rendition, in part, of Wagner’s “Spring Song.” As  
Brünnhilde makes her way—by way of “Green Song”—into “Lady Lazarus,” though, she 
certainly carries with her this Buddhist strand, but it is a distinctly Bakuninian position that this 
strand inflects. When Lady Lazarus rises from the ashes, she is enacting a cycle of death and 
rebirth, but as Brünnhilde, with her “red hair,” she is also fire—“I eat men like air”—she is also, 
that is, “radical destruction” (Žižek 205). Like Brünnhilde’s, Lady Lazarus’s final act is an act of 
personal revenge, but like Brünnhilde’s, Lady Lazarus’s final act, too, we could say, transcends 
its determining motive. In her struggle to lay claim to her series of deaths and resurrections, Lady 







repurposing, we could say, of the Siegfried figure’s warning in the lines from “Green Song” that 
Plath appropriates—that “[t]here is a charge 
  For the eyeing of my scars, there is a charge 
  For the hearing of my heart— 
  It really goes.  
 
  And there is a charge, a very large charge,  
  For a word or a touch  
  Or a bit of blood 
 
  Or a piece of my hair or my clothes. 
  So, so, Herr Doktor. 
  So, Herr Enemy.  
 
  I am your opus, 
  I am your valuable, 
The pure gold baby  
 
That melts to a shriek.  
I turn and burn.  
Do not think I underestimate your great concern. (Ariel 16) 
“Herr Doktor,” as “Herr Enemy,” who would claim the speaker’s resurrections as his “opus,” 







crunching crowd”—with whose gaze Plath aligns our own, and with whom we too are 
implicated—that there will be “a very large charge” for “[t]he big strip tease” they have made of 
her return from the dead as they “unwrap [her] hand and foot” (15). Though Lady Lazarus 
attempts to wrangle some agency from the situation, acting, in effect, as the ring master to the 
circus they’ve made of her—“Gentleman, ladies / [t]hese are my hands / [m]y knees” (15)—it 
will take, as it did in the Ring, a razing of the whole corrupt order to “[clear] the field for a new 
beginning.”  
In other words, it is not just “Herr Doktor” who is the problem; it is “Herr God, Herr 
Lucifer,” too, or perhaps more precisely, it is not just men who are the problem, but the gods that 
men would make of themselves. In a line of thinking that would indeed seem akin to the 
Feuerbachian position in the Ring, Fromm critiques Luther and Calvin, who, though they 
released man from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, he contends, primed him for the role he 
would play within capitalism, fascism, and “automaton conformity”: “while Luther,” for 
example, “freed people from the authority of the Church, he made them submit to a much more 
tyrannical authority, that of a God who insisted on complete submission of man and annihilation 
of the individual self as the essential condition of his salvation” (81).199 “Luther’s ‘faith,’” 
Fromm continues, “was the conviction of being loved upon surrender, a solution which has much 
in common with the principle of complete submission of the individual to the state and the 
‘leader’” (81). And of Calvin, Fromm writes, his “theory of predestination has [ . . . ] found its 
most vigorous revival in Nazi ideology: the principle of the basic inequality of man” (89, 
Fromm’s emphasis). “Salvation or damnation are not results of anything good or bad a man does 
in his life, but are predetermined by God before man ever comes to life,” as Fromm puts it, 
                                               







describing what Plath sums up in the margins as the “capricious malignity of predestining God” 
(87): “Why God chose the one and condemned the other is a secret into which man must not try 
to delve. He did so because it pleased him to show his unlimited power in that way. Calvin’s 
God, in spite of all attempts to preserve the idea of God’s justice and law, has all the features of a 
tyrant without any quality of love or even justice” (87). “It is obvious,” Fromm concludes, “that 
this belief represented psychologically a deep contempt and hatred for other human beings—as a 
matter of fact, the same hatred with which they had endowed their God” (89). We see such a 
Feuerbachian link between God and man (what Plath describes in the margins as “molding a 
tyrant God out of [man’s] own doubts and hates”) in her use of the German “Mr.” to link “Herr 
Doktor,” “Herr Enemy” with “Herr God, Herr Lucifer,” all of whom, then—in this link between 
God and man, and therefore, between the God man would fashion in his escape from freedom 
and fascism itself—would demand of her an “annihilation of the self” and lay claim to her 
resurrection (89). “Herr,” in other words, brings God and Lucifer down to earth quite literally as 
man-made creations, and in their syntactical linking with “Herr Doktor” and “Herr Enemy,” 
Plath marks them as part of the corrupt order in need of razing. As Fromm puts it, “God-ward 
man has no ‘free will,’ but is a captive, slave, and servant either to the will of God or to the will 
of Satan” (76). For mankind to be free—to be free, that is, of the gods and devils they themselves 
have created by way of their masochistic escape from freedom—it is precisely these gods and 
devils, so human in their origin, that must go.  
How, then, to be free of them? How to break the cycle of war and destruction in which 
God and the devil themselves—with their “Herr,” situated as they are within a poem that 
references the Holocaust—have been implicated? How to “clear [such a] field for a new 







conceives as “‘the problem of the new’ [that] haunts the entire spectrum of Western philosophy 
as well as political theory and praxis”:  
At bottom, [Arendt] claims the new confronts us with the problem of freedom, 
with radical contingency—the “abyss of nothingness that opens up before any 
deed that cannot be accounted for by a reliable chain of cause and effect and is 
inexplicable in Aristotelian categories of potentiality and actuality.” Although 
thinkers like Kant knew that “an act can only be called free if it is not affected or 
caused by anything preceding it,” writes Arendt, they could not explain it within 
what they saw as the unbreakable sequence of the time continuum, within which 
this very act appears as the continuation of a series. (67-8) 
Such a seemingly “unbreakable sequence of the time continuum,” we might say, is precisely 
what Lady Lazarus, as well as the speaker of “Getting There,” as we will see, disrupts with her 
final act. “Our political life,” writes Arendt, “despite its being the realm of action, [ . . . ] takes 
place in the midst of processes which we call historical and which tend to become as automatic 
as natural or cosmic processes, although they were started by men” (Arendt, Between Past and 
Future 167). “The truth is,” Arendt concludes, “that automatism is inherent in all processes, no 
matter what their origin may be—which is why no single act, and no single event, can ever, once 
and for all, deliver and save a man, or a nation, or mankind. It is in the nature of the automatic 
processes to which man is subject, but within and against which he can assert himself through 
action, that they can only spell ruin to human life” (167). It is “within and against” such a 
historical process, then, one whose “automatism” is figured as cyclical, that Lady Lazarus 
positions her final act, an act indeed situated within a series of acts that themselves suggest the 







seen, she has “nine times to die,” and since “[t]his is Number Three,” she has six times to go 
(Ariel 14).  
And each time she has returned, as we have seen, “[t]o the same place, the same face, the 
same brute / [a]mused shout: // A miracle!” (16). Each time she has returned, she has returned as 
“the same, identical woman” (15). This line, as Peel points out, bears a rather striking 
resemblance to a passage in Arendt’s On the Origins of Totalitarianism:  
A change of personality of any sort whatsoever can no more be induced by 
thinking about horrors than the real experience of horror. The reduction of a man 
to a bundle of reactions separates him as radically as mental disease from 
everything within him that is personality and character. When, like Lazarus, he 
rises from the dead, he finds his personality and character unchanged, just as he 
had left it. (qtd. in Peel, Writing Back 187) 
Plath’s “Lazarus,” then, when she returns from the dead and they remove the linen wrappings of 
the grave, would seem to be making just this point; though “[she] may be skin and bones” from 
the time she spent in the grave, she points out, “[n]evertheless, [she is] the same, identical 
woman” (Ariel 15). The resonances here (including the resonance of Arendt’s “mental disease” 
with Plath’s translation of Lazarus as someone repeatedly attempting suicide) could certainly be 
a coincidence, and yet, as Wootten puts it, Arendt, particularly the Arendt of On the Origins of 
Totalitarianism, proved one of Alvarez’s “great sources” (49). And as Peel points out, in Origins 
“Arendt had provided a justification for writers to speak on behalf of those who had actually 
suffered the consequences of ethnic genocide,” a justification that might well have served as part 







disintegration” as “those of two world wars, of the concentration camps, of genocide, and the 
threat on nuclear war”: 
If it is true that the concentration camps are the most consequential institution of 
totalitarian rule, “dwelling on horrors” would seem to be indispensable for the 
understanding of totalitarianism. . . . Only the fearful imagination of those who 
have been aroused by such report but have not actually been smitten in their own 
flesh, of those who are consequently free from the bestial, desperate terror which, 
when confronted by real, present, horror, inexorably paralyzes everything that is 
not mere reaction, can afford to keep thinking about horrors. (qtd. in Peel 187) 
And yet, “[w]hether Plath herself read [ . . . ] Arendt”—who perhaps, then, functioned as the 
foundation for Alvarez’s call for a “new seriousness”—with great attention, or even at all, does 
not greatly matter,” as Wootten writes; “[s]he was getting enough of Arendt in concentrated form 
from talking to Alvarez, from reading ‘Beyond the Gentility Principle’ and from the many pieces 
of popular and specialized neo-Sartrean analysis of the time” (116). Along with Fromm, then, we 
could add Arendt to the ideological heritage that Plath would have brought to the making of 
“Lady Lazarus.”  
And as it turns out, Arendt offers us a particularly useful model with which to examine 
Lady Lazarus’s final act, an act indeed performed “within and against” a seemingly 
“unbreakable” historical process. In the Gospel of John, Jesus waits two days after hearing the 
news that Lazarus is sick, so by the time he arrives, Lazarus has been four days in the grave. 
While he could have intervened earlier, in other words, he waits until Lazarus is dead so that he 
might demonstrate a miracle by resurrecting him, a miracle performed, as he describes it, “for 







Doktor” who takes on the role of Jesus in her “resurrection,” both attributing her “comeback” to 
God (as, indeed, “A miracle!”) as well as using his role in this “miracle” to glorify himself; as 
Lady Lazarus puts it, addressing him directly, “I am your opus.” As a counter to such claims, 
Lady Lazarus, from the very first lines of the poem, identifies her act, too, as a “sort of [ . . . ] 
miracle,” but it is one that she herself “manages” and as such it reads as a miracle in the 
Arendtian sense. For Arendt, “all miracles, those performed by men no less than those performed 
by a divine agent,” are “always [ . . . ] interruptions of some natural series of events, of some 
automatic process, in whose context they constitute the wholly unexpected” (Between Past and 
Future 166). “If it is true that action and beginning are essentially the same,” Arendt reasons, 
drawing from Greek and Roman definitions of these terms, “it follows that a capacity for 
performing miracles must likewise be within the range of human faculties” (168). A “miracle,” 
then, in the sense that it “cannot be accounted for by a reliable chain of cause and effect” and that 
it therefore “constitute[s] the wholly unexpected,” is what Arendt identifies as a free act; and 
“[i]f it is [indeed] true that action and beginning are essentially the same,” then a “miracle” 
constitutes not only a free act but a new beginning. As Arendt explains,  
This sounds stranger than it actually is. It is in the very nature of every new 
beginning that it breaks into the world as an “infinite improbability,” and yet it is 
precisely this infinitely improbable which actually constitutes the very texture of 
everything we call real. Our whole existence rests, after all, on a chain of 
miracles, as it were—the coming into being of the earth, the development of 
organic life on it, the evolution of mankind out of the animal species. [ . . . ] It is 







matter how well anticipated in fear or hope, strike us with a shock of surprise 
once they have come to pass. (168)  
It is just such “a shock of surprise,” we could say—expressed in the “brute, / [a]mused shout: / 
‘[a] miracle!’”—that attends Lady Lazarus’s return to life. What prompts those who witness her 
return to attribute this “miracle” to divine forces is the degree to which the act appears 
unexpected, the degree to which, in Arendt’s terms, it is free. As we saw in the case of 
Brünnhilde’s final act, “[a]ction, to be free,” according to Arendt, “must be free from motive on 
one side, from its intended goal as a predictable effect on the other”; what allows an act to 
become free is the degree to which it can transcend such “determining factors” by manifesting 
what Arendt calls a “principle.”  
            And as is the case with Brünnhilde, Lady Lazarus’s final act transcends her personal 
motive of revenge and her desire for control as it manifests the kind of creative destruction we 
witness at the end of the Ring. It is in the image of the ash, I would argue, that this moment of 
transcendence coheres, serving as it does to gather into itself Plath’s references to the Holocaust 
and Hiroshima.200 In other words, in rising from ashes that read simultaneously as the remains of 
a suicide, as well as those of victims of the Holocaust and Hiroshima, in rising, in other words, 
from the ashes not only of personal suffering but of historical atrocity, Lady Lazarus positions 
what Arendt calls the “world”—that which is between those who have it in common, that which 
both “relates and separates” people as they act politically—as precisely what is at stake in her 
final act. And what she leaves us with, then, we stand-ins for the “peanut-crunching crowd” as 
we watch at the end of the poem as Valhalla burns, in effect, is not only the possibility of a new 
beginning (a generative possibility hinted at by the fact that Lady Lazarus has “nine times to 
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die”), but the responsibility inherent within it, a responsibility that carries all the weight of 
Fromm’s “burden of freedom.” And for Plath—unlike Sitwell and Eliot, as we will see, in Four 
Quartets, who turn to Catholicism for salvation—this responsibility, as it does for Wagner, lies 
always in human hands. As she defined her beliefs in an essay she wrote for a religion class at 
Smith, because “man is born without purpose in a neutral universe,” “[i]t is man himself who is 
responsible for his destiny” (“Religious Beliefs”). “I will not give an intelligent and omnipresent 
Being credit for the atrocities man has committed through the years,” she writes; “perhaps my 
feeling that no God watches over me has resulted in my great reverence for life and my 
consuming interest in people, with their frightening and terrible responsibility for what they are 
and what they will become” (“Religious Beliefs”). And in “Getting There,” as we will see in the 
Conclusion, this space that opens up in “Lady Lazarus” between death and life, a space that 
reads, I will argue, as Arendt’s ““abyss of nothingness that opens up before any deed that cannot 
be accounted for by a reliable chain of cause and effect,” before, that is, any deed performed 











“Getting There”: Reconfiguring The Waste Land and Four Quartets 
In Sylvia Plath’s copy of The Waste Land, next to the line “You who were with me in the 
ships at Mylae!” from “The Burial of the Dead,” she has written “all wars are the same” (The 
Complete Poems 39). This gloss, I would argue, can be read as the very landscape upon which 
her Ariel poem “Getting There” is enacted. In the poem, having found herself aboard a train 
serving as a metaphor for history, Plath’s speaker struggles to extricate herself, identifying what 
“[she] ha[s] to get across” as “some war or other” (Ariel 57). And, as in The Waste Land’s very 
next line—“That corpse you planted last year in the garden” (The Complete Poems 39)—she, 
too, will perform a burial of the dead: “I shall bury the wounded like pupas, / I shall count and 
bury the dead” (Ariel 58). What’s more, the poem contains echoes of each of the other sections 
of The Waste Land: her repetition of “How far is it?” to punctuate the poem’s temporal and 
spatial progression akin to Eliot’s repetition of “HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME” in “A Game 
of Chess”; the washing pure of her speaker in the waters of Lethe, serving as her “Death by 
Water”; “the fire’s between us,” her “Fire Sermon”; “and now detonations—thunder and guns,” 
“What the Thunder Said.” But The Waste Land isn’t the only text of Eliot’s engaged in “Getting 
There.” As the poem approaches its final destination, the speaker asks, “is there no still place, 
turning and turning in the middle air,” a reference to “the still point of the turning world” in Four 
Quartets.   
“Getting There,” in this sense, then, serves as Plath’s intertextual engagement with 
Eliot’s oeuvre, moving as it does from that early modernist ur-text, The Waste Land, through the 
Four Quartets of the later Eliot, the “there” she arrives at, a reconfiguration of Eliot’s historical 







reveals a Plath who—far from being “confessional” as it has been traditionally read in her case, 
suggesting a poetics limited to the personal—expands her poetics to include—as she refers to 
them in the interview with Peter Orr for the BBC—“the bigger things”: “I think personal 
experience is very important,” she tells Orr, “but certainly it should be relevant, and relevant to 
the larger things, the bigger things such as Hiroshima and Dachau and so on.”  The interview 
indeed marks a distinctive shift in Plath’s poetics, one that has gone mostly, if not entirely, 
unacknowledged.  Often, an earlier account of her approach to the historical—her essay 
“Context,” published in February of 1962—is paired with the poems she composed around the 
time of the interview with Orr at least nine months later, including, for our purposes, “Getting 
There.”  In “Context,” Plath describes being “preoccup[ied]” with “the issues of our time,” but 
states that while they did “influence” her work, they did so “in a sidelong fashion,” so that 
ultimately, for example, her “poems do not turn out to be about Hiroshima.”   
Given Eliot’s presence in “Getting There” and the close proximity of “Getting There” to 
Plath’s interview with Orr, the shift in her poetics appears to hinge on Plath’s engagement with 
modernism in general and Eliot’s modernism in particular.  Plath suggests as much, when, in the 
interview, she describes herself, an American living in London, as “about fifty years behind” in 
her literary preferences and as the bearer of a new poetry (that of Robert Lowell and Anne 
Sexton) to a stagnated London scene.  Placing herself squarely in the transatlantic tradition of the 
first wave of modernist expatriates, she indeed prompts us to reconsider the label “confessional”; 
the term might best be understood in her case as not a break from (as it has often been read, 
perceived as incompatible with Eliot’s insistence on “impersonality”) but rather a negotiation of 







As we saw in Chapter 2, in March of 1958, while teaching at Smith, just before her spring 
break, after which she would be devoting two full weeks to Eliot’s work, including, of course, 
The Waste Land, Plath wrote in her journal, “I am living & teaching on rereadings, on notes of 
other people, sour as heartburn” (346). Quite possibly, she is referring here to her old mentor 
Elizabeth Drew’s reading of Eliot which literally frames her own—notes and quotations from 
Drew’s book on Eliot populating the margins of her own copy of his work. In her intertextual 
conversation with Eliot, in other words, Plath engaged with a text already inscribed with its own 
intertext, the particular Waste Land engaged in “Getting There,” then, at least in part, one 
translated through Drew’s interpretive lens. For Drew, “the most obvious element” in Eliot’s 
early poems, including The Waste Land, is “the ugliness, the emptiness and the aimlessness of 
the contemporary world” (58), a description akin to Eliot’s own definition of “contemporary 
history” in his review of Joyce’s Ulysses, as we have seen, as an “immense panorama of futility 
and anarchy.” For Plath, however, in “Getting There,” history is already all too patterned, a 
series of wars and destruction, to which she seeks an end or escape, the world wars and the Cold 
War conflated in the poem’s geographical setting: “It is Russia I have to get across, it is some 
war or other” (57).  The train on which she finds herself, serving as it does as a figure for history, 
is itself inscribed by war; the sound of the train moving “like cannon,” its wheels, “the terrible 
brains / Of Krupp”—that four hundred year old German dynasty, whose family business during 
World War II included supplying arms to the Nazis (57).  Contemporary history, for Plath, 
proves monolithic, “a dynasty of broken arrows,” the train shuttling forward on “wheels / Fixed 
to their arcs like gods” and, far from “aimless,” “All the gods know is destinations” (57).  
Like the “Unreal city” of Eliot’s Waste Land, though, the “trainstop” at which the speaker 







in that “death-in-life” state she notes repeatedly in the margins of Eliot’s work, “Legs, arms piled 
outside / The tent of unending cries” (57).  While the nurses at the stop elicit the expectation of 
healing and health, their ministrations—in keeping with Eliot’s view of contemporary history as 
futile—are simply a blindly performed and ineffectual ritual.  Rather than cleansing and healing 
the wounded, they are stripped of agency, passively “undergoing the faucet water, its veils, veils 
in a nunnery” and merely “touching the wounded” (57).  Plath’s waste land is certainly not arid: 
“here there is such mud.”  But this is a far cry, as is Eliot’s, from a land renewed by rain and 
restored to fertility.  Instead, the land is too wet, glutted by both the ceremonial waters of the 
celibate nun-nurses and by the blood of the soldiers, the mud “Thick, red and slipping” (58).  
And like “the crowd flow[ing] over London Bridge” in The Waste Land, when the men move, it 
is not by their own volition but by “blood [that] still pumps forward” and by the train itself, once 
it resumes its course, the men “Pumped ahead by these pistons, this blood” (57).   
As Plath notes in the margins at the end of The Waste Land, there is “very little hope in 
[its] fragmentary conclusion.”  Quoting from Drew’s study, Plath writes, “the surrender has been 
made, but still it seems a surrender to death and the possibility of rebirth is still without 
substance or outline.” “Getting There,” I would argue, can be read as a struggle to arrive at a 
different conclusion for the plight of contemporary history, an attempt to locate a space, within 
or through death, for the potential of transformation.  In the first half of the poem, the speaker 
describes herself as “a letter in this slot,” not unlike the soldiers pumped ahead by the train “Into 
the next mile” (57), her agency at this point restricted to asking about her destination, which at 
first seems inseparable from that of the train: “how far is it?” she asks; “Will there be fire, will 
there be bread?” (57). However, by the second half of the poem, when she again asks “how far is 







herself “the place [she] is getting to”: “it is so small”; “There is a minute at the end of it / A 
minute, a dewdrop” (58). To get to this destination, she must move through death, ridding herself 
of “obstacles” she identifies as “The body of this woman, / Charred skirts and deathmask / 
Mourned by religious figures, by garlanded children” (58).  Despite the trappings of religion 
here, belief capable of transforming or lending meaning to or offering an escape from the 
destruction surrounding her remains absent; while in Eliot’s “What the Thunder Said,” there is 
only “dry sterile thunder without rain,” thunder signifying a degenerative lack, the thunder in 
“Getting There” signifies all-too present destruction: “And now detonations— / Thunder and 
guns” (58).  At this point, despite indications that her destination is increasingly taking shape, the 
speaker finds herself unable to reach it; unable to move beyond the obstacles the train presents, 
she identifies still another as “the fire[] between us” (58).   
In The Waste Land, as Plath notes in her copy, the section “The Fire Sermon” alludes to 
Buddha’s admonition to his disciples to detach themselves from the world, its passions and 
despairs, all of which he likens to fire. Plath’s speaker, rooted to the world by “obstacles,” is 
unable here to achieve such a state. The ambiguity in the “us” that the fire stands in between 
gestures toward the poem’s culmination. The other entity denoted by “us” can be read as both 
her destination and the other inhabitants of the world similarly attached to it—in other words, to 
each other—by fire; by the end of the poem, as we will see, the speaker’s destination comes 
increasingly to stand for a who rather than a where, the implications of which constitute, in large 
part, Plath’s critique of Eliot’s historical vision.   
But for now, such bleakness suggested by the speaker’s inability to detach herself from 
the train’s unwavering course toward some final destruction—“I cannot undo myself and the 







way of mitigating the “futility of contemporary history”: “Is there no still place / Turning and 
turning in the middle air.” This allusion to Four Quartets summons a later Eliot’s historical 
views, those more intent on generating, in Drew’s words, “organic union and renewed life.”  The 
alternative to history as “servitude,” in the later Eliot’s terms (and in Plath’s poem, its “wheels / 
fixed to their arcs like gods”) is history as “freedom,” as “a pattern of timeless moments” (57).  
At the center of these timeless moments, for Eliot, is what he calls, in “Burnt Norton,” “the still 
point of the turning world” (Four Quartets 18). Plath’s copy of Eliot’s work contains a marginal 
notation defining the still point as “contain[ing] temporal and eternal” (The Complete Poems 86), 
a notation gleaned from Drew’s reading of the poems. According to Drew, Eliot’s formulation 
includes  
two spheres of existence. One is the physical, external world of temporal and 
spatial manifestations; the world of perpetual change.  The other is the unseen 
world of inner unchanging pattern, whose center is “the still point.” (147)   
To arrive at the “still point” calls for, as we saw in “The Fire Sermon,” detachment. In Four 
Quartets, Eliot draws from the Bhagavad Gita to explore detachment as right action, and in 
doing so, borrows some of its principle images. The Gita, a copy of which Plath owned, is shot 
through with “the imagery of travelling,” as Drew points out in a description of Four Quartets 
that—with a notable exception, as we will soon see—could equally well apply to “Getting 
There”:   
The poems are a process of exploration, both along the movements of time, and 
inward into the stillness of ‘consciousness.’ This idea emerges in the imagery of 







intensified living, are also subtly transformed, as the quality of revelation grows 
and spreads. (145)  
In the Gita, Arjuna hesitates to engage in battle, knowing that the opposing army contains friends 
and kinsmen. Advising him to proceed, Krishna explains that all the men on the field, whether 
they die there or not, are already dead, that the goal of right action—action performed as 
worship, and performed by one who has become detached from the world—is to become 
indifferent to the results of the action.    
The question, then, as we approach the final destination of “Getting There” is whether the 
speaker achieves a state of detachment and through this state the still point of Four Quartets. In 
other words, in moving beyond The Waste Land in search of a more substantive model of hope 
and renewal, does Plath—or rather, to what degree does Plath—ultimately adopt the historical 
vision of the later Eliot?  Setting her “still place” in motion rather than the world, as does Eliot in 
his evocation, suggests that, for Plath, the external world, as manifest in contemporary history, 
has proven itself not a world of “perpetual change” but rather of “unchanging pattern.” That the 
speaker formulates the question of the still point as a negative construction—“is there no still 
place”—and one ending with a period rather than a question mark, suggests that the still point 
and the necessary detachment required to achieve it is not a viable solution to the problem of 
history the poem dramatizes. The speaker’s question, rhetorical as it is, of whether the still point 
exists, effectively distinguishes it from her destination, which, earlier in the poem, she had 
already begun to define, and in doing so, affirmed its existence—“it is so small / The place I am 
getting to.” The problem with detachment, the poem implies, is that it leaves history to continue 
on its course of destruction; Arjuna heads into battle, and one battle becomes another, “one war 







Criticism of “Getting There” has traditionally accused Plath of just such a detachment. In 
the poem’s conclusion, the speaker “steps” from the train, which has become “the black car of 
Lethe,” and in doing so, she becomes “[p]ure as a baby”; all the while, we can infer, the train 
continues toward its destination, the rocking of the cars effectively lulling its passengers into a 
forgetfulness necessary for perpetuating the cycle of destruction—“the carriages rock, they are 
cradles” (59). If one forgets history, critics have reasoned, one is necessarily condemned to 
repeat it. However, another reading is possible here, one that takes into account what has tended 
to be overlooked—that these final lines do not, in fact, constitute the temporal ending of the 
poem. Formulated in the present tense, they precede the lines that—though they exist spatially in 
the poem seven lines before its ostensible ending—shift the action of the poem into the future, 
beyond the speaker’s stepping from the train: “I shall bury the wounded like pupas, / I shall 
count and bury the dead.” This action takes place in the gap between death and rebirth, in “the 
minute at the end of it, / A minute, a dew drop.” Indeed, it is in this space between death and life 
that Plath stages her historical intervention. And the poem highlights that this historical 
intervention is an intervention into the historical vision of Eliot in particular: the act (a twist on 
the burial of the corpse in the garden in The Waste Land) and the space in which the act is 
performed (envisioned by Eliot in Ash Wednesday, in a line Plath has underlined, as “the time of 
tension between dying and birth / the place of solitude”), both evoking Eliot’s oeuvre. 
And it is the work that Plath performs in this space between death and rebirth that enables 
her to move from, in Eliot’s terms—though in her revised version of them—“history as 
servitude” to “history as freedom.” As we saw in the last chapter, with “Lady Lazarus,” for an 
act to be truly free, according to Arendt, it “cannot be accounted for by a reliable chain of cause 







attachment to the results of the action; such an act, for Arendt, opens up “an abyss of 
nothingness.” Arendt, however, differs from Krishna, and from the Eliot of Four Quartets, in 
counseling not a move inward into consciousness in response to the problem of history but in 
moving outward to a renewed engagement with the world. To mitigate the chaos of the abyss 
opening up before any truly free act, Arendt proposes the promise:  
The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is 
contained in the faculty to make and keep promises. . . . Without being forgiven, 
released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, 
as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover. . . . 
Without being bound to the fulfillment of promises, we would never be able to 
keep our identities. (The Human Condition 213)  
When the speaker frees herself from the train of history—history as servitude—then, the space 
between death and life that opens up is, effectively, the Arendtian abyss of the new. Rather than 
severing herself from the world by moving inward into consciousness, into individual 
communion with God—and thereby allowing the repetition of history’s pattern of destruction to 
continue unabated—the speaker, as the full line reveals, steps to a “you,” recalling the “you” that 
appeared earlier in the poem in “the fire between us.” Stepping to a “you” revealed as the 
speaker’s final destination, then, constitutes not a movement inward but outward toward the 
world.  And to mitigate the resulting abyss of such a free act, the speaker binds herself, in 
Arendt’s terms, to the world with a promise, that of burial and transformation: “I shall bury the 
wounded like pupas, / I shall count and bury the dead.” The pupas here serve as “the image of 
renewed life” that Drew argues is missing from the ending of The Waste Land.  In this image, the 







baby”—in turn gestures toward a collective rebirth in her promise, the transformation of the 
casualties of history. In other words, rather than detaching from the world, the speaker’s 
transformations are embedded within its very landscape, ensuring that the course of history from 
which she has detached herself will not continue unaltered.  As a “substantive outline” of hope, 
the speaker offers those in the wake of her act a new path forward, laying the track, we might 
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